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•n 


CONTEMPORARY 
FRENCH  POLITICS 


CONTEMPORARY 
FRENCH  POLITICS 


BY 

RAYMOND  LESLIE  BUELL 

SOMETIME  FELLOW  IN  POLITICS  IN  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 

WITH   AN   INTRODUCTION   BY 

CARLTON  J.  H.  HAYES 

PROFESSOR   OF   HISTORY   IN    COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY 


D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  LONDON 

1920 


COPYRIGHT,    1920,    BY 

D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 


PBINTED  IN  THE  UNITKD  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


TO 
MY  MOTHER 


PREFACE 

To  many,  the  results  of  the  French  elections  of  Novem- 
ber 16,  1919,  came  as  a  welcome  surprise.  An  American 
observer  in  Paris  who  had  perhaps  taken  but  a  casual 
interest  in  French  domestic  problems  would  have  been 
convinced,  upon  visiting  the  Palais  Bourbon,  that  France 
was  on  the  verge  of  being  engulfed  in  a  tidal  wave  of 
Bolshevism  from  the  Russian  deep.  He  would  have 
heard  aghast,  the  Extreme  Left,  led  by  the  grandson  of 
Karl  Marx,  Jean  Longuet,  shrieking  its  defiance  at  all 
things  bourgeois.  Possibly  to  his  dismay,  he  would  also 
have  heard  the  thunderous  stamping  of  feet  by  which 
the  Socialists  drowned  the  sound  of  the  huge  silver  bell, 
through  insistent  ringing  of  which  the  President  of  the 
Chamber  bravely  struggled  to  maintain  order.  To  the 
Americans  at  home  the  situation  must  have  appeared  no 
less  ominous.  Judged  by  the  press  reports,  the  tumult 
arising  from  the  First  of  May  celebrations,  and  the  So- 
cialist vituperations  against  the  Peace  Conference,  surely 
gave  cause  for  grave  foreboding. 

But  a  deeper  knowledge  of  the  currents  which  under- 
lie the  surface  of  the  political  waters  in  France  belied 
any  such  catastrophe  as  the  "storm  prophets"  had 
predicted.  Those  currents  were  deep;  they  were  silent. 
Indeed,  to  their  depth  they  owed  their  relentless  power 
and  their  persistence  in  their  normal  course. 

The  strongest  of  these  forces  was  the  sterling  char- 
acter of  the  French  people  themselves.  Only  a  very 
superficial  estimate  of  national  temperament  will  judge 
the  French  to  be  excitable,  unpractical  and  unstable. 
Although  the  historj'  of  France  has  been  marked  by 
whirlwinds  in  which  the  nation  has  been  blown  hither 

vii 


PREFACE 

and  thither  by  the  gust  of  every  fresh  political  doctrine, 
French  character  possesses  at  least  three  qualities  of 
impregnable  strength. 

The  first  of  these  is  a  personal  attachment  to  property, 
whether  a  farm  or  a  wine  shop,  which  no  gilded  theory 
of  Communism  can  shake.  This  attachment  is  nearly 
universal,  for  it  is  based  upon  the  small  holdings  of 
20,000,000  peasants  and  petit  hourgeais.  Moreover, 
the  sentiment  embodied  in  the  Code  Napoleon  has  been 
and  is  likely  to  remain  the  breakwater  protecting  the 
Republic  against  the  lashing  waves  of  the  ''Interna^ 
tionale."  This  great  legal  monument  has  given  to 
France  a  scheme  of  social  and  economic  principles  which 
has  exalted  individualism  and  encouraged  an  almost 
devout  attachment  to  property. 

The  second  characteristic  is  a  respect  for  authority. 
To  us  Americans  who  were  recently  in  France,  and  to 
all  Americans  accustomed  lightly  to  regard  constituted 
power,  the  innate  obedience  and  discipline  of  the 
French  was  something  to  be  wondered  at.  It  was  first 
noticeable  at  the  very  gates  of  the  city,  where  French 
farmers  complacently  allowed  gendarmes  to  search  their 
vehicles  for  objects  upon  which  to  levy  the  time-revered 
and  superlatively  irritating  octroi  tax.  It  appeared 
again  amidst  the  solemnity  of  public  bodies,  whether 
at  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  or  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  where 
chamberlains  and  attendants,  girt  about  with  great 
sashes  and  clanking  swords,  rendered  due  homage  to 
officials  whom  they  served.  Even  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  where  members  were  allowed  the  greatest 
license,  those  who  constituted  the  crowd  filling  the  vis- 
itors' gallery  were  kept  in  docile  submission  by  elab- 
orately uniformed  and  decorated  guards  who  did  not 
hesitate  to  eject  those  who  might  attempt  too  boister- 
ously to  join  in  the  Chamber's  levity. 

At  the  universities,  this  characteristic  love  of  cere- 
monial   and    order    was    yet    more    noticeable — doubly 

viii 


PREFACE 

so  in  contrast  to  American  institutions  of  learning. 
French  professors  invariably  deliver  their  lectures  wear- 
ing their  academic  gowns;  they  are  followed  into  class 
by  an  attendant  who  carries  the  lecturer's  notes  and 
deposits  them  respectfully  upon  his  desk.  At  the  pro- 
fessor's entrance,  his  class  rises  and  maintains  a  re- 
strained silence  until  he  has  taken  his  seat;  and  when 
he  leaves  at  the  close  of  the  hour,  they  again  dutifully 
stand  until  he  has  left  the  room.  One  must  not  alto- 
gether scoff  at  these  niceties.  They  may  be  an  inherit- 
ance from  the  Monarchy  and  the  Empire,  observed 
under  the  Republic  to  give  it  an  added  discipline 
which  the  force  of  kings  formerly  imposed.  They  may 
be  a  reflection  of  the  ceremonialism  dear  to  the  Catholic 
Church — last  vestiges  of  the  union  of  Rome  with  the 
State.  But  whatever  their  causes,  they  apparently 
oppose  one  of  the  staunchest  obctacles  to  any  elements 
endeavoring  to  snatch  authority  from  those  in  whom  it 
has  been  legally  vested. 

Finally,  the  French  possess  a  civic  spirit  which 
amounts  to  more  than  enthusiasm,  is  wider  than  pa- 
triotism and  different  from  religious  zeal.  It  is  a  whole- 
souled  devotion  to  the  cause  each  man  feels  is  his  own, 
yet  at  the  same  time  extending  beyond  worship  at  par- 
ticularistic shrines  and  uniting  before  the  altar  of 
La  Patrie.  The  difference  between  French  and  Ameri- 
can temperament  was  illustrated  on  the  night  of  the 
armistice.  Poilus  and  midinettes  forgot  their  cherished 
cynicism  to  join  in  singing,  with  a  genuine  spirit  of 
thankfulness,  the  "]\Iarseillaise."  How  could  such  as 
they  understand  the  Americans,  who,  on  the  other  hand, 
serpentined  along  the  rues  and  houlevards,  singing, 
not  the  "Star  Spangled  Banner,"  but  "Hail,  Hail,  the 
Gang's  All  Here!"  America  cheered  at  the  finishing 
of  a  dirty  job  and  went  out  to  celebrate.  France  thanked 
Providence  for  winning  a  Crusade. 

The  passionate  devotion  to  La  Patrie  allows  the  ship 

ix 


PREFACE 

of  state  to  drift  on  the  swells,  but  always  within  the 
limits  which  the  length  of  this  spiritual  anchor  chain 
imposes.  Whether  it  be  foniid  in  the  street  song  of 
"Conspuez  Guillanme,"  which  French  students  shouted 
day  after  day  during  the  first  weeks  of  the  armistice, 
or  in  some  Catholic  Te  Deu-m,  a  devout  and  enthu- 
siastic nationalism,  completely  submerging  class  selfish- 
ness, is  the  dominant  trait  in  French  character  to-day. 
France,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Paris  has  ever  been  a 
fecund  breeding  ground  for  new  creeds  and  theories  of 
social  and  moral  destruction,  is  nevertheless  the  most 
conservative  country  in  the  world. 

There  are  some  singular  misconceptions  in  America 
as  to  the  nature  of  French  political  organizations.  Text- 
books, when  they  can  be  persuaded  to  deal  with  the 
subject,  often  assert  that  in  reality  French  political 
parties  do  not  exist.  Organizations  spring  up  in  the 
cool  of  the  night,  only  to  have  the  burning  sun  of  a  new 
political  faction  wither  them  away  on  the  following  day. 
But  although  France  does  not  have  the  two-party  system 
as  it  exists  in  England  and  America,  I  have  tried  to 
point  out  what  are  the  lasting  and  the  continuous  fea- 
tures in  French  political  organization  and  to  prove  that 
party  multiplicity  is  not  due  entirely  to  an  undisciplined 
resentment  to  control,  but  has  causes  which,  if  existing  in 
any  other  country,  would  produce  identical  effects.  Also 
I  have  tried  to  show  that,  although  some  parliamentary 
grmips  vaQ.y  be  transient  and  unstable,  French  parties 
possess  an  organization  and  a  personnel  which  are  well 
defined. 

I  may  have  burdened  the  reader  with  wearisome  de- 
tails, but  I  have  felt  these  necessary  to  show  the  ele- 
ments of  organization  and  the  differences  in  the  doc- 
trines of  present  political  groupings.  The  first  part 
of  the  book  may  perhaps  be  described  as  a  study  of 
the  political  forces  of  France.  Along  with  the  political 
parties,  I  have  included  the  French  Press,  for  it  pos- 

X 


PREFACE 

sesses  distinctively  political  characteristics  and  it  as- 
sumes an  aggressive  political  leadership. 

The  second  portion  of  the  book  may  be  called  a  study 
of  the  movements  for  political  reform.  Under  this 
heading  I  have  discussed  the  recent  electoral  bill  which 
has  offset  the  predominance  of  the  Radical  and  Socialist 
vote  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  a  predominance  to 
which,  hitherto,  they  were  not  wholly  entitled.  The 
demand  for  constitutional  reform — including  decentral- 
ization of  government  administration — is  most  insistent. 
I  have  attempted  to  show  the  causes  of  these  demands 
and  also  the  likelihood  of  the  adoption  of  the  proposed 
remedies.  Of  special  interest  to  Americans  should  be 
the  attempt  to  do  away  with  the  present  system  of 
parliamentary  government  and  to  substitute  for  it  a  gov- 
ernm,ent  modeled  upon  that  of  the  United  States,  in 
which  the  President  plays  a  more  prominent  role.  Like- 
wise, the  question  of  the  demand  for  experts  in  adminis- 
tration, and^  even  for  professional  representation  in 
political  bodies,  that  is  to  say,  legislatures  composed  of 
business  men  to  supplement,  if  not  entirely  to  replace, 
political  assemblies,  should  be  of  added  value,  in  view 
of  our  own  problems. 

The  policy  of  the  French  Government  during  the 
past  war  has  also  been  touched  upon,  notably,  the  ques- 
tions raised  by  the  state  of  siege,  the  censorship,  the 
State  control  of  nearly  every  phase  of  industrial  life,  the 
prohibition  of  importations,  and  the  "consortium" 
policy  followed  up  to  and  throughout  the  armistice. 
Americans  who  have  witnessed  the  gradual  development 
of  the  power  of  their  President  should  also  be  interested 
in  the  exactly  opposite  phenomenon  noticeable  in  France, 
viz.,  the  increasing  dominance  of  French  legislative  au- 
thority. 

It  has  been  impossible  to  separate  completely  a  con- 
sideration of  political  forces  from  the  study  of  the 
various  movements  of  reform.    Indeed  the  raisoii  d'etre 

xi 


PREFACE 

of  many  of  the  political  parties  is,  logically,  to  bring 
about  these  reforms.  The  latter  questions  all  figured 
more  or  less  prominently  in  the  November  elections. 

Many  people  believed  that  the  issues  of  this  election 
lay  between  those  who  sanctioned  the  war  and  those 
who  opposed  it.  The  Unified  Socialists  were  the  prin- 
cipal opposition.  Personal  antagonism  to  M.  Clemen- 
ceau,  partly  arising  from  a  faction  within  his  own  party, 
led  by  M.  Franklin  Bouillon,  also  played  a  part. 

The  issue  of  Bolshevism  was  of  even  more  importance. 
The  Unified  Socialist  party  in  its  Easter  congress  defi- 
nitely pledged  itself,  as  we  shall  see,  to  work  for  the 
inauguration  of  a  Soviet  form  of  government  and  the 
complete  establishment  of  proletariat  control.  The  issue 
which  they  brought  before  the  voters  was  therefore 
clear-cut.  The  temper  of  the  French  people  again 
proved  its  conservatism  and  its  loyalty  by  an  over- 
whelming defeat  of  such  extremists  as  Jean  Longuet, 
Jacques  Sadoul,  Raffen-Dugens,  and  Brizon,  who  had 
insistently  preached  the  Social  Revolution.  Their  hopes 
of  bringing  about  the  revolution  through  peaceful  means 
have  been  sadly  disappointed.  Whether  or  not  this  fail- 
ure will  dampen  their  efforts  to  achieve  a  coup  de  poing 
for  the  same  end,  is  another  question. 

But  the  third  issue  in  the  French  election,  one  ob- 
scured by  the  two  larger  issues,  yet  of  equal  importance 
in  the  eyes  of  many  electors,  was  the  question  of  prin- 
ciple involved  in  the  opposition  of  State  Socialism  and 
individual  initiative.  This  issue  I  have  tried  to  outline 
in  a  chapter  on  the  "French  Bureaucracy  and  State  So- 
cialism," and  to  show  how  the  war  has  accelerated  the 
participation  of  tlie  Government  in  industrial  activities 
which  have  hitherto  been  reserved  to  individual  effort. 
The  French  Radical  party — wliich  lias  maintained  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  French  Chamber  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  century — is  definitely  pledged  to  Collec- 
tivism.    Us  program  is  to  lake  over  all  public  services 

xii 


PREFACE 

and  all  industrial  enterprises  when  the  latter  become 
sufficiently  organized  to  permit  the  experiment,  at  least, 
of  State  operation. 

This  tendency,  differing  widely  from  the  pure  Marx- 
ism preached  by  the  rnified  party,  which  demands  a 
complete  bouleversenient  of  the  present  order  and  the 
directorate  of  the  proletariat,  conflicts  with  the  sturdy 
individualism  which  is  one  of  the  most  distinctive  traits 
of  the  French  i)eoi)le.  The  existence  of  State  Socialism 
in  France  is  partly  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  nearly 
all  of  the  public  services  owe  their  origin  to  the  State 
and  not  to  individuals,  as  in  America.  The  adven- 
tures of  American  private  initiative  in  the  develop- 
ment of  virgin  resources  have  no  counterpart  in  French 
history.  Furthermore,  the  French  character  is  conserva- 
tive, while  the  American  character  is  sanguine  and 
given  to  "plunging."  A  Frenchman  does  not  often 
possess  that  large  share  of  imagination  and  business 
capacity  which  has  made  American  "steel  kings." 

Again,'  the  Radical  party  has  been  maintained  in 
power  upon  issues  other  than  economic,  such  as  anti- 
clericalism.  Their  collectivist  program  has  been  partly 
imposed  by  the  strength  of  their  own  position.  The  war, 
which  so  exaggerated  the  Statist  tendency,  placed  the 
issue  squarely  before  the  French  public.  IMeasures 
taken  permanentl}'  to  fasten  this  incubus  upon  France 
were  legalized  by  a  Parliament  and  a  Ministry  whose 
mandate  had  been  extra-legally  prolonged  and  which 
owed  its  election  to  other  issues.  Business  elements, 
such  as  the  Union  of  Economic  Interests,  and  all  of 
the  Conservative  and  Centrist  parties  proclaimed  against 
a  further  injection  of  State  effort  into  industry.  It 
became  certain  that  the  issue  would  come  up  before  the 
elections  for  settlement.  Signs  of  this  discontent  were 
evidenced  by  the  fall  of  Victor  Boret,  Minister  of  Agri- 
culture, in  July,  1019.  The  elections  apparently  placed 
the  seal  of  disapproval  on  the  Government's  anti-individ- 

xiii 


PREFACE 

ualistic  program  by  the  defeat  of  five  members  of  the 
Government,  two  of  whom,  at  least,  M.  Clementel,  Min- 
ister of  Commerce,  and  M.  Morel,  Undersecretary  of 
the  Liquidation  of  War  Supplies,  were  directly  respon- 
sible for  many  of  the  more  radical  features  of  the 
policy.  Finally,  the  reduction  of  the  Radical  repre- 
sentatives by  a  hundred  at  the  last  election  seemed  to 
have  been  caused  partly  by  their  over-insistence  upon 
policies  of  State  Socialism. 

The  last  part  of  this  book  deals  with  French  opinion 
as  it  was  expressed  toward  the  peace  settlement.  Orig- 
inally, France  demanded  terms  of  peace  which  would 
either  erect  the  Rheinish  provinces  into  a  buffer  state  or 
annex  them  to  France.  She  also  asked  for  military 
guarantees  which  would  supply  the  only  security  of 
which  the  "old  diplomacy"  was  capable.  America's 
insistence  on  a  League  of  Nations,  however,  led  to  the 
abandonment  of  many  of  the  old  theories  of  "guar- 
antees," and  to  the  formal  adoption  of  the  policy  of  a 
League  of  Nations  as  furnishing  the  only  means  (1) 
of  providing  permanent  international  security  and  (2) 
of  enforcing  well-defined  rules  of  justice. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  at  no  time  was  France 
convinced  of  the  efficacy  and  the  practicability  of  a 
League  of  Nations,  but  that  her  only  trust  was  in  a 
permanent  alliance  of  her  present  allies.  However,  this 
assertion  is  open  to  grave  doubt.  During  the  early 
weeks  of  the  Peace  Conference,  there  was  abundant 
evidence  that  French  opinion  had  been  whole-heartedly 
won  over  to  the  League  of  Nations  and  that  it  was  exert- 
ing itself  toward  the  creation  of  a  League  which  would 
actually  provide  guarantees.  To  secure  this  end  her 
representatives  at  the  Peace  Table  advanced  some  very 
definite  proposals.  The  first  of  these  was  for  the  pool- 
ing of  that  part  of  the  war  debt  of  Iho  Allies  wliich  the 
indemnity  could  not  pay.  France  believed  that  if  the 
Allies  were  sincere  in  their  repeated  declarations  that 

xiv 


PREFACE 

she  had  saved  the  world  from  ruin,  they  would  agree 
to  apportion  equally  among  themselves  the  material 
charges  of  the  war.  The  second  measure  to  vitalize 
the  League  was  the  proposal  to  create  an  international 
police  force,  subject  to  the  direction  of  an  international 
executive.  This  force  would  be  immediately  available 
for  the  suppression  of  illegal  international  disorder. 
France  did  not  wish  to  be  placed  in  the  position  of 
fearfully  waiting  for  months — perhaps  even  years — 
until  her  former  Allies  should  decide  whether  or  not 
to  aid  her  again.  These  suggestions  were  both  rejected 
by  the  Peace  Conference,  principally  because  of  Ameri- 
can opposition.  Doubtlessly,  President  Wilson  and  his 
advisors  favored  them  in  modified  form ;  but  the  opposi- 
tion in  the  United  States  had  already  shown  itself 
so  opposed  to  the  creation  of  any  league  imposing  defi- 
nite responsibilities  upon  America  that  they  believed 
an  extension  of  its  powers  would  mean  its  total  re- 
jection. 

The  refusal  of  the  Conference,  at  America's  instiga- 
tion, to  create  an  efficient — in  the  military  sense — league 
was  largely  responsible  for  the  exaggeration  of  French 
demands  based  upon  the  policies  of  a  discredited  di- 
plomacy. When  some  of  these  demands  were  in  turn 
rejected  (such  as  the  annexation  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine),  the  most  violent  protests  were  made  by  public 
opinion.  These  protests  were  very  natural.  The  League 
of  Nations  was  acceptalile  to  France  only  upon  the  as- 
sumption of  providing  an  equally  secure  guarantee  of 
safety.  This  substituted  promise  of  guarantees  pre- 
vented the  annexation  of  the  Rhine,  which  at  least 
seemcil  to  offer  temporary  security  against  German 
aggression.  But  the  final  form  of  the  League  did  not 
live  up  to  its  promised  remedies.  It  offered  no  positive 
military  guarantee  commensurate  with  the  policy  it  sup- 
planted. Consequently,  France  felt  that  her  safety  had 
been  jeopardized  for  the  empty  satisfaction  of  realizing 

XV 


PREFACE 

an  ideal  wliich  America  urged  in  form  yet  now  refused 
to  adopt  in  fact.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  treatment 
which  the  United  States  Senate  accorded  the  Treaty 
aroused  a  further  skepticism  among  Frenchmen  as  to  the 
real  worth  of  a  League  of  Nations. 

The  obligations  accumulated  in  the  writing  of  this 
book  are  many.  IMy  first  is  due  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States.  To  one  who  holds  Tennyson's  "do  or 
die"  conception  of  a  soldier,  it  may  seem  rather  au- 
dacious of  an  enlisted  man  in  the  American  Expedition- 
ary Forces  to  have  departed  beyond  the  customary 
fields  of  guard  mount  and  "K.  P."  But,  at  any  rate,  I 
am  grateful  for  having  had  the  opportunity  to  go  to 
France,  to  do  what  little  I  did,  and  when  it  was  over, 
to  spend  four  delightful  months  at  the  French  Univer- 
sity of  Grenoble.  I  was  there  fortunate  to  find  myself 
in  the  very  heart  of  France,  not  the  France  of  Paris, 
but  the  France  of  the  Provinces. 

I  wish  to  thank  the  different  political  organizations  in 
Paris  who,  by  means  of  personal  interviews  or  through 
correspondence,  very  graciously  accorded  me  whatever 
information  I  desired. 

To  Monsieur  Chastenet,  the  editor  of  the  Droit  du 
Peuple  of  Grenoble,  a  fiery  Bolshevik  and  a  late  can- 
didate for  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  I  also  owe  my 
thanks.  His  amiability  and  kindly  spirit  somewhat 
dissipated,  I  must  confess,  my  natural  bourgeois  terror 
of  the  class  struggle  and  its  missionaries. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  Paul  Bozon-Verduraz,  likewise 
of  Grenoble,  a  modern  knight  upholding  the  ideals  of 
medieval  kingsliip,  a  sturdy  follower  of  Philippe  VIII, 
I  owe  much  inspiration.  Through  him,  my  confidence 
in  republics  lias  been  rudely  shaken  and  my  prejudices 
against  the  doctrine  of  Divine  Right  somewhat  removed. 

Finally,  to  Madame  J.  Fournier  T  am  greatly  indebted. 
From  the  aloof  colonial  vantage  point  of  Morocco,  she 

xvi 


PREFACE 

is  able  to  pass  serene  judgment  upon  all  the  works  of 
human  frailty — political  and  otherwise.  To  her  nothing 
can  be  perfect.  Although  the  Republic  has  its  vices,  it 
governs  France  "pretty  well, — just  as  it  is." 

Space  does  not  permit  me  to  name  the  many  friends 
in  America  who  have  given  assistance  and  encourage- 
ment in  the  writing  of  this  book.  But  I  am  under  espe- 
cial obligation  to  Professors  Edward  S.  Corwin,  Henry 
R.  Shipman,  and  Philip  IMarshall  Brown  of  Princeton 
University;  to  Professor  Carlton  J.  11.  Hayes  of  Colum- 
bia; to  W.  P.  Cresson  and  C.  L,  Barrett.  I  also  am 
greatly  indebted  to  Stoddard  Dewey,  Henry  Adams 
Gibbons,  and  Wm.  Morton  Fullerton  for  the  kindly 
interest  they  have  shown  in,  and  the  advice  they  have 
given  upon,  a  subject  concerning  which  they  have  a 
much  more  profound  knowledge  than  the  author, 

Raymond  Leslie  Buell 


CONTENTS 

PAOK 

PREFACE Vii 


INTUODUCTION 


CHAPTER  I 

PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

I.  Reasons  for  party  multiplicity. — II.  The  Royalists. — 
III.  The  Action  Liberate  Populaire. — IV.  The  Progres- 
sists.— -V.  The  Democratic  Republican  Alliance. — VI. 
The  Republican  Radical  and  Radical  Socialists. — VII. 
The  Unified  Socialists. — ^VIII.  The  Republican  Social- 
ists.— IX.  Reform  Societies.  1 

CHAPTER  II 

PARTIES  AND   PARLIAMENT 

I.  The  theory  of  parliamentary  government. — II.  Par- 
hamentary  groups,  their  relation  to  parties,  and  their 
manner  of  functioning. — III.  Ministerial  instability,  a 
result  of  the  group  system. — IV.  Dominance  of  Parlia- 
ment, a  second  result. — V.  The  growth  of  parliamen- 
tary power  during  the  war 46 

CHAPTER  III 

THE    "rLOc"   and   the   SACRED   UNION 

I.  Former  party  combinations,  the  Bloc. — ^11.  The  internal 
relations  of  the  members  of  the  Bloc. — III.  Party 
regroupings  before  the  War. — IV.  The  origin  of  the 
Sacred  Union. — V.  Socialist  opposition  to  the  Sacred 
Union,  the  minoritaires,  Zimmerwald,  Kicnthal. — 
VI.  The  victory  of  tlie  minoritaires,  the  \'illain  trial.  .       79 

CHAPTER  IV 

PARTY   REALIGNMENTS 

I.  The  Socialist  platform,  an  effort  to  conciliate  Revolu- 
tionists and  Heformists. — II.  The  Easter  Congress,  the 

xix 


CONTENTS 

pAoa 
Loriot  Soviet  program. — III.  The  motion  on  "General 
Policy." — IV.  The  Third  Internationale;  more  victo- 
ries for  the  minoritaires. — V.  A  bourgeois  Bloc  against 
the  Socialists. — VI.  Future  party  regroupings,  the 
decadence  of  the  Radicals  and  the  Action  Lib^rale,  the 
hope  for  three  major  parties 112 

CHAPTER  V 

WOMAN   SUFFRAGE  AND   THE    "r.   P." 

I.  The  movement  for  woman  suffrage. — II.  The  Family 
Vote. — III.  The  demand  for  the  scrutin  de  liste  and 
proportional  representation. — IV.  Legislative  efforts 
for  the  "R.  P."— V.  The  Electoral  Reform  Bill  of 
July  12,  1919— VI.  Effect  of  electoral  refonn  on 
French  parties 141 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE    1919  ELECTIONS 

I.  The  Peace  Treaty,  the  first  issue. — 11.  Two  party  con- 
ventions.— III.  The  formation  and  the  program  of 
the  National  Bloc. — IV.  The  election  campaign. — 
V.  Bourgeois  opposition  to  the  Bloc. — VI.  The  effect 
on  the  election  law  upon  th?  Bloc. — VII.  The  results 
of  the  elections. — VIII.  The  New  ParUament. — IX. 
The  Socialist  Strassburg  Congress 172 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE   DEMAND   FOR  A   NEW   CONSTITUTION 

I.  The  demand  for  a  government  based  upon  the  doctrine 
of  the  separation  of  powers. — II.  The  conflicts  in  the 
French  Constitution  of  1875,  a  cause  for  present  de- 
fects.— III.  Theoretical  objections  to  the  proposed 
remedy. — IV.  Historical  objections  to  an  independent 
executive  in  France 212 

CHAPTER  VIII 

syndicalism:  program  and  tactics 

I.  The  difference  between  syndicalism  and  sociaHsm;  the 
Confeflerntion  Geniralc  du  Travail. — II.  The  Minimum 
XX 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Demands  of  the  C.  G.  T. — III.  French  wages,  the 
cost  of  livinjj;,  strikes. — IV.  The  passage  of  the  Eight- 
Hour  Day  law. — V.  A  turbulent  First  of  May. — VI. 
Some  resignations  and  the  Socialist  withdrawal  from 
the  Chamber. — VII.  The  failure  of  the  political  strikes.    236 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

I  General  characteristics  of  the  French  press. — II.  The 
conservative  press,  L' Action  Franqaise,  La  Vieille 
France,  Le  Temps.  —  III.  The  liberal  press,  La 
Democratie  Nouvelle  L'CEunre.  —  IV.  The  Socialist 
press,  L'Humanite,  La  France  Libre,  Le  Populaire,  Le 
Journal  du  Peuple,  La  Vague,  Notre  Voix. — ^V.  The 
Censorship,  its  legal  basis,  functioning  and  repeal.     .     270 

CHAPTER  X 

THE   BUREAUCRACY  AND   STATE   SOCIALISM 

I.  The  malfunctioning  and  extent  of  the  bureaucracy. — II. 
— Government  food  control. — III.  The  consortium 
policy. — IV.  The  prohibition  of  importations  after 
the  armistice. — V.  The  protests  against,  and  the  final 
repeal  of  this  prohibition,  July,  1919. — VI.  General 
growth  of  and  movement  against  State  Socialism.       .     302 

CHAPTER  XI 

A  GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS   AND   EXPERTS 

I.  The  reform  of  the  bureaucracy  by  decentralization  of 
services.^II.  Experts  in  French  administration. — 
III.  Necessity  of  organization  of  functionaries;  his- 
tory and  extent  of  their  organization. — IV.  Demand 
for  professional  government,  a  Parliament  of  Interests. 
— V.  A  demand  based  on  syndical  organization  of 
industrial  groups;  extent  of  industrial  organization  in 
France. — VI.  The  defects  of  professional  government.     340 

CHAPTER  XII 

REGIONALISM 

I.  The  ext(>nt  and  result  of  the  centralization  of  local  gov- 

xxi 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

erning  activities. — II.  The  history  of  French  central- 
ization.— III.  The  movement  for  regionaUsm. — IV. 
Legislative  efforts  toward  regionaUsm. — V.  The  ob- 
jections to  regionalism 373 

CHAPTER  XIII 

WHAT  THE  FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS  MIGHT  HAVE  BEEN 

I  The  universal  demands  for  guarantees  of  security. — II. 
The  devices  of  the  Old  Diplomacy:  the  disintegration 
of  the  German  Empire,  the  annexation  of  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  a  Rhenish  Republic,  the  annexation  of 
the  Saar. — III.  The  total  disarmament  of  Germany 
and  an  inter-Allied  alliance. — IV.  The  defects  of  the 
Old  Diplomacy. — V.  The  substitute  which  the  League 
of  Nations  theoretically  offered 402 

CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

I.  The  nominal  acceptance  of  the  League  of  Nations  idea. 
— II.  The  French  demand  that  the  League  assume  the 
War  Debt. — III.  The  French  exclusion  of  Germany 
from  the  League ;  its  effect ;  the  demand  for  an  inter- 
national police  force. — IV.  The  effect  of  the  League,  as 
created,  upon  the  French  territorial  demands :  a  defeat 
and  a  compromise. — V.  Dissatisfaction,  partly  caused 
by  the  character  of  the  League  created 433 

CHAPTER  XV 

WHAT  FRANCE  THOUGHT  OF  AMERICAN  " IDEALISM" 

\.  Early  enthusiasm  for  President  Wilson. — II.  Readjust- 
ment of  personal  estimates.— III.  The  reappraisal  of 
American  help. — IV.  The  attempt  to  divide  the  Presi- 
dent and  American  opinion. — V.  The  charge  of  im 
practicability  of  American  idealism. — VI.  The  charge 
of  its   inconsistency. — VII.  The  French   opinion  of 

the  Senate's  action 4Q8 

xxii 


CONTENTS 
APPENDICES 

l-AOB 

A.  Georges  Clemenccau 497 

B.  Frencli  Taxation  durinj^  the  War 501 

INDEX 507 


INTRODUCTION 

One  hundred  and  forty-two  years  ago  the  proud 
French  Monarchy  of  the  Old  World  came  to  the  active 
military  and  naval  assistance  of  thirteen  obscure  colonies 
that  were  struggling  in  the  New  World  for  their  freedom 
and  independence.  One  hundred  and  thirty-one  years 
ago  these  colonies  put  into  effect  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  set  up  the  federal,  republican  gov- 
ernment under  which  they  have  since  prospered  and 
expanded  and  grown  powerful ;  and  in  the  same  year 
was  inaugurated  in  France  the  Great  Revolution  which, 
amid  terrors  and  travail,  was  destined  to  uproot  the 
hoary  traditions  and  habitual  abuses  of  the  old  Bourbon 
monarchy  and  to  plant  in  European  soil  the  fructifying 
seeds  of  modern  and  contemporary  France.  No  wonder 
that  for  more  than  a  century  a  potent  sympathy  has 
existed  between  the  French  nation  and  the  people  of 
the  United  States. 

Since  the  schism  of  the  English-speaking  peoples  m 
the  eighteenth  century,  the  development  of  the  United 
States  has  been,  in  certain  respects,  more  akin  to  that 
of  France  than  to  that  of  England.  Present-day  France 
is  a  country  of  farmers  and  business  men  and  laborers, 
quite  devoid  of  a  privileged,  land-owning  nobility  and 
of  a  state-supported  ecclesiastical  establishment ;  she  is 
a  country  without  a  king,  a  country  in  which  republican 
institutions  and  thoroughly  democratic  practices  and  the 
spirit  of  social  equality  have  taken  firm  root,  a  country 
which  has  repeatedly  been  stirred  b}'  sincere  altruism 
and  lofty  idealism.  What  truer  description  could  be 
given  of  outstanding  national  traits  of  us  Americans? 

Despite  the  community  of  major  interests  and  ideals, 

XXV 


INTRODUCTION 

there  are  certain  obvious  thongli  minor  differences  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  France.  The  latter,  politi- 
cally speaking,  is  a  highly  centralized  state,  while  the 
former  is  a  decentralized  federation  of  autonomous  com- 
monwealths. Government  in  the  United  States  is  car- 
ried on  alternately  by  two  well-organized  political  par- 
ties, while  in  France  the  existence  of  multifarious  and 
transitory  political  groups  gives  to  French  public  life 
an  appearance  of  the  gravest  and  most  alarming  in- 
stability of  governments  and  even  of  policies.  Moreover, 
the  French  nation  is  as  homogeneous  and  as  long  estab- 
lished as  the  American  people  are  heterogeneous  and 
recently  come  together,  a  contrast  which  accounts  in 
part  for  the  fact  that  patriotism  has  more  often  pro- 
duced chauvinism  among  the  former  than  among  the 
latter,  and  likewise  for  the  fact  that  the  former  have 
been  more  handicapped,  perhaps  more  victimized,  than 
the  latter  by  tradition  and  antique  usage.  Certainly  the 
problems  of  the  appropriate  relations  between  Church 
and  State  have  harassed  Americans  less  than  French- 
men, and,  on  the  whole  their  solution  has  been  happier 
and  more  just  in  the  United  States  than  in  France.  Be- 
sides it  should  be  noted  that  France  is  a  relatively  small 
country  whose  boundaries  have  always  been  exposed  to 
attack  by  powerful  neighbors,  and  that  both  in  1814-1815 
and  in  1871  her  capital  city  was  captured  by  military 
foes.  To  Americans,  inhabiting  the  richest  and  widest 
portion  of  an  isolated  continent  and  never  menaced  by 
numerous  or  greedy  neighbors,  what  has  been  repre- 
sented by  the  French  to  be  merely  precautionary  has 
too  often  appeared  to  be  selfish  and  glaringly  vindictive. 
It  is  the  facade  of  a  temple  that  first  arrests  the  eye — 
and  a  fa(^ade  is  not  necessarily  the  index  of  the  beauties 
and  familiarities  of  the  temple's  interior.  If  the  average 
American,  before  the  late  war,  could  have  pressed  past 
the  obvious  external  strangeness  of  France  and  gotten 
into  the  mind  and  soul  of  the  French  people,  he  would 

xxvi 


INTRODUCTION 

have  found  much  the  same  temple  as  he  had  reared 
at  homo  and  much  the  same  sort  of  worsliip  as  he  him- 
self paid,  albeit  in  a  different  language  and  with  some 
variations  in  detail,  to  the  spirit  of  liberty  and  equality 
and  human  brotherhood.  But  before  the  war,  the  aver- 
age American  stopped  short  at  the  facade:  he  was  alien- 
ated by  the  strange  language  and  deceived  by  writers 
and  critics  who  unsympathetically  stressed  what  was 
peculiar  to  the  French  rather  than  what  was  common 
to  French  and  Americans ;  his  traditional  morality  was 
shocked  by  the  ** realism"  in  French  literature  and 
art — the  "realism"  that  was  typically  unrevealing  of 
the  truest  and  deepest  aspirations  of  the  French  people ; 
and  he  came  to  believe,  while  he  continued  to  do  senti- 
mental homage  to  the  land  of  a  Lafayette  and  a 
Rochambeau,  that  contemporary  Frenchmen  were  de- 
generate descendants  of  illustrious  sires. 

The  Great  War  has  given  us  a  new  perspective.  * '  De- 
generate" people  could  not  fight  as  unflinchingly  and 
as  heroically  as  did  the  French  during  the  ])ast  five 
years.  To  put  if  mildly,  France  and  the  French  people 
surprised  and  astonished  us  Americans.  And  on  the 
other  hand,  the  United  States  availed  herself  of  a  su- 
preme opportunity  to  repay  with  interest  the  debt  she 
OAved  France  since  the  days  of  76.  At  Montdidier,  at 
Chriteau-Thierry,  in  the  Belleau  Woods,  at  St.  Mihiel, 
in  the  Argonne,  and  on  the  Somme,  was  consecrated 
anew  the  Franco-American  entente. 

That  the  newer  perspective  may  not  be  lost,  that  the 
recently  hallowed  entente  may  not  be  destroyed,  is  a 
hope  which  will  be  realized  only  if  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic  there  is  a  systematic  and  sympathetic  in- 
terpretation of  one  people  to  the  other.  Vague  rhetorical 
sentimentalizing  will  not  suffice.  There  must  be  sound 
study  and  understanding;  there  must  be  adequate  and 
unpre.iudiced  presentation  of  all  phases  of  national  life 
— political,  social,  economic  and  cultural. 

xxvii 


INTRODUCTION 

Among  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  young  Ameri- 
cans who  journeyed  to  France  in  1917-1918  as  modern 
knights  and  crusaders  in  the  cause  of  democracy  and 
international  solidarity  were  a  goodly  number  who 
pondered  the  meaning  of  the  Great  War  and  who  in 
their  camps  or  on  furloughs  or  even  in  the  trenches 
studied  France  and  the  French  people  freshly  and  at 
close  range  and  without  the  prejudice  of  bookish  pro- 
fessors or  pedantic  publicists.  To  the  goodly  number 
belongs  the  author  of  this  book,  Mr.  Raymond  L.  Buell, 

]\Ir.  Buell  utilized  to  the  full  his  military  experience  in 
France.  With  amazing  insight  and  perseverance  he  col- 
lected first-hand  a  vast  amount  of  reliable  information 
concerning  contemporary  French  politics — the  condi- 
tions which  have  shaped  them,  and  the  direction  toward 
which  they  tend.  And  with  no  little  skill  and  literary 
ability  has  he  incorporated  his  information  in  this  vol- 
ume. If  one  wishes  to  know  about  the  political  groups 
in  France,  about  the  French  parliamentary  system, 
about  the  last  elections,  about  the  most  recent  phases 
of  French  socialism  and  syndicalism,  about  current  agi- 
tations for  woman  suffrage,  for  constitutional  amend- 
ment, for  proportional  and  professional  representation, 
one  will  read  this  book.  Furthermore,  if  one  desires 
to  obtain  an  idea  of  what  the  bulk  of  the  French  people 
themselves  think  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  of  President  Wilson,  and  of  American  ideal- 
ism in  general,  one  will  do  well  to  study  this  volume. 
The  volume  is  interesting,  but  it  is  neither  dogmatic 
nor  sentimental.  It  describes  and  analyzes;  it  never 
flatters  or  scolds.  In  its  tone  as  well  as  in  its  content, 
it  occupies  a  unique  position  among  American  com- 
mentaries on  political  France ;  it  forms  a  vital  contribu- 
tion to  a  sound  and  lasting  accord  between  the  first 
Republic  of  the  Old  World  and  the  first  Republic  of 
the  New. 

Carlton  J.  II.  Hayes 


CONTEMPORARY 
FRENCH  POLITICS 


La  'politique,  cest  notre  sang,  notre  argent,  noire  honneur. 

— LE  Duc  d'Audiffret  Pasquier 


CONTEMPORARY 
FRENCH  POLITICS 


CHAPTER  I 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 


Pour  rester  unis,  le  veritable  tnoyen  est  de  rester  distincts. 

Jules  Ferby. 


The  system  of  party  government  in  France,  if  indeed 
it  can  be  characterized  by  such  a  term,  is  perhaps  the 
most  interesting  and  baffling  feature  of  French  political 
organization.  Semi-organized,  sporadic,  over-numerous, 
these  parties  follow  out  an  uncertain  existence,  each 
drawing  its  support  from  a  devoted  following.  Their 
characteristic  of  multiplicity  is  usually  attributed  to 
the  French  type  of  mind  which  is  unwilling  to  com- 
promise and  associate  differing  shades  of  thought.  The 
greatest  diversity  of  opinion  exists  upon  every  political 
subject ;  and  each  element  feels  that  it  must  seek  repre- 
sentation in  a  "group,"  which,  despite  its  fluctuating 
and  dissolving  composition,  continually  puts  forward  its 
candidates  upon  a  complete  program  and  doctrine.  An 
undisciplined  independence  of  political  beliefs  is  thus 
one  of  the  causes  of  the  multiplicity  of  French  parties — 
an  independence  which  does  not  allow  Frenchmen  to  be 

1 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

bound  by   caucuses,   and  at   tbe   same   time   precludes 
political  opportunism. 

This  individualism  a  French  author  accounts  for  in 
these  words: 

It  is  said  that  Frenchmen  are  rebels  to  association.  That 
is  true.  Unfortunately  in  our  divisions  and  in  our  quarrels 
our  chief  desire  is  not  to  do  as  our  neighbors.  You  say 
White,  I  say  Black;  you  go  to  the  Left,  I  go  to  the  Right. 
Is  not  this  our  temperament?  At  all  times  we  are  seeking 
to  find  the  things  which  separate  us,  rather  than  a  common 
ground.  We  form  a  party,  we  divide  ourselves  into  factions 
which  fight  each  other  and  detest  each  other  reciprocally.  We 
are  imited  before  an  immense  peril,  but  only  when  necessity 
constrains  us.   .    .    . 

Circumstances  have  aggravated  this  natural  defect.  At 
the  head  of  these,  we  may  place,  first,  the  existence  of  a  gov- 
ernment ordinarily  without  authority ;  secondly,  our  resistance 
to  all  sanction — our  unacknowledged  quest  for  a  "comfortable" 
life  where  every  one  may  take  his  ease  and  do  only  what 
pleases  huu;  thirdly,  our  false  pride  of  equality  which  in 
reality  makes  us  hostile  to  superiority  and  to  talent.  Finally, 
there  is  the  insufficiency  of  our  moral  education  which  de- 
velops a  sentiment  of  personal  dignity  and  aspirations  for 
independence  without  giving  as  a  counterbalance,  the  spirit 
of  sacrifice  and  of  submission  to  authority.  It  is  very  well 
to  drive  superstitution  from  our  schools  and  to  abolish  old 
ideas  which  do  not  accord  with  progress,  but  nothing  can  be 
gained  by  sujipressing  even  these  if  they  are  not  replaced  by 
some  equivalent.  If  the  i)rinciple  of  authority  or  of  sub- 
ordination of  all  to  the  common  good  is  no  longer  understood 
as  it  was  formerly,  its  value  is  not  less  apparent.  In  the  spirit 
of  our  present  institutions,  obedience  is  voluntary;  never- 
theless, it  must  bo  obtained  or  we  will  play  into  the  hands  af 
the  reactionaries  who  lie  in  wait  for  us.* 

*  Lysis,  Vers  la  Dcmocratie  Nouvclle  144. 

2 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

Pointinf?  out  tlie  motives  which  inspire  French  voters, 
anotiier  writer  adds: 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  clearly  individiialisfic  and 
independent  spirit  of  the  Frenchman  adapts  itself  with  diffi- 
culty to  the  rigorous  discipline  of  Biitish  parties.  And  in 
fact,  by  observing  the  results  of  an  election,  it  wiU  be  noted 
that  at  present  a  deputy  who  is  elected  does  not  often  obtain 
the  entire  number  of  the  votes  of  his  political  sympathizers. 
On  the  contrary,  he  receives  votes  of  electoi-s  who,  although 
not  supporting  his  ideas,  nevertheless  give  him  their  votes  from 
considerations  beaiing  upon  his  person,  his  family,  his  situ- 
ation, his  past,  and  the  services  which  he  has  rendered.  .  ,  . 
They  vote  for  an  individual  and  not  for  an  idea  or  a  program. 
If  this  were  general,  it  would  make  any  party  regime 
imjiossible.- 

'  L6on  Jacques,  Les  Partis  PoUiiques  sous  la  III  Republujuc,  451. 

One  of  the  best  descriptions  of  the  temperament  of  the  French 
people  was  portrayed  by  Alexis  de  Tocqueville  many  years  ago : 

' '  When  I  examine  that  nation  in  itself,  I  cannot  help  thinking 
it  is  more  extraordinary  than  any  of  the-  events  of  its  history. 
Did  there  ever  appear  on  the  earth  another  nation  so  fertile  in 
contrasts,  so  extreme  in  its  acts — more  under  the  dominion  of 
feeling,  less  ruled  by  principle;  always  better  or  worse  than  was 
anticipated — now  below  the  level  of  humanity,  now  far  above; 
a  people  so  unchangeable  in  its  leading  features  that  it  may  be 
recognized  by  portraits  drawn  two  or  three  thousand  years  ago, 
and  yet  so  fickle  in  its  daily  opinions  and  tastes  that  it  becomes 
at  last  a  mystery  to  itself,  and  is  as  much  astonished  as  strangers 
at  tlie  sight  of  what  it  has  done ;  naturally  fond  of  home  and 
routine,  yet,  once  driven  forth  and  forced  to  adopt  new  customs, 
ready  to  carry  jiriiieiples  to  any  lengths  and  to  dare  anything; 
indocile  by  disposition,  but  better  pleased  with  the  arbitrary  and 
even  violent  rule  of  a  sovereign  than  with  a  free  and  regular 
government  under  its  chief  citizens;  now  fixed  in  hostility  to 
subjection  of  any  kind,  now  so  passionately  wedded  to  servitude 
that  nations  made  to  serve  cannot  vie  with  it;  led  by  a  thread 
so  long  as  no  word  of  resistance  is  spoken,  wholly  ungovernable 
when  the  standard  of  revolt  has  been  raised — thus  always  de- 
ceiving its  masters,  who  fear  it  too  much  or  too  little;  never  so 
tree  that  it  cannot  be  subjugated,  nor  so  kept  down  that  it  can- 
not break  the  yoke;  qualified  for  every  pursuit,  but  excelling  in 
nothing  but  war;  more  prone  to  worship  chance,  force,  success, 
6clat,  noise,  than  real  glory;    endowed  with  more  heroism   than 

3 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

This  French  attitude  is  not  wholly  a  weakness  for, 
although  a  lack  of  party  discipline  may  be  a  civic  defect, 
one  of  its  chief  causes — the  vigor  of  political  thought — 
is  a  virtue.  Theoretically  a  party  regime  necessitates  a 
minimum  of  political  issues,  or  at  least  their  reduction 
to  two  broad  categories,  each  one  of  which  some  party 
supports.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  complexity  of 
modern  political  life,  when  accomjjanied  by  a  keen  in- 
terest in  its  problems,  makes  this  simplification  almost 
impossible.  Furthermore,  as  noted  above,  the  French- 
man in  his  attitude  toward  political  issues  does  not  seek 
a  solution  of  each  limited  in  itself;  but  he  molds  these 
immediate  issues  into  a  larger  philosophy,  be  it  political, 
religious,  or  economic.  He  is  not  content  with  the  solu- 
tion of  single  and  isolated  problems.  He  will  only  be 
satisfied  by  working  for.  the  complete  attainment  of  his 
ideal.  It  is  upon  this  ideal  that  his  party  rests.  Party 
programs  are  really  unchanging  doctrines — expounding 
philosophies  which  more  than  fill  the  theoretical  omis- 
sions of  the  Constitution  of  1875.  Upon  immediate 
issues  they  are  often  vague,  but  their  real  purpose,  at 
least,  attempts  to  be  logically  homogeneous. 

Among  other  factors  which  account  for  party  diversity 

virtue,  more  genius  than  common  eense;  better  adapted  for  the 
conception  of  grand  designs  than  the  accomplishment  of  great 
enterprises;  the  most  brilliant  and  the  most  dangerous  nation 
of  Europe,  and  the  one  that  is  surest  to  inspire  admiration,  hatred, 
terror,  or  pity,  but  never  indifference?" 

De  Tocqueville,  The  Old  Beginie  and  the  Ecvolution  (transla- 
tion by  John  Bonner)   253,  254. 

Guy  do  Maupassant's  characterization  of  the  French  people  ia 
of  equal  interest   (see  his  short  story  The  Tlorla)  : 

"The  populace  is  an  imbecile  Hock  of  sheep,  now  stupidly  pa- 
tient, and  now  in  ferocious  revolt.  Say  to  it:  'Amuse  yourself,' 
and  it  amuses  itself.  Say  to  it:  'Go  and  fight  with  your 
neighbor,'  and  it  goes  and  fights.  Say  to  it:  'Vote  for  the 
Emperor,'  and  it  votes  for  the  P^mperor,  and  then  say  to  it: 
'Vote  for  the  Eepublic, '  and  it  votes  for  the  Republic." 

4 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

and  which  are  perhaps  even  more  tangible  than  this 
tendency  of  mind  just  noted,  arc  certain  historical  is- 
sues, peculiar  to  France.  These  have  been  either  long 
since  solved  or  else  never  arose  in  other  countries  pos- 
sessing a  similar  form  of  government.  The  Monarchy 
presents  the  first  of  these  issues.  France  has  not  had 
to  choose  merely  between  the  Monarchy  and  the  Re- 
public, but  between  three  different  sorts  of  Monarchy 
and  the  Republic.  These  divisions  were  illustrated  in 
the  National  Assembly  of  1871-1875  where  the  Legitimist 
party,  led  by  the  Count  of  Chambord  and  supported  by 
the  more  reactionary  landlords,  officers,  and  churchmen, 
stood  for  the  unrestricted  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  to 
the  throne.  They  wished  to  govern  the  country  "abso- 
lutely" and  under  the  dra/peaio  hlanc.  The  second  divi- 
sion was  formed  by  the  Bonapartist  party,  or  the 
Imperialists ;  under  the  leadership  of  Prince  Jerome  and 
Rouher,  they  endeavored  to  restore  Napoleon  HI,  who 
had  sought  refuge  in  England.  His  sole  claim  to  the 
throne  rested  on  "the  will  of  the  people."  The  death 
of  the  ex-emperor  in  1873  upset  the  immediate  plans  of 
the  Bonapartists ;  but  under  the  leadership  of  the  Em- 
press Eugenie,  they  placed  their  hopes  in  her  son,  the 
Prince  Imperial.^  The  third  division,  the  Orleanist 
party,  wished  to  restore  the  line  of  Louis  Philippe ;  they 
were  loud  in  their  promises  to  govern  constitutionally 
and  liberally.  The  Count  of  Paris  was  the  candidate  of 
this  party  for  the  throne.* 

Aside    from    the    Monarchist    issue,    Clericalism    has 

*The  Prince  Imperial,  son  of  Napoleon  III,  joined  the  British 
expedition  to  Zuhdand,  in  1879,  where  he  met  his  death   (.Tune  1). 

*  The  history  of  the  struggle  of  these  factions  may  be  found 
in  detail  in  G.  Ilanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  ii.  Jacques, 
op.  cit.,  90-169,  also  gives  a  good  summary  of  the  Assembly 
period. 

5 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

caused  party  divisions.  In  the  period  following  the  AVar 
of  1870,  and  for  some  fifteen  or  twenty  years  there- 
after, the  Catholic  cause  was  completely  associated  with 
that  of  the  IMonarchy.  The  Count  of  Chambord  declared 
himself  in  favor  of  the  restoration  of  the  Pope's  tem- 
poral power.  Since  then,  the  Catholic  interests  have  been 
openly  espoused  by  the  Orleanists.  But  the  Republic 
created  a  division.  Its  establishment  on  a  firm  basis, 
despite  Catholic  and  monarchial  opposition,  finally  led 
Leo  XIII,  a  skilled  politician  as  well  as  a  learned  priest, 
to  issue  the  famous  Encyclical  letter,  "Inter  innumeras 
sollicitudines"  (tenth  of  February,  18^2).  It  besought 
Catholics  not  to  judge  the  Republic  by  the  irreligious 
character  of  its  government,  and  explained  that  a  dis- 
tinction must  be  drawn  between  the  form  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  should  be  accepted,  and  its  laws,  which 
should  be  improved.^  The  policy  enunciated  in  this 
letter,  known  as  RalUement,  gave  rise  to  a  Catholic 
party,  known  as  the  Conservateurs  Rallies,  which 
pledged  its  support  to  the  Republic.^     This  policy  was 


"  The  early  Catholic  attitude  toward  the  Tliird  Republic  and 
democracy  in  general,  was  illustrated  by  the  following  words  of 
M.  de  Mun,  one  of  the  founders  of  the  Liberal  Action  party: 

"The  Revolution  is  neither  an  act  nor  a  fact,  it  is  a  political 
doctrine,  which  pretends  to  found  society  upon  the  will  of  man 
instead  of  founding  it  upon  the  will  of  God,  which  places  the 
sovereignty  of  human  reason  in  place  of  divine  law.  This  is  the 
Revolution,  the  rest  is  nothing,  or  rather  all  the  rest  results  from 
it,  from  this  proud  revolt  from  whence  the  modern  State  has 
emerged,  the  State  which  has  taken  the  place  of  all,  the  State 
which  has  become  your  God  and  which  we  (the  Catholics)  refuse 
to  adore  with  you.  The  counter-revolution  is  the  contrary  prin- 
ciple; it  is  the  doctrine  wliich  makes  society  rest  upon  Christian 
law!  .  .  .  "  From  a  speech  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  Novem- 
ber, 1878,  quoted  in  Dcbidour,  Jiappnrts  do  I'Efjlisc  ct  de  I'Etat  en 
France  dc  nS'J-lH70,  G."?:?. 

•A  good  account  of  the  origin  of  the  "Rallies"  will  be  found 
in  the  Cnthnlic  Encyclopedia,  vi,  177,  under  "France."  On 
May  G^   1S92,   Leo  XIII   wrote  to   the  French  cardinals: 

6 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

also  later  expressed  in  the  movements  represented  by  the 
parties  of  the  Actian  Libcrale  Populmre,  the  Sillon,  and 
the  Jeiine  RepuMique.  But  the  Monarchist  Catholics 
vigorously  protested  against  any  policy  of  concession, 
asserting  that  the  Republic  and  the  Church  were  organ- 
ically antagonistic/ 

A  third  cause  for  party  division  has  been  Socialism, 
which  had  its  birth  in  France  and  received  its  political 
baptism  in  1848.  Succeeding  years  gave  rise  to  two 
differing  tendencies  in  this  doctrine :  the  tendency  of 
Reform  versus  tlic  tendency  of  Revolution.  The  latter, 
of  Marxian  origin,  has  largely  controlled  the  French 
Socialist  party;  but  the  first,  which  is  directed  toward 
participation  in  bourgeois  governments  and  the  improve- 
ment of  bourgeois  society,  has  led  to  the  creation  of  an 
independent  Socialist  party.  Both  tendencies  have  at 
one  time  or  another  given  rise  to  half  a  dozen  Socialist 
party  divisions. 

Finally,  the  supporters  of  the  Republic  have  divided 
themselves  into  first,  the  Conservatives,  headed  originally 
b}'-  Thiers,  and  standing  for  a  conservative  Republic  in 
which  the  people  would  have  little  participation;  second, 
'the  Liberals  or  Radicals,  at  first  headed  by  Gambetta, 
then  by  Clemenceau,  and  standing  for  popular  govern- 
ment and  collective  reforms.     Both  of  these  divisions 


"Accept  the  Ecpublic,  that  is  to  say,  the  power  now  con- 
stitute(i  and  existing  among  you, — respect  it.  As  representing  the 
power  coming  from  God,  submit  to  it." 

E.  Zevort,  Ilistoire  dc  la  Troisicme  Bepublique,  iv,  171. 

'For  the  Monarchist  view  upon  the  "Rallies",  see  Charles 
Maurras  La  Politique  religieuse,  345.  Many  writers,  nside  from 
the  Monarchists,  question  the  success  of  the  policy  of  ralliement. 
M.  Paul  Sabaticr  says,  "The  policy  of  Leo  XIII,  far  from 
bringing  about  a  reconciliation  between  the  Church  and  Democ- 
racy, had  quite  the  opposite  result.  It  made  their  incompatibility 
more  conspicuous."     Disestablishvicnt  in  Fran-ce,  60. 

7 


CONTEIilPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

have  been  united  in  the  defense  of  the  Republic  against 
the  IMonarchists ;  but  they  have  differed  widely  concern- 
ing the  conception  of  the  character  of  Republicanism 
and  the  powers  to  be  given  to  its  government. 

These  tendencies  have  been  very  potent  in  French 
party  history.  They  are  based  upon  differences  which 
cannot  be  charged  merely  to  fickleness  of  mind  or  to  a 
frivolous  resistance  to  authority.  They  have  formed  very 
natural  bases  for  party  divisions,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how,  under  similar  circumstances,  even  England  or 
the  United  States  could  have  avoided  party  multiplicity. 

• 
II 

The  history  of  modern  party  organization  begins  about 
1900.  In  1898  a  "Comite  d 'Action  Francaise"  an- 
nounced the  birth  of  the  "Ligue  de  la  Pafrie  Fran- 
gaise. "  Becoming  more  mature  in  its  program,  it  pro- 
claimed its  Royalist  (Orleanist)  aspirations  in  1905  un- 
der the  changed  title  of  the  "Ligue  d 'Action  Fran- 
Qaise,"  In  1899  a  group  was  formed  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  under  the  name  of  the  "Action  Liberale  Popu- 
laire. "  In  1901  the  Republican  Radical  and  Radical  So- 
cialist party  was  founded.  In  1902  the  Democratic  Re- 
publican Alliance  was  likewise  created.  In  the  same 
year,  the  Sillon  announced  itself.  In  1905  the  So- 
cialist groups  became  united  and  took  the  name  of  the 
"French  Section  of  the  International  Workingmen 's  As- 
sociation." Soon  after,  in  190G,  the  moderate  Repub- 
licans organized  the  Republican  Federation.  Finally, 
in  July,  1911,  the  Socialists  who  had  refused  to  adhere 
to  the  pact  of  Amsterdam  of  1904,  formed  the  Republi- 
can Socialist  party,  which  during  the  war  took  the 
name  of  the  National  Socialist  party.    In  the  same  year, 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

ion,  the  Democratic  Republican  Alliance  cliangcd  it- 
self into  the  Democratic  Republican  party. 

Dividing  the  parties  according  to  their  doctrines  and 
according  to  the  manner  in  which  they  sit  in  Parliament  ^ 
they  may  be  classified  as  the  Eight,  composed  of:  (1) 
the  iMonarchists,  in  turn  divided  into  (a)  the  Orleanists, 
(6)  the  Bonapartists ;  (2)  the  Nationalists,  including  the 
so-called  plebiscitaires  and  conservatives,  differing  little 
from  the  Monarchists;  (3)  the  Liberal  Action  party  or 
Catholic  Republicans;  the  Center,  composed  of  (1)  the 
Moderate  or  Progressist  Republicans,  whose  party  is  the 
Republican  Federation;  (2)  the  Republican  Democratic 
party  or  Alliance;  the  Left,  composed  of  (1)  the  Radi- 
cal Socialist  party;  (2)  the  Republican  Socialist  party; 
(3)  the  Unified  Socialist  party. 

Of  these  parties,  at  least  seven  are  strong  enough  to 
warrant  a  discussion  of  their  doctrines,  organization, 
and  strength. 

Two  of  the  three  aspirants  to  the  French  throne  have 
been  virtually  eliminated  from  among  the  Royalists. 
The  death  of  the  Count  of  Chambord  in  1883  left  no 
heir  to  the  Legitimist  or  elder  Bourbon  line,  and  the 
succession  passed  to  the  Count  of  Paris,  the  grandson 
of  Louis  Philippe,  of  the  younger  Bourbon  or  Orleanist 
line.  Although  the  Emperor,  Napoleon  I,  has  no  direct 
male  descendants  living,  the  line  established  by  his 
brother  Jerome,  is  now  represented  by  Prince  Victor 
Napoleon,  the  acknowledged  candidate  of  the  Bonapart- 
ists for  the  French  throne.  Before  the  war  he  found 
refuge  in  Brussels,  where  he  married  the  third  daugh- 


*  To  avoid  confusion,  it  must  be  stated  that  this  classification  is 
not  by  parliamentary  groups,  but  by  outside  party  organizations. 
Thus  the  Right  contains  only  t^vo  groups,  but  three  or  four 
parties. 

9 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ter  of  Leopold  I,  the  former  king  of  Belgium.  As  he 
was  born  in  1862,  age  M-ill  soon  eliminate  his  suitability 
for  the  throne,  while  his  only  direct  descendants  are  a 
daughter  born  in  1912  and  a  son  born  in  1914 — the  lat- 
ter are  rather  unpromising  candidates  for  the  succes- 
sion.® 

Victor  Napoleon  is  a  son  of  Prince  Napoleon  (Napo- 
leon-Joseph-Charles-Paul Bonaparte).  The  latter  was 
the  son  of  the  ex-King  Jerome,  and  was  known  for  the 
part  he  played  i:i  the  movement  for  Italian  unity.  Na- 
poleon III  is  said  to  have  urged  a  plan  of  Italian  con- 
federation as  opposed  to  Cavour  's  plan  of  a  united  Italy, 
in  order  to  give  the  Prince  the  throne  of  one  of  the 
minor  states,  probably  of  Tuscany.  The  marriage  of  the 
Prince  (who  was  a  cousin  of  Napoleon  III)  with  the 
daughter  of  Victor  Emmanuel  II,  king  of  Sardinia, 
sealed  the  Franco-Piedmontese  alliance  in  the  war  against 
Austria  for  Italian  unity.  From  this  union  two  chil- 
dren were  born,  Victor  and  Louis.  The  Prince  was  ex- 
pelled from  French  territory  in  1872  by  order  of  Thiers. 
He  was  never  popular  even  among  Bonapartists,  al- 
though he  attempted  to  assume  the  leadership  of  the 
Bonapartist  party.  The  ex-Empress  Eugenie  was  bit- 
terly opposed  to  him  for  fear  he  would  usurp  the  rights 
of  her  son  who  was  born  in  1856.  The  majority  of  the 
party  supported  Victor,  the  Prince's  son,  as  the  Bona- 
partist pretender,  even  while  the  Prince  was  alive. 

In  1911,  the  Bonapartists,  through  a  Comite  politique 
plchiscitaire,  published  a  program  calling  for  a  Bona- 
partist Republic.  They  also  took  a  small  part  in  the 
elections  of  1914.    A  majority  of  the  Independent  group 

'  The  Baroness  Adolphe  do  Rothschild  is  reported  to  have  de- 
scribed Victor  Napoleon  as  "an  eaj^let  whose  wliolc  life  is  spent  in 
molting."     E.  A.  Vizetelly,  Republican  France,  185. 

TO 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

in  the  Chamber  of  1914  were  Bonapartists,  among  them 
being  some  brilliant  men,  such  as  Fernand  Engerand. 
In  the  elections  of  1919,  many  Bonapartists  appeared  on 
the  tickets  of  the  Republican  Bloc.  Prince  IMurat  was 
,  olected  to  the  Chamber  from  the  provinces. 

L'Ordre  Public,  established  in  the  winter  of  1919,  is 
strongly  suspected  of  being  a  Bonapartist  newspaper. 
But  despite  the  distinguished  men  connected  with  the 
movement,  the  Bonapartists  have  ceased  to  figure  among 
the  Republic's  disturbers. 

The  I\ronarchist  movement  in  France,  on  account  of 
the  death  of  the  Count  of  Chambord  and  of  the  feeble- 
ness of  the  Bonapartist  heir  and  following,  is  now  led  by 
the  Orleanists  through  the  organization  known  as  the 
Ligne  d'Action^Frangaise.  The  Orleanist  candidate  for 
the  throne  is  the  Duke  of  Orleans,  Philippe  VIII.  He 
acquired  this  title  and  became  chief  of  the  Orleans  house 
in  1894  at  the  death  of  his  father,  the  Count  of  Paris.^** 
The  Duke  was  born  in  England  in  1869,  was  partly  edu- 
cated in  France,  but  was  exiled  shortly  after  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Third  Republic,  by  a  law  passed  in  1886. 
In  1890  he  made  a  great  show  of  patriotism  by  entering 
France  despite  the  decree  of  banishment  against  him, 
and  presenting  himself  for  the  military  service  to  which 
every  French  youth  is  subject.  As  a  result,  he  was  tried 
by  the  government  and  imprisoned  for  four  months. 
After  being  freed,  he  went  to  America  and  visited  the 
battlefields  of  the  Civil  War  upon  which  his  ancestors, 
his  father  and  the  Prince  of  Joinvillc,  had  fought.  In 
1905,  1907,  and  1909  he  undertook  three  voyages  to  the 
Arctic  regions.     Before  the  war  he  lived  in  Belgium. 

^"  The  Count  of  Paris  was  a  prandson  of  Louis  Philippe.  He 
wrote  a  six-volume  history  of  the  American  Civil  War  and  a  work 
on  the  Englisli  trades  unions. 

11 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Upon  its  outbreak  he  tried  to  enlist  in  the  French  army, 
but  M.  Viviani,  then  President  of  the  Council,  refused 
the  request  because  of  the  law  of  banishment.  He  sug- 
gested, however,  that  the  Duke  apply  for  admittance  in 
the  armies  of  the  other  Allies.  A  similar  request  ad- 
dressed to  the  King  of  England,  of  Belgium,  and  to  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  was  also  refused.  Consequently  the 
Duke  of  Orleans  had  no  opportunity  to  show  his  military 
prowess,  and,  as  his  opponents  feared,  to  establish  a 
dangerous  prestige. 

Although  the  Orleanists  describe  their  candidate,  the 
Prince,  as  "an  energetic  and  resolute  man,  of  prompt 
spirit  and  sure  judgment,"  ^^  his  enemies  call  him  "Phil- 
ippe the  Red  Nosed, ' '  because  of  his  fondness  for  strong 
liquors.  Socialists  point  to  his  marriage  with  Maria 
Dorothea  Amelia  ^^  the  daughter  of  Archduke  Joseph, 
cousin  of  the  former  Emperor  of  Austria,  as  proof  of 
the  inconsistency  of  the  party's  vaunted  patriotism. 
Generally  it  is  believed  that  the  Prince  has  none  of  the 
outstanding  qualities  necessary  in  a  man  who  could  over- 
come the  present  regime  by  personal  force. 

The  philosophical  justification  of  the  Royalist  position 
is  set  forth  in  a  very  talented  book  by  Georges  Valois, 
L' Homme  qui  vient.  M.  Valois  attributes  the  pernicious 
theories  of  the  Revolution  to  "the  three  great  criminals, 
the  three  great  impostors.  Fathers  of  Lies,  who  have 
turned  our  intelligence,  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, against  our  welfare :  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau,  the 
false  Man  of  Nature ;  Immanuel  Kant,  the  false  Man  of 
Duty ;  and  Karl  Marx,  the  false  ]\Ian  of  Necessity. ' '  ^^ 

^  Ahna7iach  de  I' Action  Fran^aisc  for  1919,  46. 

"The  Duko  has  no  cliildren.  Uj)on  liis  death  the  headship  of 
the  House  of  Orleans  will  pass  to  his  brother,  Ferdinand,  Duke  of 
Montpensier. 

"  L' Homme  qui  vicnt,  preface,  x. 

12 


PARTY  PTTTLOSOPITTES 

The  doctrine  of  the  Monarchy  itself  is  completely  em- 
bodied in  the  Enqm'te  s-ur  la  Monarchie,  a  compendium 
of  Monarchist  opinion,  edited  by  Charles  Maurras,  and 
containing  interviews  with  the  Duke  of  Orleans,  and 
such  men  as  Sully-Prudhomme,  Paul  Bourget,  Jules 
Lemaitre,  Jacques  Bainville,  Henri  Bordeaux,  and 
Henri  Vaugeois,  all  of  whom  expound  some  phase  of  the 
Monarchist  program. 

After  first  condemning  the  Republican  regime  as 
based  on  false  principles  and  maintained  by  Jews,  Ma- 
sons, Protestants,  and  Mctcquos,'^'^  a  regime  from  which 
real  Frenchmen  are  excluded,  it  offers,  as  the  one  re- 
demption of  France,  the  kingship  based  on  the  following 
principles : 

The  monarchy  must  be  traditional.  .  .  .  The  monarchy  must 
be  hereditary  .  .  .  the  monarchy  must  be  anti-parliamentarian 
...  in  favor  of  a  nominative,  personal,  and  responsible  gov- 
ernment. .  .  .  The  monarchy  must  be  decentralized.^^ 

Holding  liigh  the  principle  of  integral  nationalism, 
the  monarchists  offer  a  program  containing  definite 
political  and  religious  changes.  When  the  kingship  is 
established.  Parliament  will  be  supplanted  by  an  as- 
sembly of  professional  interests  of  practically  no  polit- 
ical power.  The  framing  of  laws  will  be  entrusted  to  a 
body  of  experts  directed  by  the  King.  Political  parties 
will  have  no  reason  to  exist,  and  the  King  will  direct 
every  national  affair.  Decentralization  of  administra- 
tion through  regionalism  "  will  overcome  the  abuses  of 
Republican  administration. 


"  Metiquc — a  class  of  foreigners  exploiting  the  government  for 
their  own  ends. 

^'' Enquitc   sur   hi    Monarchie,    182. 
"  See  Chapter  XII. 

13 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

The  religious  program  of  the  Orleanists  is  frankly 
reactionary.  It  gives  to  the  Catholic  Church  a  "mani- 
fest privilege  over  other  confessions"  because  of  its  his- 
toric and  national  rights.  In  the  economic  field,  the 
hours  of  labor  will  be  unrestricted  for  adults,  any  limi- 
tation being  a  "reflection  on  their  dignity."  Labor, 
however,  will  be  protected  from  all  disorders;  and  the 
King  will  organize  both  labor  and  capital  into  offsetting 
and  collaborating  bodies.  Generally  speaking  the  King 
W'ill  be  absolute ;  in  this  respect  the  Orleanists  have  de- 
parted from  their  liberal  and  constitutionalist  tendencies 
exhibited  in  the  policies  upheld  in  the  National  Assembly 
of  1871-1875. 

The  Royalist  plans  for  the  restoration  of  the  Mon- 
archy, set  forth  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  Enqucte,  are  of 
interest:  "The  Monarchy  must  be  set  up  just  as  all  the 
governments  of  the  world  have  been  established  since 
the  world  has  been  the  world:  by  force."  ^^  Such  a  res- 
toration would  not  be  opposed  by  the  country.  "A  vig- 
orous solution  would  not  be  unpopular.  It  would  even 
be  extremely  popular.  He  who  said:  'France  loves  the 
sword,'  has  uttered  a  great  truth." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Duke  of  Orleans 
urged  his  adherents  to  support  the  national  defense, 
and  throughout  its  course  the  French  Royalists  were  the 
most  vigorous  defenders  of  the  Fatherland.  Although 
they  have  been  charged  with  plotting  to  restore  the  king, 
they  have  never  been  accused  of  pro-Germanism.  In 
fact,  hatred  of  Germany  is  an  essential  element  in  their 
nationalism.  By  means  of  the  vigorous  campaigns  of 
L' Action  FranQaise,  the  official  paper  of  the  party,  edited 

^''Enqucte,  499. 

14 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

by  Charles  IMaurras  and  Leon  Daiidet,  many  traitors 
and  pseudo-traitors  have  been  exposed."^ 

Although  the  Orlcanists  profess  to  disdain  ordinary 
parliamentary  taetics,  they  possess  a  remarkably  com- 
plete organization.  The  LUjuc,  whose  center  is  in  Paris, 
has  sections  in  most  of  the  larger  cities  of  the  provinces. 
The  younger  Royalists  are  formed  into  the  auxiliary 
organizations  of  the  Camelots  dii  Hoi  and  the  Etudiants 
de  r Action  Frmiqaise,  while  the  Royalist  women  and 
girls  are  similarly  grouped.  IMembers  of  the  League  must 
sign  a  pledge  ending  in  these  words:  "I  associate  my- 
self in  the  work  of  monarchical  restoration.  I  promise 
to  serve  it  by  every  means."  Each  must  pay  minimum 
dues  of  three  francs  a  year. 

The  intellectual  activity  of  the  League- is  not  only 
carried  on  by  the  daily  journal,  L' Action  Frangaise,  but 
by  an  Institute  in  which  courses  are  given  upon  the 
problems  which  the  monarchy  will  have  to  solve.  In 
addition  there  is  a  Review,  which  likewise  studies  these 
problems  (suspended  during  the  war),  an  annual  Al- 
manac, and  a  publishing  house,  the  Nouvelle  Lihrairic 
Natiomxdc,  which  issues  books  of  Royalist  sympathies. 

The  list  of  the  adherents  to  this  party  is  not  pub- 
lished. Naturally  it  is  not  large,  although  they  claim 
to  have  doubled  their  number  during  the  war.  The  old 
nobility,  residing  chiefly  in  Touraine  and  the  INIidi,  is 
its  chief  support. 

There  is  little  likelihood  of  the  Restoration.  The  many 
admirers  of  Charles  ]\Iaurras,  the  leader  of  the  party, 
do  not  necessarily  adopt  his  Royalist  theories.  It  is  his 
patriotism,  scholarship,  and  vigor  which  attract  them. 
The  party  is  not  completely  reactionary,  as  its  decentral- 

"See  pp.  278,  274,  277. 

15 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ization  and  its  labor  platforms  suggest.  The  incom- 
patibility of  its  doctrines  with  modern  tendencies,  was 
completely  illustrated  during  the  Peace  Conference. 
But  despite  this,  the  French  Royalist  movement  offers 
a  unique  and  interesting  feature  of  French  politics. 
The  remote  probability  of  their  success  permits  a  certain 
respect  for  Royalists  by  Republicans.  Their  sincerity, 
their  love  for  La  Patrie,  and  their  unmistakable,  if  mis- 
directed desire  to  serve  and  advance  the  land  of  their 
birth  are  traits  which  all  parties  might  emulate. 

Closely  akin  to  the  Royalists  may  be  placed  the  Ligue 
des  Patriotes,  an  organization  purely  nationalist  in  pur- 
pose. This  League  was  founded  in  1882 ;  and,  under  the 
leadership  of  its  first  two  presidents,  Henri  Martin  and 
Anatole  de  la  Forge,  it  limited  its  activities  to  the  urging 
of  patriotic  and  military  education.  But  after  1885, 
when  Paul  Deroulede  became  its  head,  it  turned  into 
U.A  active,  jingoist  organization,  which  urged  the  return 
to  France  of  all  territory  hitherto  forcibly  taken  from 
it — especially  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  It  strove  to  awaken 
the  idea  of  La  Revanche,  by  preaching  against  the  dis- 
sipation of  national  effort  in  colonial  enterprise.  In 
1889  the  League  was  suppressed  for  its  support  of  Gen- 
eral Boulanger,  but  it  was  soon  afterward  reestablished. 
During  the  Dreyfus  affair,  Deroulede  attempted  another 
sensational  overthrow  of  the  Republic,  but  failed. ^^  The 
League,  with  which  the  so-called  plchiscitaires  are  asso- 
ciated in  sympathy,  is  supposed  to  stand  for  a  Republic 
headed  by  an  executive  of  dictatorial  powers.  Maurice 
Barres,  the  present  head  of  the  League,  is  accused  by 

'■'  .Soo  Maurifo  Barres,  Scenes  et  Doctrines  du  Nationalisme,  v, 
La  Part  de  Deroulede. 

For  the  rlissolution  of  the  TAfjue  des  Patriotes,  see  E.  Zevort, 
Bistoire    de    la    Troisieme    Eeyublique,    iv,    79. 

16 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

I 

the  Royalists  of  not  having  the  courage  of  his  pre- 
decessors, while  the  Socialists  genuinely  hate  him.  He 
is  particularly  ridiculed  by  Leon  Werth  in  Cla(vel  Sol- 
dat,  a  novel  suppressed  during  the  war.  In  this  book 
M.  Barres  was  represented  as  arising  every  morning  to 
stretch  his  arms,  and  saying:  *'I  am  Joan  of  Arc ;  I  am 
Napoleon."  In  another  place,  Clavel  is  sent  with  the 
army  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  where  he  supposes  he  will  find 
M.  Barres,  gun  in  hand,  at  the  crossroads  to  meet  him, 
but  to  his  well-feigned  surprise,  M.  Barres  is  nowhere 
to  be  found !  As  the  Socialist  press  pointed  out,  his  field 
of  action  lay  in  a  Paris  office,  far  from  the  battle-line! 
M.  Barres  is  naturally  a  strong  Catholic  as  the  Church 
is  an  essential  element  in  his  doctrine  of  nationalism. 
But  his  relation  to  the  Church  appears  to  be  merely 
political,  for,  so  far  as  his  religion  goes,  he  seems  to  be 
much  more  pantheist  than  Christian.    For  instance : 

The  thoughts  of  our  remote  ancestors  always  exercise  their 
mysterious  and  powerful  influences  on  our  lives.  The  people 
of  the  fairies  and  the  spirits  who  lived  in  the  waters,  the 
wood  and  the  caves,  have  disapjieared,  but  in  dying,  they 
have  bequeathed  to  the  places  which  they  loved,  titles  of  ven- 
eration. They  still  guard  our  race  with  the  tears  of  their 
friendship  or  of  their  terror.  The  centuries  but  little  con- 
sider those  who  in  the  solitude  listen  to  their  own  consciences 
and  receive  from  them  profound  murmurs  and  the  source 
of  their  being, — dispossessed  Gods. 

Fantastic  woods,  sweet  fairies  of  the  meadows  and  springs, 
mysterious  emanations  of  the  trees!  The  night  wind  which 
passes  across  the  copses!  Oh,  fragmentary  sentiments!  .  .  . 
Nature  for  me  is  filled  with  the  essence  of  Gods  half  wasted! 
.  .  .  These  vanquished  hosts  sleep  at  the  bottom  of  the  lakes 
and  in  the  valleys  under  dead  leaves  .  .  .,  waiting  for  the 
people  of  France  to  awaken  to  their  beauties.^*' 

""From  tlie  "Grande  Pitie  des  Eglises  de  France,"  quoted  in 
Le  Mcrcure  de  France,  November-December,  1916. 

17 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

It  is  in  this  literary  style  that  IM.  Barres  urges  France 
to  rally  round  la  terre  et  les  morts,  the  only  substitute 
for  the  kingship  as  a  guardian  of  national  permanency. 

Apart  from  its  insistence  on  the  French  annexation 
of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  on  the  "Family  Vote," 
the  League,  under  his  direction,  takes  little  part  in  poli- 
tics. It  has  buried  the  body  of  Deronlede  in  Alsace  as  a 
fitting  tribute  to  his  passionate  struggle  for  the  recovery 
of  the  lost  provinces ;  and  likewise,  since  the  war  it  has 
published  a  beautifully  illustrated  work  commemorating 
their  restoration  to  France. 


Ill 


The  Liberal  Action  party  (the  Action  Liherale  Popu- 
laire)  is  another  organized  party  of  the  Right.  It  was 
founded  in  1902  and  until  lately  directed  by  ]\IM.  Piou 
and  ]\Iun,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  and  securing 
"all  the  freedom  essential  to  the  life  of  the  nation,  par- 
ticularly religious  libertj^  which  is  of  a  superior  order 
and  which  to-day  suffers  the  greatest  injury,  "^^  In  as 
much  as  it  is  an  offspring  of  the  "Rallies,"  a  religious 
issue  naturally  constitutes  its  principal  basis.  Firm  in 
its  devotion  to  the  Republic,  it  insists  upon  freeing  the 
Catholic  Church  from  the  anticlerical  legislation  passed 
since  IDOl,^^  Nevertheless  it  is  opposed  to  a  distinctively 
Catholic  party  in  which  issues  of  cult  w^ould  be  the 
only  ones  insisted  upon  and  which  would  be  subjected 
to  the  direction  of  ecclesiastical  authorities.  The  party 
is  intended  for  Catholics,  but  it  must  be  open  to  all — 

"Jacques,  op.  cit.,  321. 

"  It  seems,  however,  that  the  anticlerical  lopcialation  has  strength- 
ened the  Churclj'B  position  instead  of  weakened  it. 

18 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

evon  those  who,  believing  in  religious  freedom,  are  not 
Catholics. 

In  addition  to  this  conception  of  religious  liberty,  the 
A.  L.  P.  Avishes  to  inaugurate  a  society  based  upon  Chris- 
tian principles.  Although  standing  for  an  advanced 
program  of  social  reform,  it  asserts  that  "the  increase 
of  salaries  will  remain  but  a  powerless  palliative  if  the 
soul  of  the  people  is  not  saved  from  the  yoke  of  ma- 
terialist doctrines  and  docs  not  find  a  divine  ideal.  .  .  . 
The  Ten  Commandments  and  the  Gospel  are  the  great 
factors  in  true  social  progress.  .  .  .  The  solution  of 
the  social  problem  lies  in  Christianity."  "^ 

Politically,  the  party  program  demands  nine  major 
reforms:  A  Declaration  of  Rights,  a  Constitution,  a 
Supreme  Court,  election  of  the  President  by  a  special 
electoral  college,  professional  organization  and  repre- 
sentation, proportional  representation,  the  referendum,^'* 
provincial  and  municipal  decentralization,  and  the 
granting  of  a  definite  status  to  government  officials. 

As  a  religious  program,  it  declares  that  there  can  be 
no  possible  legal  organization  of  the  Church  without  a 
preliminary  agreement  with  the  Pope.  It  affirms  the 
absolute  right  of  the  father  and  the  mother  of  a  family 
to  form  their  child  "in  their  own  image  and  resem- 
blance, to  educate  him  according  to  their  views  and  con- 
victions, and  to  have  him  share  their  ideals  in  this  world 
and  their  eternal  hopes  in  the  one  beyond.  .  .  ."-^  As 
it  is  the  first  duty  of  Catholic  parents  to  oversee  the 
education  of  their  cliildren,  they  must  not  be.  contami- 
nated by  lay  education.     Ideally  they  should  be  taught 


"  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  331. 

"  The  LiT)enil  Action  party  is  one  of  the  few  to  advocate  the 
popular  review  of  any  legishitivo  act. 
"  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  326. 

19 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Catholic  doctrines  in  the  public  schools.  But  as  this  is 
impossible  under  an  anticlerical  government,  in  a  coun- 
try where  there  are  many  different  cults,  the  party  ad- 
vocates the  proportional  division  of  school  funds,  so  as 
to  enable  each  sect  to  establish  its  own  schools  to  which 
the  children  of  each  would  be  sent  and  educated  in 
the  religious  faith  of  their  parents.  From  the  duty  of 
Catholic  parents  to  send  their  children  to  Catholic 
schools,  arises  the  practice  generally  followed  by  them 
in  France  even  now,  although  the  proportional  division 
of  resources  never  has  been,  and  is  not  likely  to  be, 
achieved.  To  carry  out  its  theories  of  religious  educa- 
tion, the  party  has  created  the  Association  of  the  Fa- 
thers of  Families,  which  before  the  war  contained  over 
800  associations  divided  into  seventeen  federations. 

The  party's  advocacy  of  repartition  proportionnelle 
of  school  funds,  of  representation  professionnelle,  and  of 
representation  proportionnelle^  has  won  for  itself  the 
name  of  "The  party  of  the  Three  R's. " 

In  addition  to  the  religious  program  of  the  party,  it 
is  characterized  by  its  interest  in  the  amelioration  of 
labor  conditions.  Believing  in  the  moderate  interven- 
tion of  the  State  in  economic  questions,  it  stands  for  the 
regulation  of  the  hours  of  work,  the  establishment  of  a 
minimum  wage  for  liome  work,  labor  conciliation  and 
arbitration,  and  professional  and  technical  education. 
The  party  appeals  to  all  classes  to  assist  the  working- 
men.  Under  its  auspices,  Catholic  syndicates  have  been 
organized — the  so-called  "free"  unions — which  are  in- 
dependent of  the  General  Confederation  of  Labor,  and 
have  been  brought  into  frieiully  touch  with  Catholic 
employers'  organizations.^" 

"  The  Ijibcral  Action  party  is  one  of  the  best  orfjanizcd  in 
France.     Along  with  a  central  committee  established  at  Paris,  a 

20 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

Before  the  war  tliis  party  had  nearly  forty  federa- 
tions, over  2,005  committees  or  groups  of  adherents,  and 
265,000  members.  It  appears  to  have  h)st  weiglit  in 
suecessive  elections,  for  in  1902  it  had  seventy-nine  rep- 
resentatives in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  sixty-four  in 
1906,  and  thirty-one  in  1910.  In  1914,  however,  its 
numbers  rose  to  thirty-two,  while  in  1919  the  party  was 
successful  in  electing  sixty-nine  deputies. 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  the  Action  Liberate 
Populaire  presents  a  very  powerful  organization  with  a 
very  definite  program.  Both  its  demands  for  constitu- 
tional reform  and  for  social  betterment  are  practicable 
and  meritorious.  Although  the  party's  idea  of  liberal- 
ism is  perhaps  warped  by  its  Catholic  prejudices,  it  is 
one  of  the  few  parties,  beyond  those  of  strictly  clerical 
composition,  which  builds  its  platform  upon  a  mioral  and 
religious  foundation. 

The  Sillon,  now  disbanded,  is  another  Catholic  Re- 
publican group.  Although  it  never  claimed  to  be  a 
party,  it  loyally  attempted  to  reconcile  a  sincere  at- 
tachment to  the  Republic  with  a  love  for  Catholicism. 


"Secretariat  fjeneral"  exists,  subdivided  into  sections.  The 
party  organization  is  composed  of  (1)  the  committees  constituted 
or  agreed  to  by  this  central  committee;  such  as  the  auxiliary 
groups  of  the  Jcunesse  Liberale,  the  Jeuncsse  CathoUque,  the 
Union  of  Free  Workmen,  and  some  unions  of  employers;  (2) 
active  members,  paying  a  sum  of  one  hundred  dollars  and  an 
annual  fee  of  at  least  five  dollars;  (3)  associate  members  paying 
an  annual  fee  of  at  least  one  franc.  Women  may  belong  to  the 
party.  The  members  are  divided  into  communal,  cantonal,  and 
department  committees.  An  effort  is  being  made  to  establish  a 
central  committee  in  every  department  as  the  head  of  all  party 
activities  in  that  district. 

Every  two  years  the  party  holds  a  general  or  national  Congress 
at  wiiich  discussions  are  held  concerning  "organization,"  "elec- 
toral questions,'''  and  "social  reform."  A  weekly  Bulletin  is 
issued  to  its  active  members,  a  quarterly  Bulletin  and  an  almanac 
to  its  associate  members. 

21 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Its  purpose  was  to  bring  about  in  France  a  "democratic, 
honest,  just,  and  fraternal  Republic."  Like  the  Action 
Lihcralc,  it  insisted  upon  the  fundamental  importance  of 
religious  principles  in  society,  and  upon  Christianity  as 
"an  incomparable  source  of  democratic  energy,  since  it 
identities  the  individual  and  the  general  interest."  -^  It 
advocated  the  organization  and  protection  of  both  labor 
and  capital  and  the  extension  of  cooperative  societies. 
Strangely  enough  it  also  stood  for  the  development  of 
communal  property,  which  every  laborer  might  in  turn 
enjoy.  It  especialh'  urged  popular  education  as  a  means 
of  spreading  its  doctrines.  In  1909,  however,  the  Sillon, 
whose  advanced  teachings  angered  certain  conservative 
Catholics,  was  dissolved  by  order  of  the  Pope.  It  was 
succeeded  by  a  group  called  the  Jeune  Repuhlique, 
which  especially  urged  the  referendum,  proportional 
representation,  and  a  protected  status  for  government 
officials.  It  existed  for  the  propaganda  of  opinion  rather 
than  for  the  mere  election  of  deputies,  a  characteristic, 
it  may  be  added,  of  all  leagues  as  opposed  to  parties. 


-IV 


Turning  now  to  the  parties  composing  the  Center,  we 
first  find  the  Moderate  or  "Progressist"  Republicans 
organized  under  the  title  of  the  Republican  Federation. 
Since  this  was  the  most  conservative  of  all  the  Repub- 
lican parties,  it  practically  controlled  the  government 
during  the  first  twenty  years  of  the  Repul)lic  under  the 
direction  of  such  men  as  Ferry,  Ribot  and  Meline.  In 
1898,  however,  the  Moderates  began  to  lose  power — some 
of  its  members  adhering  to  the  ' '  Rallies ; ' '  while  the  Bloc, 

"Jacques,  op.  eit.,  345. 

22 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

formed  by  Waldeck-Rousseau,  uniting  the  Radicals,  Rad- 
ical Socialists,  and  Socialists,  secured  control  of  the 
Chamber.  The  recent  organization  of  this  party  dates 
from  the  18th  of  November,  1903,  when  a  meeting  was 
held  at  which  the  Republican  Federation  was  organized.^'* 
At  that  time  the  National  Republican  Association,  which 
had  been  headed  by  I\I.  Audiffret,  the  Liberal  Republi- 
can Union,  w'hich  had  been  headed  by  ]\I.  Barboux,  and 
the  Alliance  of  Progressist  Republicans,  which  had  been 
headed  by  Jules  Meline,  were  fused  into  the  Republican 
Federation.  The  Moderates  vigorously  opposed  the  gov- 
ernment of  M.  Combes,  and  especially  his  anticlerical 
policy.  In  1906  the  party  underwent  a  reorganization 
and  gained  new  members ;  and  in  1910  it  made  a  net  gain 
of  thirty  seats  in  the  Chamber,  a  sign  w^hich  the  party 
interpreted  as  indicating  the  return  of  the  country  to 
its  program.  In  1914  it  practically  maintained  its  par- 
liamentary strength,  polling  about  ten  per  cent  of  the 
votes  cast  (1,810,679).  Although  the  number  of  adher- 
ents is  not  published,  it  is  estimated  to  be  between  7,000 
and  8,000.  The  party's  influence  is  much  wider  than 
its  limited  membership — a  statement  true  of  all  French 
parties. 

The  ]\Ioderate  or  Progressist  Republican  party  is  the 
most  idealistic  of  the  parties  of  the  Republic.  Strongly 
imbued  with  the  principles  of  1789,  it  is  founded  on 
the  principles  of  the  dignity  and  worth  of  the  indi- 
vidual ;  consequently  it  is  strongly  against  State  Social- 
ism, tolerant  in  religious  matters,  and  liberal  in  its  eco- 
nomics. Three  marked  divisions  may  be  found  in  its 
ranks:  the  Progressists  proper,  to  whom  stability  and 

'^ La  Federation  Eepublicaine,  December,  1919,  the  monthly 
Bulletin  of  the  Ecpublican  Federation. 

23 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

immobility  is  the  controlling  doctrine;  the  moderates, 
who  do  not  fear  radicalism,  and  are  willing  to  sacrifice 
old  doctrines  to  regain  political  power ;  and  between  these 
two,  a  conciliatory  group,  playing  the  part  of  juste  mi- 
lieu. Composed  largely  of  the  wealthy  upper  classes,  the 
party  is  insistent  upon  the  rights  of  private  property ;  it 
is  vigorously  opposed  to  state  monopolies  and  to  the  so- 
cialization of  the  means  of  production.  Its  motto,  "Prog- 
ress by  Order,"  and  its  watchword,  "Conserve  and 
Create,"   have   indicated   its   parliamentary  policy.^^ 

As  to  political  reforms,  the  party  desires  a  Bill  of 
Rights,  a  Supreme  Court  (to  decide  the  constitutionality 
of  laws)  proportional  representation  and  the  scrutin  de 
liste,^^  the  representation  of  interests  in  the  Senate,  and 
the  enactment  of  stringent  laws  against  fraud.  It  also 
asks  for  administrative  decentralization  through  an  in- 
crease of  the  powers  of  departmental  assemblies.  As 
judicial  measures,  it  asks  for  the  reduction  of  arron- 
dissement  tribunals,  for  the  simplification  of  procedure, 
and  for  the  reduction  of  the  expenses  of  justice.  It  also 
stands  for  public  assistance  to  the  old,  the  infirm,  and 
the  sick.^^ 


"  For  details  of  the  Federation 's  Program,  see  Compte  Rendu 
du  Congres,  from  1906  to  1914,  tlie  reports  of  the  Annual  Con- 
ventions  of    the   party. 

Charles  Bcnoist,  French  minister  to  Holland,  Alexandre  Ribot 
and  Jules  Meline,  two  former  prime  ministers,  are  prominent 
members  of  this  party. 

"See  pp.  152,  153. 

"The  organization  of  the  party  is  known  as  the  "Republican 
Feileration."  It  is  administered  by  a  general  council  of  fifty 
members  elected  by  itself.  The  council  merely  gives  its  advice, 
while  a  directing  committee  of  twenty  members  proposes  measures 
for  the  consideration  of  a  bureau  consisting  of  a  president,  six 
vice-presidents,  a  secretary-general  and  a  treasurer.  In  each  ar- 
rondisscment  or  commune  and  department,  cither  a  committee,  a 
federation,  or  a  union,  directs  the  party  activities.  In  some  centers, 
such  as  Lyons  and  Toulouse,  there  are  regional  organizations.     A 

24 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

In  its  electoral  methods,  the  party  is  often  willing  to 
support  candidates  of  other  parties  professing  similar 
doctrines,  if  its  own  have  no  chance  of  success.  As  long 
as  the  purely  progressist  element  of  the  party  is  in  con- 
trol, its  prospects  for  electoral  victories  are  slight ; 
but  under  more  advanced  leadership,  it  would  doubtless 
have  a  considerable  following  among  the  great  class  of 
' '  moderate ' '  Frenchmen. 


The  ** Democratic  Republican  Alliance"  is  the  other 
great  party  of  the  parliamentary  Center.  It  is  not  so 
conservative  as  the  Progressists,  and  it  is  not  radical. 
It  announces  its  platform  as  "Neither  Reaction  nor 
Revolution,  Neither  Imprudence  nor  Adventure."  Its 
part  has  been  to  reconcile  the  conservatism  and  the  radi- 
calism of  the  Republic. 

The  Alliance  was  the  first  party  after  the  war  to  an- 
nounce a  program  of  reconstruction  and  reform.  It  de- 
nounced all  attempts  to  stir  up  class  antagonism  as  an 
invention  of  Teutonic  imperialism,  and  it  pleaded  for 
the  union  of  all  parties  in  the  task  of  reconstruction. 
It  emphasized  the  necessity  for  the  creation  of  a  great 
Republican  party,  "boldly  reformist  as  well  as  firmly 
resolved  to  prevent  the  outbursts  of  revolutionary  or 
reactionary  violence ;  this  party  must  be  strongly  enough 
organized,  numerous  enough  and  powerful  enough,  to 
give  stability  and  duration  to  the  government  which 
gains  its  support. ' '  ^^ 

national  congress  closing  with  a  banquet  is  held  annually.  The 
Federation  has  the  pledged  support  of  nearly  three  hundred 
publicists  and  nearly  eight  hundred  newspapers;  consequently,  it 
exercises  considerable   influence. 

"  From  a  brochure  distributed  by  the  Alliance. 

25 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

It  has  advocated  electoral  and  administrative  reforms, 
the  introducitioin  of  industrial  methods  in  the  public 
services  and  decentralization;  a  law  for  the  protection 
of  government  employees  (including  the  prohibition  of 
the  right  to  strike)  ;  complete  reparation  by  the  State 
for  the  damages  of  the  war;  the  early  return  to  com- 
mercial liberty  and  the  cessation  of  State  control  over 
industry ;  the  confederation  of  representatives  of  indus- 
try, commerce,  and  agriculture  to  consider  the  economic 
needs  of  the  country;  technical  education;  the  concilia- 
tion of  labor  and  capital ;  the  development  of  social  in- 
surance,- measures  combating  the  "rural  exodus"; 
measures  destined  to  increase  the  birth  rate  and  to  cur- 
tail infant  mortality  and  alcoholism ;  the  financial  sec- 
tion of  a  League  of  Nations,  and  the  reform  of  the  taxa- 
tion sj'stem. 

^Finally,  the  Alliance  stands  for  "any  measure  cal- 
culated to  ensure  for  the  country  general  prosperity, 
liberty,  social  justice,  economic  advancement,  intellectual 
renaissance  and  moral  grandeur."  ^^ 

The  party's  strength  is  not  exactly  known,^*  but  it 
includes  many  of  the  most  representative  statesmen  of 
the  Republic.    Among  its  honorary  presidents  have  been 

"  Ibid. 

""Although  the  Alliance  was  founded  as  early  as  May,  1901,  by 
Adolphe  Carnot,  it  was  not  until  1911  that  it  first  took  a  prominent 
and  independent  part  in  French  politics.  M.  Carnot  is  still  its 
president,  holding  his  office  for  life.  On  account  of  his  age  he 
attempted  to  resign  lately,  but  was  reelected.  He  is  assisted  by 
a  secretary-general,  an  assistant  secretary  and  a  secretary  of 
committees,  surrounded  by  a  superior  council  composed  of  one 
delegate  from  each  department,  the  whole  forming  a  central 
executive  committee.  The  cantons,  arrondissemcnts,  and  depart- 
ments have  their  respective  committees.  A  weekly  bulletin  is 
issued  by  the  party  while  the  local  associations  carry  on,  by 
means  of  circles,  libraries,  and  social  organizations,  an  active  cam- 
paign tending  to  develop  civic  education  and  communal  life  by 
every   means. 

26 


PARTY  PTTTLOSOPITIES 

Emile  Lonbot,  former  Prosiilciit  of  the  Republic,  M. 
Waldeck-Rousseau,  who  founded  the  famous  Bloc,  and 
Joseph  IMangin,  one  of  France's  prominent  generals. 
Raymond  Poineare  is  vice-president  of  the  organization. 
Paul  Deschanel,  the  new  President  of  the  Republic, 
is  also  a  member.  In  1911  the  Alliance  had  140  Depu- 
ties in  the  Chamber — seventy-one  belonging  to  the  group 
of  the  Democratic  Left,  fifty  to  the  Radical  Left,  and 
about  fifteen  to  the  Radical  Socialist  Left.  In  the  Senate 
it  had  eighty  members  inscribed  in  the  group  of  the  Re- 
publican Union.  In  the  1914  elections  it  polled  the 
highest  number  of  votes  of  any  party,  receiving  1,564- 
578.  In  the  1919  elections  133  of  its  members  were 
elected  to  the  Chamber. 

VI 

The  principal  party  of  the  parliamentary  Left  and 
one  of  the  most  powerful  in  the  Republic,  is  the  "Re- 
publican Radical  and  Radical  Socialist  Party,"  often 
known  as  the  "Unified  Radicals,"  the  "Radical  Social- 
ists," or  plainly,  the  "Radicals."  This  party,  rooted  in 
the  Jacobin  clubs  of  the  Revolution  and  in  the  followers 
of  Ledru-Rollin  during  the  Revolution  of  1848,  really 
came  to  light  with  the  dawn  of  the  Third  Republic. 
About  1880  a  group  of  advanced  Radicals  detached  them- 
selves from  the  "Republicans,"  and  because  of  their 
bitter  opposition  to  the  conservatism  of  Thiers  and  even 
to  the  opportunism  of  Gambetta,  they  soon  became 
known  in  contrast  with  the  "Opportunists,"  as  the  "In- 
transigeants."  They  stood  solidly  and  without  com- 
promise for  the  absolute  achievement  of  Republican 
ideals.  This  group  increased  in  1885  and  1899  until  it 
became  a  factor  in  the  elections  of  the  latter  year.    In 

27 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

1887  it  fought  for  the  suppression  of  the  right  of  the 
Senate  to  authorize  the  President  to  dissolve  the  Cham- 
ber; from  1888  to  1898  it  opposed  the  moderate  Repub- 
licans, although  uniting  with  them  whenever  the  Re- 
public was  threatened.  Thus  many  so-called  concentra- 
tion ministries  contained  many  Radical  leaders — Flo- 
quet,  Brisson,  Goblet,  Sarrien,  and  Ricard.  Clemenceau 
was  one  of  the  most  destructive  leaders  of  the  group. 
His  particular  delight  was  the  defeat  of  ministries,  and 
he  became  known  as  the  "Ministry  Smasher."  He  is  said 
to  have  tried  to  defeat  twenty-three  of  them  and  to  have 
been  successful  in  the  case  of  eighteen. 

In  1892  many  Radicals  became  Radical  Socialists, 
urging  collective  reforms  and  the  general  betterment 
of  labor  conditions.  But  in  1893  the  group  was  success- 
ful enough  to  elect  120  members  to  the  Chamber.  Be- 
side them  were  grouped  the  Radical  Socialists,  some  of 
whose  members,  notably  M.  Millerand,  were  passing 
over  to  pure  Socialism.  The  Radical  Socialists  and  the 
Socialists  in  this  Chamber  had  about  sixty  members. 
Upon  a  strongly  anticlerical,  an  income  tax,  and  social 
reform  platform,  the  Radicals,  combining  forces  with  the 
Radical  Socialists,  and  pure  Socialists,  were  successful 
enough  in  1895  to  establish  a  completely  Radical  min- 
istry, headed  by  M.  Bourgeois.  In  1901  the  fusion  of  the 
Radicals,  the  Radical  Socialists,  and  the  Socialists,  was 
officially  made.  The  adoption  of  the  formula,  "No  ene- 
mies on  .the  Left, ' '  led  many  Radicals,  who  were  unwill- 
ing to  associate  with  pure  Socialists,  to  desert  the  party 
and  adhere  to  the  Democratic  Alliance.  But  nevertheless 
the  Radical  party  gained  power.^^ 

"  An  intorestinfj  story  is  told  of  the  initial  success  of  the  reor- 
p^anizod  Radicals  shortly  after  1900.  There  was  a  certain  jeweler 
and  his  brother  who  were  conducting  a  very  successful  business 

28 


PARTY  PIIILOSOPITTES 

The  Radicals  assert  that  they  are  essentially  a  party 
of  the  middle  class,  the  petite  hourgeaisie,  wishing  to 
establish  a  united,  fraternal  and  social  Republic  in 
which  every  citizen  will  be  rewarded  upon  a  basis  of 
his  own  labor  and  merit. 

The  party  still  adheres  to  the  ** Program  of  Nancy" 
adopted  in  1907,  which  contains  a  complete  outline  of  its 
political,  economic,  and  social  reforms.  Although  annual 
"declarations"  have  subsequently  interpreted  or  modi- 
fied this  program,  it  still  remains  the  creed  of  their 
political  beliefs. 

Politically,  the  party  stands  for  the  direct  election 
of  senators.  Until  1919  it  refused  definitely  to  commit 
itself  to  proportional  representation,  although  it  has 
stood  for  the  scrutin  de  liste.  It  also  seeks  certain  ad- 
ministrative reforms,  the  supremacy  of  the  Chamber  of 


in  Paris  in  a  shop  on  the  Boulevard  de  la  Sebastopol.  The  firm 
grew  to  such  an  extent  that  its  traveling  salesmen  carried  the 
firm 's  jewelry  into  every  part  of  France.  At  the  time  of  the 
elections,  the  jewelers,  through  some  sort  of  negotiation  with 
the  Radical  chiefs,  turned  over  their  salesmen  to  the  party  as 
propagandist  agents.  They  were  so  successful  that  the"  country 
returned  an  overwhelming  majority  for  the  Radicals  and  with  it, 
the  government.  The  Radicals,  as  a  reward,  promptly  elected 
the  jeweler  to  the  Senate,  an  extraordinary  step  for  one  who 
had  not  first  served  in  the  Chamber.  The  gentleman  is  still  serving 
very  prominently  in  that  capacity,  and  is  very  proud  of  his  remark- 
able achievement. 

From  1902  to  1906,  the  Radical  party  formed,  with  the  Social- 
ists and  the  moderate  Radicals  of  the  Democratic  Alliance,  the 
Bloc  of  the  Left;  in  1906  they  and  the  Socialists  won  an  ag- 
gregate of  400  seats;  in  1910,  excluding  the  Socialists,  they  had 
334  seats.  At  the  Congress  of  Pau  in  1913  the  party  reorganized 
itself,  deciding  that  all  of  its  deputies  must  adhere  to  a  strictly 
Radical  group.  After  this,  the  party  became  known  as  the 
Unified  Radicals.  The  elections  of  1914,  partly  because  of  the 
bitterness  of  their  anticlerical  policy,  their  pacifism,  and  this 
measure  of  reorganization  to  which  many  deputies  refused  to 
adhere,  reduced  their  number  to  2;')7  nieml)ers.  In  1919  this 
number  was  still  further  reduced  to  143. 

29 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Deputies  over  the  Ministry  and  the  Senate,  and  the 
reorganization  of  the  Judiciary. 

It  was,  however,  the  anticlerical  platform  of  the  party 
which  brought  it  to  power  and  still  constitutes  the  sine 
qua  non  of  its  existence.  Although  the  issue  is  prac- 
tically dead,  the  party  is  still  pledged  to  the  rigid  main- 
tenance of  all  anticlerical  legislation,  the  suppression 
of  illegally  existing  religious  orders,  and  the  exclusive 
control  of  education  by  the  State. 

In  addition  to  anticlericalism,  the  party's  support  of 
collectivism  is  its  principal  characteristic.  Although 
recognizing  the  value  of  private  property  and  of  in- 
dividual initiative,  it  desires  to  correct  the  abuses  of  the 
present  regime  through  the  assumption  by  the  State  of 
every  actually  existing  monopoly.  The  conclusions  of 
M.  Chauvin  at  the  Congress  of  Dijon  in  1908  still  repre- 
sent the  party 's  position  upon  State  control  of  industry : 

1.  Individual  property,  properly  so  called,  arising  from 
labor,  and  maintained  by  labor,  Ave  must  conserve  as  sacred. 

2.  Individual  property  must  give  way  to  the  general  inter- 
est when  the  interest  of  the  proprietor  is  found  to  be  in 
manifest  contradiction  to  the  interest  of  society. 

3.  Finally,  if  for  the  creation  or  for  the  conservation  of 
industrial  property,  where  all  the  work  and  all  the  efforts 
of  the  proprietor  have  ceased  to  exist,  and  if  this  property 
is  a  monopoly  in  the  possession  of  a  single  person,  or  if 
it  is  wealth  entirely  created  by  society  or  by  others,  this 
property,  truly  capitalistic,  can  and  should  be  taken  over  by 
the  State.38 

These  principles  the  Radicals  have  extended  to  in- 
clude natural  resources  and  industrial  enterprises  now 
dangerously  centralized. 

"Quoted  by  A.  Cliarpcntier  in  Le  Parti  Eadical  et  EadicaX- 
Socialiste  a  travers  ses  emigres,  445, 

30 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

Socially,  the  party  "attempts  to  give  to  the  prole- 
tariat the  full  conscioiisnes.s  of  its  rights  and  duties, 
and,  with  the  responsibility  for  its  action,  the  authority 
necessary  to  establish  a  more  rational  and  just  social 
constitution."  ^^  It  is  ready  to  take  every  legal  measure 
to  guarantee  to  each  the  product  of  his  toil  and  to  pre- 
vent capitalistic  domination  of  the  consumer.  "Reso- 
lutely hostile  to  the  egotistical  conceptions  of  the  school 
of  laissez  faire,"  the  party  favors  State  inter\'ention  in 
the  relations  of  capital  and  labor.  It  promises  assist- 
ance to  needy  children,  the  sick,  the  infirm,  and  the  old. 
It  promises  a  pension  to  workers  overcome  by  work  or 
age.  It  has  demanded  the  enactment  of  a  labor  code 
embracing  laws  (1)  upon  the  employment  of  women  and 
children  in  industry,  (2)  upon  labor  and  apprentice- 
ship contracts,  (3)  upon  the  regulation  of  differences 
between  labor  and  capital  by  compulsory  arbitration, 
(4)  upon  labor  accidents,  the  risks  and  diseases  of  in- 
dustrj^  and  the  responsibility  of  employers,  (5)  upon 
the  limitation  of  hours  of  labor  and  a  weekly  rest,  (6) 
upon  the  organization  of  government  insurance  in  favor 
of  every  worker  in  industry,  commerce,  and  agriculture 
against  the  risks  of  accidents,  sickness,  and  unemploy- 
ment, (7)  upon  mutual  insurance  and  savings  funds  to 
improve  the  condition  of  labor,  (8)  upon  conditions  of 
health  and  hygiene  in  industrial  and  commercial  estab- 
lishments. 

Financially  the  party  has  stood  for  the  income  tax 
and  the  suppression  of  the  "four  direct  contributions"; 
it  is  also  against  consumption  taxes,  stamp  and  registry 
fees,  and  taxes  weighing  on  agriculture,  commerce,  and 
small  industry. 

^  Program  of  Nancy,  a  brochure  distributed  at  party  head- 
quarters. 

31 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

As  an  agrarian  program,  it  urges  the  development  of 
agricultural  education,  cooperative  associations,  agricul- 
tural credit,  and  insurance  against  tire,  hail,  frost,  and 
the  death  of  cattle.  ^* 

Many  prominent  men  are  associated  with  the  Radi- 
cals— among  them  being  MM.  Clemenceau ;  Caillaux,  now 
in  disrepute ;  Combes  and  Herriot,  two  prominent  Sen- 
ators; Rene  Renoult,  former  president  of  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  party  and  president  of  the  Army 
Commission  of  the  Chamber;  Franklin  Bouillon,  former 
head  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Commission ;  and  Senator 
Leon  Bourgeois,  president  of  the  Senate  and  a  repre- 
sentative on  the  French  Peace  Delegation.^^ 

*''  On  July  26,  1919,  a  petit  congres  of  the  Radical  party  was 
held  in  Pans  where  a  reconstruction  program  was  drawn  up.  It 
contained  little  in  addition  to  previous  platforms  except  to  urge 
more  vigorous  measures  against  speculators,  modification  of  the 
income  tax  so  as  to  exempt  small  salaries,  and  the  abolition  of  the 
three-year  military  service  law  and  gradual  disarmament  in  view  of 
the  League  of  Nations. 

^  The  organization  of  the  Radical  party  is  very  coherent.  It  is 
based  on  the  communal  committee,  upon  which  repose  arrondisse- 
ment,  canton,  department,  and  regional  federations.  The  arron- 
disscment  and  d'^partment  committees  are  the  most  active.  A 
central  Executive  Committee  with  offices  in  Paris  directs  all  party 
activities.  The  members  of  the  party  in  each  locality  form  its 
committee.  In  each  department,  delegates  of  these  committees 
meet  at  least  once  a  year  and  choose  department  delegates  to 
tiro  Annual  Congress.  Since  1909  the  Executive  Committee  has 
been  composed  of  (1)  all  of  the  deputies  and  senators,  adherents 
of  the  party,  members  by  right;  (2)  delegates  elected  at  the 
Congress  by  the  department  delegates.  Before  the  war  the  Exe- 
cutive Committee  contained  over  six  hundred  members.  From  its 
own  members,  it  elects  a  president,  sixteen  vice-presidents  (eight 
of  M'hom  must  be  members  of  Parliament),  sixteen  secretaries 
(eight  of  whom  also  must  be  members  of  Parliament),  an  admin- 
istrative secretary-general  and  a  treasurer, — a  total  of  thirty-five. 
The  president  is  not  immediately  eligible  for  reelection,  and  this 
bureau  is  renewed,  one  half  each  year.  Tliia  committee  is  sub- 
divideil  in  turn  into  committees  on  rules  and  discipline,  finance, 
preparation  for  Congrea.ses,  propaganda,  and  j)arty  organization. 
The  bureau  is  divided  into  five  permanent  committees:  party 
administration,  elections,  propaganda,  bulletin,  and  demands. 

32 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 


VII 


Following  the  parliamentary  groupings  toward  the 
Left  we  find  the  Socialist  representatives,  divided  into 
the  Republican  Socialists  and  the  Unified  Socialists. 
This  division  is  the  result  of  events  which  must  be 
briefly  summarized. 

The  earlier  groupings  of  the  French  Socialists  after 
the  banishments  following  the  Commune,  occurred  at  the 
Congress  of  the  French  Workingman's  party  held  in 
1874.  Several  years  later  the  organization  then  formed 
broke  up  into  two  groups:  the  Marxist  group,  recruited 
in  the  North,  and  led  by  Jules  Guesde,  and  the  French 
Federation  of  Socialist  Workingmen.  This  latter  or- 
ganization was  of  reformist  tendencies  and  consequently 
became  known  as  the  "Possibilists. "  It  was  led  by 
Paul  Brousse.  In  1890  this  Federation  of  Socialist 
Workingmen  split  into  two  branches,  the  cause  being  a 
question  of  centralization  of  party  organization.  The 
revolutionary  element  became  known  as  the  "Alleman- 
ists,"  from  the  name  of  their  leader,  Allemane.  The 
other  section  continued  under  the  leadership  of  Brousse. 
Under  the  guidance  of  Guesde  and  Allemane,  most  of  the 
divisions  of  the  Socialist  party  supported  Marx's  advo- 
cacy of  the  Social  Revolution  in  contrast  with  the  purely 
French  idea  of  progressive  reform.  At  this  time  a  fourth 
section  of  the  Socialist  following,  that  led  by  Blanqui,^" 


*'Blanquism,  M.  Hanotaux  describes  as  "the  traditional  party 
of  insurrection,  conspiracy,  and  sedition.  It  possessed  hardly 
any  other  political  conception  except  that  of  opposition  to  the 
last  breath,  by  all  means,  to  all  governments.  It  was  integral, 
republican,  leveling,  the  adversary  of  social  order,  but  neither 
communist,  separatist,  nor  socialist:  in  fact,  anarchist."  Can- 
temporary  France,  i,  164. 

33 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

constituted  about  a  quarter  of  their  forces.  In  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  there  were  also  attempts  to  form 
a  Labor  party.  Thus  at  least  five  Socialist  organizations, 
many  of  them  antagonistic  to  each  other,  came  into  ex- 
istence, each  struggling  for  the  labor  vote.  In  addition 
to  them,  a  strong  group  of  men  unassociated  with  parties 
but  having  collectivist  doctrines,  are  to  be  noted :  Miller- 
and,  Viviani,  and  Andre  Lefevre.  In  view  of  the  elect- 
ions of  1893  reformist  elements  among  the  Socialists  and 
some  discontented  Radicals  united  in  a  "League  of 
Revolutionary  Action  for  the  Inauguration  of  the  So- 
cial Republic. ' '  This  coalition  was  successful  in  electing 
fifty-five  Radical  Socialists,  who  took  their  seats  in  the 
Chamber  at  the  extreme  Left.  Twenty-five  Socialists 
were  elected,  more  than  half  of  them  coming  from  the 
department  of  the  Seine.*^ 

In  1899  an  effort  was  made  to  unify  further  the  differ- 
ent factions,  and  a  general  Socialist  committee  was  or- 
ganized to  effect  a  union.  This  combination  was  prac- 
tically achieved  when  an  incident  arose  which  resulted 
in  the  withdrawal  of  the  Guesde  following.  This  was 
the  noted  ''Millerand  Case."  M.  Millerand  had  been 
ai)pointed  Minister  of  Commerce  in  the  Waldeek-Rous- ■ 
seau  Ministry  in  1899,  but  as  he  was  affiliated  with  the 
Socialist  party,  Guesde  and  Sembat  insisted  that  it  was 
contrary  to  the  teachings  of  Karl  Marx  for  a  Socialist 
to  collaborate  in  any  way  with  a  bourgeois  government. 
In  opposition  to  these  out-and-out  revolutionists,  how- 
ever, another  group  within  the  party,  men  of  a  reform- 
ist tendency,  content  with  a  policy  of  improving  present 
society,  men  such  as  Aristide  Briand,  Rene  Viviani,  Paul 
Brousse,  and  Jean  Jaures,  asserted  Millerand 's  right  to 

"  Soo  P.  F.  Dcsmartros,  "La  France  Polituiuc  a  la  Vcille  des 
Scrutiny;"  Europe  Nouvcllo,  March  22,   1919. 

34 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

be  associated  with  the  government.  In  a  party  congress 
held  at  Paris  in  1899  ministerial  participation  was  con- 
sented to  by  a  vote  of  818  to  634;  but  the  International 
Congress  held  in  Paris,  in  1900,  virtually  resulted  in  a 
negation  of  this  decision  by  adopting  a  motion  (offered 
by  Jules  Guesde)  to  the  effect  that  this  was  only  to  be 
considered  a  measure  of  expediency  caused  by  excep- 
tional conditions.  At  Bordeaux  in  1903  IMillerand  was 
again  justified  by  a  party  declaration  for  remaining  a 
member  of  the  Cabinet,  but  was  censured  for  not  follow- 
ing party  principles  in  his  ministerial  policy.*-  The  un- 
willingness of  the  party  to  expel  Millerand  led  Guesde 
to  withdi-aw,  and,  joining  the  Blanquists  in  1901,  he 
formed  the  rarti  Socialiste  de  France.  Soon  afterward, 
the  followers  of  Jaures,  who  had  now  become  the  leader 
of  the  reformists,  together  with  the  independents, 
formed  the  Parti  Socialiste  Frangais.  In  1902  the  Cham- 
ber contained  forty  Socialist  members. 

In  1904  the  International  Socialist  Congress  at  Am- 
sterdam not  only  settled  the  Millerand  case,  but  secured 
the  definite  triumph  of  Marxism  over  the  purely  French 
doctrine  of  "reformism."  Despite  the  vigorous  defense 
of  the  latter  by  Jean  Jaures,  the  German  delegation,  led 
by  Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Bebel,  forced  the  Congress  to 
adopt  a  resolution  "rejecting  in  the  most  energetic  man- 
ner revisionist  attempts  ...  to  substitute  a  policy  of 
concession  to  the  established  order  for  the  conquest 
of  political  power  through  an  open  struggle  against  the 
bourgeoisie. "  *^  It  pronounced  itself  frankly  against  any 
"party  satisfied  with  reforming  bourgeois  society";  and 


■"  Millerand  was  expelled  from  the  Federation  of  the  Seine  in 
1904. 

"Zeva&s  and  Prolo,  Une  Campagne  Politiq^ie:  Ic  Parti  Eepuhli- 
caiti  Socialiste,  8. 

35 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

further  declared  tliat  "socialist  democracy  cannot  ac- 
cept any  participation  in  a  government  of  a  bourgeois 
society. "  *^  M,  Jaures,  though  defeated,  loyally  accepted 
this  decision;  and  upon  his  return  to  France,  all  his 
personality  and  great  intellectual  powers  were  exercised 
successfully  in  uniting  the  Revolutionary  Socialist 
"Workingmen 's  party,  the  Socialist  party  of  France,  the 
French  Socialist  party,  and  five  autonomous  Federa- 
tions, into  the  Unified  Socialist  party.  This  union  was 
finally  consummated  at  the  Congress  of  Rouen  in  March, 
1905.  The  decision  of  Amsterdam,  however,  displeased 
not  only  Millerand,  but  also  many  other  prominent  men, 
such  as  Yiviani  and  Briand,  who  refused  to  join  the 
Unified  party.  That  party  now  took  the  official  name 
of  the  French  Section  of  the  International  Working- 
men's  Association. 

Beginning  with  the  elections  of  1906  the  party,  ostens- 
ibly at  least,  repudiated  the  Bloc,  and  pursued  an  inde- 
pendent policy  even  to  the  extent  of  voting  against  ap- 
propriation bills.  Under  the  leadership  of  Jaures,  how- 
ever, who  was  still  at  heart  a  reformist,  it  took  an  active 
part  in  urging  social  reforms.  Because  of  its  splendid 
unity  and  discipline,  its  electoral  successes  were  aston- 
ishing. In  1910  the  party  elected  75  deputies ;  and  in 
1914,  101.  The  latter  election  was  won  upon  a  purely 
pacifist  and  antimilitary  platform  as  well  as  upon  the 
reassertion  of  a  new  social  and  financial  policy.  The 
unity  of  the  party  in  the  1914  elections  was  so  complete 
that  only  five  of  its  candidates  were  defeated  in  the 
provinces,  and  but  tlirco  in  Paris.  As  will  be  seen 
later  ^'  however,  this  unity  has  been  seriously  disrupted 


'  Ibid. 
'See  p.  97. 

3G 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

during  the  war.-    Unless  present  divisions  are  mended, 
future  party  successes  appear  improbable. 

Little  need  be  said  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Socialist 
party,  which  in  most  of  its  outstanding  features  re- 
sembles that  held  by  Socialists  everywhere.  The  real 
purpose  and  aim  of  the  party  was  set  forth  in  the  "Mu- 
tual Declaration  of  Socialist  Organization,"  adopted 
January  13,  1905,  a  part  of  which  follows : 

1.  The  Socialist  party  is  a  party  of  Class  which  has  for 
its  object  the  socialization  of  the  means  of  production  and 
exchange,  that  is,  to  transform  capitalistic  society  into  a 
collectivist  or  a  communist  society,  and  for  a  means,  the 
economic  and  political  organization  of  the  proletariat.  Its 
object,  its  ideal,  and  the  means  which  it  employs,  make  the 
Socialist  party  (while  pursuing  the  realization  of  immediate 
reforms  demanded  by  the  working-class)  not  a  party  of  re- 
form, but  a  party  of  class  struggle  and  of  revolution. 

2.  The  representatives  of  the  party  in  Parliament  form  an 
independent  group  o]iposing  all  the  political  factions  of  the 
bourgeoisie.  The  Socialist  group  in  Parliament  must  there- 
fore refuse  to  the  government  all  the  means  which  assure  the 
domination  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  its  maintenance  in  power;  it 
must  consequently  refuse  military  credits,  credits  for  colonial 
conquest,  secret  funds,  and  indeed  the  entire  budget.*^ 

On  one  point  in  its  doctrine,  the  French  Unified  So- 
cialists have  become  frankly  opportunistic  and  from  the 
standpoint  of  pure  Socialist  principle,  despicably  so. 
Realizing  that  the  doctrine  of  the  class  struggle  and 
the  socialization  of  property  is  incompatible  with  the 
ideas  of  the  peasant  population  of  France,  whose  adher- 
ence to  the  Socialist  cause  is  necessary  for  success,  the 
party  has  made  exceptions  to  the  Marxian  dogma.  The 
peasant    population,    comprising    about    15,000,000,    is 

*' Eeglement  du  Parti  Socialiste,  issued  by  the  National  Coun- 
cU. 

37 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

divided  into  so  many  different  categories  that  the  rough 
division  of  "capitalist"  and  "laborer"  cannot  possibly 
be  made.  There  are  thousands  of  small  farmers  own- 
ing their  farms  and  at  the  same  time  working  several 
days  of  the  week  for  larger  owners/^  Owners  who  ex- 
clusively occupy  their  ov/n  places,  and  employ  doz- 
ens of  laborers — cannot  be  called  capitalists  because 
they  themselves  engage  in  manual  labor  and  borrow 
capital.  Even  tenant  farmers  hire  help  and  invest  capi- 
tal; they  are  evidently  both  capitalist  and  employer, 
employee  and  debtor.  In  short,  the  agricultural  situa- 
tion in  France  completely  belies  the  doctrine  of  the 
struggle  and  the  opposition  of  classes.  It  illustrates,  on 
the  other  hand,  their  actual  interpenetration. 

The  last  attempt  to  meet  this  situation  was  made  by 
the  Administrative  Commission  of  the  party  in  the  early 
summer  of  1919,  when  a  declaration  was  framed  de- 


"  In  1882,  there  were  2,150,000  i^easants  cultivating  their  own 
lands,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  work;  there  were  1,374,000 
peasants  cultivating  their  own  lands  and  in  addition  working  for 
some  one  else, — making  a  total  number  of  3,524,000,  not  including 
their  families. 


Illustration  of  Increase  in 

THE  Number  op  Peasants 

1862 

1882 

1892 

Peasants  cultivating  their  own 
land  exclusively 

1,812,000 
1,987,000 

2,150,000 
1,374,000 

2,199,000 

Peasants  working  for  another  .  .  . 

1,888,000 

Although  figures  for  a  later  period  are  not  available,  these  just 
cited  would  seem  to  disprove  the  Socialist  thesis  that  the  peasants 
are  gradually  being  expropriated  by  and  subjected  to  capitalism. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  independent  proprietors  are  increasing  in 
numbers,  while  peasants  working  for  a  landlord,  etc.,  are  decreas- 
ing. See  La  Mevue  Politique  et  Parlcmentaire,  November  10, 
1919,  "  L'accroissemcvt  du  nomhrc  des  jxvjsans-proprietaircs." 

38 


PARTY  PIIILOSOPIIIP]S 

noiincing  "men  wlio  are  rocognizod  by  tlioir  conservative 
opinions,"  and  parties  "wlio,  disguising  their  reaction- 
ary desires  under  cfiuivoeal  labels,"  wish  to  antagonize 
the  peasants  against  socialism.  The  manifest  stated  that 
the  Socialist  party  is  not  the  adversary  of  the  rural 
masses,  that  it  is  not  concerned  solely  -with  protecting 
the  city  workers  to  the  detriment  of  those  in  the  coun- 
try. Socialism,  it  maintains,  wishes  "to  bring  back  to 
the  laborers  themselves  the  means  of  production.  .  .  . 
It  docs  not  struggle  against  the  small  owners  who  them- 
selves produce,  whether  they  be  in  the  country  or  in  the 
city."  The  Socialists  net  only  wish  to  defend  these 
small  holders,  but  they  even  appear  to  wish  to  increase 
them. 

"The  Socialist  party,"  it  continues,  "does  not  wish 
to  rob  you  of  your  labor — which  it  wishes  only  to  render 
more  productive — but  to  guarantee  to  you  its  posses- 
sion." The  manifest  concludes  by  outlining  a  program 
dealing  with  the  means  of  agricultural  reconstruction 
and  proposing  new  methods  in  production,  and  projects 
in  favor  of  increased  salaries.  But  the  matter  of  * '  com- 
munal ownership"  of  rural  property  is  assiduously 
avoided."^ 

The  contradiction  betw^een  this  concession  to  peasant 
prejudices  and  the  principles  of  the  party  formulated 
in  1905  is  conspicuously  evident.  Moreover,  the  peasant 
population  of  France  is  so  conservative  and  individual- 
istic, that  the  successes  won  by  this  abdication  of  prin- 
ciple appear  too  meager  to  justify  the  means  employed. 
Indeed  the  Socialists  must  place  their  revolutionary 
hopes  in  the  Paris  mobs,  the  factor  from  which,  since  the 
days  of  Marcel,  the  Commune,  and  the  last  "First  of 

*"  Manifesto  reported  in  Lc  Temps,  June  1,  1919. 

39 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

May,"  disorder  in  France  has  always  been  evoked.  Their 
enemy  and  the  source  of  their  defeat  will  come  from 
the  paysans  who  have  sacrificed  most  for  La  Patrie 
and  who  now  cherish  more  than  ever  their  personal  share 
in  its  prosperity.*^ 

Before  the  war  the  Socialist  party  had  about  eighty 
department  federations.  Its  adherents  in  1905  were 
34,688,  a  number  which  increased  to  63,000  in  1912.  On 
account  of  the  war  this  number  decreased  to  37,073  in 
1918,  although  by  the  middle  of  April,  1919,  it  had  re- 
trieved most  of  its  former  strength — mustering  57,159 

"  In  keeping  with  its  idea  of  democracy,  the  Socialist  party  haa 
no  permanent  president;  but  there  is  a  permanent  administrative 
commission  (known  as  the  C.  P.  A.)  of  twenty-two  members,  and 
a  secretary,  who  is  charged  with  the  execvitive  work  of  the  party. 
These  members  are  elected  by  the  National  Congress,  an  annual 
meeting  of  the  party,  which  decides  its  policies.  The  delegates 
to  this  Congress  are  elected  by  congresses  of  the  department 
federations  in  proportion  to  their  dues-paying  members — one  dele- 
gate for  the  first  hundred  members,  and  one  for  every  two 
hundred  thereafter.  Between  congresses  the  party  is  directed  by  a 
National  Council  composed  of  (1)  the  Socialist  members  of  Par- 
liament, (2)  delegates  from  the  department  federations,  (3)  the 
administrative  commission  above  described.  This  national  council 
is  the  supreme  body  of  the  party  when  the  Congress  is  not  in 
session.  It  meets  ordinarily  once  every  two  months;  it  is  charged 
with  the  general  propaganda  and  with  executing  the  decision  of 
the  Congress.  The  Administrative  Commission  acts  in  its  absence 
and  for  it.  The  Socialist  group  in  the  Chamber  is  required  to  sub- 
mit an  annual  report  to  the  party  Congress  and  each  deputy  is 
required  to  pay  a  monthly  fee  of  fifty  dollars. 

Tho  only  requirements  for  joining  the  party  are  the  obligations 
to  subscribe  to  its  declaration,  pay  an  annual  fee  of  five  cents,  and 
belong  to  the  labor  union  of  tho  members'  trade. 

Tho  party  maintains  a  section  in  every  commune — which  holds 
a  meeting  at  least  once  a  month.  These  sections  are  administered 
by  a  commission  which  holds  bimonthly  meetings.  At  Paris 
and  Lyons  there  are  sections  for  every  arrondisscmcnt.  These 
sections  form  a  federation  in  every  department  which  is  admin- 
istered by  a  federal  committee.  There  is  also  a  Federal  Council, 
composed  of  delegates  of  the  sections,  wliich  is  a  deliberative 
bo<iy.  Disyiutes  between  department  federations  are  arbitrated  by 
themselves,  or  in  case  of  failure  to  reach  an  agreement,  by  an 
arbitrator  designated  by  tho  National  Council. 

40 


PARTY  PHILOSOPHIES 

members.  In  September  the  membership  had  jumped  to 
104,000.^^  The  party's  electoral  inlluence  is  naturally 
much  larger  than  the  number  of  pledged  supporters  in- 
dicates; the  number  of  votes  cast  for  Socialist  candidates 
increased  from  30,000  in  1885  to  1,200,000  in  1910, 
1,400,000  in  1914,  and  1,700,000  in  1919. 

The  history  of  the  Unified  Socialist  party  shows  that 
it  has  been  a  tremendous  power  in  French  politics — for 
it  has  drawn  its  support  from  bourgeoisie  as  well  as 
proletariat.  In  fact,  few  of  its  leaders  can  be  classed 
as  laboring  men.  M]\I.  Bracke  and  Loriot,  two  of  the 
most  extreme  Socialists,  are  school  teachers ;  M.  Compere- 
]\Iorel  is  an  agriculturist ;  M.  ]\Iistral,  another  prominent 
deputy,  is  a  wine  merchant;  M.  Albert  Thomas  is  an 
agrege  of  the  University  of  Paris  and  is  reputed  to  have 
great  wealth ;  Marcel  Sembat  is  a  lawyer.  Indeed,  from 
the  standpoint  of  Socialist  theory  this  has  been  the 
party's  weakness  in  the  past.  However,  its  pronounced 
tendency  to  move  further  toward  the  Left,  under  the 
leadership  of  Longuet  and  Loriot,^^  is  rapidly  alienating 
most  of  its  bourgeois  and  moderate  elements — and  at 
the  present  time  future  electoral  successes  of  the  party 
are  not  likely  to  be  so  important  as  in  the  past. 


YIII 

Many  Socialists,  friends  of  Millerand,  who  were  orig- 
inally associated  with  the  movement  of  1880,  prided 
themselves  on  opposing  the  doctrine  which  the  German 

"  The  growth  of  the  Socialists  is  not  as  remarkable  as  the  above 
figures  indicate,  for  according  to  ]\I.  Hanotaux  {op.  cit.,  1,  166) 
the  International  Workingmen 's  Association  in  Paris  alone  had 
between  70,000  and  80,000  members  in  1870. 

"See  p.  112. 

41 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

delegates  forced  upon  the  Congress  of  Amsterdam.  These 
believers  in  progressive  reform  and  in  participation  in 
bourgeois  government  did  not  adhere  to  the  Unified  So- 
cialist party  in  1905.  Just  previous  to  the  elections 
of  1910  about  thirty  deputies,  some  of  them  elected  as 
Republican  Socialists,  others  as  Independent  Socialists, 
and  few  as  Radicals,  formed  a  group  at  the  Chamber 
which  took  for  its  title  the  "Republican  Socialist 
Group."  On  June  7,  1010,  the  group  issued  a  declara- 
tion of  principles: 

Resolutely  and  exehisively  reformist,  the  group  believes  that 
reforms  can  be  considered  only  as  steps  towards  a  more  com- 
plete transformation  and  as  degrees  in  the  progressive  inaugu- 
ration of  a  new  social  order  where  labor  will  have  been  as- 
sured its  integral  rights. ^^ 

The  Declaration  outlined  a  gradual  transformation 
of  those  industries  in  which  capital  was  sufficiently  con- 
centrated, from  private  to  state  operation.  It  stood  for 
collective  bargaining,  for  the  development  of  labor  or- 
ganizations, and  for  their  participation  in  the  profits 
and  management  of  commercial  enterprises.  In  the  field 
of  agriculture,  it  offered  encouragement  to  the  small  in- 
dividual proprietor. 

Among  the  deputies  adhering  to  this  declaration  were 
three  prominent  statesmen :  A.  Millerand,  Paul  Painleve, 
and  Rene  Viviani.  Aristide  Briand  had  been  elected  to 
the  Chamber  by  the  Republican  Socialist  Federation  of 
the  Seine,  but  because  he  was  President  of  the  Council 
at  the  time  of  the  organization  of  this  group,  he  re- 
served his  adliesion. 

This  party  differs  from  the  Unified  Socialists  in  that 
it  repudiates  the  "class  struggle"  and  the  "revolution" 

**  ZevaCs  and  Prolo,  TJne  Campagnc  Politique,  17. 

42 


PARTY  PIIILOSOPmES 

— it  stands  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order.  Sec- 
ondly, it  is  nationalistic.  It  has  even  stood  for  the  three- 
year  military  service  law  which  the  "Unifies"  opposed; 
it  has  moreover  always  looked  upon  Germany  as  an 
enemy  of  France. 

The  organization  of  the  Republican  Socialists  is  large- 
ly patterned  upon  that  of  the  Unified  Socialists.  As  to 
the  strength  of  the  party,  it  appears  to  poll  about  one 
third  of  the  votes  of  the  Unified  Socialists.  In  the  elec- 
tions of  1910  it  made  a  gain  of  140,121  votes  over  those 
cast  for  it  in  1906.  In  1914  it  polled  323,326  votes.  In 
190G  it  had  twenty-nine  representatives  in  the  Chamber; 
in  1914,  this  number  had  increased  to  thirty;  in  1919, 
it  had  twenty-seven. 

IX 

This  ends  the  description  of  the  French  parties.  In 
addition  to  these  regular  parties  there  are,  however,  a 
multitude  of  societies  and  "groupements"  which  pose 
either  as  new  parties  or  reform  organizations.  In  this 
manner  the  "  party  of  the  "New  Democracy"  was 
launched  in  April,  1919.  By  November  it  claimed  to 
have  25,000  adherents.  It  ambitiously  demands  effi- 
ciency in  government,  the  exclusion  of  members  of  Par- 
liament from  office  in  the  Ministry,  the  representationtof 
trade  interests,  the  suppression  of  State  Socialism,  the 
union  of  classes,  and  full  religious  toleration.  The  writ- 
ings of  Lysis  in  his  organ,  La  Democratie  Nouvelle,  are 
widely  read;  but  the  party's  program  causes  it  to  be 
suspected  of  conservative  designs.^^  Its  following  is  until 
now  largely  a  personal  one  and  it  is  unlikely  to  attain 
the  strength  of  its  older  competitors. 

"See  p.  229. 

43 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

A  similar  movement,  the  League  of  the  Rights  of  Man, 
is  of  interest.  This  organization  was  founded  at  the  time 
of  the  Dreyfus  affair.  Although  it  is  not  a  political  or- 
ganization in  the  sense  of  attempting  to  get  candidates 
elected,  it  nevertheless  proposes  to  protect  every  citizen 
"in  the  exercise  of  the  rights  assured  him  by  the  Decla- 
ration of  the  Rights  of  Man  of  1789. ' '  ^*  This  program 
has  taken  the  form  of  defending  citizens  too  poor  to  se- 
cure counsel  in  the  courts.  The  League  has  likewise 
protested  against  several  alleged  illegal  processes,  such 
as  the  conviction  of  Malvy  during  the  war.  Although 
largely  composed  of  Socialists  and  Radicals,  it  is  by 
no  means  revolutionary.  During  the  peace  negotia- 
tions it  was  practically  the  only  organization  in  France, 
except  the  Socialists,  to  advocate  a  liberal  peace  settle- 
ment. 

There  are  many  other  organizations,  each  urging  the 
adoption  of  a  specific  or  a  general  reform,  such  as  the 
Civic  League,  the  Party  of  the  Fourth  Republic,  the 
League  of  Professional  Representation  and  Regionalist 
Action,  the  League  of  Proportional  Representation,  the 
Ligue  dcs  Gouvernes,  the  Union  of  Economic  Interests, 
the  Ligue  des  Hommes  Litres,  the  National  Association 
for  the  Organization  of  Democracy,  the  Republican 
Union  of  Commerce  and  Industry,  the  Circle  of  the 
Boulevard  of  the  Capucins,  and  the  Union  of  Former 
Combatants — all  of  which  illustrate  the  riotous  and  the 
prolific  character  of  French  politics.  Many  of  the  doc- 
trines and  activities  of  these  organizations  will  be  men- 
tioned in  subsequent  chapters. 

"The  Lca^o  of  the  Rights  of  Man  has  had  several  illustrious 
precursors.  In  1830  the  Society  of  the  Rioflits  of  Man  was  organ- 
ized, and  during  the  reign  oT  Louis  I'liilippc  it  carried  on  an 
effective  propaganda  for  the  Republic.  Hoe  Georges  Weill,  Uis- 
toiro  du  Parti  Jicpublicain  en  France,  98-142. 

44 


PARTY  PIIILOSOPIIIES 

From  the  discussion  of  the  programs  and  organiza- 
tions of  French  political  parties  it  may  also  be  con- 
cluded that  the  charge  of  party  instability  can  be  over- 
exaggerated,^^  for  at  least  seven  of  these  parties  main- 
tain offices  in  Paris  and  sections  in  great  numbers  of 
the  communes  and  departments.  A  majority  of  them 
exact  the  regular  payment  of  dues,  a  practice  contribut- 
ing more  than  anything  else,  to  the  fixity  of  organization. 
Nearly  all  of  them  have  annual  Congresses  in  which 
local  units  are  represented.  This  is  a  custom  which 
American  parties  lack.  Finally,  the  French  parties  are 
centers  of  social  intercourse  and  of  education  to  a  much 
greater  extent  than  American  parties,  as  nearly  all  of 
them  are  supported  by  auxiliary  organizations  among 
the  women  and  youth.  In  these  respects  the  French 
party  system,  apart  from  its  parliamentary  expression, 
manifests  many  elements  of  continuity. 

°°  Parties  must  always  be  distinguished  from  parliamentary 
groups.  Wliile  the  former  since  1900  have  been  fairly  continu- 
ous, tlie  latter,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  are  constantly 
changing. 


CHAPTER  II 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 


Notre  Tarlement,  institution  esscntielle,  etait,  il  est  encore,  un 
theatre. — Creek. 


A  parliamentary,  in  contrast  to  a  congressional,  gov- 
ernment, is  based  upon  a  legislative  body  directly  elected 
by  and  responsible  to  the  people.  The  Ministry  or  the 
Government  is  chosen  from  among  the  members  of  the 
party  or  parties  having  the  majority  in  this  legislative 
body.  Such  a  government  not  only  looks  after  the  ad- 
ministrative services,  as  does  the  American  executive, 
but  it  actively  directs  legislation.  Through  its  mem- 
bers who  at  the  same  time  belong  to  Parliament,  it  in- 
troduces measures  and  urges  their  passage.  So  impor- 
tant is  this  legislative  function,  that  in  England  a  meas- 
ure has  little  chance  of  success  unless  it  directly  ema- 
nates from  the  I\Iinistry.  Although  this  is  not  so  true  in 
France,  here  a  distinction  is  made  between  a  project 
of  law,  introduced  by  the  government,  and  a  proposition 
of  law,  introduced  by  an  ordinary  member  of  Parlia- 
ment. Generally,  it  may  be  said  that  the  Ministry,  un- 
der a  Cal)inet  form  of  government  is  supreme  so  long 
as  it  possesses  the  confidence  of  Parliament. 

But  such  a  Ministry  is  always  responsible  to  the 
chambers  for  its  collective  and  individual  acts,  theoretic- 


1*ARTIKS  AND  PARLIAMENT 

ally,  both  to  the  iij)por  and  the  lower;  in  reality,  only  to 
the  lower. ^  If  defeated  ni)on  any  propof;ition  it  must 
either  resign  as  a  body,  or  dissolve  Parliament  and  call 
a  speeial  eleetion.  In  the  latter  case,  the  people  decide 
whether  they  approve  the  ]\Iinistry  or  Parliament  by  re- 
turning representatives  favorable  to  the  one  or  the  other. 
If  the  same  Parliament  is  returned  the  Ministry  must 
resign  and  one  representing  the  dominant  opinion  is  ap- 
pointed. If  a  new  Parliament  favorable  to  the  old  Min.* 
istry  is  returned,  the  latter  continues  in  power.  Thus 
responsibility  of  the  Ministry  to  Parliament  and  to  the 
people — and  of  Parliament  to  the  people — is  ideally 
assured. 

To  be  completely  successful,  the  parliamentary  system 
of  government  must  be  founded  upon  strongly  organized 
parties.  If  ministers  are  to  come  from  a  sympathetic 
Parliament  and  if  they  are  to  fall  when  they  lose  its 
sympathy,  that  is,  of  a  majority  of  its  members,  a 
coherent  organization,  composed  of  two  balanced  and 
stable  divisions,  must  exist.  This  division  must  be 
just  flexible  enough  so  that  members  outside  of  both 
(or  inside,  for  that  matter,)  may  throw  their  weight 
from  one  side  to  another  whenever  the  Ministry  in  power 
loses  their  confidence.  But  the  party  coming  into  power 
should  be  strong  enough  to  govern  alone,  unsupported 
by  other  groups,  in  order  that  unity  and  responsibility 
be  exercised  by  its  Ministry.  In  a  satisfactory  parlia- 
mentary government,  then,  there  must  be  two  large 
parties,  nearly  equally  dividing  the  support  of  the  na- 
tion. Such  has  been  the  experience  in  England ;  but 
the  impossibility  of  such  a  stable  and  equal  division 
in  France,  as  we  have  noted  in  the  last  chapter,  has 

'  For  the  control  of  tlie  French  Senate  on  the  Ministry,  see  p.  225. 

47 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

brought  about  some  features  in  parliamentary  govern- 
ment which  may  be  called  defects. 


II 


Before  examining  these  defects  we  must  first  consider 
the  manner  in  which  French  parties  function  in  Par- 
liament. On  their  election,  by  far  the  greater  number 
of  Deputies  and  Senators  become  associated  with  what 
is  called  a  "parliamentary  group."  These  groups,  com- 
posed of  members  of  like  political  views,  are  supposed, 
to  a  certain  extent,  to  represent  party  organizations. 
But  the  very  remarkable  thing  about  these  groups  is 
that  the  majority  of  them  have  no  connection  with 
French  party  organizations  and  they  are  almost  abso- 
lutely free  from  external  party  control.  Out  of  the 
nine  principal  groups  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in 
191-9,  four  were  organized  upon  a  definite  party  basis: 
The  Unified  Socialist,  the  Republican  Socialist,  the  Radi- 
cal Socialist,  and  the  Liberal  Action  group.  In  the  other 
five,  the  Radical  Left,  the  Republicans  of  the  Left,  the 
Republican  Radical  Union,  the  Group  of  the  Entente, 
and  the  Group  of  the  Right,  party  lines  overlapped. 
Although,  generally  speaking,  each  group  represented  a 
conservative  or  a  liberal  tendency,  parties,  as  outlined 
in  the  previous  chapter,  were  merged  into  different 
groups;  strictly  party  men  found  themselves  joined  with 
complete  independents  in  the  same  group;  and  men  of 
antagonistic  politics,  such  as  an  Orleanist  and  a 
"Rallie, "  sat  together. 

Among  the  members  of  the  Right,  there  appears  to  be 
absolutely  no  relation  between  party  organization  and 
membership  in  parliamentary  groups.    Often  this  is  be- 

48 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

cause  there  is  no  party  organization  to  speak  of,  and  it  is 
also  not  inconsistent  with  the  "irresponsible"  doctrines 
this  element  holds.  (The  Liberal  Action  group  offers  a 
slight  exception,  perhaps,  for  a  majority  of  the  execu- 
tive committee  of  the  party  organization  must  be  mem- 
bers of  Parliament  and  the  party  maintains  a  distinct 
party  group,  insuring  a  certain  amount  of  discipline 
and  unity.)  Similarly,  there  is  little  relation  between 
the  representatives  of  the  Republican  Federation  in 
Parliament  and  the  party  organization  itself,  or  be- 
tween those  of  the  Republican  Democratic  Alliance  and 
its  party  organization.  Indeed  many  of  the  adherenta 
of  this  group  belong  to  the  Group  of  the  Entente.  In 
the  Radical  party,  however.  Senators  and  Deputies  pro- 
fessing to  be  members  of  it,  must  accept  at  least  its 
minimum  program.  They  must  pay  their  dues,  assist 
at  party  congresses  and  adhere  to  the  "party  group." 
Senators  and  Deputies  are  ex  officio  members  of  the 
Executive  Committee.^ 

Thus  Radical  members  of  Parliament  can  only  obtain 
the  "approval"  of  their  party  if  they  have  formally 
adhered  to  the  party's  program  and  if  they  maintain  the 
loyalty  this  implies  throughout  their  term  of  office. 

Candidates  for  office  are  selected  by  the  department 
Federations.  There  can  be  only  one  candidate  in  each 
constituency;  and  no  party  representative  or  journal  is 
allowed  to  oppose  a  Radical  candidate  by  supporting  a 
candidate  of  another  party.    If  any  Radical  representa- 

'  Likewise,  sixteen  of  the  thirty-five  members  of  the  Bureau 
of  the  Executive  Committee  must  be  members  of  Parliament. 
There  is  a  commission  upon  discipline  which  reports  to  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  upon  any  fracture  of  party  mandates.  Tlie  latter 
body  may  impose  the  penalties  of  warning,  censure,  or  exclusion. 
Such  a  penalty  can  only  bo  imposed  by  a  majority  of  two-thirds 
of  the  committee. 

49 


CONTEJMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tive  in  Parliament  lends  his  support  to  a  candidate  con- 
demning the  policy  of  the  party,  he  is  liable  to  dis- 
cipline. By  these  means,  a  very  close  relationship  exists 
between  the  Radical  Socialist  group  in  Parliament  and 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  party.  The  latter,  by 
wielding  its  disciplinary  power,  may  virtually  direct 
the  parliamentary  group.  Although  the  Radical  group 
is  strongly  represented  in  the  Committee,  a  firm  bond 
between  party  interests  and  members  throughout  the 
country  is  maintained.^ 

But  the  Radical  party  has  not  always  maintained  this 
control  over  its  parliamentary  members.  Until  just 
prior  to  the  war,  there  was  no  distinct  and  all-inclusive 
Radical  group  in  the  Chamber.  Although  they  pos- 
sessed the  balance  of  power  and  the  majority  for  a  long 
period  of  time,  their  representatives  were  scattered  be- 
tween a  number  of  groups,  each  working  quite  independ- 
ently of  the  other.  In  1911,  the  Radical  Left  contained 
113  representatives  of  the  party,  while  149  of  them  were 
inscribed  in  the  Republican  Radical  Socialist  group.  Just 
before  the  elections  of  1914,  the  members  of  the  party 
were  divided  into  three  parliamentry  groups — four  be- 
longed to  the  Democratic  Left,  and  the  remainder  split 
their  allegiance  between  the  Radical  Left  and  the  Radi- 
cal Socialist  group.  The  Congress  at  Pau  attempted  to 
remedy  this  condition  and  to  effect  a  general  reorgani- 
zation of  the  party  by  deciding  that  the  Senators  and 
Deputies  of  the  party  must  constitute  the  "group"  of 
the  Radical  and  Radical  Socialist  party,  and  that  they 
may  not  inscribe  themselves  in  parliamentary  groups 


*  These  particulars  will  be  found  in  Uio  Party  Stntufes  and  Hequ- 
lationa,  piven  in  the  apiiomlix  to  Jacques,  op.  nt.,  484-.'541.  See 
also  Douciemc  Congris  du,  Parti  Rcpublicain,  Eadiral  ct  Jiadical- 
Socialiste,  at  Tours,  a  brochure,  199. 

50 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

of  other  parties.  It  was  also  decided  tluit  tlic  "party 
group"  must  be  exclusively  composed  of  all  the  Deputies 
of  the  party,  and  no  others.*  Tlie  concentration  of 
forces,  resulting  from  this  decision,  gave  rise  to  the 
name,  Unified  Radicals,  which  characterized  the  party  in 
the  1914  elections,  but  which  in  1919  seemed  to  have 
disappeared. 

The  Republican  Socialist  party  also  compels  candi- 
dates seeking  election  to  sign  both  its  declaration  of 
principles  and  its  program.  The  party  ropresentatives 
in  Parliament  constitute  a  part  of  the  administrative 
commission  of  the  party,  and  they  form  a  unique  ])arty 
group.  But  aside  from  their  participation  in  the  ad- 
ministrative commission  of  the  party,  the  members  of 
this  group  are  responsible  only  to  their  own  department 
federation. 

The  Unified  Socialist  party  maintains  the  strictest 
control  and  discipline  exercised  by  a  party  over  its  par- 
liamentary representatives.  They  form  an  exclusive 
group  in  the  Chamber.  Every  candidate  for  office  must 
sign  a  declaration  promising  to  observe  its  principles 
and  regulations  and  to  follow  the  tactics  of  the  party,  and 
the  decisions  of  national  and  international  congresses. 
A  Deputy  who  leaves  the  party  is  under  the  obligation, 
although  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  provision  can  be 
enforced,  of  resigning  from  office  if  the  organization 
originally  electing  him,  refuses  him  further  support. 
The  Socialist  group  in  Parliament  must  present  an  an- 
nual report  to  the  annual  congress  of  the  party.  A 
collective  delegation-  from  the  group  forms  a  part  of  the 

*See  account  of  Treisieme  Congres  du  Parti  Hepublicain,  Radical 
et  Sadical-Socialistc,  at  Pan,  a  brochure,  357, 

51 


CONTET^rPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

National  Council.^  As  previously  noted,  the  members 
of  the  group  must  pay  a  monthly  fee  of  250  francs,  100 
francs  going  to  the  National  Council  and  150  francs  to 
the  organization  which  bore  their  election  expenses.  If 
a  member  fails  to  pay  this  fee  for  three  months  he  is 
read  out  of  the  party.  A  Socialist  Deputy  must  conse- 
quently replenish  part^'  funds  and  must  subject  him- 
self to  direct  control. 

By  means  of  an  arbitral  commission  the  Socialist 
party  settles  conflicts  between  members,  sections,  or 
groups.  This  commission,  subject  to  appeal,  may 
"warn"  a  member,  temporarily  suspend  him  from  any 
delegation,  or  even  exclude  him  entirely  from  the  party. 
The  parliamentary-  group  itself  is  under  the  control  of 
the  National  Council  and  the  latter  body  decides  how 
the  members  of  the  group  should  vote  upon  any  ques- 
tions of  importance  before  the  Chamber.  The  expulsion 
of  members,  because  of  refusal  to  comply  with  party 
decisions,  has  been  frequently  employed. 

Department  federations,  following  the  famous  ex- 
ample of  the  federation  of  the  Seine  in  expelling  Mil- 
lerand,  expelled  numerous  ex-m-ajoritaires  ^  during  the 
summer  of  1919,  M.  Compere-Morel  being  one  to  suffer 
such  a  fate.  The  organization  and  discipline  of  the 
Socialists  has  been  and  continues  to  be  the  great  cause  of 
Socialist  successes.  Similar  tactics  on  the  part  of  the 
bourgeois  parties  will  be  a  necessity  if  they  are  success- 
fully to  combat  the  Llarxian  Socialists. 

The  Unified  Socialists  and  the  Radicals  are  the  only 
parties  maintaining  an  immediate  control  over  their 
parliamentary    groups — the    only    ones    to    establish    a 

^  lirfjlemcmt  du  Parti,  broelniro  distributed  by  tho  National 
Couneil. 

"For  tlio  origin  of  tlic  cx-majoritaircs,  sec  p.   107. 

52 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

firm  relationslii])  between  tbe  rejjular  party  organiza- 
tion and  tlie  pai-ty  representatives.  The  other  parties — 
notably  those  of  tlie  Riglit — exercise  no  sueh  control  over 
their  representatives.  Among  the  latter,  party  dis- 
cipline is  unknown.  This  is  one  reason  for  the  weak- 
ness of  tlie  conservative  forces  in  France — ^lack  of  or- 
ganization. It  likewise  accounts  for  one  of  the  weak- 
nesses in  French  parliamentary  government,  for  as  Eng- 
lisli  practice  illustrates,  there  must  be  the  closest  bonds 
between  the  constituents  of  a  party  and  its  parliamen- 
tary representatives. 

As  for  the  groups  themselves,  they  are  regularly  or- 
ganized. They  hold  meetings  resembling  caucuses,  ex- 
cept that  the  decisions  reached  cannot  be  enforced  upon 
their  members.  As  they  are  at  liberty  to  resign  from 
their  group  and  adhere  to  another,  discipline  can  be 
enforced  only  with  difficulty,  especially  when  the  group 
member's  party  maintains  no  "party  group."  The 
groups  are  supposed  to  cast  homogeneous  and  solid 
votes;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  they  seldom  do.  The 
only  practical  purpose  these  groups  appear  to  serve 
is  as  a  basis  for  the  composition  of  the  "Permanent 
Committees  of  the  Chamber."  At  the  beginning  of 
every  Chamber  (that  is,  every  four  years),  nineteen 
such  "committees"  or  "commissions"  are  elected,  each 
composed  of  forty-four  members.'^     The  different  parlia- 


'  Regulation  voted  January  29  and  February  4,  1915.  These 
coniniissions  arc  (1)  General,  Departmental  and  Communal  Ad- 
ministration, (2)  Foreign  Affairs,  I'rotectorates  and  Colonics,  (-i) 
Agriculture,  (4)  Armj',  (5)  Social  Insurance  and  Pensions  (Pre- 
voyance),  (G)  Budget,  (7)  Commerce  and  Industry,  (8)  Definite 
Accounts  and  Economics,  (9)  Tariff,  (10)  Education  and  Fine 
Arts,  (11)  Public  Hygiene,  (12)  Civil  and  Criminal  Legislation, 
(13)  Fiscal  Legislation,  (14)  Marino  and  War,  (15)  Merchant 
Marine,  (16)  Mines,  (17)  I'osts  and  Telegraphs,  (IS)  Labor, 
(19)  Public  Works,  Railways  and  Communication  Facilities. 

53 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

mentary  groups  are  proportionally  represented  in  these 
commissions  in  the  following  manner :  Five  days  before 
the  date  fixed  for  the  nomination  of  these  commissions, 
the  different  political  groups  of  the  Chamber  must  fur- 
nish to  the  President,  for  publication,  a  list  of  all  their 
members.  No  representative  is  allowed  to  appear  on 
more  than  one  group  list.  Three  days  before  the  date 
fixed  for  the  nomination,  the  groups  submit  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Chamber  a  list  of  candidates  for  these  com- 
missions, varying  in  number  according  to  the  strength 
of  the  groups,  as  indicated  on  the  lists  previously  sub- 
mitted. Finally,  the  mere  submission  of  such  a  nomi- 
nating list,  provided  it  does  not  exceed  the  number  of 
candidates  to  which  each  group  is  entitled,  is  considered 
equivalent  to  their  election  by  the  Chamber.  Thus 
each  group  elects  its  own  representatives  to  these  com- 
missions. In  case  a  certain  percentage  of  the  Chamber 
protests  the  nomination  of  any  member  to  a  commis- 
sion (as  was  done  with  the  Socialist  group  nomination 
of  ]\IM.  Longuet  and  IMayeras  to  the  Commission  for  the 
Ratification  of  the  Treaty),  a  vote  is  taken  by  the  Cham- 
ber on  all  of  tlie  candidates.  Special  commissions  acting 
for  limited  and  specific  purposes  are  chosen  in  a  similar 
manner.^ 

In  order  to  secure  a  majority  in  the  Chamber,  it  is 
obviously  necessary  for  a  certain  number  of  these  groups, 
temporarily  at  least,  to  enter  into  combination.    But  be- 

*  As  an  exnniple  of  the  representation  \ipon  such  a  commission, 
the  ratification  commission,  chosen  by  the  Chamber,  June  25th, 
19J9,  contained  sixty  members,  of  which  the  Socialists  orij^jnally 
nominated  eleven;  tho  Eepublican  Socialists,  three;  the  Radical- 
Socialists,  eighteen;  tho  Radical  Left,  six;  the  Republican  Left, 
six;  tho  Republican  Radical  Union,  two;  the  group  of  the  Kntenti^, 
seven;  Ijiberal  Action,  two;  Group  of  the  Right,  one;  group  of 
"xion-inscrits. "  one;  Independents,  three. 

54 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

cause  of  their  number  alone,  regardless  of  their  lacik  of 
discipline  and  their  indej)endenee  of  party,  control, 
such  coalitions  are  generally  of  the  most  transient  in- 
stability. Yet  a  new  ]\Iinistry  can  come  to  power  only 
1)3'  efTecting  such  a  combination.  In  the  presence  of 
such  a  large  number  of  groups,  it  is  practically  impossi- 
ble for  one  party  to  have  a  majority,  althougli  the  Radi- 
cals several  times  have  been  able  to.  Thus,  instead  of 
a  majority  and  a  minority  party  consistently  offsetting 
each  other,  France  is  governed  by  a  group  system,  in 
which,  because  of  the  number  of  these  groups,  the  ma- 
jority is  continually  changing  in  composition.  As  a  re- 
sult ministries  depend  on  no  one  party  for  support; 
and  they  can  follow  no  strictly  party  policy. 

Furthermore,  these  groups  are  continually  shifting, 
disappearing,  dissolving,  and  reappearing.  Of  the  last 
two  groups  which  formed  a  part  of  the  National  As- 
sembly from  1871  to  1876,  one,  the  Extreme  Radical 
and  Socialist  Left,  disappeared  in  1906,  and  the  other, 
the  Center  Left,  vanished  shortly  after  the  elections  of 
1910.  The  terms,  "Legitimists,"  "Orleanists,"  and 
"Imperialists,"  which  figured  in  this  Assembly,  were 
applied  to  combinations  which  have  long  since  been 
merged  into  the  "group  of  the  Right."  This  group 
of  the  Right  in  1902  was  known  as  the  Reactionary 
group.  The  "Rallies"  and  "Nationalists"  have  com- 
pletely lost  their  significance,  most  of  the  former  now 
adhering  to  the  Liberal  Action  group,  and  the  latter, 
grouped  with  the  Right,  or  "Independents."  The  ]\Iin- 
isterial  and  Radical  Dissident  groups  of  1902  disap- 
peared in  the  Chamber  of  1906 ;  and  the  members  of 
both  appear  to  have  merged  with  the  Democratic  Left. 
Similarly,  the  group  of  the  Extreme  Radical  and  Social- 
ist Left  and  that  of  the  Independent  Socialists,  existing 

55 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

in  1902,  disappeared  after  1906,  while  a  new  Parlia- 
mentary^ Socialist  group  came  into  being.  The  latter  dis- 
appeared in  the  1910  Chamber  where  a  new  Republican 
Socialist  group  made  its  debut. 

A  similar  confusion  exists  in  the  Senate  where  the 
Republican  Left  corresponds  to  the  Republican  Union 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  the  Republican  Union 
of  the  Senate  may  be  compared  with  the  Democratic 
Left  of  the  lower  house. 

These  instances  will  indicate  the  confused  complica- 
tion of  the  party  machinery  and  the  difficulties  in  which 
French  parliamentarism  is  called  upon  to  function.  With 
the  exception  of  one  or  two  groups,  there  is  no  relation- 
ship between  the  parties  proper  and  their  parliamentary 
representatives;  the  latter  are  organized  into  independ- 
ent, shifting  groups  of  little  discipline  or  homogeneity.^ 
Consequently,  parliamentary  representatives  are  really 
free  from  all  obligation ;  and  there  is  no  way  to  en- 
force their  adherence  to  a  certain  program  or  a  certain 
cabinet.  Thus,  the  most  essential  basis  of  a  satisfactory 
parliamentary  government — party  discipline — is  absent. 


Ill 

Two  general  results,  already  implied,  arise  from  the 
condition  just  described.  Tlie  first  is  the  instability  of 
ministries  and  the  inevitable  lack  of  continuity  in  policy. 
The  second  is  the  overwhelming  predominance  of  Par- 
liament over  the  Ministry. 

As  no  one  party  commands  an  absolute  majority  in 

"  M.  Aristide  Briand  offers  an  example  of  tho  independence 
of  a  Frencli  I)ej>iity.  Elected  by  the  Ke])iil)li('an  Socialist  party 
from  St.  Etienno,  he  belnn{,'s  to  no  parliamentary  group,  al- 
through  the  Republican  Socialists  are  organized  in  one. 

5G 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

the  French  Cliaiiihcr,  the  President  of  the  Rei)uhlic 
must  select  a  man  as  President  of  the  Council  of  ^lin- 
isters  (the  I*riine  IMinister),  avIio  will  connnand  the  sup- 
port of  sevei'al  parties.  The  dileinnia  of  the  Premier  is 
increased  by  the  necessity  -of  selecting  an  entire  cabinet 
from  tliese  difT(>rinfi:,  often  hostile  elements.  In  England 
the  task  of  choosing  a  Prime  ]\Iinister  is  comparatively 
simple  because  the  leader  of  the  party  in  power  is  gener- 
ally distinguishable.  But  in  France,  on  account  of  the 
reason  above  given,  the  President  is  allowed  to  use  a 
great  deal  of  personal  discretion  because  no  outstanding 
party  leader  can  exist.  There  may  be  three  or  four  avail- 
able candidates,  but  because  of  their  number,  the  final 
choice  must  rest  with  the  President  of  the  Republic  alone. 
As  a  result  of  this"  condition,  long  intervals  frequently 
elapse  between  the  fall  of  one  cabinet  and  the  formation 
of  another.  Even  when  a  Prime  Minister  is  chosen, 
he  must  carry  on  negotiations  with  groups,  securing 
their  adherence  by  the  judicious  distribution  of  seats, 
and  often  by  the  creation  of  new  ones  merely  to  satisfy 
certain  representations.  This  necessity  was  increased 
during  the  war  when  the  willing  collaboVation  of  every 
group  in  the  ]\Iinistry  became  a  necessity.  The  Viviani 
Cabinet,  already  in  power  when  war  was  declared  on 
August  3,  1914,  immediately  enlarged  itself  to  include 
MM.  Delcasse,  Ribot,  Millerand,  Briand,  Sembat  and 
Guesde.  (The  latter  was  given  no  administrative  posi- 
tion, but  was  merely  denominated  "IMinister  without 
Portfolio."  It  is  said  that  he  did  nothing  in  the  Council 
of  Ministers^"  except  draw  a  salary  and  insure  the  So- 

^"The   Council   of   Ministers   as   opposed   to  the  Cabinet  is   the 

administrative  body  of  ministers  recognized  in  tlie  Constitution ; 
the  Cabinet  is  tlic  ]>oliti<'al  body.  The  President  of  the  Kepublic 
meets  witli  the  former  but  not  with  the  latter. 

57 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

cialist  support  of  the  war.)  In  the  Briaiid  Cabinet, 
which  followed  that  of  Viviani,  a  new  device  was  used 
to  secure  the  political  representation  of  all  parties.  This 
was  the  creation  of  ]\Iinisters  of  State,  of  whom  there 
were  five.  MM.  Freycinet,  Emile  Combes,  Leon  Bour- 
geois, Jules  Guesde  and  Denys  Cochin  occupied  these 
new  positions,  the  first  being  a  ]\Ioderate,  the  second  two, 
Radical  Senators,  the  fourtli,  a  Socialist,  and  the  fifth, 
a  member  of  the  Extreme  Right. 

The  Yiviani  i\Iinistry  which  came  to  power  on  June 
13,  1914,  illustrated  the  dif^culty  of  the  formation  of  a 
new  cabinet.  On  June  2,  1914,  the  Doumergue  Cabinet 
resigned,  and  because  of  the  increased  strength  of  the 
Left,  Rene  Yiviani,  a  Republican  Socialist,  was  imme- 
diately asked  to  form  a  ncAv  government.  It  took  him 
exactly  eleven  days  to  come  to  terms  with  the  Radicals, 
notably  upon  the  three-year  military  service  law  to 
which  the  Radicals  Avere  opposed-  Concessions  were 
passed  back  and  forth  unsuccessfully  until  June  9,  when 
President  Poincare,  despairing  of  Yiviani 's  success, 
asked  A.  Ribot,  a  Moderate  belonging  to  the  Republican 
Union  of  the  Senate,  to  make  the  attempt  to  form  a 
cabinet.  M.  Ribot  judiciously  selected  a  cabinet  from 
the  Left  and  Center  groups,  but  because  of  his  support 
of  the  three-year  law,  the  Unified  Socialists  and  the  Rad- 
icals overthrew  him  on  June  12  by  a  vote  of  306  to  262. 
Finally,  upon  June  13,  Yiviani  succeeded  in  coming  to 
terms  with  the  Radicals,  and  took  over  the  ]\Iinistry.  In 
his  cabinet  were  five  Radicals,  two  Republican  Social- 
ists, three  Senators  from  the  Democratic  Left,  one  Re- 
publican of  the  Left,  and  one  member  from  the  Radical 
Left.  More  than  half  of  these  twelve  ministers  had 
voted  for  the  three-year  law  of  August  7,  1913,  al- 
though   collectively    the    cabinet    had    come    to    power 

58 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

pledged  to  overcome  it.  P)Ut  as  soon  as  llie  ('al)iiiet  ^vas 
firmly  seated  in  power,  it  announced  its  firm  intention 
to  give  it  its  support.  Such  a  change  of  policies  is  a 
frequent  occurrence  under  the  French  regime.  Although 
the  Unified  Socialists  withdrew  their  support,  the  Radi- 
cals were  able  to  muster  a  majority  which  kept  M,  Vi- 
vian! in  i)ower. 

The  attempt  of  M.  Ribot  to  form  a  government,  as 
above  related,  resulted  in  what  was  kno^vn  as  the  One 
Day  Government  from  the  length  of  its  tenure.  This 
affords  an  illustration  of  the  uncertainty  and  the  in- 
stability of  French  ministries.  According  to  figures 
compiled  by  ]\I.  Leon  ]\luel,"  during  a  period  of  a  hun- 
dred years,  from  1789  to  1890,  France  has  had  ninety- 
four  IMinisters  of  Justice,  117  of  the  Interior,  ninety- 
nine  of  Foreign  Affairs,  ninety-nine  of  Finance,  109  of 
War,  and  eighty-eight  of  IMarine.  Thus  the  average 
term  of  office  of  the  IMinisters  of  Justice,  Finance,  and 
Jlarine,  was  a  little  over  a  year ;  that  of  the  Llinisters  of 
the  Interior  and  of  War,  a  little  less  than  a  year. 

From  the  advent  of  the  cabinet  of  Jules  Dufaure,  on 
IMarcli  9,  1876  (who  was  the  first  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil under  the  Third  Republic),  to  the  accession  of  the 
Clemenceau  Ministry  in  November,  1917,  there  were 
fifty-six  ministries — during  a  period  covering  forty-one 
years.  In  other  words,  a  French  ]\Iinistry  has  had  an 
average  life  of  less  than  nine  months.  Contrasted  with 
the  ministerial  tenure  in  England,  where  from  1873  to 
191-1  there  have  only  been  eleven  ministries,  the  ad- 
vantages of  a  stable  party  organization  can  readily  be 
seen.  During  the  same  length  of  time — 1876  to  1917 — 
France  had  five  times  as  many  ministries  as  England. 

"  Cited  in  Etlmond  Villey,  Les  Vices  de  la  Constitution  Fran- 
faist',   122. 

59 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Although  both  countries  nominally  have  the  same  par- 
liamentary form  of  government,  they  work  quite  dif- 
ferently in  practice.  Of  course  the  essential  thing 
about  a  "cabinet"  government  is  that  it  holds  office  only 
so  long  as  it  maintains  the  sympathy  of  the  majority 
of  Parliament  or  of  the  country.  But  as  already  noted, 
•«'hile  this  majority  in  England  is  organized  and  stable, 
and  its  sympathies  definitely  determined  and  expressed, 
in  France  there  can  be  no  majority  in  the  English  sense. 
There  are  combinations,  coalitions,  and  blocs,  tempo- 
rarily held  together  by  a  common  ambition.^^  The  num- 
ber, the  independence,  the  changing  interests,  and  the 
lack  of  discipline  of  these  groups  do  not  long  allow  them 
to  endure.  AVhen  these  combinations  break  up,  it  usual- 
ly means  that  another  combination  will  be  formed,  an- 
tagonistic to  the  Ministry — and  the  latter  must  fall. 
The  result  upon  the  conduct  of  the  government  is  plain. 
An  ordinary  Ministry  will  try  to  perpetuate  its  power 
as  long  as  possible.  To  do  this,  it  will  have  to  satisfy 
the  demands  of  the  four  or  five  groups  supporting  it. 
But  these  demands  are  usually  conflicting  and  they 
cannot  be  carried  out  to  the  satisfaction  of  all.  Con- 
sequently a  Ministry  usually  "marks  time";  at  least  it 
is  subjected  to  the  temptation  of  temporizing.  Re- 
forms which  it  is  pledged  to  enact  are  found  impossible 
of  realization  if  it  wishes  to  remain  in  power.  Measures 
demanding  immediate  adoption  drag  through  successive 
Parliaments,  their  principle  not  being  accepted  because 
groups  differ  on  details.  This  has  been  especially  true 
of  the  income  tax.  Promised  by  the  Radical  party  in 
1906,  advocated  many  years  before,  it  was  finally  en- 
acted in  1914.     This  has  been  true  also  of  electoral  re- 

"  For  a  history   of   tlioso  conibinationa,  sec   Chapter    I  IT 

GO 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

form,  advocated  in  one  form  or  another  ever  since  the 
creation  of  the  Third  Republic,  and  only  enacted  in 
1919.  Unless  a  IMinistry  is  couraj^eons  beyond  the  ordi- 
nary, it  is  not  likely  to  urge  reform  measures  which  may 
react  against  the  self-interest  of  some  parliamentary 
group.  If  a  strong  Ministry  urges  them  it  is  sooner  or 
later  bound  to  fall.  As  a  result  pressure  for  reforms 
does  not  usually  come  from  the  Government.  This  is 
true  especially  in  matters  of  social  and  economic  legisla- 
tion. It  comes,  if  at  all,  from  independent  members  of 
Parliament  outside  the  IMinistry,  and  more  strongly, 
from  great,  organized  extra-parliamentary  bodies  such 
as  the  General  Confederation  of  Labor  who,  by  threat, 
have  forced  the  passage  of  greatly  needed  measures. ^^ 

In  fact,  the  weakness  of  the  Government  and  the 
inability  of  Parliament  to  accomplish  results  seem  to 
be  one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  strength  of  these 
outside,  and  purely  extra-legal  bodies.  As  far  as  the 
French  Ministry  is  concerned,  its  virtual  powerlessness 
to  initiate  reform  legislation  and  its  uncertain  lease  on 
life,  has  a  strong  tendency  to  keep  the  stronger  men  of 
the  country  out  of  the  cabinet.  But  their  places  are 
greedily  held  by  successive  swarms  of  men  who  in  other 
countries  would  be  wholly  unable  to  hold  ministerial 
positions. 

Criticism  upon  this  score  is  often  exaggerated,  how- 

"  The  demand  of  the  National  Association  of  Functionaries,  for 
salary  increases  by  July  21,  1919,  seems  to  have  been  the  only 
reason  why  Parliament  provided  them.  Other  orgjanizations,  such 
as  the  Civic  League,  the  League  of  the  Rights  of  jMen,  the 
League  for  Proportional  Representation,  the  League  for  Regional 
Action  have  led  figKts  for  reform.  The  Electoral  Reform  Bill 
of  July,  1919,  is  an  instance  of  a  great  reform  which  was  spon- 
sored by  members  of  Parliament,  without  the  support  of  the 
Ministry.  In  fact,  the  Clemenceau  Ministry  appeared  to  be  se- 
cretly opposed  to  it. 

61 


CONTEIMTORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ever,  for  the  effects  of  the  imstable  tenure  of  ministries 
is  partlj'  overcome  by  several  offsetting  institutions  and 
practices.  In  the  first  place,  the  officials  who  directly 
manage  the  Government  services  and  administration 
have  been  given  a  status,  assuring  them  permanency  in 
office.  This  has  resulted  largely  from  the  demands  of 
organizations  composed  of  these  employees.  To  a  certain 
extent  this  has  overcome  the  so-called  "Spoils  System" 
by  which  a  new  Government  fills  all  positions  with  its 
camp-followers.  Consequently,  government  administra- 
tion has  a  permanence  and  a. stability  on  which  even 
frequent  ministerial  changes  have  little  effect.  The 
granting  of  a  permanent  status  to  functionaries  has  been 
further  necessitated  bj^  the  centralization  of  the  French, 
government  and  the  vast  control  which  it  exercises  over 
business  enterprises.  For  example,  it  would  be  incon- 
ceivable for  university  professors  or  tobacco  manufac- 
turers to  be  removed  upon  every  change  in  ministry. 
Their  permanency  of  position  has  overcome  what  would 
otherwise  be  a  hopeless  and  impossible  situation. 

Secondly,  a  change  in  ministry  is  not  so  wide-sweep- 
ing in  its  effect  as  it  is  in  England.  In  the  latter  coun- 
try, it  is  customary  for  an  entirely  new  cabinet  to  take 
the  place  of  the  one  just  fallen  ;  and  the  new  body  adopts 
an  entirely  different  policy.  But  in  France,  ministers 
of  old  cabinets  are  usually  found  on  new.  There  are 
always  some  ''hold-overs,"  men  who  have  had  previous 
experience  in  cabinet  positions.  A  defeat  of  a  Govern- 
ment often  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  a  ministerial 
shake-up.  Such  a  defeat  is  usually  caused  by  the  aroused 
hostility  of  one  of  the  four  or  five  groups  constituting 
its  majority;  and  a  re-formed  cabinet  is  often  changed 
only  to  the  extent  of  containing  representatives  of  an- 
other group  to  take  the   place  of  the  one  whicli   has 

62 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

drifted  away.  It  is  ciistoiuary  for  a  defeated  Prime 
IMinister  to  take  a  portfolio  in  tlie  cabinet  succeeding 
his  own.  Tims  Viviani  after  his  fall  became  ]\Iinister 
of  Justice  in  the  Briand  Cabinet  which  succeeded  him 
on  October  29,  1915.  Upon  the  last  Clemenceau  Cabinet, 
three  members,  ]\IM.  Clementel,  Claveille,  and  Loucheur, 
''held  over"  in  the  same  positions  from  the  Painleve 
cabinet.  The  IMinister  of  Finance,  Louis  Klotz,  served 
in  the  same  position  on  three  previous  cabinets,  those 
of  Caillaux,  Poincare,  and  Briand.  The  Minister  of 
Commerce,  M.  Clementel,  held  a  similar  position  on  four 
previous  cabinets;  at  one  time  he  was  also  Minister  of 
Agriculture  in  the  Barthou  Ministry  and  Minister  of 
Finance  in  the  Ribot  Cabinet  of  1917.  M.  Pains,  IMinis- 
ter of  Interior,  was  Minister  of  Agriculture  in  the  Cail- 
laux and  Poincare  Cabinets ;  M.  Lafferre,  Minister  of  In- 
struction, was  IMinister  of  Labor  under  the  Briand  IMin- 
istry  of  1910 ;  I\r.  Leygucs,  Minister  of  Marine,  was  Min- 
ister of  Colonies  in  the  Sarrien  Cabinet  of  1906 ;  while 
Stephen  Piehon,  IMinister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  held  a  like 
office  in  previous  Briand  (1910),  Clemenceau  (1906), 
and  Barthou  (1914)  Cabinets.  Thus  a  French  cabinet, 
despite  its  shifting  composition,  is  assured  of  members 
who  have  had  previous  political  and  ministerial  ex- 
perience. 

Finally,  the  instability  of  French  governments  can- 
not be  charged  only  to  organic  defects  in  the  parlia- 
mentar}'  system  of  the  Third  Republic.  The  whole  his- 
tory of  France  has  been  one  of  constant  turmoil,  one 
form  of  government  forcibly  turning  into  another, — 
Rei)ublic,  IMonarchy,  and  Empire,  each  following  the 
other  in  kaleidoscopic  rapidity.  Since  the  beginning  of 
the  Revolution  eleven  constitutions  have,  at  one  time  or 
another,  governed  France;  but  until  the  Fundamental 

63 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Laws  of  the  Third  Republic,  no  one  of  them  has  been  in 
effect  longer  than  twenty  years." 

France  has  been  twice  an  Empire,  and  three  times 
a  Constitutional  Monarchy;  she  has  seen  the  regime  of 
three  Republics.  Since  the  death  of  Louis  XIV  only 
two  monarchs  died  in  the  occupancy  of  the  throne. 
Under  the  Third  Republic,  the  fii"st  three  Presidents, 
MM,  Thiers,  IMac^Iahon  and  Grevy,  were  forced  to  re- 
sign ;  the  fourth,  M.  Carnot,  was  assassinated ;  the  fifth, 
Casirair-Perier,  voluntarily  quitted  office  in  disgust ;  and 
the  sixth,  Felix  Faure,  died  prematurely — even  mj-steri- 
ously.  It  was  not  until  the  Republic  was  in  its  thirty- 
sixth  year  that  a  President  at  last  quietly  laid  down  his 
office  at  the  expiration  of  his  term,  as  Loubet  did  in  1906. 
The  present  parliamentary  system  in  France  surely  can- 
not be  responsible  for  the  instability  of  past  history  or 
for  the  checkered  careers  of  its  Presidents  who  were  re- 
moved from  its  operation. 


IV 

The  second  defect  of  French  parliamentary  govern- 
ment arises  in  part  from  the  first.  This  is  the  tyran- 
nical dominance  which  Parliament — or  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies — maintains  over  the  Government.  In  England 
the  Cabinet  directs  Parliament ;  it  not  only  handles  gov- 
ernment administration,  but  it  actively  leads  legislative 
work.  It  is  nearly  a  free  agent  in  the  direction  of  the 
chief  duties  of  the  central  government ;  Parliament  in- 
tervenes only  to  liold  it  aceountal)le  to  its  trust.  The 
French  Parliament,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  no  such 

"For  a  list  of  these  laws  and  constitutions,  see  F.  E.  Dareste, 
Lcs  Constitutions  Modemes,  i,   1  -9. 

64 


PARTIP]S  AND  PARLIAMENT 

amiable  disposition.  It  constantly  interferes  in  the  af- 
fairs of  the  IMinistry,  it  dictates  its  policies,  and  con- 
tinually demands  explanations  and  defenses.  Generally, 
it  assumes  a  hif^hly  dictatorial  attitude.  The  IMinistry 
often  finds  itself  at  its  absolute  mercy, — not  of  that  of 
a  stable,  reasonable  majority, — but  of  a  whimsical  and 
often  insignificant  group.  Patience,  therefore,  becomes 
a  cliief — even  essential — ministerial  virtue. 

There  are  several  devices  by  which  Parliament  may 
control  the  IMinistry.  Oral  questions  may  be  asked  a 
Minister  at  the  beginning  of  a  session.  They  cannot  be 
debated  and  the  author  is  the  only  one  allowed  to  re- 
spond to  the  IMinister's  reply.  Written  questions  may 
also  be  submitted  to  the  President  of  the  Chamber ;  they 
are  printed  in  the  Official  Journal  along  with  the  re- 
sponse from  the  proper  minister  within  eight  days.  The 
latter,  however,  may  declare  in  writing  that  the  public 
interest  does  not  allow  an  answer.  The  chief  means  by 
which  Parliament  lays  a  heavy  hand  on  the  cabinet  is 
by  the  means  of  "interpellations."  An  interpellation  is 
the  act  by  which  a  member  of  either  the  Senate  or  the 
Chamber  can  force  a  minister  to  answer  questions  and 
generally  to  defend  his  administration.  The  President 
of  the  Council  may  even  be  brought  to  defend  the  entire 
general  policy  of  the  Government. ^^    Indeed,  interpella- 

"  The  following  is  a  summary  of  tlie  Rules  of  the  Chamber  in 
regard  to  interpellations: 

The  Cliamber  fixes  the  day  upon  which  interpellations  are 
heard.  Interpellations  upon  interior  policies  cannot  be  post- 
poned more  than  a  month. 

No  order  of  tiie  day  motive  upon  interpellations  can  be  pre- 
sented unless  it  is  in  writing. 

The  order  of  tlie  day  yur  ct  simple,  if  it  is  requested,  always 
has  priority. 

If  the  order  of  the  day  pur  et  simple  is  not  adopted  and  if 
it  is  not  ordered  to  the  bureaus,  the  presitlent  submits  the  order 
of  the  day  motive  to  the  vote. 

65 


CONTEJIPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tions  are  seldom  used  raercl}^  to  obtain  information; 
they  more  often  constitute  a  challenge  to  a  debate  in 
which  all  members  of  the  Chamber  and  of  the  Ministry 
may  participate.  Originating  in  technical  and  unim- 
portant matters,  such  discussions  often  end  in  the  over- 
throw of  the  Grovernment.  An  interpellation  is  made  in 
writing  and  it  becomes  a  special  order  of  the  day,  the 
time  for  the  debate  it  provokes  being  definitely  set  in 
advance.  After  such  a  debate — in  which  the  inter- 
pellators  may  place  the  IMinister  under  a  grueling  ex- 
amination, which  is  limited  by  no  restriction  of  time 
— the  vote  ''of  the  order  of  the  day"  is  taken.  This 
vote  usually  includes  an  expression  of  confidence  in  the 
Government.  For  example,  last  June  (1919),  after  an 
interpellation  in  which  certain  members  of  the  Chamber 
questioned  the  Government  as  to  searching  certain  of- 
fices, the  Chamber  passed  the  following  order  of  the  day : 

The  Chamber,  respectine:  the  guiding  principle  of  the  sepa- 
ration of  powers  and  confident  that  the  Government  will  allow 
justice  to  follow  its  course  in  full  independence,  passes  to  the 
order  of  the  day. 

If  the  Chamber  refuses  to  pass  such  a  motion,  "lack 
of  confidence"  is  expressed  and  the  Minister  individ- 
ually, if  not  the  cabinet  collectively,  is  bound  to  resign. 
The  latter  result  may  be  avoided,  if  a  new  IMinister  is 
appointed  who  will  conform  to  the  Chamber's  wishes. 

The  order  of  the  day  imr  ct  simple  is  a  vote  which  neither 
censures  nor  praises  the  (Jovernment,  but  wliich  proceeds  to  the 
other  business  of  the  Assembly  without  comment. 

The  order  of  the  day  motive  expresses  a  definite  opinion  upon 
the  interpellation;  i.e.,  it  either  exonerates  or  condemns  the 
government  policy  under   debate. 

See  licglemcnU  de  la  Chamhrc  dcs  Deputes,  Chapter  VI,  Articles 
39-40,  quoted  in  Moreau  et  Delpech,  Les  Bcglcmcnts  des  As- 
semblces  Legislatives. 

66 


PARTIES  AND  l^ARLTAMENT 

The  Clianil)cr,  however,  may  vote  the  "oixler  of  the 
day"  with  no  mention  of  confidence.  This  novel  pro- 
ceeding in  the  French  system  has  often  raised  questions 
as  to  its  exact  status.  For  instance,  on  the  TSth  of 
July,  1919,  after  listening  unfavorably  to  the  I\Iinister 
of  Agriculture  {M.  Boret)  in  a  defense  of  the  eco- 
nomic policy  of  the  Government,^"  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties passed  the  following  resolution: 

The  Chamber,  believing  thai  the  price  of  living  has  dimin- 
ished one  half  in  Belgium  since  the  tnontli  of  January,  1!)19; 

That  the  price  of  living  has  diminished  one  quarter  in  Eng- 
land since  the  armistice; 

That  it  has  not  ceased  to  increase  in  France  since  that  date, 
and  judges  this  result  to  be  due  to  the  economic  policy  of  the 
government ; 

Passes  to  the  order  of  the  day. 

Although  perhaps  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Cham- 
ber that  the  IMinister  of  Agriculture  should  resign,  the 
resolution  contained  no  word  of  confidence  or  lack  of 
confidence.  In  the  minds  of  many,  there  was  a  question 
whether  the  IMinister  was  under  the  obligation  to  resign 
and  whether  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Chamber  that  he 
should  do  so  or  whether  it  merely  desired  to  bring  about 
the  change  of  his  policy.  But  whether  or  not  the  Cham- 
ber directly  expresses  lack  of  confidence,  such  a  motion 
clearly  indicates  that  the  IMinister  does  not  have  its  ap- 
proval. In  connection  with  this  incident,  the  Unified 
Socialists  asserted  that  this  vote  should  be  interpreted  to 
mean  that  the  whole  Clemenceau  ]\Iinistry  had  fallen. 
But-  such  a  contention  in  French  practice  was  inad- 
missible, although  it  would  perhaps  be  valid  in  England, 

The  whole  system  of  interpellation  is  subject  to  the 
greatest  criticism.    Its  use  and  abuse  are  too  frequent; 

"  See  p.  326. 

67 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

its  causes  are  so  superficial  that  the  mere  debating  of 
them  is  often  a  waste  of  time.  The  public,  indeed,  re- 
gards them  rather  facetiously,  for  every  Friday  (the 
principal  day  set  for  interpellations)  Parisians  throng 
the  Chamber  to  enjoy  the  spectacle  and  do  their  best 
to  assist  the  opposition  in  unseating  a  ministry !  ^^  The 
frequency  of  these  interpellations  is  illustrated  by  the 
two  yeai*s'  tenure  of  the  Meline  Ministry  in  which  there 
were  218  interpellations,  one  about  every  two  days.  The 
Socialists  became  so  obnoxious  in  introducing  interpella- 
tions under  the  Clemenceau  Government  that  during  the 
war  the  latter  actually  refused  to  consider  most  of  them, 
moving  for  adjournment  sine  die  on  the  ground  that  the 
national  defense  would  not  allow  public  discussion, — a 
practice  which  led  the  Socialists  to  brand  the  Clemen- 
ceau Ministry  as  the  sine  die  Government.  During  the 
armistice,  this  device  was  especially  abused ;  every  week, 
two  or  three  interpellations  would  be  filed  upon  the 
Government's  financial  policy,  the  evacuation  of  troops 
from  Russia,  the  Government's  attitude  toward  strikes, 
and  the  debates  at  the  Peace  Conference.  By  these 
means  the  Government  is  kept  in  a  continual  state  of 
belligerent  defense;  and  an  enormous  amount  of  the 
time  of  its  ministers  is  wasted  in  discussion  which  ordi- 
narily adds  no  light,  and  which  clears  up  no  misunder- 
standings. Tlie  Socialists,  who  make  the  greatest  number 
of  these  interpellations  (although  they  constitute  but  a 
sixth  of  the  Chamber)  are  already  fixed  in  their  opin- 
ions. They  intentionally  pursue  an  obstructionist  policy 
to  which  the  interpellation  is  readily  adaptable.  If  the 
interpellation  would  be  utilized  as  is  the  "question"  or 
the  vote  of  confidence  in  England,  the  Chamber  and 

"This  pastime,  a]on<]^  with  others,  was  largely  foregone  during 
the  war. 

G8 


PARTIES  AND  PARLFAMENT 

the  Government  could  cooperate  witli  and  clearly  under- 
stand each  other.  As  it  now  stands,  however,  it  is  a 
l)()litical  discouragement  to  the  Ministry  and  a  tremen- 
dous and  largely  useless  handicap  to  its  administrative 
duties. 


By  a  decree  of  September  3,  1914,  the  extraordinary 
session  of  the  French  Parliament,  called  August  4  on 
account  of  the  German  declaration  of  war,  was  closed ; 
and  another  session  was  not  convoked  until  December 
22,  1914.  During  the  interval  between  these  two  ses- 
sions, the  Government  exercised  both  executive  and  legis- 
lative functions ;  under  the  powers  granted  to  it  by  the 
laws  establishing  the  state  of  siege,  it  exercised  great 
powers,  and,  by  means  of  its  decrees,  it  virtually  and 
repeatedly  enacted  legislation. 

In  accordance  with  the  law  of  July  16,  1875,  the 
Chambers  were  again  convoked  on  the  second  Tuesday, 
that  is,  the  12th  of  January,  1915,  by  the  President  of 
the  Republic.  According  to  this  constitutional  provision, 
the  Chambers  must  remain  in  session  at  least  five 
months.^^  Thereafter  the  President  of  the  Republic  may 
close  the  session  and  call  an  extraordinary  session  when- 
ever he  may  wish  during  the  remainder  of  the  year. 
But  in  the  course  of  the  year  1915,  the  Government, 
without  any  other  official  declaration,  made  it  known  to 
the  press  ^^  that  during  the  period  of  hostilities  it  would 
not  use  its  right  of  closing  Parliament.  As  a  result, 
since  the  beginning  of  1935  and  until  the  end  of  the 
war  Parliament  in  the  fall  of  1919,  the  Chambers  sat 

"See  Art.  2  of  the  law  of  July  16,  1875. 

"See  L.  Du^iit,  Manuel  de  Droit  Const itutionncl,  203. 

69 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

in  a  permanent  session.  Recesses  were  frequently  taken, 
it  is  true ;  but  all  adjournments  Avere  made  by  the  Cham- 
bers themselves.  Parl^ment  in  this  manner  took  over 
a  power  which  the  Ministry  in  a  parliamentary  govern- 
ment usually  exercises. 

This  war  practice  was  the  outgrowth  of  another 
French  practice  which  marks  a  difference  from  that  fol- 
lowed in  England.  Under  a  parliamentary  government, 
the  Ministry  may  in  times  of  dispute  dissolve  Parlia- 
ment, order  a  general  election,  obtain  a  majority  and 
remain  in  power,  or  vice  versa.  Such  an  occurrence  was 
illustrated  in  the  special  elections  in  England  in  1910. 
In  France  the  President  of  the  Republic  enjoys  this 
theoretical  right  of  dissolution  of  the  Chamber — a  right 
which  differs  from  that  of  closing  the  ordin^y  sessions 
of  Parliament  above  described.  It  may  be  exercised  at 
any  time,  but  it  must  have  the  assent  of  the  Senate,  an- 
other difference  from  the  British  practice.  But  a  more 
essential  factor  is  that  the  President  has  never  exercised 
this  right  since  1877  when  INIaCiMahon  used  it  in  an  at- 
tempt to  secure  an  anti-Republican  majority.  The 
abuse  of  this  power  was  so  evident  that  its  exercise  has 
since  been  held  in  disfavor.  As  a  result,  a  French  Min- 
istry has  no  recourse  to  the  people  in  a  conflict  with 
Parliament.  There  is,  therefore,  no  means  of  knowing 
if  it  is  pursuant  to  the  will  of  the  people  rather  than 
to  the  mere  will  of  Parliament  that  a  certain  IMinistry  is 
caused  to  fall.  This  distinction  is  vital  because  it  makes 
the  French  Parliament  absolutely  supreme,  in  contrast 
to  the  American  Congress  which  has  no  control  over  the 
composition  of  the  Executive  once  the  latter  is  estab- 
lished,-'^ and  it  is  more  powerful  than  the  British  Parlia- 

"•  Except   l)y    impcacliment,   etc. 

70 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

raent,  which  is  responsible  to  the  people  like  the  Cabinet 
itself.  The  Frencli  Parliament  is  kept  within  bounds  by 
the  multiplicity  and  contradiction  of  its  own  compo- 
nents. If  these  components  were  ever  fused  into  one 
mind  under  a  powerful  leader,  there  would  be  no  limits 
to  the  usurpation  of  powers  by  Parliament. 

Two  other  instances  will  illustrate  the  growth  of  par- 
liamentary ])ower  during  the  war.  One  of  these  was  the 
utilization  of  the  Permanent  Committees  of  both  the 
Senate  and  the  Chamber  in  assisting  and  supervising  the 
Government  in  military  and  industrial  preparations ;  the 
other  is  by  the  exercise  of  the  power  arising  from  de- 
cisions reached  in  secret  sessions. 

Commissions  of  Inquiry  have  always  been  used  by 
Parliament  to  investigate  the  acts  of  a  Government  when 
an  interpellation  would  divulge  secrets  of  state.  But 
until  the  passage  of  a  law  on  the  23rd  of  IMareh,  1914, 
(after  the  scandalous  "Rochette  affair")  the  Chamber 
had  no  general  right  to  summon  witnesses  to  appear  be- 
fore it,  although  it  could  call  Government  officials.  Now, 
however,  this  right  has  been  granted  and  Commissions 
of  Inquiry  (such  as  the  Commission  of  Metallurgy  at 
present  investigating  the  alleged  intervention  of  the 
Committee  of  Forges  in  the  operations  of  the  army) 
activel}^  search  out  the  administrative  activities  of  the 
Government  in  a  manner  far  more  efficient  than  the 
method  of  interpellatioiis. 

The  Government's  refusal  to  give  the  Chamber  infor- 
mation concerning  army  operations  in  1915  and  the 
early  months  of  1916  was  very  irritating  to  the  members 
of  that  body.  Especially  upon  matters  such  as  Balkan 
diplomacy,  the  High  Command,  the  removal  of  General 
Joffre,  and  the  independence  of  the  General  Staff,  did 
the  Deputies  wish  to  be  informed.     The  Government's 

71 


CONTEJklPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

refusal  to  divulge  this  information  was  upon  the 
ground  that  such  public  discussion  in  Parliament  would 
aid  the  enemy. 

To  overcome  this  difficulty  and  to  assure  parliamen- 
tary supremacy,  the  Unified  Socialist  group  introduced 
a  bill  into  the  Chamber  which  provided  for  the  nomina- 
tion of  a  special  commission  charged  with  investigating 
all  questions  bearing  upon  national  defense  in  the  zone 
of  the  armies  as  well  as  in  the  zone  of  the  interior.  An- 
other proposition  supported  by  the  same  party  provided 
for  the  creation  of  an  "organism"  composed  of  Senate 
and  Chamber  delegates  with  the  same  powers  as  that  of 
the  commission  above.  Both  of  these  propositions  were 
defeated  upon  the  9th  of  February',   1916. 

This  idea,  however,  made  great  progress  in  the  Cham- 
ber, and  upon  June  22,  1916,  by  a  vote  of  41-i  to  80,  it 
adopted  an  "order  of  the  day,"  a  portion  of  which 
read  as  follows:  "The  Chamber  decides  to  institute  and 
organize  a  direct  delegation  which  will  undertake,  with 
the  cooperation  of  the  Government,  to  exercise  the  ef- 
fective and  immediate  control  in  situ  of  all  the"  services 
whose  function  it  is  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  army. ' '  ^^ 

This  bill,  providing  for  a  new  organ  of  government, 
which  might  interfere  directly  with  every  phase  of  army 
operations — excepting  perhaps  the  actual  disposition  of 
troops  in  combat,  met  with  the  greatest  resistance  from 
the  Government,  After  an  eloquent  discourse  from  the 
President  of  the  Council,  on  the  20th  of  July,  1916,  this 
bill  was  abandoned.  But  on  the  27th,  a  proposition  in- 
troduced by  M.  Chaumct  was  passed  by  a  vote  of  269 

"  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  work  of  the  ' '  Govern- 
ment of  Bordeaux,"  the  regime  of  decrees,  and  tlic  eventual 
establishment  of  parliamentary  control  over  war  ministries,  see 
L'(Kuvrc  dc  Guerre  da  Parlcmcnt,  par  un  Kei)ublieaiii,  published 
in   " Le  Fait   de   la  Scmain^"   series,   Librairio  Grasset. 

72 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

to  200,  which  placed  on  the  "permanent  commissions  of 
the  Chamber"  the  control  of  tlie  government  in  regard 
to  the  conduct  of  the  war.  This  control,  according  to 
the  bill,  tlie  commissions  already  exercised.  The  only 
addition  it  made  was  to  require  the  commissions  to  make 
a  quarterly  report  to  the  Chamber.  Thereafter  the 
commissions  took  a  considerable  part  in  all  questions 
dealing  with  army  supplies.  It  was  due  to  the  activities 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Army  that  the  Under- 
secretary of  Aviation  resigned.  The  commissions  also 
succeeded  in  securing  the  resignation  of  a  Minister  of 
AYar  who  cherished  superannuated  doctrines  upon  ar- 
tillery. Later  they  also  brought  about  the  creation  of 
the  Undersecretaryship  of  ^lunitions.  They  even  suc- 
ceeded in  speeding  up  the  inertia  of  other  government 
services, — the  reorganization  of  the  health  service  and  an 
adequate  suppl}^  of  artillery,  munitions,  and  machine 
guns  being  attributed  to  them."  Although  strictly 
limited  in  the  exercise  of  their  powers,  the  French  com- 
missions appear  to  have  functioned  very  successfully. 

The  original  decision  of  the  Chamber  to  constitute  a 
"direct  delegation"  was  taken  in  secret  session.  These 
secret  sessions  were  themselves  an  innovation  which 
Parliament  forced  upon  the  Government  for  the  same 
reason  as  it  forced  the  commission  jurisdiction.  The 
Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  1875,  provided  that  each 
Chamber  might  go  into  "secret  committee"  at  the  re- 
quest of  a  certain  number  of  members,  to  be  fixed  by 
the  house  regulations.  This  right,  however,  like  that  of 
dissolution,  had  never  been  exercised.  But  finally,  in 
order  to  -obtain  a  more  intimate  knowledge  of  the  con- 
duct of  the  war  and  to  exercise  more  fully  the  right 

^  See  Joseph  Barthelemy,  Democratie  et  Politique  Etrangere, 
335. 

73 


CONTEMPOKARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

of  interpellation,  both  the  Senate  and  the  Chamber, 
overcoming  old  precedents,  decided  to  constitute  them- 
selves into  "secret  committees"  in  the  spring  of  1916. 
In  June,  the  Chamber  held  seven  such  sessions.  Through- 
out the  year  it  held  ten  others, — both  series  followed  by 
votes  of  confidence  in  the  Briand  Ministry.  On  January 
26,  1917,  another  secret  session  was  held  to  discuss  affairs 
in  Greece,  and  upon  the  28th  a  new  vote  of  confidence 
was  given  to  the  Briand  Ministry.  Upon  the  14th  of 
March,  1917,  the  Chamber  in  secret  session  discussed  an 
interpellation  upon  the  aircraft  service ;  and  as  a  result 
of  an  incident  following  this  session.  General  Lyautey, 
Minister  of  AVar,  resigned.  This  resignation  finally 
brought  about  the  fall  of  the  Briand  Cabinet.  Similarly, 
the  Senate  held  secret  sessions,  interpellating  the  Govern- 
ment upon  its  conduct  of  the  war.  Neither  assembly 
emitted  votes  of  confidence  within  their  so-called  secret 
committees;  tliey  were  always  voted  upon  in  public 
session.^^ 

On  the  part  of  the  executive,  an  attempt  was  made  by 
the  Briand  Ministry  on  the  l-ith  of  December,  1916,  to 
arrogate  distinctly  legislative  powers.  The  project  of 
law  laid  before  the  Chamber  at  that  time  would  give 
it  power  virtually  to  legislate  by  decree.  Promptness, 
it  was  urged,  necessitated  immediate  action  which  the 
slow  processes  of  legislation  could  not  give.  This  sug- 
gestion raised  such  a  storm  of  protest,  however,  that  the 
bill  was  not  pressed,  although  the  Chamber,  upon  agree- 
ment with  the  IMinistry,  enacted  a  law  providing  for 
emergency  legislation.  The  bill  stipulated  that  in  time 
of  war  the  Government  might  introduce  a  law  with  a 
declaration  that  its  enactment  was  immediately  neces- 

^ L'OSuvrc  dc  Guerre  du  Farlcnicnt,  46-61. 

74 


PARTIES  AND  I'ARLIAMKNT 

saiy.  The  Chamber  then  fixed  the  maximum  delay,  at 
tlie  most  not  to  exeeed  five  days  after  the  "deposit"  of 
the  project,  in  Avhieli  it  must  be  discussed. ^^ 

Aside  from  the  extraordinary  powers  exercised  by  tlie 
Government  under  tlie  rights  granted  by  the  declaration 
of.  the  State  of  Siege,  the  Chambers  have  suffered  a 
diminution  of  control  in  only  one  respect.  Ordinarily 
one  of  the  most  sweeping  and  detailed  methods  of  con- 
trol over  the  Government  has  been  by  the  annual  voting 
of  the  budget.  By  the  discussion  of  the  different  minis- 
terial requests,  by  refusing  to  vote  certain  items,  etc., 
the  Chambers  could  virtually  dictate  Government  poli- 
cies. But  during  the  war  no  regular  budget  was  voted, 
and  the  Chambers  merely  granted  en  bloc  the  credits 
which  tlie  Government  asked.  This  was  done  by  what 
is  known  as  the  douzicmes  provisoires.  The  financial 
year  in  France  commences  the  1st  of  January  and  ends 
the  31st  of  December.  This  requires  that  the  budget,  in 
peace  time,  be  voted  and  promulgated  not  later  than 
December  31st.  But  it  frequently  happens  that  Parlia- 
ment does  not  vote  the  budget  by  that  time,  although 
without  it,  the  Government  cannot  raise  taxes  or  pay 
expenses.  To  overcome  this  difficulty,  it  has  become  cus- 
tomary to  grant  the  Government  provisional  authority 
to  raise  taxes  and  make  expenditures  necessary  to  the 
operation  of  the  public  services  during  a  period  of  one, 
two  or  three  months,  as  the  case  may  be.  (As  the 
amount  of  this  expense  is  estimated  by  the  month,  or  by 

-'  Discussion  upon  tho  bill  is  ^limited  to  the  rapporteur  of  the 
commission  and  to  a  speaker  chosen  by  the  minority  of  the 
commission,  except  when  a  Minister  speaks.  Upon  amendments 
only  the  Government,  the  president  and  the  rapporteur  of  the 
commission  nnd  the  author  of  the  amendment  may  speak.  Under 
no  circumstance  can  an  orator  other  than  those  of  the  Government 
or  of  the  commission  have  the  floor  more  than  once  every 
quarter  of  an  hour.     Duguit,  op.  cit.,  436,  518. 

75 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

a  twelfth  of  the  year's  total,  the  system  is  called  the 
douziemes  provisoires. )  This  system  was  employed  dur- 
ing the  war,  credits  being  granted  every  three  months. 
An  annual  budget  was  impossible  because  no  one  knew 
what  war  expenditures,  etc.,  would  be.  But  it  resulted 
that  Parliament,  in  not  debating  and  voting  the  budget 
chapter  by  chapter  as  was  its  jDrevious  practice,  lost 
one  of  its  most  effective  means  of  ministerial  control. 
The  end  of  the  war  and  the  possibility  of  again  accu- 
rately estimating  necessary  expenditures  will  undoubt- 
edly bring  back  the  old  system. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  through  the  systems  of  interpella- 
tion, permanent  sessions,  the  war  commissions  and  the 
secret  committees,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  as  well  as 
the  Senate,  has  increased  its  power  over  the  executive 
branch  of  the  government  during  the  last  five  years. 
Such  an  increase  is  opposed  to  the  evolution  of  execu- 
tive power  which  war  activities  elsewhere  produced. 
Ordinarily,  increased  legislative  power  may  be  consid- 
ered a  sure  defense  against  those  who  might  overturn 
the  Government  for  personal  interests.  But  in  the 
French  Chamber,  whose  power  is  based  on  changing, 
independent,  and  even  rebellious  groups,  many  regard 
recent  events  as  a  sign  of  increased  impotency  of  the 
French  executive  and  a  tyrannical  usurpation  of  legis- 
lative authority. 

The  importance  of  the  intrusion  which  the  French 
Parliament  has  theoretically  made  into  the  province  of 
executive  power  may,  liowever,  be  exaggerated.  The 
fact  yet  remains  that  the  personal  equation  in  French 
politics  may  still  override  tlie  processes  of  parliamen- 
tary machinery.  As  long  as  the  Frencli  party  sj^stem 
continues  as  it  is,  political  leaders,  who  naturally  occupy 
Cal)inet  positions,  will  always  enjoy  greater  personal  in- 

76 


PARTIES  AND  PARLIAMENT 

fluence  than  in  countries  where  party  discipline  me- 
chanically organizes  and  directs  party  activity.  The  in- 
flnence  which  M.  Clemenceau  maintained  over  the 
French  Chamber  during  a  time  when  public  opinion  was 
severely  critical  was  extraordinary.  In  debates  on  min- 
isterial policies,  such  as  the  censorship,  which  when  con- 
sidered individually  different  parliamentary  groups  had 
roundly  condemned,  M.  Clemenceau  won  sweeping  ma- 
jorities.^^ 

This  inconsistency  illustrates  a  weakness  in  the  pres- 
ent system  of  parliamentary  government:  Parliament 
often  refuses  to  press  an  isolated  reform  in  the  face  of 
ministerial  opposition  if  it  believes  that  a  ^Ministry 
whose  continuance  in  power  is  necessary  for  the  solution 
of  more  important  problems,  wdll  resign  on  account  of 
its  passage.  In  the  case  of  the  Clemenceau  Ministry, 
there  is  little  question  that  a  majority  of  the  Chamber 
opposed  the  maintenance  of  the  state  of  siege  and  the 
censorship  during  the  armistice,  the  prohibition  of  im- 
portations, and  even  the  Government's  reconstruction 
policy.  But  the  primordial  necessity  which  faced  Par- 
liament was  the  belief  that  Clemenceau  and  no  one  else 
could  secure  a  peace  settlement  which  would  guarantee 
France  against  future  invasion.  Consequently,  when  the 
Prime  Minister  appeared  before  the  Chamber  and  made 
any  consideration  of  Government  policies  to  which  ihe 
Chamber  objected,  a  matter  of  confidence  upon  which 
the  Ministry  would  resign  if  the  Chamber  voted  against 
it,  complaints  were  hushed  up  or  parliamentary  grum- 
blings vented  on  lobby  walls. 


"  This  statement  is  somewhat  inconsistent  with  that  made  in  the 
first  of  this  chapter  in  regard  to  Parliamentary  domination.  But 
the  lack  of  party  discipline  allows  dominant  personalities  to 
gain  an  ascendancy  which  for  a  time  may  olTset  group  control. 

77 


conte:\ipoRxVry  French  politics 

From  another  standpoint,  the  personal  element  in  the 
French  political  situation  prevents  an  undue  arrogance 
of  parliamentary  power.  In  England  and  in  the  United 
States,  parties  are  nationalized.  The  organization  of 
each  party  supports  candidates,  often  with  no  expense  to 
themselves,  with  the  aid  of  a  vast  machinery  and  upon 
a  party  platform.  It  is  not  for  the  candidate  so  much 
as  the  principles  for  which  the  candidate  stands,  that 
ballots  are  cast ;  he  is  a  brick  in  the  wall  for  which  his 
party  supplies  the  mortar.  In  France,  on  the  contrary, 
party  organizations  do  not  have  the  inherent  strength 
or  the  discipline  to  select  a  candidate  or  to  provide  him 
with  the  support  necessary  for  his  election.  A  French 
candidate  is  largely  dependent  upon  his  immediate  con- 
stituency for  his  election  and  continuance  in  office. 
Upon  their  favor  he  stands  or  falls,  unsupported  by  the 
backing  which  American  or  British  parties  afford  their 
representatives.  As  a  result,  French  elections  usually 
turn  upon  personalities ;  and  a  French  Deputy,  and  even 
a  Senator,  continually  keeps  his  ear  to  the  ground  in  an 
endeavor  to  follow  the  opinions  of  those  upon  whom  his 
reelection  is  dependent.  A  desire  for  reelection  is  as 
keen  among  Frenchmen  as  it  is  among  Americans.  Their 
utter  dependence  upon  their  political  constituencies  keeps 
their  parliamentary  activities  within  bounds  established 
by  public  opinion. 


CHAPTEE  III 

THE  "bloc"   and  the  SACRED  UNION 


La  France  sera  hero'lqucment  def endue  par  tous  ses  fils,  dont 
ricn  nc  brisera  dcvant  I'ermc'mi  I'union  sacree. — 

Raymond  Poincar^. 


1 


As  pointed  out  in  tlio  last  chapter,  the  large  number 
of  political  groupings  in  the  Chamber  necessitates  their 
frequent,  though  often  temporary,  combination  in  order 
to  assure  and  maintain  a  ministerial  majority.  A  dis- 
cussion of  past  combinations  and  of  the  complete  union 
of  political  parties  which  the  war  exacted,  may  indicate 
the  efforts  which  have  been  made  to  improve  and  facili- 
tate the  processes  of  French  party  government. 

After  the  elections  of  1885  there  were  three  general 
groupings  in  the  Chambers, — the  Conservatives,  the  Re- 
publicans (Opportunists),  and  the  Radicals  (Intransi- 
geants).  As  no  one  of  the  three  was  capable  of  muster- 
ing a  majority  alone,  combinations  became  necessary. 
When  the  two  Republican  groups,  the  Opportunists  and 
the  Intransigeants,  united  their  efforts  to  offset  the  Con- 
servative or  ]\Ionarchist  group,  such  a  combination  was 
known  as  "Hepublican  concentration."  "When  one  of 
the  Republican  groups  united  with  the  group  of  the 
Right,  it  became  knoAvn  as  a  union  of  "pacification." 
Until  1898  parliamentary  government  was  generally  car- 

79 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ricd  on  by  the  two  policies  or  expedients  of  "concentra- 
tion" or  "pacification." 

The  first  "Concentration  Cabinet"  was  formed  by 
Henri  Brisson,  a  Radical,  in  April,  1885.  It  contained 
elements  from  all  the  Moderate  and  Radical  gronps, — 
despite  the  hatred  which  already  showed  itself  between 
the  Union  des  GaucJics,  led  by  Gambetta  and  Ferry,  and 
the  Radicals  properly  so-called.  The  Rouvier  IMinistry, 
formed  in  1887,  was  the  first  "Pacification  Ministry." 
In  the  following  years,  attempts  were  made  to  form  ex- 
clusively party  cabinets,  but  without  success  until  the 
Bourgeois  Ministry  of  1895-1896  came  into  power  upon 
a  purely  Radical  platform  of  social  and  financial  re- 
form. Forced  to  resign  because  of  its  policy  in  ]\Iada- 
gascar,  in  turn  it  was  succeeded  by  a  nearly  homogeneous 
cabinet  of  Moderate  Republicans  under  Meline.  These 
instances  aroused  the  hope  that  France  might  at  last 
settle  down  to  a  stable  system  of  two-party  govern- 
ment. But  this  belief,  partly  founded  on  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  ]\Ionarchist-Clerical  element  from  all  serious 
participation  in  the  Government  after  its  discreditable 
support  of  General  Boulanger,  was  in  the  end  thwarted 
by  this  very  element  itself.  The  Dreyfus^  case,  reawak- 
ening a  fear  of  Clericalism,  resulted  in  the  fusion  of  the 
groups  of  the  Left  in  the  famous  Bloc.^  The  elections 
of  1898  returned  about  250  deputies  divided  among  the 
Radicals,  the  Radical  Socialists,  and  the  Socialists.  With 

'See  p.  2.34. 

-  Tlic  name  of  the  Bloc  is  said  to  have  boon  invented  by 
Clemeneeau  in  1891.  A  play,  by  the  name  of  Thermidor,  •written 
by  Sardou,  in  which  Eobespierre  played  the  lead,  was  forbidden, 
after  one  performance  at  tlie  (!oiiu''dio  Fraiicaiso.  M.  Clemeneeau 
Jiphehl  tins  sujipression  of  the  play  in  Parliament,  saying,  "The 
First  Kevohition  is  a  'bloc,'  which  you  must  take  or  leave." 
'I'lie  name  still  lives  in  French  politics.  See  .lerrold,  France  To- 
dn>i,    10I5,    note. 

80 


THE  ''BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

the  aid  of  the  Liberal  Repn})li('ans  (who  soon  formed 
the  Democratic  Republican  Alliance)  these  groups  ef- 
fected an  alliance  which  controlled  the  Government  at 
least  until  1906.  Originally  under  the  leadership  of 
AValdeek-Rousseau,  President  of  the  Council  from  1899 
to  1902,  this  Bloc  accomplished  the  separation  of  the 
Church  and  State  by  passing  the  Associations  law  of 
1901,  and  by  abrogating  the  Concordat  in  1905,  which 
in  turn  was  supplemented  by  the  law  of  1907. 

The  policy  of  the  Bloc  was  vindicated  in  the  elections 
of  April,  1902,  when  321  adherents  were  returned,  the 
opposition  electing  only  268.  It  was  in  this  year  that 
the  line  between  Conservatism,  represented  by  the  Mon- 
archists, Nationalists,  and  Liberal  Catholics,  Progress- 
ism,  represented  by  the  remnants  of  the  Moderate  Left 
of  the  Assembly  of  1871,  and  a  portion  of  the  Republican 
Union  which  followed  Gambetta,  and  Reformism,  repre- 
sented by  the  Radicals  and  Radical  Socialists,  the  Demo- 
cratic Republican  Alliance  and  the  independent  Social- 
ists,— became  clearly  drawn.  Reformism  constituted 
the  Bloc;  while  Conservatism  and  Progressism  were  its 
deadly  enemies. 

The  Bloc  maintained  a  government  of  the  Left 
through  the  Alinistry  of  Emile  Combes,  a  Radical  (1902- 
1905),  through  the  Rouvier  Ministry  (1905-1906),  and 
through  the  Sarrien  Ministry,  which  came  to  power  in 
]\larch,  1906.  The  program  adopted  by  the  Socialist 
Congress  at  Amsterdam  in  1904  caused  the  Radicals  to 
fear  that  the  Socialists  might  be  obliged  to  withdraw 
from  the  Bloc.  But  although  they  officially  refused  to 
allow  their  members  to  become  cabinet  ministers,  and 
even  to  cooperate  with  reformist  parties,  in  reality, 
under  the  leadership  of  Jaures,  they  supported  Radical 
measures  of  reform.    The  election  of  1906  increased  the 

81 


CONTEIVIPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

combined  power  of  the  Left,  its  seats  rising  to  375 ;  the 
Progressists  were  reduced  one  half,  while  the  Reaction- 
aries maintained  their  numbers.  The  entire  Right  was 
able  to  muster  only  140  votes. 

In  October,  1906,  Georges  Clemenceau  took  over  the 
leadership  of  the  Sarrien  IMinistry.  He  was  himself  re- 
sponsible for  the  first  real  break  in  the  Bloc.  Of  a 
dictatorial  and  independent  character,  he  relied  upon 
the  Radicals  alone ;  and  although  his  achievements  were 
reformist,  they  were  apparently  accomplished  without 
seeking  the  active  cooperation  either  of  the  Republicans 
of  the  Alliance  or  of  the  Socialists.  In  fact,  the  first 
event  of  the  new  JNIinister's  reign  was  his  acrimonious 
debate  with  Jaures  upon  Socialism  in  the  Chamber.  He 
further  antagonized  the  Socialists  by  refusing  to  allow 
Government  officials  to  form  syndicates  and  adhere  to 
the  General  Confederation  of  Labor.^  Likewise,  the 
wholesale  discharge  of  the  postal  employees  (who  struck 
in  IMarch,  l309)  offended  the  labor  vote.  The  Briand 
Ministry,  coming  into  power  in  1909,  included,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  Premier,  men  of  distinctly  socialistic  tenden- 
cies. In  spite  of  this  fact,  they  nevertheless  came  in 
conflict  with  the  Unified  Socialists.  This  became  ap- 
parent as  the  result  of  the  Government's  action  in  sup- 
pressing a  nation-wide  railway  strike  in  the  autumn  of 
1910,  by  mobilizing  the  employees  subject  to  military 
service,  and  making  them  operate  the  roads  under  a 
military  regime.  Opposition  from  the  Socialists  was  so 
intense  that  in  1911  Briand  was  forced  to  resign. 

In  1910  the  Dreyfus  incident  had  become  ancient  his- 
tory, and  the  questions  of  anticlericalism  and  the  re- 
organization of  the  army  had  been  solved  to  the  satis- 

»See  p.   350. 

82 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

faction  of  the  Radicals.  The  purposes  for  which  the 
Bloc  had  been  formed  had  thus  been  achieved,  while  new 
issues  were  arising,  such  as  the  income  tax,  proportional 
representation,  and  militarism,  upon  which  not  only  the 
parties  of  the  Bloc  but  divisions  in  them  could  not 
agree.  IMoreover,  the  members  of  the  Democratic  Re- 
pul)lican  Alliance  felt  that  the  anticlerical  movement 
had  now  gone  far  enough  and  that  a  policy  of  concilia- 
tion should  be  undertaken.  This  attitude  was  especially 
objectionable  to  the  Combists  of  the  Radical  party,  who 
believed  that  their  future  successes  depended  upon  the 
maintenance  of  clerical  issues.  There  were  thus  many 
reasons  for  the  disintegration  of  the  Bloc  when  the  elec- 
tions of  April-]\Iay,  1910,  divided  it  further.  The  new 
Chamber  was  composed  as  follows :  Right,  19 ;  Liberal 
Action,  34 ;  Progressists,  76 ;  Democratic  Left,  73 ;  Rad- 
ical Left,  112;  Radical  Socialists,  149;  Independent  So- 
cialists, 30 ;  Unified  Socialists,  75 ;  Independents,  20.* 

The  ]\Iinistry  of  Joseph  Caillaux,  which  came  to  power 
in  1911,  did  much  to  discredit  the  Radical  party  with 
the  country  and  to  shake  its  confidence  in  the  old  Bloc — 
now  fast  disappearing  so  far  as  it  represented  any  com- 
mon feeling  between  the  parties  of  the  Left.  Caillaux, 
having  defeated  Glemeneeau  for  the  Radical  leadership, 
aimed  to  follow  a  policy  of  pacification  toward  Germany. 
lie  also  stood  for  the  maintenance  of  the  two-year  mili- 
tary service  law,  adopted  by  the  Rouvier  Ministry,  in 
place  of  the  old  three-year  service  law,  a  measure  which 
those  who  feared  German  armament  were  now  trjdng  to 
reenact.  The  questionable  financial  dealings  of  M.  Cail- 
laux, especially  his  speculations  on  the   Bourse,   com- 

*  Election  figures  for  1910  vary  greatly  according  to  sources. 
The  above  are  taken  from  the  Annual  Register  (Loudon)  for  1910, 
289. 

83 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

pleted  the  formidable  list  of  charges  against  him,  re- 
sulting in  the  do^\^lfall  of  his  IMinistry  and  the  retire- 
ment of  the  Radical  party  from  power.  On  January  13, 
1912,  M.  Raymond  Poincare  became  President  of  the 
Council.  A  member  of  the  Democratic  Republican  Al- 
liance, he  brought  into  being  a  cabinet  of  moderate  ten- 
tencies.  By  this  time  not  only  the  homogeneity  but  the 
numerical  force  of  the  Bloc  had  been  overcome,  and  new 
groupings  and  combinations  were  in  the  process  of 
formation. 

II 

Before  discussing  the  new  groupings,  however,  the  in- 
terior relations  of  the  members  of  the  Bloc  must  be  re- 
viewed in  order  to  understand  to  what  extent  they  were 
willing  to  bring  about  real  party  combinations. 

This  Bloc  had  actually  been  formed  in  1901  at  the 
first  Congi'ess  of  the  Radical  and  Radical  Socialist 
party,  where  a  union  between  all  Socialists  was  organ- 
ized, and  where  the  slogan.  Pas  d'ennemis  a  gauche, 
was  adopted,  and  indeed  continued  as  a  party  motto 
until  very  recent  times. 

Thus  in  the  Radical  Congress  of  1904,  'M.  Debierre 
secured  the  adoption  of  a  motion  affirming  "the  neces- 
sity of  alliances  with  other  parties  of  the  Left  .  .  .  dur- 
ing the  elections."^  None  the  less  he  asserted  the  com- 
plete independence  of  the  Radical  program.  This  mo- 
tion showed  that  the  contemplated  alliances  were  not  to 
be  considered  as  fusions,  but  merely  as  opportunistic 
combinations.  The  French  electoral  system  lent  itself 
((uite  readily  to  such  temporary  junctures.  Elections  to 
the  Chamber  are  decided  by  an  absolute  majority  vote. 

•^  Quoted  in  Charpentier,  Le  Parti  Eadical  et  Badical-Socialiste, 

428. 

84 


THE  "JiLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

If  no  candidate  received  a  majority  of  all  the  votes  cast, 
a  supplementary  election  must  be  held  two  weeks  later 
at  which  the  same  candidates  may  present  themselves 
and  where  their  fate  is  decided  by  a  simple  plurality.*' 
Now  under  this  system,  every  party  usually  ran  a  can- 
didate in  every  arrondissement  during  the  first  ballot- 
ing. In  case  no  party  candidate  received  a  majority, 
combinations  between  parties  for  the  second  election 
were  ordinarily  effected.  It  was  by  this  method  that 
the  Bloc  secured  the  return  of  its  candidates,  Radicals 
voting  with  Socialists  or  with  Alliance  Republicans  upon 
the  second  ballot. 

Despite  the  decision  taken  at  Amsterdam,  the  Radi- 
cals did   not   give  up   the  hope   of   Socialist  support.'^ 

However,  the  antipatriotie  preaching  of  Gustave 
Herve,  actually  urging  soldiers  to  desert,  caused  the 
Congress  of  Radicals  held  at  Nancy  in  1907  to  declare 
that  although  the  Bloc  must  continue,  the  members  of 
the  party  would,  refuse  "their  votes  to  any  candidate 
who  advocates  the  disorganization  of  the  armies  of  the 
Republic,  either  by  desertion  in  time  of  peace,  or  by  in- 
surrection and  the  general  strikes  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy.  .  .  . "  ^ 

This  motion  was  a  direct  attack  upon  th§  entire  So- 
cialist party  program  because  at  its  Congress  of  Limoges 
in  November,  1906,  it  had  voted  to  prevent  the  outbreak 
of  war  "by  every  means,  from  parliamentary  interven- 
tion, public  agitation,  and  popular  manifestations,  to 
the  general  workingmen's  strike  and  insurrection."^ 
But  the  Radical  Congress  held  at  Dijon  in  1908,  while 

"This  systcMii  has  been  changed  by  the  Electoral  law  of  1919. 
See  pp.   16")- 169. 

''Sec  Cliarpenticr,  op.  cit.,  430. 

"Ibid.,  4.32. 

"  Alexandro  Zevaes,  Le  Parti  Socialiste  Unifie  et  La  Guerre,  13. 

85 


CONTEJMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

repiidiating  aiw  alliances  with  the  progressist  or  liberal 
parties,  declared  "itself  ready  to  reconstruct  the  old 
Bloc  of  the  Left  in  order  to  realize  social  and  economic 
reforms."  This  olive  branch  not  being  accepted  by  the 
Socialists  ("whose  Marxist  tendencies,  on  the  contrary, 
continued  to  develop),  the  Radicals  at  the  Congress  of 
Xiines  (1911)  decided  to  postpone  the  matter  of  their 
future  relationship  with  them  for  a  year.  This  decision 
was  taken  in  order  to  conciliate  and  compromise  the  ele- 
ment who  wished  to  repudiate  all  relations  with  the 
Socialist  party  (when  the  latter  had  refused  to  vote 
confidence  in  the  JMonis  Government,  simply  because  it 
was  a  "bourgeois"  government).  ]\Iany  Radicals,  how- 
ever, still  felt  the  necessity  of  Socialist  cooperation. 
Thus,  while  the  rupture  between  the  Radicals  and  the 
Socialists  was  not  quite  complete,  the  hearty  understand- 
ing existing  between  the  two  parties  in  1901  certainly 
continued  no  longer  in  1911. 

The  union  between  the  Democratic  Republican  Alli- 
ance and  the  Radicals,  which  constituted  the  other  part 
of  the  Bloc,  experienced  a  similar  evolution.  Between 
1901  and  1910,  both  parties  acted  in  complete  accord, 
and  it  even  appears  that  until  1911  these  liberal  Repub- 
licans were  regarded  as  the  right  wing  of  the  Radical 
party.  Consequently  the  definite  constitution  of  a 
Democratic  Republican  party  by  the  Alliance  in  1911 
somewhat  antagonized  the  Radicals,  especially  as  many 
of  them  belonged  both  to  the  Alliance  and  to  their  own 
l)arty  at  the  same  time.  ^lorcover,  the  Radicals  in  1910 
bad  formall}'  disai)proved  these  double  affiliations  and 
at  the  Congress  in  Rouen  it  was  decided  that  the  re- 
actionary peril  having  been  removed,  each  party  should 
devote  itself  to  its  own  organization  and  platform.  The 
Alliance  received  the  decision  that  Radicals  could  no 

86 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

longer  bo  affiliated  with  their  organization  with  some 
resentment,  which  later  led  to  a  complete  separation  of 
the  two. 

Lastly,  the  Republican  Socialists  eKd  not  maintain 
wholly  cordial  relationships  with  the  Radicals,  although 
before  1911  they  acted  in  cooperation  with  them  and 
formed  part  of  the  Bloc.  At  a  congress  of  the  party 
held  in  Toulouse  in  1911,  the  Radicals  were  declared 
to  be  solely  a  party  of  anticlcricalism ;  while  the  Unified 
Socialists  were  condemned  as  exponents  of  direct  action 
and  antimilitarism,  neither  of  which  the  Republican 
Socialists  could  support.  In  June,  1912,  when  the  Radi- 
cals attempted  to  form  an  alliance  with  the  Republican 
Socialists  in  the  Paris  municipal  elections,  the  later  re- 
plied that  while  they  would  support  the  Radical  clerical 
program,  they  exclusively  reserved  entire  freedom  upon 
all  other  questions. 


Ill 


Such  were  the  respective  attitudes  of  the  parties  of 
the  Left  at  the  time  of  the  accession  of  the  Poincare 
Ministry  in  1912.  Although  it  was  a  Moderate  Ministry, 
it  contained  such  Radicals  as  Leon  Bourgeois,  Pams  and 
Steeg  upon  it.  Despite  this  the  Radical  Congress  at 
Tours,  October,  1912,  expressed  a  deep  resentment 
toward  the  Democratic  Alliance  of  which  M.  Poincare 
was  a  member,  accusing  it  of  voting  for  clerical  candi- 
dates in  the  Chateaudun,  Apt,  and  Ilaut-Rhin.^"  ]\Iean- 
while  Aristide  Briand  was  urging  the  policy  of  pacifica- 
tion towards  the  Church  and  the  union  of  the  moderate 

*"  See  Bcmsieme  Congres  du  Parti  Bepublicain,  Eadical  et  Badi- 
oal-Socialiste,  Tours,  brochure,  21. 

87 


CONTE]\IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

elements  into  a  single  party.  His  efforts  were  also  re- 
pudiated by  the  Congress  of  Tours  which  condemned 
what  it  termed  "an  intolerable  policy  of  pacification." 
Upon  the  election  to  the  Presidency  of  Rajonond  Poin- 
care  over  Jules  Pams,  the  Radical  candidate,  M.  Briand, 
a  bitter  opponent  of  the  Radicals,  was  made  Premier. 
At  his  fall  upon  the  issue  of  electoral  reform  in  March, 
1913,  another  Republican  of  the  Alliance  succeeded  him, 
Louis  Barthou.  Thus  three  successive  ministries  were 
headed  by  anti-Radical  men.  ]\I.  Barthou 's  Cabinet  was 
especially  attacked  by  the  Radicals  because  it  contained 
a  Progressist  Republican,  M.  Thierry,  When  Charles 
Dumont,  one  of  the  vice-presidents  of  the  Radical  partj' 
bureau,  was  asked  to  join  the  Barthou  Ministry,  the 
officers  of  the  Executive  Committee  vigorously  pro- 
tested against  Radical  participation  in  any  other  but  a 
strictly  Left  Ministry. 

Beginning  with  the  Poincare  Cabinet  and  continuing 
through  the  Barthou  Ministry,  there  was  a  movement  to 
unite  all  the  moderate  elements  of  the  Chamber  in  order 
to  appease  certain  antagonistic  elements  in  the  Republic, 
especially  the  Catholics.  One  of  these  attempts  was 
known  as  the  Entente  Democratique  et  Sociale,  organ- 
ized in  the  Chamber  by  M.  ]\Iaginot,  with  the  object  of 
combining  the  deputies  in  a  "Center  group,"  complete- 
ly independent  of  other  political  combinations.  This 
group  later  came  to  be  known  as  the  Centre  Gauche,  and 
included  members  of  both  the  Radical  and  Independent 
Socialist  parties.  This  grouping  soon  was  vigorously  at- 
tacked by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Radical 
party;  and  as  the  result  of  a  letter  written  on  the  18th 
of  June,  1913,  it  succeeded  in  securing  the  withdrawal 
of  eiglit  Radicals  from  this  coml)iiiati()n. 

Both  of  tlicse  developments,  i.e.,  Radical  participa- 

88 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

tioii  iu  a  Cabinet  which  iiichuled  a  I'rogrcssi.st  Repul)li- 
can  and  Radical  adherence  to  a  group  based  upon  a 
policy  of  conciliation,  were  condemned  by  the  Congress 
of  Pau,  in  October,  1913,  as  throwing  the  Republic  back 
into  the  hands  of  the  Clericals.  The  fundamental  im- 
portance in  a  democracy  of  "distinct  parties,  conflicting 
in  their  ideas,  opposing  program  to  program,"  was 
emphasized. ^^ 

The  month  following  the  Congress  (in  December, 
1913),  M.  Aristide  Briand,  in  a  famous  speech  at  St. 
Etienne,  proclaimed  the  necessity  of  a  Republican 
entente.  He  protested  against  socialistic  attempts  at 
revolution,  strongly  attacking  the  Radicals;  he  pleaded 
for  reconciliation  with  the  Catholics ;  he  urged  propor- 
tional representation  and  the  three-year  military  law; 
and,  finally,  he  denounced  Joseph  Caillaux  in  no  uncer- 
tain terms. 

It  was  about  this  same  time  that  the  Radicals,  who 
now  were  called  the  "Unified  Radicals,"  were  able  to 
win  control  of  the  IMinistry,  Senator  Doumergue  becom- 
ing its  head.  This  Cabinet  was  pledged  to  carry  out  the 
Pau  program  which  called  for  (1)  the  repeal  of  the 
three-year  law  which  the  Barthou  Cabinet  had  enacted ; 
(2)  "laic  defense,"  or  further  legislation  to  drive  Cath- 
olic schools  out  of  France;  (3)  an  income  tax.  The 
Cabinet,  however,  was  very  opportunist ;  Senator  Dou- 
mergue supported  the  three-year  law  and  did  virtually 
nothing  with  respect  to  laic  defense ;  no  agreement  could 
be  reached  with  the  Senate  over  the  inclusion  of  rentes 
in  the  income  tax ;  and  as  Senator  Clemenceau  was  hos- 
tile to  proportional  representation  on  the  grounds  that 
it  would  increase  Catholic  power,  the  party  made  no 

"  Troisieme  Covnrrs  du  Parti  Bepublicain,  Badical  et  Eadical- 
Sociali^te,  Pau,   1913,   brochure,   387. 

89 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

progress  with  electoral  reform.  Finally,  the  activities  of 
M.  Caillaux,  Minister  of  Finance  and  the  acknowledged 
leader  of  the  Radicals,  at  last  became  openly  disrepu- 
table. He  was  accused  of  using  his  position  not  onlj^  to 
favor  foreign  banks  in  which  he  was  interested,  but  also 
to  forward  his  speculations  on  the  Bourse.  In  addition, 
he  was  accused  of  obstructing  the  course  of  justice  in 
the  Rochette  case,  that  of  a  notorious  swindle  involving 
Mexican  railway  stock.  These  factors  increased  hostil- 
ity to  the  Radicals  and  also  the  demand  for  a  great  Re- 
publican and  ^Moderate  party.  This  demand  finally  cul- 
minated in  the  formation  of  a  group  called  the  Fed- 
erated Parties  of  the  Left,  or  simply,  the  Federation  of 
the  Left,  upon  January  14,  1914. 

This  group  was  composed  of  124  members,  including 
M]\I.  Barthou,  Baudin,  ]\Iillerand,  Klotz,  and  Berenger, 
Naturally,  !M,  Briand  was  its  president.  It  included  most 
of  the  "Centrist"  elements,  a  few  Radir-als,  and  some 
independent  Socialists.  It  announced  a  program  of 
labor  and  social  legislation,  of  parliamentary  reform, 
and  of  conciliation  with  the  Church.  It  denounced  the 
Radicals  for  their  equivocal  attitude  in  officially  protest- 
ing against  the  three-year  law  and  then,  when  in  power, 
of  supporting  it.  It  also  criticized  the  vagueness  of 
their  social  reform  program,  and  their  eternal  pleading 
for  "liberty"  in  contrast  to  their  severe  oppression  of 
the  Church. 

Against  the  Federation  of  the  Left,  then,  stood  the 
Unified  Radicals  and  the  Unified  Socialists.  This  was 
the  last  stage  of  party  evolution  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  Meanwhile,  Jean  Jaures  was  manfully 
trying  to  swing  the  Socialists  back  into  line,  and  to 
bring  about  a  union  of  the  Radicals  and  the  Socialists. 
Such  a  restoration  of  the  old  Bloc  would  mean  the  con- 

90 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACKED  UNION 

trol  of  the  Chanibor  by  the  Left— without  the  help  of 
the  Federation  of  the  Left— which  was  tlie  bitter  enemy 
of  both  Unified  parties.  At  the  Socialist  Congress  of 
Amiens,  held  in  the  latter  part  of  January,  19U, 
Jaures  urged  that  upon  second  ballots,  Socialists  should 
cooperate  with  Radicals.  In  order  to  avoid  the  appear- 
ance of  too  flagrantly  violating  their  cherished  princi- 
ples, he  introduced  a  carefully  worded  resolution  which 
reaffirmed  the  absolute  unwillingness  of  the  Socialist 
party  to  enter  any  alliance  with  a  bourgeois  party,  but 
which  suggested  that  upon  second  ballots  Socialist  voters 
might  support  "the  candidates  of  other  parties  who 
most  clearly  and  vigorously  combat  the  three-year  law, 
war,  chauvinism,  and  the  military-clerical  combination." 
As  this  could  obviously  mean  none  other  than  the  Cail- 
laux  Radicals,  the  motion  met  with  the  greatest  oppo- 
sition from  such  leaders  as  Allemane,  Chauvin,  Negre, 
and  Le  Gleo,  who  said  that  "the  resolution  voted  at 
the  International  Congress  of  Amsterdam  which  forbade 
Socialists  of  all  nations  to  form  agreements,  coalitions 
or  ententes  with  bourgeois  political  parties,  has  been 
trodden  under  foot  by  the  majority  of  the  Socialist  party. 
The  majority  has  hypocritically  concluded  an  illegal 
alliance  with  the  most  despicable  and  the  most  criminal 
of  all  political  parties,  the  Radical  party."  Upon  the 
adoption  of  the  Jaures  motion,  under  the  leadership  of 
Allemane,  these  protestauts  withdrew  and  attempted  to 
form  a  Labor  party,  an  attempt,  however,  which  proved 
unsuccessful,  and  the  break  was  soon  mended. 

The  ensuing  provisional  union  between  the  two  Uni- 
fied parties,  and  the  purely  pacific  program  of  both  re- 
sulted in  the  return  of  a  Chamber  strongly  Left  in  its 
tendencies  as  the  result  of  the  elections  of  the  spring  of 

91 


CONTEMPORAKY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

1914.^-  The  Unified  Radicals  and  the  Unified  Socialists, 
as  we  noted  in  the  last  chapter,  were  strong  enough 
to  drive  the  Ribot  Ministry  out  of  power,  June  12,  1914, 
because  it  supported  the  three-year  law^  In  the  Cabinet 
of  Viviani,  who  was  a  Republican  Socialist,  which  fol- 
lowed, the  names  of  five  Unified  Radicals  appeared ;  but, 
in  keeping  with  their  policy,  no  Unified  Socialists  were 
included.  Following  the  decision  of  the  Viviani  Govern- 
ment to  support  the  three-year  law,  the  Unified  Social- 
ists withdrew  their  support,  and  the  Government  was 
maintained  by  purely  bourgeois  parties. 

Amidst  the  growing  signs  of  a  conflict  with  Germany, 
a  congress  of  the  Unified  Socialists,  held  on  the  16th 
of  July,  1914,  adopted  the  following  motion: 

"The  results  of  the  1914  elections  were  as  follows: 

Kepublican   Democratic   Alliance    1,564,578 

Unified  Radicals   1,496,058 

Federation  of  the  Left  1,396,447 

Unified  Socialists   1,408,114 

Eight  and  Liberal  Action  1,297,712 

Republican   Federation    810,679 

Republican  Socialists   323,326 

In  the  Chamber,  the  groups  presented  this  composition    (these 

figures  differ  according  to   sources;    but  those   given  below   seem 

to  be  the  average). 

Radical  Socialist  group   172 

Unified  Socialist    101 

Republican   Socialist    30 

Liberal   Action    32 

Republican   Federation    36 

Democratic  Left   34 

Radical   Left    66 

Republicans  of  Left 54 

Republican  Union   21 

Right   15 

' '  Non-inscrits ' '  and  independents   41 

602 
It  will   bo  noted   that  tlio  Federation  of   the   Left   maintained 

no  distinct  parliamentary  group. 

About  seventy  Radicals  were  also  to  be  found  divided  among 

other  groups. 

92 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

Among  all  means  employed  to  forestall  and  prevent  war 
and  to  impose  upon  governments  a  recourse  to  arbitration, 
the  Congress  considers  as  particularly  effective  the  method 
of  a  general  labor  strike  simultaneously  and  internationally 
organized  in  the  interested  countries. 

In  addition  to  its  oft-repeated  refusals  to  vote  appro- 
priations, especially  war  credits,  for  a  bourgeois  govern- 
ment, and  to  act  in  collaboration  with  the  Ministry  of 
such  a  government,  the  party  now  reiterated  its  threat 
of  a  general  strike  in  the  face  of  imminent  hostilities.  It 
was  with  considerable  misgiving,  therefore,  that  the 
patriotic  elements  of  the  country  saw  war  being  forced 
upon  them ;  and  it  was  doubtless  with  considerable  en- 
couragement that  Germany  pushed  her  preparatory 
moves. 


IV 


On  the  3rd  of  August,  1914,  Germany  declared  war  on 
France ;  and  on  the  4th  of  August,  the  Parliament  was 
assembled  in  extraordinary  session.  In  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  M.  Paul  Deschanel  pronounced  a  eulogy  upon 
Jean  Jaures  who  had  been  assassinated  upon  the  31st 
of  July.^^  From  the  grave  of  the  man,"  he  said,  "who 
has  perished,  a  martyr  to  his  ideas,  rises  a  thought  of 
union ;  from  his  clay-cold  lips  rises  a  cry  of  hope  for  the 
fatherland,  for  justice,  for  the  human  conscience.  Is 
this  not  the  most  worthy  homage  we  can  render  him?" 
It  was  on  the  same  day  that  M.  Poincare,  President  of 
the  Republic,  issued  his  famous  call  for  unity  in  the  face 
of  danger:     "France,"  he  wrote,  "will  be  heroically 

"  For  a  short  discussion  of  the  life  and  work  of  this  great 
Socialist  leader,  see  Jean  Jaures,  with  a  preface  by  Pierre  Kenau- 
del,  published  in  "Le  F.ait  de  la  Scinaine"  series. 

93 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

defended  by  all  of  her  sons,  united  in  the  Sacred  Union 
which  nothing  can  break.  They  will  stand  before  the 
enemy,  bound  together  by  a  common  indignation  and 
in  a  common  political  faith." 

The  members  of  the  Socialist  party,  joining  with 
every  other  group  in  the  Chamber,  unanimously  voted 
to  accept  the  eighteen  projects  of  law  which  the  Govern- 
ment considered  necessary  to  meet  the  circumstances. 
The  Unified  Socialists  approved  the  credits  requested 
by  the  Government.  They  moreover  unanimously  voted 
to  declare  the  State  of  Siege,  and  for  a  law  restraining 
the  liberty  of  the  press.  Three  weeks  later  the  Viviani 
Cabinet  was  enlarged  to  include,  not  only  representa- 
tives of  all  parties  (except  the  Right),  but  the  most 
fiery  opponents  of  ministerial  participation  among  the 
Unified  Socialists, — Jules  Guesde  and  Marcel  Sembat. 
Thus  France  saw  the  Socialist  party  in  this  hour  of 
national  peril  deserting  all  the  principles  of  "bourgeois" 
opposition,  laid  down  in  the  Congress  of  Amsterdam, 
to  become  completely  identified  with  the  Sacred  Union, 
upon  which  the  safety  of  France  now  depended. 

Yet  even  in  the  face  of  this  crisis  the  Socialists  at- 
tempted to  explain  the  abandonment  of  their  Marxian 
tenets  in  a  declaration  published  on  August  28,  1914, 
which  read  as  follows: 

Citizens, 

As  the  consequence  of  a  mature  deliberation  and  after  a 
decision  carefully  arrived  at,  the  Socialist  party  has  authorized 
two  of  its  members,  our  comrades,  Jules  Guesde  and  Marcel 
Sembat,  to  form  part  of  the  new  government ;  and  it  has  made 
them  its  delegates  in  the  work  of  national  defense.  Every 
representative  of  the  Socialist  group  in  Parliament  .  .  .  has 
agreed  to  assume  with  them  the  grave  responsibilities  which 
they  have  consented  to  undertake. 

If   it    were   only    a    question    of   readjustment   within    the 

94 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

Ministry,  if  it  were  only  a  (lueslion  of  contril)iitin,i^  to  an 
old  gDvermuent  some  of  the  forces  in  which  our  party  is  so 
rich;  even  more,  if  it  were  only  a  question  of  ordinary  partici- 
pation in  a  bourj2^eois  government,  neither  the  consent  of  our 
friends  or  of  ourselves  would  have  been  obtained. 

It  is,  however,  the  future  of  the  nation,  the  life  of  France 
which  is  the  question  to-day.    The  party  has  not  hesitated.  .  .-. 

In  these  words  the  party  justified  its  collaboration  in 
a  Ministry  of  the  bourgeoisie,  and  for  the  first  time 
since  the  organization  of  the  i)arty  in  1905,  permitted 
a  member  of  the  Unified  Socialists  to  serve  on  such  a 
Ministry. 

Of  the  sincerity  of  the  patriotism  shoAvn  by  the  other 
groups  there  was  no  question.  The  German  peril  be- 
came infinitely  more  near  and  real  than  Monarchism, 
Clericalism  or  Combism.  Every  element  united  in  the 
national  defense ;  the  union  of  French  political  antago- 
nisms proved  a  possibility  when  the  welding  force,  ex- 
ercised from  without,  was  of  sufficient  strength.  The 
spectacle  was  now  afforded  of  ^I.  Ribot  working  side  by 
side  with  the  Socialists  who  had  just  turned  out  his 
Ministry,  and  of  M.  Guesde  once  more  cooperating  with 
his  former  bitterest  enemies — IMillerand,  Viviani,  and 
Briand — whose  "heresy"  had  excluded  them  from  the 
Socialist   party. 

Outside  of  Parliament,  the  same  transformation 
united  every  effort  in  the  national  defense.  Even  Gus- 
tave  Ilerve  exhibited  a  most  remarkable  change  of  heart. 
Originally  the  most  rabid  antimilitarist  among  the  So- 
cialists, a  preacher  of  desertion  and  of  sabotage,  he  now 
freely  offered  himself  for  enlistment  in  the  army.  Upon 
January  1,  1916,  he  changed  the  name  of  his  formerly 
revolutionary  paper,  La  Guerre  Socialc  to  La  Victoire, 

95 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

and  while  carrying  on  an  ardent  campaign  of  criticism 
— exposing  defects  in  the  military  administration — his 
policy  was  adopted  solely  for  the  purpose  of  better 
assuring  victory.  As  a  climax  to  his  reformation  he 
finally  became  so  nationalistic  that  he  was  at  last  read 
out  of  the  Socialist  party!  The  General  Confederation 
of  Labor,  likewise,  urged  its  adherents  (nearly  a  mil- 
lion) to  fight  and  overcome  German  imperialism,  as  the 
first  essential  step  in  the  achievement  of  social  democ- 
racy. Among  clerical  circles,  thousands  of  members  of 
the  excluded  religious  orders  hurried  back  to  France 
and  entered  the  army ;  equally  large  numbers  of  priests 
joined  its  ranks  either  as  chaplains  or  combatants. 

In  January,  1915,  the  Socialists  in  the  Chamber — who 
had  previously  nominated  a  separate  list  of  candidates 
for  the  presiding  officers  of  the  Chamber — decided  to 
do  away  with  this  practice  and  unite  with  the  other 
groups  in  an  almost  unanimous  reelection  of  M.  Des- 
chanel  as  President.  Well  might  the  President,  in  his 
inaugural  address,  enlarge  upon  the  Sacred  Union  and 
praise  the  willingness  of  all  parties  to  forget  political 
antagonism  in  the  face  of  a  common  danger !  The  Briand 
Cabinet,  formed  on  the  29th  of  October,  1915,  even  more 
forcefully  acknowledged  the  strength  of  this  Union, 
for  out  of  its  twenty-two  Ministers,  eight  were  former 
Prime  Ministers :  Doumergue,  Ribot,  Viviani,  Combes, 
Bourgeois,  Freycinet  and  Meline,  representing  widely 
different  shades  of  political  opinion.  One  member  came 
from  the  irreconcilable  Right  (Denys  Cochin)  ;  a  So- 
cialist Minister  of  State  (Jules  Guesde),  and  another 
Socialist,  as  Minister  of  Munitions  (Albert  Thomas), 
completed  a  ministerial  combination  the  like  of  which 
had  never  been  thought  possible  in  France. 

9G 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 


While  these  adjustments  were  taking  place,  certain 
Socialist  elements,  secretly  clinging  to  the  old  Marxist 
theory  of  the  "inherent  class  struggle,"  and  convinced 
that  the  war  was  caused  as  much  by  French  as  by  Ger- 
man capitalistic  exploitation,  were  beginning  to  chafe 
under  the  bonds  of  the  Union.  Fresh  courage  was  given 
this  group  by  the  widespread  depression  which  German 
successes  brought  to  French  morale.  The  Unified  So- 
cialist Federation  of  the  Haute-Vienne  in  May,  1915, 
passed  a  resolution — now  famous — addressed  to  all  the 
federations  of  the  party,  announcing  what  purported  to 
be  "its  criterion  and  its  judgment  upon  present  events." 
The  language  of  this  resolution,  very  moderate  in  com- 
parison with  those  which  followed,  reproached  certain 
members  of  the  party  for  writing  chauvinistic  articles, 
and  proposed  that  the  Socialists  keep  a  receptive  ear 
open  for  "any  propositions  of  peace,  from  wherever  it 
may  come."  The  federations  of  the  Isere  and  of  the 
Rhone  approved  the  resolution  of  the  Haute-Vienne; 
and  a  very  strong  minority  in  the  federation  of  the 
Seine,  led  by  Jean  Longuet,  the  grandson  of  Karl  Marx, 
also  adhered  to  its  program.^*  This  resolution  marked  the 
birth  of  the  first  division  in  the  Socialist  party,  the  first 
sign  of  a  tendency  which  step  by  step  caused  its  with- 
drawal from  the  Sacred  Union.  The  majoritaires  of  the 
party,  i.e.,  those  who  held  a  majority  in  the  Socialist 
group  in  Parliament,  opposed  the  Haute-Vienne  motion. 
They  attempted  to  conciliate  the  national  duty  with  the 

"At  a  congress  of  the  Federation,  December  19,  1913,  the 
Renaudel-Fiancette  motion  received  6,000  votes;  while  the  Longuet 
motion  received  4,000. 

97 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

care  of  international  labor  interests,  and  they  believed 
that  Germany  was  completely  responsible  for  the  war. 
Moreover,  they  did  not  believe  in  the  opening  of  inter- 
national negotiations  with  the  enemy  Socialists  until 
the  war  had  ended,  and  they  even  opposed  a  discussion 
of  peace  terms  until  victory  had  been  won.  To  insure 
this  victory,  the  majoritaires  believed  in  Socialist  par- 
ticipation in  the  Government  and  in  the  voting  of  credits. 
The  leaders  of  this  section  of  the  Socialists  were  Albert 
Thomas,  Alexandre  Varenne,  and  Compere-j\Iorel. 

In  opposition  to  the  majoritaires,  the  minor itaires 
arose,  led  by  Jean  Longuet,  Mistral,  Mayeras,  and  Presse- 
manne,  who  were  the  original  supporters  of  the  Haute- 
Vienne  motion.^^  Although  they  still  supported  the 
prosecution  of  the  war,  they  began  little  by  little  to 
question  its  enemy  origin,  attributing  it  to  universal 
capitalism.  They  more  and  more  insistently  stigmatized 
the  "imperialism"  of  the  Entente,  and  began  to  de- 
mand a  declaration  of  Peace  Aims  which  should  define 
the  Allies'  exact  position.  Between  these  two  major 
divisions  of  rather  indefinite  principles  a  small  Centrist 
group  arose,  attempting  to  conciliate  both  extremes. 
This  group  was  led  by  ]\Iarcel  Cachin,  Pierre  Renaudel, 
and  ]\Iarcel  Sembat.  Of  these,  Cachin  was  of  undoubt- 
edly minoritaire  sympathies,  while  Renaudel  represented 
the  majoritaire  bent  (although,  because  of  his  editorship 
of  L'Humanite,  the  official  Socialist  newspaper,  he  at- 
tempted to  remain  neutral). 

In  July,  1915,  at  a  meeting  of  the  National  Council, 
the  majoritaires  showed  their  preponderating  desire  for 

"  The  dissident  movement  started  by  the  Hauto-Vienne  federation 
was  supported  by  the  Limousin  Deputies,  wliose  Socialist  con- 
stituents liad  been  turnetl  against  the  Government  because  of  a 
number  of  military  executions. 

98 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

the  continuance  of  the  war — a  determination  wliich  was 
voted  for  by  an  overwhehning  majority.  In  September, 
however,  another  split  occurred  in  the  party  of  even 
more  extremism  tlian  that  caused  by  the  minoritaires. 
This  element,  bolder  and  perhaps  more  honest  than  the 
latter,  condemned  capitalism  outright  as  the  cause  of  the 
war,  affirming  that  it  was  waged  in  the  interest  of  capi- 
talist oppression  of  Labor.  Pure  Marxists,  the  adher- 
ents of  this  group  urged  the  immediate  opening  of 
negotiations  with  the  enemy  Socialists  to  the  end  of 
stopping  the  war  by  the  hitherto  unsuccessful  interna- 
tional strike,  a  means  which  now  meant  a  refusal  longer 
to  bear  arms.  To  this  element  the  "class  struggle" 
was  still  the  fundamental  issue  which  the  war,  far  from 
belying  its  truth  or  postponing  its  application,  had  em- 
phasized. 

From  the  5th  to  the  9th  of  September,  1915,  at  Zim- 
merwald,  in  Switzerland,  this  extremist  element  of  the 
French  Socialist  party  met  representatives  of  the 
Italian,  Roumanian,  Bulgarian,  German,  Swedish,  Nor- 
wegian, Swiss,  Polish,  Dutch,  and  Russian  Socialists. 
They  agreed  to  a  manifesto  addressed  to  the  "Prole- 
tariat of  All  Nations"  condemning  the  war,  demanding 
an  immediate  peace,  and  proclaiming  that  the  "national 
defense  is  not  socialistic."  MM.  Bourderon  and  Merr- 
heim  signed  this  declaration  as  representatives  of  the 
French  Socialists.  But  at  the  Christmas  Congress  of 
the  Unified  party  in  France  (toward  the  end  of  1915), 
the  Zimmerwald  program  and  the  German  proposals  for 
peace  were  voted  down  by  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  2,736  against  76 — the  majoritaires  thus  again  exhibit- 
ing their  supremacy.  But  w'hat  the  minoritaires,  par- 
ticularly the  extreme  element  who  had  attended  the 
Zimmerwald  conference,  lacked  in  numbers,  they  made 

99 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

up  in  enthusiasm.  In  the  latter  part  of  April,  1916, 
a  second  "International  Congress"  was  held  at  Kien- 
thal,  another  little  town  in  Switzerland.  Forty  dele- 
gates attended  this  congress,  chiefly  from  the  official 
Italian  Socialist  party,  and  from  the  Swiss  and  Russian 
parties.  Two  German  representatives,  one  of  whom  was 
the  editor  of  Vorivdrts,  were  present.  The  French  So- 
cialists were  represented  by  three  Deputies — MINI.  Blanc, 
Brizon  and  Raffin-Dugens.  Their  attendance  indeed  was 
a  remarkably  bold  act  because  of  the  official  position 
they  held  in  a  Parliament  charged  with  the  prosecution 
of  the  war.  The  Kienthal  meeting  emphasized  the  pro- 
gram adopted  at  the  meeting  of  the  previous  autumn. 
Thereafter,  the  three  French  Deputies  systematically 
voted  against  all  war  credits,  and  upon  the  22nd  of 
September,  1916,  Raffin-Dugens  aggravated  this  atti- 
tude and  created  a  sensation  in  the  Chamber  by  speaking 
of  "his  comrades  in  Germany." 

The  vigor  of  this  extremist  movement,  and  the  force 
of  the  agitation  which  was  now  being  carried  on  through- 
out all  the  Socialist  federations,  was  shown  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  National  Council  of  the  party,  held  on  April 
9,  1916.  Here  the  minoritaires  were  able  to  muster  about 
one  third  of  the  votes.  Their  strength  was  exhibited  in 
the  Longuet-Pressemanne  motion  to  renew  international 
relations  with  the  German  Socialists  and  for  the  imme- 
diate discussion  by  the  Government  of  peace  terms  with 
Germany ;  it  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  1,996  against  960. 
The  majority  motion,  which  was  finally  adopted,  con- 
tained many  concessions  to  the  minority.  Although  it 
demanded  the  liberation  of  Serbia  and  of  Belgium  as  the 
sine  qua  non  of  peace,  it  made  no  mention  of  the  return 
of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Finally,  the  motion  recommended  that  the  other  sec- 

100 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

tions  of  the  International  Workingmen's  party  should 
frame  principles  which  Socialism  should  exact  in  the 
peace  settlement,  and  that  they  should  also  determine 
the  responsibility  for  the  war's  origin. 

Concerning  the  result  of  this  important  meeting,  Le 
Droit  du  Peuple,  a  minority  organ  of  the  Federation  of 
the  Isere,  said : 

Certainly,  the  result  obtained  is  not  that  which  we  had 
desired.  But  it  nuist  be  admitted  that  the  niinonty  is  not 
a  neg'liirible  quantity  since  it  includes  a  third  of  the  party. 
The  elements  which  compose  it  are  capable  of  deploying 
the  greatest  energy  and  of  becoming,  perhaps  sooner  than  it  is 
generally  believed,  the  majority  of  the  party.^^ 

M.  Chastenet,  the  author  of  these  words,  was  a  better 
prophet  than  he  knew. 

Gustave  Herve  in  La  Victoire  pointed  out  the  moral 
of  this  vote  according  to  his  own  lights : 

The  gravest  and  the  saddest  thing  about  this  decision  is  that 
the  socialism  of  Zimmerwald  which  controlled  only  a  handful 
of  votes  three  months  ago,  has  this  time  united  a  third  of  the 
party.     This  is  surely  a  bad  day  for  the  national  defense.^^ 

Meanwhile,  the  minoritaires  were  gradually  gaining 
control  of  whole  federations,  especially  in  the  industrial 
centers  of  France,  where  assertions  of  the  war's  "im- 
perialism," the  impossibility  of  victory,  and  the  neces- 
sity of  an  immediate  peace,  were  boldly  made.  The 
National  Congress  of  the  party,  held  in  Paris  from  the 
2-lth  to  the  28th  of  December,  1916,  again  resulted  in 
definite  minoritaire  increases.  On  a  motion  which  ex- 
pressed confidence  in  the  parliamentary  group,  and 
stated  ' '  that  no  act  be  done  by  the  group  which  would 

"Grenoble,  issue  of  April  12,  1916. 
"  Issue  of  April  10,  1916. 

101 


CONTE]\IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

result  in  liindering  the  national  defense,"  1,595  favor- 
able votes  were  cast  representing  the  majoritaire  ele- 
ment; 233  votes  were  cast  against  it,  representing  the 
Kienthalian  element;  but  there  were  1,104  abstentions, 
representing  the  minoritmres.  Thus  nearly  one  half 
(1,337)  of  the  Congress  refused  directly  to  authorize 
its  representatives  in  Parliament  to  continue  their  sup- 
port of  the  National  Defense!  At  the  same  convention, 
Albert  Thomas  Avas  authorized  to  continue  in  office  as 
^Minister  of  Munitions  in  the  Briand  Cabinet ;  but  his 
collaboration  was  to  be  exercised  "under  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  Administrative  Commission  of  the  party." 
This  decision,  however,  was  barely  agreed  to  by  a  vote 
of  1,637  against  1,372.  Thus  it  appeared  that  the  So- 
cialist party  was  on  the  verge  of  breaking  the  Sacred 
Union,  and  of  refusing  longer  to  support  the  vigorous 
prosecution  of  the  war. 

The  vote  upon  another  resolution  concerning  interna- 
tional relations  showed  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  This 
was  a  substitute  for  a  Kienthalian  motion  intended  to 
open  the  way  for  negotiations  with  the  German  Social- 
ists and  for  immediate  peace  "at  whatever  price."  How- 
ever, the  substituted  motion  provided  for  cA'entual  nego- 
tiations subject  to  certain  conditions.  This  motion  re- 
ceived 1,537  votes  while  1,407  opposed  it.  IMeasured  by 
figures,  .therefore,  the  growth  of  the  minoritaires  had 
increased  (since  the  vote  in  April  when  they  obtained 
960  as  against  1,996),  to  a  present  voting  strength  of 
but  a  hundred  less  than  the  majoriiaires.  Tliis  cer- 
tainly was  a  remarkable  and  a  disconcerting  evolution 
toward  the  Left.  The  supremacy  of  tlie  minoritaires 
meant  that  the  Sacred  Union  would  be  sliattered  and 
that  the  party  Avould  resume  its  Amsterdam  program 
even  in  Ihe  face  of  German  invasion. 

102 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

In  Iho  sprinj?  of  1!)17  the  Stockholm  agitation  arose. 
Connnonly  supposed  to  have  been  of  Russian  origin,  a 
movement  was  inulerlaken  to  hold  a  meeting  of  all  of 
its  sections,  Allied  and  Germanic,  of  the  International 
AVorkingmen's  Association.  The  purpose  of  this  gather- 
ing was  to  define  tei-ms  of  peace  and  to  bring  an  imme- 
diate end  to  the  war.  All  the  well-known  arguments 
for  such  a  Conference  were  put  forwai'd :  it  would  prove 
to  both  the  Russian  and  German  Socialists  that  the  Allies 
had  no  imperialistic  ambitions,  and  that  as  a  result, 
Russia  would  stay  in  the  war,  and  the  German  Social- 
ists would  resist  its  prolongation.  The  Allied  Govern- 
ments, however,  suspected  the  conference  to  be  of  Ger- 
manic origin,  and  purely  defeatist  in  its  pur- 
poses. This  attitude  indeed  was  taken  at  first  by  the 
French  Socialist  party  which,  at  the  end  of  April,  1917, 
voted  not  to  participate  in  the  Stockholm  conference. 
However,  agitation  for  participation  grew  with  the  gath- 
ering strength  of  the  minority  element,  until  on  May  28, 
1917,  the  French  decision  was  changed  and  it  was  de- 
cided to  go  to  Stockholm  "to  define  war  aims  and  to 
prepare  for  a  full  meeting  of  the  Internationale."  The 
not  illogical  refusal  of  the  French  Government  to  give 
passports  to  this  conference  naturally  angered  the  So- 
cialists. At  its  Bordeaux  Congress,  held  in  October, 
1917,  the  party  (with  the  remarkable  exceptions  of  MM. 
Guesde,  Bracke  and  a  few  others),  was  determined  to 
go  to  Stockholm.  This  unanimity  was  itself  a  victory 
for  the  Kienthalians,  the  party  now  officially  recogniz- 
ing the  legitimacy  and  the  value  of  the  action  taken  by 
the  few  extremists  who  had  attended  the  conferences  at 
Zimmerwald  and  Kienthal  if!  the  fall  of  1915  and  the 
spring  of  1916. 

In  addition  to  the  Stockholm  question,  the  Congress 

10:3 


CONTE]\IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

was  again  faced  with  that  of  ministerial  participation. 
Albert  Thomas  had  continued  to  be  the  Socialist  repre- 
sentative in  the  Ribot  Ministry,  which  had  succeeded 
Briand  on  March  19,  1917.  M.  Ribot  was  forced  to  re- 
sign on  September  10  and  his  successor,  Paul  Painleve, 
a  Republican  Socialist,  also  retained  Albert  Thomas  in 
his  Cabinet.  But  because  of  the  violent  criticism  of  the 
minoritaires  as  to  the  war  aims  of  the  Government — as 
well  as  to  the  principle  of  ministerial  participation,  he 
resigned  in  order  to  preserve  the  unity  of  the  party. 

In  the  preceding  Ministries  (notably  those  of  Viviani, 
of  Briand  and  of  Ribot),  the  Socialists  had  been  repre- 
sented. Consequently,  the  withdrawal  of  Socialist  sup- 
port from  the  Government  was  generally  interpreted  as 
the  breaking  up  of  the  Sacred  Union — the  return  to  the 
Marxian  theory  of  unmitigated  opposition  to  a  bour- 
geois government.  Moreover,  on  account  of  the  loss 
of  the  Socialist  support  on  which  his  Government  largely 
depended,  M.  Painleve  was  forced  to  resign.  He  was  re- 
placed on  November  13,  1917,  by  M.  Georges  Clemen- 
ceau,  a  vigorous  Radical.  Here  was  a  man  of  different 
stamp.  Accepting  the  Socialist  challenge,  he  declared 
a  relentless  war  on  their  antipatriotic  .  maneuvers — • 
openly  declared  as  such;  and  thoroughly  antagonistic 
toward  their  antipatriotisra,  and  confident  in  his  own 
powers,  he  successfully  formed  a  Cabinet  without  their 
representation  or  support !  ^^ 

Thus,  so  far  as  the  safety  of  the  Sacred  Union  was 
concerned,  the  Bordeaux  Congress  made  little  difference. 
The  Socialists  now  found  themselves  unable  to  reenter 
the  Government  even  had  they  chosen  so  to  act.  But 
the  Congress  nevertheless  voted  a  majoritaire  motion, 

'"For  .1  sliort  account  of  M.  Clcninnccau 's  life,  soe  Appendix  A. 

104 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACKED  UNION 

which  declared  for  representation  at  Stockholm,  for  sup- 
port of  the  war,  for  voting  war  credits,  for  participation 
in  the  Government,^^  and  for  the  revision  of  Allied  war 
aims.  'This  motion  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  1,552.  An- 
other motion,  introduced  by  the  minoritaires,  was  some- 
what similar.  It  expressly  favored,  however.  Socialist 
adherence  to  the  National  Defense  only  so  lon<^  as  the 
war  continued  to  be  a  defensive  war.  This  motion  re- 
ceived 831  votes.  The  third  motion,  introduced  by  M. 
Brizon,  representing  the  Kienthalians,  demanded  imme- 
diate peace  and  suggested  that  the  Socialists  should  re- 
fuse to  vote  war  credits;  a  motion  which  received  385 
votes.  A  still  more  extreme  group  fostered  another 
motion  against  war  credits,  which  received  118  votes. 
The  comparatively  stVong  vote  for  the  majoritaires 
(1,552),  did  not  necessarily  indicate  a  weakening  of  the 
minority ;  first,  because  the  former  adhered  in  the  latter 's 
demand  for  the  Stockholm  Conference;  secondly,  the 
minority  was  really  divided  between  the  supporters  of 
the  three  motions — their  total  being  1,334  votes. 


VI 


After  the  Bordeaux  Congress,  the  minority  carried  on 
an  increased  agitation  against  the  "imperialism"  of  the 
Government.  The  failure  of  the  Allies  to  state  definitely 
their  war  aims  and  the  success  of  the  Bolsheviki  in 
Russia,  gave  the  minority  some  ground  for  the  belief 
that  a  bourgeois  Government  could  never  inaugurate  a 
policy  leading  to  democratic  peace.  In  the  spring  of 
1918,  the  minority  organized  itself  into  a  definite  group, 
and  through  the  columns  of  Le  Populaire,  edited  by  its 

"Subject  to  certain  qualifications. 
105 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

leader,  Jean  Longuet,  carried  on  a  systematic  campaign 
for  peace.  To  meet  the  increasingly  extensive  and  effec- 
tual activities  of  the  minoritaires,  the  majority  started 
a  new  paper,  La  France  Lihre,  the  first  number  tippear- 
ing  in  July.  Thus  the  fight  between  the  tAvo  divisions 
of  the  Socialist  party  became  more  bitter  than  ever. 
Victory  finally  came  to  Longuet  and  his  following  at 
a  meeting  of  the  National  Council  of  the  party,  held 
on  the  29th  and  30th  of  July,  1918.  The  minority,  with 
the  assistance  of  its  vanguard,  the  Kienthalians,  was 
at  last  able  to  muster  a  clear  majority  of  votes.  Upon 
the  Longuet  motion  asking  for  a  revision  of  war  aims, 
definite  conditions  of  peace  upon  the  basis  defined  by 
the  Russian  Revolution,  and  a  determined  refusal  to 
vote  further  military  credits  in  case  the  Government  per- 
sisted in  refusing  passports  to  an  international  confer- 
ence, 1,544  votes  were  mustered.  The  Renaudel  majori- 
taire  motion  calling  in  general  terms  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  war,  received  only  1,172  votes.  To  the  ma- 
jority now  held  by  Longuet  should  be  added  152  votes 
received  by  a  strictly  Kienthalian  motion,  offered  by  M. 
Loriot,  the  new  leader  of  the  group.  Thus  the  element 
in  the  Socialist  party  which  demanded  the  renewal  of 
relations  with  the  German  Socialists,  a  peace  which 
would  not  necessarily  include  the  return  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  and  which  meant  the  virtual  recognition  of  the 
Bolsheviki,  came  into  power.  The  victory  was  even 
more  complete  than  the  vote  showed,  for  the  Renaudel 
motion  also  provided  for  an  international  conference 
and  for  the  refusal  of  war  credits  if  the  Government 
longer  denied  the  issuance  of  passports  for  the  delegates. 
In  October,  1918,  the  National  Congress  of  the  party 
definitely  confirmed  the  lately  acquired  power  o^  the 
old  minoritaires.     The  former  majority,  led  by  Albert 

106 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

Thomas,  Vareniie  and  Compere-Morel,  now  became 
known  as  the  ex-majoritaires,  and  the  new  majority,  led 
by  Longuet  and  IMistral,  beeame  the  ex-minorit aires. 
The  control  of  TTvmanite  had  already  passed  out  of  the 
hands  of  Renaiidel,  who  now  belonged  to  the  ex-majori- 
taires, and  its  control  Avas  placed  with  INIarcel  Cacliin,  a 
Centrist,  but  of  minority  sentiment,  subject  to  the  direc- 
tion of  a  committee  of  fifteen. 

Thus  the  Socialist  party  gradually  had  broken  away 
from  the  Sacred  Union  in  spirit,  if  not  in  fact.  Froia 
a  patriotism  which  called  the  war  a  crusade  "of  jus- 
tice" and  the  national  defense  "the  highest  duty,"  it 
now  turned  to  ]Marxian  concepts  which  denounced  both 
as  of  oppressive  injury  to  the  working  class.  Deserting 
its  new-born  nationalist  conceptions,  it  had  again  re- 
turned to  its  theories  of  class  consciousness  and  in- 
ternationalism. It  no  longer  was  represented  in  the 
Ministry,  and  with  the  exception  of  twenty-eight  ex- 
majoritaires,  many  of  whom  subsequently  left  the 
party,  it  refused  to  vote  the  military  credits  for  the 
second  quarter  of  1919.  By  the.  end  of  the  war  the 
party  had  completely  returned  to  the  principles  of  the 
Congress  of  Amsterdam.  The  patriotic,  nationalist  ele- 
ments in  France  were  beginning  to  oppose  the  Unified 
Socialists  not  only  because  of  their  Marxian  theories, 
but  because  of  the  domination  of  the  part}^  by  Jean 
Longuet,  a  grandson  of  Karl  IMarx — a  connection  which 
public  opinion  invariably  interpreted  to  be  associated 
with  the  service  of  Germany. 

One  other  event,  although  it  occurred  after  the  close 
of  the  war,  Avill  indicate  tlie  final  severance  of  the  So- 
cialist party  from  the  spirit  of  the  Sacred  Union — an 
event  in  fact  which  confirmed  the  Socialist  conviction 
that  injustice  was  inherent  in  a  bourgeois  regime.     This 

107 


CONTEIVIPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

was  the  Villain  trial.  It  will  be  recalled  that  Jean 
Jaures,  the  great  reformist  leader  of  the  Socialists,  was 
assassinated  on  July  31,  1914,  by  Raoul  Villain,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  old  Sillon  party  and  a  fanatical  nationalist. 
Arrested  immediately  after  the  act.  Villain  admitted 
his  guilt.  He  justified  himself  by  saying  that  Jaures 
was  a  traitor  who,  in  opposing  the  three-year  military 
law,  wished  to  deliver  France  to  the  enemy.  From  the 
legal  standpoint,  the  case  was  quite  clear.  A  murder 
had  been  committed,  the  murderer  had  been  appre- 
hended in  the  act,  and  had  confessed  his  guilt.  Although 
his  justification  was  entirely  irrelevant,  the  majority  of 
the  country  believed  that  Jaures  was  a  great  patriot, 
striving  to  keep  France  in  a  state  of  honorable  peace. 
Villain  should  have  been  brought  before  the  Court  of 
Assizes  within  three  months,  tried  and  convicted.  But 
the  Government  perhaps  imprudently  kept  him  in  prison 
nearly  five  years  without  even  a  hearing.  Unfortunate- 
ly, French  justice  is  not  acquainted  with  the  habeas 
corpus  proceeding  and  so  Villain  remained  in  prison, 
as  the  friends  of  Jaures  suggested,  safely  protected  from 
the  trenches  where  otherwise  he  would  have  gone.  The 
motives  for  the  murder  were  variously  interpreted.  Ac- 
cording to  the  prevailing  opinion,  Jaures  was  assassi- 
nated through  German  instigation  so  as  to  stir  up  in- 
ternal turmoil  in  France.  Divided  internally  upon  such 
an  issue,  France  would  the  more  easily  succumb  to  a 
German  attack.  To  offset  this  possibility,  the  Viviani 
Government  issued  a  proclamation,  condemning  the 
"abominable  attack,"  and  urging  that  "all  should  have 
confidence  in  the  law"  and  give  in  this  "hour  of  peril 
the  example  of  coolness  and  of  union."  The  manifesto 
recalled  that  the  country  was  in  danger  and  promised 
that  the  assassin  would  be  punished. 

108 


THE  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

The  probable  reason  for  the  postponement  of  the  trial 
was  the  fear  that  it  might  stir  up  class  dissension  fatal 
to  the  national  defense,  if  held  during  the  war.  The  case 
finally  came  before  the  Court  of  Assizes  on  the  24th  of 
March,  1919.  The  President  of  the  Court  informed  the 
jury  that  the  case  was  very  simple  since  Villain  had 
assumed  complete  responsibility  for  the  act.  But  not- 
withstanding the  admitted  guilt  of  Villain  and  the  testi- 
mony of  the  most  prominent  men  in  the  Republic  as 
to  Jaures'  patriotism,  the  juiy,  after  a  deliberation  of 
an  hour  and  a  half,  returned  a  verdict  of  not  guilty !  ^^ 
At  one  time  the  procedure  of  French  justice  may  have 
justified  Alexandre  Dumont's  remark:  "If  I  am  ever 
accused  of  stealing  the  towers  of  Notre  Dame,  I  am 
going  to  get  out  of  the  country."  Now,  however,  as  the 
trial  of  I\Ime.  Caillaux  for  the  murder  of  Gaston  Cal- 
mette  in  1914  had  already  showed,  the  contrary  is  ap- 
parently true. 

As  a  strong  contrast  to  the  Villain  case,  a  contrast 
whicli  the  Socialist  press  was  not  slow  in  pointing  out, 
was  the  trial  of  Emile  Cottin,  wlio  had  attempted  to 
assassinate  M.  Clemenceau,  at  about  this  same  time.  He 
only  succeeded  in  wounding  him  in  the  shoulder;  but 
within  four  weeks  of  the  crime,^^  he  was  brought  before 
a  Council  of  War,  convicted  in  a  session  of  a  few  hours, 
jand  sentenced  to  death.^^  On  the  other  hand,  Villain, 
avowedly  guilty  of  a  worse  offense,  was  confined  fifty- 
one  months  before  trial;  he  was  then  brought  before  a 
civil,  not  a  military  court,  and  acquitted.  In  the  first 
case,  the  Socialists  pointed  out,  the  head  of  the  Govern- 

"On  March  29,  1919. 

"Cottin  attacked  Clemenceau  on  February  19,  1919;  ho  was 
sentenced  on  March  14. 

"  President  Poincarc  later  commuted  this  sentence  to  ten  years' 
imprisonment,  at  the  request  of  M.  Clemenceau. 

109 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ment  had  been  wounded;  in  the  second,  an  opponent  of 
the  Government,  a  representative  of  the  proletariat,  had 
been  killed.-^  The  parallel  was  too  obvious  to  pass  with- 
out scathing  criticism. 

The  Paris  press,  with  the  exception  of  L' Action  Fram- 
gaise,  was  unanimous  in  condemning  the  Villain  verdict. 
But  despite  this  empty  sympathy,  the  Socialists  and  the 
labor  elements  finally  judged  the  verdict  as  a  case  of 
pure  class  discrimination.  On  the  1st  of  April,  the 
Union  of  Syndicates  of  the  Seine  declared  that  the  ' '  ver- 
dict of  the  29th  of  March  brutally  reminds  us  that  there 
is  nothing  in  common  between  good  sense  and  bourgeois 
justice.  It  leads  us  to  a  clearer  vision  of  realities  and 
shows  the  immense  effort  which  must  still  be  made  to 
bring  about  the  advent  of  a  trulj^  just  society." 

La  Yerite,  a  Socialist  paper,  on  March  30,  in  an  edi- 
torial entitled,  "La  Parole  est  au  P<iuple,"  wrote: 

Villnin  is  acquitted. 

Villain  is  free.  To-morrow  he  may  kill  whomever  he 
wishes ! 

The  Bourg-eois  conscience  has  passed  its  judgment.  The  po- 
litical master  of  the  hour  is  wounded  by  a  shot;  the  verdict  is 
death.  Jaures,  the  master  of  the  woi^ld's  thought,  is  killed ; 
it  is  acquittal! 

Le  Journal  du  Peuple,  on  the  same  day,  wrote: 

Villain  is  acquitted.  .  .  .  We  I'ejoice  in  this  verdict.  It 
clearly  shows  that  there  are  two  Frances.  The  France  of  La- 
bor which  pays  with  its  sweat  for  the  sloth  of  wealth,  .  .  . 
and   the   France   of  the   Bourgeoisie   which   does   not   hesitate 

to  pardon  its  children  when  the.y  stoop  to  crime. 

i 1 — 

-'  The  sole  justification  given  for  the  acquittal  of  Villain  was 
that  the  Socialists  would  havcusod  his  conviction  ns  a  vindication 
of  thoir  war  oj>i)i)sition  and  policy.  Tlicrc  seems  to  be  no  reason 
why  a  jury  could  not  have  convicted  Villain  and  at  the  same 
time  condemned  the  war  tactics  of  the  party,  if  such  a  distinction 
was  necessary. 

110 


TIIP]  "BLOC"  AND  THE  SACRED  UNION 

Thus  this  verdict,  wliose  iiijuslice  was  adiiiittod  by 
all,  pive  to  the  growth  of  the  cx-niinoritiiirc  inoveiiicnt, 
now  the  majority  element  oi'  the  Socialist  parly,  an  im- 
mense impetus.  It  bi'ought  countless  adliei'ents  to  a 
freshened  failh  in  i)ure  Marxism  and  it  renewed  the 
reality  of  the  class  struggle.  It  was  the  final  stej)  in  1he 
complete  abandonment  of  the  policy  of  oi)portunism  in- 
augurated by  Jaures,  which  the  inferior  leaders  who  had 
succeeded  him  had  vainly  attempted  to  perpetuate  dur- 
ing the  war.  .Moreover,  in  the  imperialistic  demands 
which  various  delegations  were  making  at  the  Peace 
Conference,  the  Socialists  found  new  excuses  to  justify 
this  return  to  their  former  creed. 

From  this  brief  review  of  the  combinations  which 
French  parties  have  recently  effected,  it  Avill  perhaps  be 
noted  that  these  have  always  been  for  mere  electoral  pur- 
poses. Indeed  none  of  the  parties  has  shown  any  real 
willingness  to  sacrifice  their  doctrines  or  independence 
to  form  greater  and  more  stable  groupings.  Roughly, 
these  party  coalitions  have  been  directed  from  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Republic  till  about  1809,  first,  against 
IMonarchism,  and  secondly  (from  1900  to  1912),  against 
Clericalism.  From  1912  to  1914,  while  no  definite  com- 
bination seemed  realizable  a  division  appeared  to  be 
forming  upon  the  subject  of  militarism.  But  when  the 
war  was  forced  upon  France,  the  third  Bloc  arose,  in- 
cluding all  parties,  against  Germanism.  The  next  chap- 
ter will  discuss  probable  future  combinations  and  group- 
ings. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PARTY    REALIGNMENTS 
Nous  voulons  un  pays  plus  large  qu'un  drapeau. — GW)YABD. 

I 

The  divisions  of  the  Unified  Socialist  party  into  ex- 
maj  or  it  a  ires  and  ex-minoritaires  was  of  serious  concern 
to  party  leaders.  Together  with  the  Centrists  and  the 
Kienthalians,  these  divisions  were  upon  the  point  of 
disrupting  the  unity  of  the  party  which  Jaures  had  so 
carefully  maintained.  The.  real  differences  between 
these  four  divisions,  however,  did  not  arise  from  the 
war,  although  the  Socialist  leaders  generally  attributed 
them  to  that  overshadowing  cause.  But  as  subsequent 
events  proved,  these  dissensions  were  caused  by  the  fun- 
damental difference  separating  the  supporters  of  Ke- 
visionism  and  Revolution. 

Realizing  how  fatal  such  party  discords  might  prove 
to  future  electoral  successes,  a  program  was  drawn  up 
and  presented  to  the  Federation  of  the  Seine,  on  March 
31,  1919,  which  seriously  attempted  to  compromise  and 
reconcile  both  the  majority  and  minority  elements.  This 
program^  asserted  that  the  war  had  but  proved  that  the 


^  The  Socialist  program,  quoted  in  part,  is  taken  from  L'Hu- 
manite.  The  accounts  of  the  Congres's  are  also  taken  from 
L  'Humanite. 

112 


PARTY  REALirxNMENTS 

tenets  of  Socialism,  which  had  predicted  it  as  a  result 
of  capitalism,  were  true ;  and  that  it  illustrated  once 
more  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  class  struggle  by 
creating  new  wealth  in  the  hands  of  a  few,  ^Vhile  at  the 
same  time  increasing  the  miseries  of  Labor.  Socialism, 
the  program  asserted,  is  the  sole  solution  for  the  over- 
whelming problems  which  the  war  has  produced ;  it  is 
the  only  preventative  of  another  and  larger  war.  "In- 
ternational Socialism  is  the  ultimate  stage  of  human 
civilization."  Strengthened  by  this  conviction,  the  So- 
cialist party  "declares  that  the  final  aim  of  its  efforts 
is  the  social  revolution."  Such  a  revolution  is  nothing 
more  or  less  than  the  "substitution  of  a  colleetivist 
regime  of  production,  of  exchange  and  of  consumption 
for  the  present  economic  regime,  founded  on  private 
property,  an  economic  order  which  belongs  to  a  past 
period  of  history."  The  social  revolution  must  finish 
the  task  which  the  French  Revolution  began  by  effacing 
the  hereditary  privileges  of  property  and  the  hereditary 
servitudes  of  Labor.  The  program  next  analyzes  the 
party's  attitude  toward  violence. 

Whether  this  revolution  shall  come  "by  the  legal 
transmission  of  power  under  the  pressure  of  universal 
suffrage,  or,  by  a  movement  of  force,"  depends  solely 
upon  the  future.  "The  Socialist  party  does  not  confuse 
revolution  with  violence.  ...  It  ardently  desires  that 
its  victory  be  accomplished  in  peace.  .  .  .  But  the  pro- 
letariat cannot  renounce  any  means  of  combat  which 
will  forward  tlie  conquest  of  political  power;  the  form 
of  the  revolution  will  finall}^  depend  .  .  .  upon  the 
nature  of  the  resistance  opposed  to  it." 

This  was  the  first  compromise  contained  in  the  pro- 
gram. To  satisfy  the  new  majority,  led  by  Jean  Lon- 
guet,  it  proclaimed  the  necessity  and  the  imminence  of 

113 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  revolution.  At  the  same  time  it  softened  the  fierce- 
ness of  such  a  prophecy,  doubly  bold  in  the  face  of 
Russian  and  Hungarian  excesses,  by  drawing  a  fine  dis- 
tinction between  revolution  and  violence.  Thus,  if  the 
bourgeoisie  would  peacefully  acquiesce  in  the  demands 
of  the  party,  there  would  be  no  bloodshed — quite  natu- 
rally. This  empty  declaration  was  intended  to  appease 
the  moderates  of  the  party  while  it  pledged  no  one  to 
any  definite  course  of  action.  Soothing  the  compla- 
cency of  the  old  majoritaires  it  palliated  the  revolution- 
ary verbalism  of  the  Left.  On  the  other  hand,  it  an- 
tagonized the  Kienthalian  group,  led  by  Loriot,  which 
demanded  the  immediate  revolution,  if  need  be  by  fire 
and  sword,  overturning  bourgeois  parliaments  and  sub- 
stituting therefor  "Councils  of  AVorkingmen. " 

The  program  also  contained  this  significant  Marxian 
statement:  "Whatever  the  form  which  the  revolution 
may  take,  the  assumption  of  power  by  the  proletariat 
will  probably  be  followed  by  a  period  of  dictatorship." 
But  this  dictatorship,  meaning  the  exclusion  of  the  bour- 
geoisie from  power,  will  be  "transitional,"  lasting  only 
until  a  communist  regime  is  firmly  established.  To 
minimize  the  terrors  which  such  a  dictatorship  has 
Caused  in  Russia  the  party  urges  Labor  to  complete  its 
organization  so  it  may  intelligently  direct  society.  Thus 
the  revolution  is  hailed  as  a  "supreme  necessity";  but 
"whether  its  coming  be  near  or  still  far  off,"  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  party,  the  "presumptive  heir  of  the  capi- 
talist world  whose  wealth  is  made  from  the  accumulated 
lal)or  of  generations,"  to  "preserve  and  prepare  for  its 
heritage." 

While  awaiting  the  revolution,  however,  the  party  is 
urged  to  continue  its  efforts  to  reform  present  society 
so  tliat  tlie  transition  to  a  new  social  order  will  be  less 

114 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

difficult."  The  party  manifesto,  therefore,  stands  for 
the  complete  organization  of  labor.  It  asks  for  the  re- 
vision of  the  Constitution  so  that  it  will  be  based  on  (1) 
universal  suffrage  of  both  sexes,  (2)  direct  consultation 
of  the  peoi)le,  (3)  right  of  popular  initiative,  (4)  inte- 
gral proixirtional  representation  by  regions,  (5)  a  single 
legislative  assembly,  (fi)  administrative  decentralization, 
(7)  refusal  of  legislative  positions  to  the  heads  of  public 
business  enterprises,  etc.,  (8)  creation  of  economic 
Chambers,  (9)  reorganization  upon  an  industrial  basis 
of  all  public  services  and  state  monopolies.  The  mani- 
festo also  demands  the  complete  reestablishment  of  the 
constitutional  liberties  of  the  press,  assembly,  and  of 
opinion. 

Under  the  heading  of  economic  reconstruction,  the 
party  condemns  the  penury  and  disorder  into  which  a 
capitalist  war  has  thrown  France.  Asserting  that  Ger- 
many will  not  be  able  to  pay  for  the  damages  it  has  in- 
flicted upon  France,  it  asks  that  the  difference  be  raised 
by  (1)  State  seizure  of  excess  profits,  (2)  conscription 
of  fortunes,  (3)  a  tax  on  capital  and  on  increasing 
wealth,  (4)  the  strict  collection  of  the  income  tax,  (5) 
the  establishment  of  new  monopolies,  (6)  State  participa- 
tion in  ever\^  sufficiently  centralized  industry,  (7)  the 
nationalization  of  the  railways,  and  all  other  means  of 
river  and  land  transportation,  of  the  great  steel  fac- 
tories, of  water  power,  of  refineries,  of  banks,  of  insur- 
ance, and  the  manufacture  of  alcohol.  This  is  a  much 
more  inclusive  plan  of  government  ownership  than  that 
which  the  Radical  party  supports. 

The  party  does  not  conceal  the  fact,  however,  that 
these  measures  may  prove  inadequate  to  meet  the  pres- 

"  As  we  shall  see,  thcso  reforms  wore  a  direct  concession  to  the 
okl   majority. 

115 


CONTEI^IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ent  crisis.  "The  capitalist  regime  may  succumb  under 
the  weight  of  the  charges  which  it  itself  has  created." 
What  is  fundamentally  needed  is  an  increase  of  produc- 
tion. To  secure  this  end  the  State  must  not  "spend 
less,  but  more  and  more."  To  bring  about  this  increase 
(and  under  the  heading  of  "Immediate  Reforms"),  the 
party  demands  that  labor  be  made  compulsory,  idleness 
to  be  punished  by  law.  It  also  asks  that  education  be 
gratuitous,  dependent  not  upon  the  means  of  parents 
but  upon  the  child's  aptitude.  To  insure  Labor  its  com- 
plete share  of  the  products  of  civilization,  the  party 
wishes  to  impose  certain  principles,  Concerniyig  the 
orgamzation  of  labor:  (1)  the  suppression  of  unemploy- 
ment by  means  of  employment  bureaus,  (2)  increase  of 
social  insurance,  (3)  the  protection  of  the  health  and 
security  of  workmen,  (4)  the  reduction  of  hours  of  work, 
(5)  a  minimum  income,  (6)  unreserved  recognition  of 
a  right  to  organize.  Concerning  agricultural  labor,  the 
following  proposals  are  made:  (1)  extension  of  laws  of 
industrial  labor  to  agriculture,  (2)  alleviation  of  the 
tenant  system,  (3)  cooperative  organization  of  small 
proprietors  and  tenants  for  production,  sale  of  products, 
purchase  of  seed,  machinery,  and  insurance.  Concern- 
ing measures  of  social  welfare:  (1)  rigorous  protection 
of  mothers  and  children,  by  the  medical  control  of  chil- 
dren, the  creation  of  nurseries,  school  sanatoriums,  and 
open  air  colonies,  (2)  the  fusion  of  all  education,  free 
and  compulsory,  under  national  control,  "permitting, 
by  a  series  of  selections  and  of  si)e(!ialization,  the  utiliza- 
tion to  the  best  end  of  the  social  interest,  of  the  varietj'' 
of  individual  aptitudes."  Concerning  the  welfare  of 
lahor:  (1)  the  general  expropriation  of  unsanitary  ])rop- 
erty,  (2)  the  creation  by  the  communes,  of  a  pul)lic  hous- 
ing service,  (3)  the  immediate  use  of  public  funds  for 

11  r,     . 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

the  construction  of  hcaltliy  lodgings,   (4)   tlie  organiza 
tion  of  a  public  food  service,   (5)   the  public  oiganiza- 
tion  of  leisure,  by  sports,  theatrical  representations,  art, 
and  culture. 

This  program,  the  party  asserts,  cannot  be  carried 
out  until  peace  is  inaugurated.  As  a  further  compromise 
and  concession  to  the  old  majority,  the  program  says: 
"Convinced  that  the  integrity  and  the  independence  of 
nations  are  fundamental  to  the  international  organiza- 
tion itself,  the  Socialist  party  has  unstintingly  spent  it- 
self for  the  defense  of  the  country."  But  its  efforts 
were  premised  upon  the  acceptance  of  a  Wilsonian 
peace.  And  the  party  "remains  opposed  to  every  con- 
dition of  peace  which  exalts  the  decrepit  forms  of  an 
exasperated  nationalism,  forms  which  will  but  tend  to 
unloose  the  confused  mclce  of  imperialistic  ambitions, 
protecting  in  every  country  the  efforts  or  the  revenges 
of  reaction.  ...  It  also  deplores  the  fact  that  the  Gov- 
ernment did  not  support  whole-heartedly  the  intentions 
and  the  propositions  of  President  AVilson." 

The  party  denounces  the  practices  of  a  secret  diplo- 
macy wliich  "threatens  to  falsify  the  significance  of 
peace  which  it  forestalls."  It  is  "ardently  attached  to 
the  idea  of  a  League  of  Nations,  considering  that  it 
should  embrace  every  people,  equal  in  rights  and  duties 
— and  not  merely  a  few  governments."  It  demands  that 
it  be  provided  with  sanctions  capable  of  assuring  its  au- 
thority. But  this  League  of  Nations,  in  addition  to  its 
role  of  Peacemaker,  must  gradually  direct  and  regulate 
the  economic  life  of  the  world.  International  legisla- 
tion must  supplement  national  reconstruction,  through 
regulation  of  labor  and  economic  competition  between 
nations.  "The  League  of  Nations  ...  is,  therefore, 
obliged,  by  tlie  very  fact  of  its  existence,  to  regulate  the 

117 


CONTEm^ORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

conditions  of  production  and  of  consumption  suitable  to 
each  country.  It  must  control  the  ectablishing  of  rates 
of  transportation,  assuring  between  nations  ...  an 
equitable  distribution  of  raw  materials  and  of  products. 
...  It  must  facilitate  by  every  means  the  exchange  of 
food  supplies,  of"  capital  and  of  persons.  ...  In  work- 
ing for  the  cooperation  of  peoples,  toward  prosperity 
and  peace,  the  League  of  Nations  will  necessarily  move 
forward  along  the  path  of  international  socialism.  ..." 

But  now  deserting  at  last  this  program  of  reformism, 
the  document  we  are  considering  returns  to  its  funda- 
mental Marxian  basis  by  declaring  that  in  the  end  it  is 
the  revolution  which  ''must  always  inspire  the  means, 
and  the  means  must  never  be  diverted  from  the  end." 
"While  the  outlines  of  a  Socialist  regime  may  be  laid 
down  under  a  bourgeois  society,  the  ultimate  goal  of  the 
party  is  the  social  revolution,  wherein  not  only  the  gov- 
ernment but  industry,  education,  and  culture,  wall  be 
dominated  by  the  dictatorsliip  of  the  proletariat. 

Finally,  the  program  under  analysis  closes  with  this 
peroration : 

There  will  be  true  equality  only  when  the  sole  recognized 
distinetion  between  men  shall  be  that  of  their  social  value. 
True  justice  will  exist  only  when  the  sole  property  recognized 
in  men  will  be  that  which  arises  from  man's  own  labor; 
when  the  tithe  levied  by  the  employer  ujion  the  employee,  by 
the  proprietor  of  the  soil  upon  the  tenant,  shall  have  disap- 
peared with  tlie  form  of  property  of  which  it  is  the  direct 
expression.  There  will  only  be  true  harmony  when  the  activity 
of  each  man  shall  be  applied  to  his  natural  task  and  the  com- 
monwealth of  the  soil  is  exploited  for  the  good  of  all. 

The  Socialist  party  therefore  calls  upon  all  laborers  to  assist 
by  their  elTorts  in  this  beneficent  evolution  of  histoiy.  It  calls 
upon  them  to  assist  it  in  the  wo?-k  of  social  resreneration 
which  is  its  end  and  object.  The  general  interests  of  the  na- 
tions,  and   those   of  entire   civilization,   are   indissolubly   con- 

118 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

founded  with  oiii-  own.  Heirs  to  the  benefit  of  every  effort 
of  oryani/ation  wliicli  has  developed  in  the  world,  we  must 
ourselves  realize  a  i)rojiTam,  the  acconiplLshnient  of  which  a 
fallen  bourgeoisie  and  a  covetous  capitalisui  would  not  even 
dure  to  attempt. 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  program  contains  many 
finely  balanced  distinctions  between  immediate  reforms 
and  the  revolution.  In  fact,  the  principles  of  reform- 
ism even  assume  a  predominant  position.  The  meas- 
ures advocated,  although  more  advanced,  are  practically 
the  same  in  principle  as  those  for  which  the  Radical 
party  stood — a  program  of  collectivism.  As  such,  many 
non-Marxian  liberals  could  have  sincerely  supported 
them.  And  for  this  very  reason  they  were  severely  at- 
tacked by  the  Loriot  group.  This  group  was  opposed  to 
any  program  attempting  to  improve  bourgeois  society. 
It  believed  that  the  adoption  of  immediate  reforms  and 
the  amelioration  of  the  economic  conditions  of  Labor 
would  benumb  Labor's  revolutionary  desires.  Economic 
content  under  the  present  regime  would  kill  the  chief 
stimulus  which  urged  the  revolution  on.  The  aim  of  the 
proletariat  should  not  be  "the  full  stomach"  alone — it 
should  aim  to  seize  and  achieve  power  and  work  toward 
the  entire  assumption  of  political,  social  and  economic 
activity.  To  secure  the  adoption  of  reforms  would 
but  weaken  the  impelling  incentive  to  revolution.  The 
increase  of  poverty,  of  misery,  and  of  discontent  was  the 
best  guarantee  of  the  Internationale.  Such  was  the  argu- 
ment of  the  Loriot  group ;  from  the  Marxian  standpoint, 
it  was  admittedly  logical.  Its  adoption,  however,  would 
certainly  have  meant  the  destruction  of  the  French 
Socialist  party.  Consequently,  the  draft  of  the  program 
retained  its  reformist  features,  and  the  Loriot  group  re- 
fused its  adhesion. 

119 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 


II 


The  extraordinary  session  of  the  National  Congress 
of  the  Unified  Socialist  party  was  held  in  Paris  on  April 
20,  21,  and  22,  1919.  It  was  called  primarily  to  adopt 
this  program  and  to  settle  other  issues  upon  which  the 
party  was  still  divided.  Mme.  Saumonneau,  for  the 
Loriot  group,  opened  the  attack  on  the  program  during 
the  first  day's  session  of  the  Congress.  She  made  the 
following  motion,  which  embodied  the  extreme  demands 
of  the  Kienthalians — largely  patterned  upon  the  ideals 
of  the  Russian  Soviets: 

1.  The  complete  assumption  of  power  by  the  proletariat. 

2.  Institution  of  compulsory  labor. 

3.  Socialization  of  the  means  of  production  and  exchansre, 
land,  industries,  mines,  means  of  transportation,  under  the 
direct  management  of  the  peasants,  workmen,  miners,  railway 
men  and  sailors. 

4.  Distribution  of  products  by  cooperative  societies  and 
municipal  stores  under  collective  control. 

5.  Mimicipalization  of  private  dwellings  and  of  hospitals. 

6.  The  forced  transformation  of  the  government  services 
and  their  transfer  to  the  direct  management  of  the  employees. 

7.  Universal  disarmament  as  a  result  of  the  union  of  all 
the  proletariat  Republics  in  a  Socialist  Internationale. 

A  second  group,  led  by  M.  Verfeuil  and  Paul  Faure, 
introduced  another  program,  containing  the  reforms  of 
the  original  one,  but  more  boldly  demanding  the  revolu- 
tion. 

The  debate  upon  these  programs  was  very  acrimo- 
nious— the  20th  and  21st  were  marked  by  a  scathing  ad- 
dress from  ]\I.  Loriot  declaring  a  program  of  reforms 
to  be  "monstrous,"  and  reproaching  the  party  with 
weakness.    He  was  followed  by  M.  Leon  Blum,  speaking 

120 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

in  favor  oi'  the  original  progi'am,  avIio  made  wliat  was 
considered  the  best  speccli  of  the  convention.  It  was 
finally  decided  to  refer  tlie  three  programs  to  the  com- 
mittee on  resolutions.  But  on  the  22nd  the  committee 
reported  it  could  reach  no  decision  and  that  it  liad  de- 
cided to  have  a  representative  of  each  speak  before  the 
convention,  after  Avhich  a  vote  Avonld  be  taken.  After 
this  was  done,  the  following  decision  was  announced: 
For  the  original  program,  1,304:  votes;  for  the  Verfcuil 
program,  29G ;  for  the  Loriot  program,  245.  Thus  the 
compromised  measure  was  adopted  and  so  far,  at  least,  a 
nominal  unity  between  the  two  major  elements  of  the 
party  had  been  assured. 


Ill 


However,  there  w^re  certain  matters  of  importance 
which  this  program,  because  of  its  compromised  char- 
acter, had  omitted,  and  which  the  new  majority,  sup- 
ported by  the  Kienthalians,  felt  should  receive  party 
sanction.  Thus  no  declaration  had  been  made  with  re- 
spect to  the  Russian  and  German  revolutions,  the  causes 
of  the  war,  participation  of  Socialists  in  bourgeois  gov- 
ernments, party  discipline,  and  the  reconstruction  of  the 
Internationale.  Consequently,  two  motions  were  made 
on  "general  policy"  to  supplement  the  program  and  to 
supply  its  omissions.  Discussion  upon  these  two  mo- 
tions, presented  by  the  new  majority  and  by  the  Loriot 
group,  led  to  scenes  of  disorder  and  ill-feeling  in  which 
Renaudel,  an  ex-majoritaire,  accused  Longuet,  the  new 
leader  of  the  party,  of  being  in  German  pay.^  The  mo- 
tion on  general  policy,  submitted  by  the  new  majority 

'See  p.  274. 

121 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

and  finally  adopted,  declared  that  the  war  was  "the 
direct  consequence  of  the  economic  political  anarchy 
in  which  the  capitalist  system  maintains  the  world." 
It  declared  that  events  justified  the  present  policy  of 
the  new  minority  and  condemned  the  compromises  which 
the  party  maintained  during  the  first  years  of  the  war. 
This  war,  represented  by  the  bourgeoisie  as  a  war  of 
Right,  the  party  condemns  as  imperialistic.  "The  party 
denounces  the  hyprocrisy  of  the  French  Government 
which,  after  having  exploited  the  ignorance  and  the 
credulity  of  the  people  by  making  them  believe  that  it 
urged  only  a  war  of  national  defense,  a  war  to  secure 
the  liberty  of  peoples  to  dispose  of  themselves,  a  war 
for  the  destruction  of  armaments,  now  prepares  to  give 
to  the  results  arising  from  this  war  a  purely  imperialistic 
and  capitalistic  solution  from  which  new  conflicts  will 
emerge  if  the  international  proletariat  does  not  soon 
become  master  of  his  destinies." 

The  motion  also  condemned  the  League  of  Nations, 
as  constituted  by  the  Peace  Conference.  A  real ' '  League 
of  Nations  must  be  the  international  organization  of  the 
proletariat  finally  delivered  from  capitalist  oppres- 
sion." The  conflicting  policies  of  imperialism  illus- 
trated by  the  proceedings  of  the  Peace  Conference,  it 
declared,  again  proved  the  incapability  of  the  bour- 
geoisie to  reorganize  society  upon  a  just  basis.  Conse- 
quently the  revolution  was  more  necessary  than  ever. 

As  an  equitable  basis  of  peace,  "the  Socialist  party 
extends  a  fraternal  hand  to  the  German  people.  It 
stigmatizes  the  excessive  pretensions  which,  under  pre- 
text of  material  reparations,  tends  to  reduce  the  entire 
German  people  to  slavery.  ...  It  greets  the  German 
revolution.  ...  It  likewise  greets  every  revolution 
which  the  great  shock  of  war  has  caused  to  arise.  .  .  . 

122 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

Its  sympatliies  are  addressed  to  every  oppressed  people 
without  distinction,  whether  they  be  oppressed  by  the 
Central  Powers  or  wliether  they  still  undergo  tlie  yoke 
of  the  Entente  capitalists.  .  .  .  The  unquestioned 
strengthening  of  the  Republic  of  the  Soviets  .  .  .  the 
courage  and  the  tenacity  with  which  the  working  and 
the  peasant  class  of  Russia  are  carrying  on  their  strug- 
gles .  .  ,  prove  how  much  tlie  French  Socialist  party 
was  right  in  placing  confidence  in  the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion and  in  combating  tlie  criminal  intervention  by 
which  the  bourgeoisie  of  the  Allied  countries  have  aimed 
and  still  aim  to  destroy  it." 

The  motion  again  emphasized  the  declarations  of  the 
program  by  asserting  the  "inalienable  riglit  of  the  dis- 
posseSvSed  class  to  expropriate  the  possessing  class  by 
means  of  the  revolution."  It  affirms  that  the  "dictator- 
ship of  the  proletariat  at  the  beginning  of  every  tri- 
umphant revolution"  is  a  necessity.  To  this  end,  force 
is  also  necessary. 

Again  recurring  to  the  principles  set  forth  at  the 
convention  of  Amsterdam,  the  motion  declares: 

The  stnicfgle  of  classes  demands  uncompromising  opposition 
to  bourgeois  power;  it  condemns  any  participation  in  the  exer- 
cise of  this  power  under  whatever  form  tliis  may  present  itself; 
it  implies  the  systematic  refusal  of  militaiy  and  civil  credits — 
and  the  rejection  of  the  whole  budget.  The  absolute  autonomy 
of  the  Socialist  party  as  the  political  part}'  of  the  working 
class  naturally  excludes  all  possibility  of  alliance  or  electoral 
coalition  with  a  bourgeois  party. 

To  enforce  party  unity,  those  who  will  not  recognize 
these  principles  and  who  "will  continue  to  grant  credits 
to  a  bourgeois  government"  will  be  read  out  of  the 
party. 

Finally,  the  "Socialist  party  makes  an  appeal  to  the 
123 


CONTEIVIPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

revolutionary  force  of  the  proletariat,  against  capitalist 
society  which  is  responsible  for  the  war.  It  appeals  for 
the  total  destruction  of  militarism  and  for  the  emanci- 
pation of  the  workingmen  bj^  the  estal)lishment  of  col- 
lective production  and  property.  It  intends  to  employ 
"every  possible  form  of  action"  to  bring  about  these 
ends. 

After  another  bitter  debate  wherein  the  old  tnajori- 
taires  and  the  Sacred  Union  were  l)oth  bitterly  criti- 
cized, the  Faure  motion  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  962 ; 
the  Loriot  motion,  going  to  still  further  extremes,  re- 
ceived 232.  There  were  789  abstentions  representing 
the  old  majority  who,  not  having  a  motion  of  their  own, 
nevertheless  refused  to  condemn  the  war  as  imperialistic 
and  the  Sacred  Union  as  discreditable  to  the  ideals  of 
Socialism. 

To  carry  out  the  motion  respecting  a  general  policy, 
another  motion  was  almost  unanimously  adopted  on 
electoral  discipline.  This  declared  that:  (1)  No  one  can 
be  a  party  candidate  without  expressly  adhering  to  its 
program;  (2)  any  kind  of  electoral  coalition  in  the  com- 
ing general  elections,  with  bourgeois  parties,  is  expressly 
prohibited;  (3)  any  candidates  opposing  this  last  pro- 
vision will  find  themselves  opposed  by  other  candidates, 
supported  by  the  entire  party  organization. 

These  two  motions — on  general  policy  and  on  electoral 
discipline — seemed  to  nullify  completely  the  compro- 
mises which  had  been  made  in  the  program  for  the  sake 
of  the  old  majority.  In  fact,  the  policy  of  the  latter 
during  the  war  w^as  expressly  condemned.  The  party 
now  denounced  the  war  as  being  French  as  well  as 
German  in  origin.  The  program  which  originally  ex- 
tolh'd  tlie  League  of  Nations,  now  denounced  it  as  but 
another  device  to  enchain  the  Labor  world.    The  motion 

124 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

emphasizod  tbe  necessity  of  a  social  revolution  by  force ; 
while  the  program  alleged  its  peaceful  advent.  The  mo- 
tions made  no  mention  of  reforms,  but  they  implied  their 
uselessness  by  forl)idding  Socialist  particii)ation  in  a 
bourgeois  IMiuistr}^  and  the  voting  of  the  budget.  How 
could  collectivistic  reforms  be  carried  out  without  an 
appropriation?  The  Socialists  in  condemning  the  one 
had  to  condemn  both.  Hence  the  Loriot  group  had  real- 
ly triumphed.  The  party  program  henceforth  laid  its 
emphasis  upon  the  revolution.  Despite  this  doctrinaire 
victory,  the  disunity  which  the  program  attempted  to 
heal  was  now  definitely  exaggerated  by  these  motions, 
condemning  outright  the  old  majority  policy  and  its  con- 
tinuance. The  Socialist  party  thus  virtually  rejected 
a  policy  of  reconstruction,  through  which  France  might 
have  been  aided,  and  relapsed  into  the  hopeless  and  de- 
structive ideology  of  pure  Marxism. 


IV 


The  last  matter  of  importance  to  come  before  the  Con- 
gress was  that  of  the  Third  Internationale.  The  First 
International  Workingmen's  Association  was  founded 
at  London  in  1864  in  response  to  the  now  classic  appeal 
terminating  the  Communist  manifesto,  "Workers  of  all 
countries,  unite ! ' ' 

By  no  means  purely  Socialist  in  its  original  tendencies, 
the  eloquence  of  ]\Iarx  gradually  won  it  over  to  his 
doctrines  until  at  the  Congress  of  Brussels  in  1868  it 
became  definitely  a  Socialist  organization.  The  disap- 
pearance of  the  First  Internationale  in  1873  was 
brought  about  by  struggles  between  the  Russian  an- 
archist, Bakunin,  the  British  Unionists  who  believed  in 
the  formation  of  labor  parties,  and  the  German  Marx- 

125 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ists.  The  stigma  which  the  Paris  Commune  fastened 
upon  Socialism  hastened  the  dissolution.  Between  1873 
and  1888  numerous  attempts  were  made  to  create  an- 
other "International  Congress  of  Workingmen. "  Final- 
ly, in  1889,  a  new  organization,  the  Second  Internation- 
ale, was  effected  at  Paris.  From  that  date  to  1914  the 
Internationale  made  great  advances ;  thirty  nations  were 
represented  in  its  organization  and  its  congresses  were 
often  composed  of  a  thousand  delegates.  But  despite  the 
elaborately  arranged  plans  of  this  organization,  it  failed 
to  stop  the  war  in  1914  by  means  of  an  international 
strike.  Its  efforts  to  hold  international  conferences  dur- 
ing the  war  also  largely  failed  ;*  and  for  five  years  the 
union  of  its  different  national  sections  was  prevented. 

The  close  of  the  war  and  the  desire  to  bring  pressure 
upon  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  led  to  the  resurrection 
of  this  organization  at  the  conference  of  Berne,  Switzer- 
land, which  was  held  on  the  1st  of  February,  1919.  But 
in  many  respects,  tliis  meeting  of  the  Second  Interna- 
tionale was  unsatisfactory.  There  were  only  about  a 
hundred  delegates  present.  Neither  Italy,  the  United 
States,  Russia,  Serbia,  nor  Belgium  was  represented. 
The  convention  was  marked  by  disorganization  and  con- 
fusion, by  the  defense  and  special  pleading  of  the  Ger- 
man majoritaircs,  and  by  indecision  toward  Bolshevist 
Socialism — perhaps  the  most  vital  issue  discussed. 

The  failure  of  the  Second  Internationale  to  prevent 
the  war,  its  impotency  during  the  five  years  of  the  war's 
progress,  the  half-hearted  support  which  Labor  gave  to 
the  congress  of  Berne,  and  the  conservatism  which  de- 
veloped in  its  steering  committee  gave  the  extremist  So- 

*  Tho  Stockholm  conforoncc  was  ono  attempt.  Chapter  TTT  does 
not  attcmi)t  to  give  them  all — merely  those  affecting  the  Sacred 
Union. 

12G 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

cialists  an  incentive  to  oryani/.e  a  Third  Tnternationalo, 
Under  the  fi^nidance  of  the  JJolslieviki,  the  Tliird  or  Com- 
munist Internationale  met  at  Moscow  on  i\rarch  2,  1910. 
Thirty-two  delegjates  with  full  })ower  to  act,  were  present 
from  parties  or  groups  in  Germany,  Russia,  Hungary, 
Sweden,  Norway,  Bulgaria,  Roumania,  Finland,  Ukrai- 
nia,  Esthonia,  and  Armenia ;  and  consultative  repre- 
sentatives were  present  from  groups  in  Switzerland, 
Holland,  Bohemia,  Jugo-Slavia,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Turkestan,  Persia,  Korea,  China,  and  the  ITnited  States.^ 
M.  Guilbcaux,  an  outcast  renegade  M'ho  had  been  con- 
demned to  death  by  a  French  Council  of  "War,  took  it 
upon  himself  to  act  as  a  representative  of  the  French 
party.® 

The  Third  Internationale,  thus  formed  of  minority 
groupings  principally  from  Russia,  Italy,  Switzerland, 
and  Germany,  condemned  the  Internationale  at  Berne 
for  its  impotency  and  for  deserting  the  fundamental 
principles  of  Socialism — notably  the  principle  of  the  so- 
cial revolution.  It  asked  the  parties  of  all  nations  who 
could  adhere  to  the  tenets  of  the  newly-organized  Bol- 
shevist regime,  to  desert  the  Second  and  adhere  to  the 
Third  International  AVorkingmen 's  Organization. 

The  French  Socialist  part}^,  therefore,  again  found  it 
necessary  to  decide  where  to  cast  its  allegiance.  Three 
views  were  represented  at  this  congress.  The  first,  held 
by  the  old  majority,  was  for  the  retention  of  membership 
in  the  Berne  Internationale  as  at  present  constituted; 
the  second  view,  held  by  the  new  majority,  under  Lon- 
guet,  was  for  adhesion  to  the  old  Internationale  pro- 

'A  full  account  of  this  meeting  will  be  found  in  the  Liberator, 
July,   1919. 

•Tliis  unauthorized  representation  was  denounced  by  the  Fed- 
eration of  the  Seine,  April  13,  1919,  by  a  vote  of  5,022  against 
970. 

127 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

vided  it  moved  toward  the  Left.  The  third  view,  held 
by  the  Kienthalians  (whom,  in  fact,  the  BoLsheviki  had 
declared,  "were  alone  "advanced"  enough  of  the  French 
Socialists  to  adhere  to  their  organization),  was  for  ad- 
hesion to  the  Third  Internationale. 

M.  Jean  Longuet,  in  the  last  session  of  the  congress, 
declared  that  the  old  Internationale  was  "mutilated  and 
incomplete,"  that  it  had  failed  to  prevent  the  w^ar  be- 
cause the  French  ex-maj&ritoires  would  not  agree  to  its 
assembly  during  the  war,  and  that  it  needed  the  ex- 
purgation of  its  conservative  elements  and  the  vigorous 
reconstruction  upon  a  radical  basis.  With  such  changes, 
the  Berne  Internationale,  in  his  opinion,  would  be  more 
satisfactory  than  that  of  INIoscow  because  it  already  had 
the  support  of  a  greater  number  of  parties.  The  motion 
which  he  read  invited  the  sections  not  represented  at  the 
meeting  at  Berne,  to  send  delegates  to  the  next  con- 
gress, with  the  purpose  (1)  to  expel  its  conservative 
members,  (2)  to  restore  fully  the  principles  of  the  class 
struggle  and  of  the  irreconcilable  opposition  to  bour- 
geois parties  and  government,  (3)  to  direct  the  Inter- 
nationale toAvard  the  social  revolution,  following  the  ex- 
ample of  Russia,  Hungary,  and  Germany.  At  the  same 
time,  the  French  Socialist  party  declared  itself  walling 
to  enter  into  "fraternal  relations"  with  the  Moscow 
organization. 

This  motion  was  finally  adopted  by  a  vote  of  894 
against  757  for  the  motion  of  the  old  majority,  and  270 
for  the  Loriot  motion  for  the  Third  Internationale. 

The  congress  thus  took  one  more  step  toward  a  repu- 
diation of  the  moderate  policy  which  liad  controlled  the 
party  during  tlie  war.  It  did  not  immediately  enter  the 
new  Internationale — which  the  Bolsheviki  controlled — 
but  it  limit ed  ils  adherence  to  the  old  Internationale 

128 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

by  insisting  that  tlie  laller  prepare  for  a  revolution  along 
lines  which  the  Bolsheviki  had  already  made  effective. 
Thus  it  assured  tlie  moral  dominance  of  Bolshevism 
over  the  old  Internationale  and  over  the  policies  which 
the  French  party  would  pursue  at  home. 

"Within  three  days  the  French  Socialist  party  had 
burnt  down  all  the  bridges  of  nationalism  and  of  re- 
formism liberal  well-wishers  had  built  for  it.  It  now 
centered  its  hopes  upon  the  revolution.  Inspired  by  the 
examples  of  Lenin  and  Bela  Kun,  it  henceforth  preached 
the  "Red"  Gospel  with  tireless  insistency.  Its  task 
appears  to  be  a  hopeless  one.  The  French  people  are 
extremely  individualistic.  Despite  their  theorizing,  de- 
spite the  fantastic  projects  which  their  ready  political 
imaginations  often  devise,  Frenchmen  are  realists.  As 
lovers  of  personal  independence,  they  cherish  their  small 
holdings,  whether  a  vineyard  or  an  epicerie.  In  theory, 
they  may  understand  and  even  admit  the  advantages 
of  collectivism.  But  these  theoretical  advantages  are 
completely  outweighed  by  the  repulsion  which  the  ex- 
cesses of  Russian  Bolshevism  have  produced.  The 
Frenchman  is  essentially  a  pragmatist ;  although  he  may 
admit  the  defects  in  the  present  form  of  society,  he  will 
not  sacrifice  certainty  for  uncertainty. 

Revolutions  generally  have  their  causes  in  deep-laid 
political  or  social  misery.  These  conditions  are  usually 
the  product  of  years  of  abuse  and  of  oppression ;  they 
are  tolerated  until  misery  makes  them  intolerable,  or 
until  external  forces,  such  as  military  defeat,  break 
down  the  oppressing  power.  But  no  such  conditions 
can  be  said  to  exist  at  present  in  France.  Although 
Labor  has  many  just  grievances,^   it  is  by   no  means 

'See  pp.  244-246. 

120 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

■v\-eighed  down  by  that  economic  hardship  which  La 
Bruyere  so  forcibly  described,  preceding  the  Revolution 
of  1789: 

Certain  wild  animals,  male  and  female,  dark,  pale,  burned 
by  the  sun,  niiiilit  be  seen  spread  over  the  countryside,  bound 
to  the  soil  which  they  dug-  and  which  they  tilled  with  strange 
obstinacy.  They  had  an  articulate  voice,  and  when  they  rose  to 
their  feet  they  displayed  a  human  face;  in  short,  they  were 
men.  At  night  they  returned  to  their  hovels  where  they 
lived  on  black  bread,  water  and  roots.  They  saved  other 
men  the  trouble  of  sowing,  working,  and  gathering  for  their 
food. 

It  would  be  hard  to  find  the  counterpart  of  such  be- 
ings in  France  to-day ! 

There  were  few  Frenchmen  who  accepted  the  Social- 
ist theory  that  the  war  was  a  product  of  capitalist  gov- 
ernments. Liberals  in  other  countries  have  indeed  sus- 
tained this  thesis.  But  among  Frenchmen,  outside  of 
some  fifty  thousand  simon-pure  Socialists,  it  had  abso- 
lutely no  support.  To  them  the  present  economic  dis- 
order is  not  conceivably  part  of  a  capitalist  scheme  of 
oppression ;  it  is  the  result  of  a  war  outwardly  imposed. 
Consequently,  the  great  majority  of  the  nation  joined  as 
one  to  build  up  what  had  been  torn  down.  A  class 
struggle  is  beyond  their  comprehension.  In  the  future, 
the  nation  may  adopt  collective  methods  in  carrying  out 
its  reconstruction  tasks,  but  that  these  methods  will  go 
to  the  extent  of  overturning  the  broad  outlines  of  the 
existing  order,  is  an  extremely  remote  possibility. 


The  definite  proclamation  of  a  revolution  of  the  Rus- 
sian type  as  the  goal  of  one  of  the  most  powerful  polit- 

130 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

ical  parties  in  France  carae  as  a  distinct  shock  to  the 
other  parties.  The  continuance  of  the  Sacred  Union  had 
been  advocated  even  before  the  close  of  the  war  by  a 
few  members  of  the  press.  The  Socialist  decision  to 
abandon  its  moderate  stand  consequently  gave  the  dis- 
tinctively "bourgeois"  parties  another  motive  for  con- 
tinuing the  policy  of  a  Bloc  Avhich  they  had  faithfully 
maintained  during  the  war.  As  has  been  noted,  ]\Ion- 
archism,  Clericalism  and  Germanism  have  each  in  turn 
been  the  three  causes  powerful  enough  to  bring  about 
party  combinations.  Party  combinations  have  been  suc- 
cessful in  overcoming  all  three  of  these  dangers.  But  these 
issues  having  passed  aw^ay,  there  is  little  possibility  of 
another  Bloc  unless  an  equally  threatening  menace  again 
appears.  For  the  future,  there  appears  to  be  only  one 
outstanding  danger  likely  to  threaten  the  Republic :  the 
social  revolution  which  the  Unified  party  is  now  preach- 
ing assiduously  and  which  it  hopefully  expects  soon  to 
accomplish.^  It  is  quite  certain  that  every  bourgeois 
party  in  the  Republic,  except  possibly  some  Radicals, 
would  combine  to  offset  the  Socialists.  The  fourth  great 
Bloc  of  the  Third  Republic,  it  can  confidently  be  said, 
will  be  against  the  peril  of  the  Revolution. 

Signs  of  this  new  Bloc  soon  made  their  appearance. 
As  early  as  December,  1918,  a  group  was  formed,  a  Re- 
publican entente,  upon  the  basis  of  the  solidarity  of 
classes.  It  was  not  until  the  summer  of  1919,  however — 
after  the  Socialist  party  had  declared  its  intention  of 


'M.  Chastenet,  a  Kienthalian  Socialist,  and  editor  of  the 
Grenoble  Droit  du  Pcuple,  told  the  author  that  the  party  ex- 
pected tho  revolution  witliin  a  year;  and  lience  it  made  no 
dilference  to  them  whether  the  Senate  killeil  the  bill  giving  Gov- 
ernment employees  the  right  to  organize  or  any  other  I^abor  bill. 
He  confidently  expects  that  within  a  year  I'ariiaments  will-  be 
overcome  and  workingmen  's  councils  established  in  their  place. 

131 


\^ 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

bringing  about  the  "Fourtli  Republic" — that  signs  of 
an  extended  union  appeared. 

Some  elements  wished  to  continue  the  Sacred  Union — ■ 
including  IMonarchists  as  well  as  Radicals.  Thus  on  the 
18th  of  July  the  Duke  of  Orleans  issued  a  manifesto 
which  urged  the  continuance  of  the  Sacred  Union 
against  the  Socialist  danger.  About  the  same  time,  the 
Liberal  Action  party,  at  a  banquet  presided  over  by 
Jacques  Piou,  asked  for  a  "national  party"  grouping  in 
a  Bloc  all  the  patriotic  elements  against  "every  attempt 
at  dictatorship  on  the  part  of  one  class."  On  the  8th 
of  July  at  a  meeting  of  the  Democratic  Republican  Al- 
liance, M.  Chaumet,  director  of  the  propaganda  of  the 
Alliance,  said,  "The  time  has  come  to  constitute  a  great 
and  all-embracing  Republican  party  in  which  all  our 
different  groupings  may  find  a  place." 


VI 


In  addition  to  the  new  Bloc  which  it  is  certain  every 
party  of  a  bourgeois  character  in  the  Republic  will  join 
against  the  Unified  Socialists,  there  are  signs  that  some 
other  and  perhaps  more  stable  and  coherent  party  re- 
alignment is  under  way.  The  causes  which  brought  the 
old  parties  into  existence  are  largely  disappearing.  It 
is  certain  that  the  monarchy  will  never  be  reestablished. 
If  the  occasion  for  it  should  conceivably  arise,  there  is 
no  candidate  able  to  attract  a  following  strong  enough 
to  seat  him  on  the  throne.  The  Ligue  d'Action  Fran- 
gaise  will  probably  outlast  the  lifetime  of  its  leaders, 
MM.  IMaurras  and  Daudct.  But  signs  are  not  wanting 
that  in  the  future  its  criticism  will  be  largely  destructive 
and  nationalistic.    Little  will  be  said  of  the  kingship. 

132 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

As  far  as  the  Liberal  Action  party  is  concerned,  there 
is  slight  probability  of  the  repeal  of  the  anticlerical 
legislation.  The  Government  appointment  of  bisliops  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  aronsed  Catholic  hopes,  but  this  anom- 
alous action  was  explained  by  the  fact  that  Alsace- 
Lorraine  has  to  be  governed  under  the  old  Concordat 
until  the  anticlerical  legislation  is  extended  to  its  juris- 
diction. The  policy  of  the  Government  toward  the 
Church  was  brought  out  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  last 
July  W'hen  Jean  Bon  accused  it  of  having  a  secret  rep- 
resentative at  the  Vatican.  This,  M.  Pichon,  IMinister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  vigorously  denied,  adding,  "the 
policy  of  separation  as  now  practiced  in  conformity 
to  the  law,  satisfies  the  Government."  The  Catholic 
strength  has  been  dissipated  between  the  "Rallies"  and 
the  ]\Ionarchists.  They  may  unite ;  but  it  seems  that  the 
Church  is  losing  popularity  as  an  issue  in  politics,  and 
that  it  is  secretly  satisfied  with  its  present  independence 
from  the  control  which  the  Concordat  formerly  imposed. 
As  for  the  social  doctrines  of  the  Liberal  Action  party, 
they  find  their  embodiment  elsewhere. 

The  Progressists,  as  already  pointed  out,  have  split 
into  a  conservative  and  a  moderate  group.  There  seems 
to  be  some  indication  that  the  former  may  unite  with 
sympathetic  elements  in  the  Right,  although  both  are  so 
independent  and  unreasonable  in  holding  to  their  anti- 
quated doctrines  that  as  a  parliamentary  force  it  does 
not  appear  that  they  will  ever  be  effective.  Similarly, 
it  is  quite  possible  that  the  moderates  of  the  Republican 
Federation  may  unite  with  the  Democratic  Alliance. 
Upon  this  latter  organization  (the  Democratic  Alliance), 
the  future  control  of  French  politics  is  probably  cen- 
tered. Its  program  is  a  moderate  one ;  it  is  thoroughly 
Republican ;  it  stands  for  a  policy  of  pacification.     Un- 

133 


CONTEIklPOKAEY  FRENCH  POLITICS  ^ 

der  its  present  leadership,  it  may  even  prove  strong 
enough  to  absorb  other  parties  within  its  organization. 

The  Radical  party,  on  the  other  hand,  has  passed  the 
zenith  of  its  career.  It  rode  to  power  on  the  issue  of 
clericalism.  Now  that  this  issue  is  dead,  the  party,  like 
the  Action  Lihcrale  Populaire,  has  lost  its  chief  reason 
for  existence.  In  its  enforcement  of  the  clerical  laws, 
especially  during  the  Ministry  of  ]\I.  Combes,  the  party 
was  untactful  and  overviolent.  In  driving  the  religious 
orders  out  of  France,  nuns  were  driven  into  the  streets, 
and  Good  Friday  was  deliberately  chosen  to  remove  the 
crosses  hitherto  hung  in  court  rooms ;  every  effort  was 
apparently  made  needlessly  to  antagonize  the  Catholics. 
Now  that  this  issue  appears  definitely  settled,  it  would 
be  the  worst  of  policies  to  harp  continually  upon  a  past 
menace.  Yet  it  is  this  policy  which  the  Radicals  are 
fatuously  trying  to  perpetuate,  and  because  of  which 
they  are  vigorously  opposed  to  the  "pacification  policy" 
proposed  by  the  Democratic  Alliance  and  M.  Briand. 

Secondly,  the  Radicals  have  been  found  guilty  of 
the  worst  opportunism.  The  Doumergue  Ministry  came 
into  power  in  1913  pledged  to  fulfill  the  Pan  program, 
calling  for  the  repeal  of  the  three-year  military  service 
law.  Yet  the  Llinistry  supported  it.  As  far  back  as 
1906  the  party  promised  the  income  tax,  but  when  in 
I)Ower  it  failed  to  enact  any  such  measure  until  the  out- 
break of  the  war  made  it  a  necessity.  Upon  the  issue  of 
electoral  reform,  the  party  was  equally  vacillating.  Al- 
ways opposed  to  the  representation  of  minorities,  it  was 
not  until  1919  that  it  finally  agreed  to  the  partial  in- 
corporation of  this  principle  in  the  electoral  reform  law. 
Finally,  the  Radicals  had  become  vague  and  lukewarm 
in  regard  to  questions  of  social  reform;  their  declaration 
of  July,  1919,  seemed  merely  to  mark  time  until  the 

134 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

coming  of  some  wind  should  point  the  direction  of  suc- 
cess. 

Tliirdly,  the  party  is  suffering  from  a  discreditable 
leadership.  Until  the  beginning  of  the  war  at  least,  M. 
Caillaux  was  in  complete  control.  He  alone  determined 
its  program,  a  principal  feature  of  which  was  pacifica- 
tion with  Germany,  obviously  unpopular,  to  say  the  least, 
in  France  at  the  present  moment.  Not  only  in  his 
cabinet  but  as  Minister  of  Finances  in  the  Doumergue 
Ministry,  he  was  guilty  of  shielding  embezzlers,  as  the 
Rochette  case  proved ;  and  he  was  moreover  frequently 
and  openly  charged  with  financially  profiting  by  his 
position  as  Minister  of  Finances.  The  murder  of  Gaston 
Calmette,  editor  of  Le  Figaro,  by  Mme.  Caillaux, 
through  fear  that  he  would  continue  to  reveal  the  per- 
sonal and  financial  immoralities  in  Caillaux 's  life,  fur- 
ther implicated  him.  His  record  during  the  war  has 
also  been  discreditable.  Its  treasonable  extent  has  not 
yet  been  decided ;  but  his  actions  appear  to  have  been 
very  far  from  patriotic.^ 

Two  other  prominent  Radicals,  Malvy  and  Desclaux, 
have  also  brought  the  party  into  disrepute.  Llalvy, 
Minister  of  the  Interior  in  several  war  cabinets,  in  July, 
1918,  was  judged  by  the  French  Senate,  sitting  as  a 
High  Court  of  Justice,  to  have  "ignored,  violated,  and 
betrayed  the  duties  of  his  charge."  Desclaux,  who  had 
been  Caillaux 's  secretary  when  the  latter  was  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  was  an  army  contractor  who  was  ac- 
cused of  stealing  army  supplies.  A  prominent  Paris 
dressmaker  was  found  to  have  concealed  the  stolen 
goods;  and  upon  the  basis  of  this  proof  Desclaux  was 

*  In  the  latter  part  of  April,  1920,  the  French  Senate  voted 
Caillaux  guilty  of  having  had  "conimerco"  and  "correspondence" 
with  the  enemy. 

135 


CONTE]\IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

sentenced  to  seven  years  of  solitary  confinement.  And 
by  a  strange  perversion  of  loyalty  the  Radical  party  has 
stood  behind  their  former  leaders  to  the  bitter  end.  This 
statement  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  Caillaux  was  again 
nominated  by  the  Radicals  as  a  candidate  for  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  from  the  Sarthe,  in  the  elections  of  No- 
vember, 1919,  But  on  the  refusal  of  the  High  Court  of 
Justice  to  grant  M.  Caillaux  "temporary  liberty"  in 
which  to  carry  on  his  campaign,  he  declined  the  nomina- 
tion. 

It  now  appears  that  Clemenceau  has  taken  the  leader- 
ship of  the  Radicals  away  from  Caillaux ;  but  the  latter 
still  retains  some  of  his  old  following  in  the  Left  wing 
of  the  party,  the  Radical  Socialists  proper.  The  divi- 
sion caused  by  this  issue  has  not  been  the  only  one  in 
the  party.  Countless  other  differences  have  arisen,  near- 
ly as  serious  and  quite  as  numerous  as  those  in  the  Uni- 
fied Socialists.  Thus  an  element  led  by  Franklin  Bouil- 
lon, has  bitterly  opposed  M.  Clemenceau.  There  are 
some  moderate  Radicals  who  are  opposed  to  the  exten- 
sion of  collectivism ;  there  are  extreme  Radicals  who 
wish  to  ally  themselves  with  the  Unified  Socialists,  de- 
spite the  latter 's  revolutionary  program.  There  are 
Radicals  who  stand  for  a  peace  of  annexation;  many 
others  who  condemn  the  present  treaty  as  violating 
principles  of  justice.  These  countless  divisions  will  all 
inevitably  contribute  to  the  weakening  of  a  party  whose 
ascendancy  was  reached  several  elections  before  the  war. 

But  the  chief  of  these  weaknesses  is  the  lack  of  lead- 
ership. Among  the  senators,  MM.  Bourgeois,  Combes, 
and  Ilerriot  figure  prominently.  M.  Bourgeois  is  a 
scholarly  man,  but  not  gifted  with  any  brilliant  qualities 
of  leadership.  M.  Combes,  it  seems,  has  already  contrib- 
uted his  full  share  to  the  direction  of  the  party;  only 

13G 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

M.  Herriot,  an  intellectual  leader,  appears  likely  to  be- 
come Prime  ]\linister  some  day,  altliough  he  is  also  de- 
prived of  the  magnetism  of  M.  Clemenecau. 

As  for  the  Republican  Socialists,  they  have  profited 
by  their  patriotism,  and  have  won  over  to  their  doctrines 
many  former  believers  in  Socialism  of  the  'Utnifie" 
variety,  who  have  become  dissatisfied  with  its  "pro- 
Bolshevist"  domination.  Pure  reformists,  believers  in 
collectivism,  there  seems  to  be  little  difference  between 
them  and  the  Albert  Thomas  ex-majoritaire  type  of 
Unifies  or  the  extreme  Radicals.  A  grouping  of  these 
three  elements  upon  a  Reformist-Collectivist  program, 
such  as  that  urged  by  the  British  Labor  party,  can 
easily  be  imagined. 

As  for  the  future  of  the  Unified  Socialists,  the  out- 
look from  their  standpoint  does  not  appear  bright.  We 
have  already  indicated  the  reasons  why  they  have  such 
small  chances  of  bringing  about  a  revolution  "by  force." 
This  chance  has  still  further  diminished  since  the  signa- 
ture of  peace.  Politically,  they  have  absolutely  no  pros- 
pect of  winning  a  majority  on  account  of  the  Bloc  which 
will  always  be  formed  against  them  in  the  elections,  a 
Bloc  representing  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
French  people,  absolutely  opposed  to  a  replica  of  the 
Russian  and  Hungarian  experiences.  The  extremism  of 
the  Unified  Socialist  party  is  the  natural  source  of  its 
'  weakness,  for  it  has  hopelessly  divided  it  into  factions 
and  deprived  it  of  its  leaders.  Such  men  as  Briand, 
Millerand,  Viviani,  and  Herve,  who  refused  to  be 
swept  into  an  avowal  of  the  revolutionary  tenets  which 
have  continually  controlled  the  party,  have  been  ex- 
cluded from  its  membership.  The  party  thus  has  lightly 
cast  away  the  only  elements  which  cantassure  its  success, 
with  each  step  in  its  evolution  toward  the  Left.     This 

137 


CONTE]\IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

evolution  has  already  deserted  the  scholarly  opportun- 
ism of  Jaures  for  the  milk-and-water  Bolshevism  of  Lon- 
guet.  It  bids  fair  to  seek  its  inspiration  in  the  icono- 
clasm  of  Loriot. 

The  real  issue  in  France  to-day,  aside  from  the  ques- 
tion of  Bolshevism,  is  the  projection  of  the  State  into 
industry — that  is,  State  Socialism.  This  movement  is 
not  the  same  as  the  Socialism  preached  by  the  ' '  Unifies. ' ' 
It  advocates  no  change  in  the  direction  of  industry  as 
far  as  the  proletariat  assumption  of  power  is  concerned ; 
on  the  other  hand,  it  advocates  the  gradual  absorption 
of  industries  by  the  State  as  at  present  constituted. 
This  program  of  collectivism  or  of  nationalization  is  ad- 
vocated by  the  Radical  party  and  the  Republican  So- 
cialists. But  it  is  even  more  vigorously  opposed  by  the 
Republicans  of  the  Alliance  and  of  the  Federation.  Be- 
cause of  this  additional  issue,  it  seems  reasonable  to 
believe  that  two  strong  bourgeois  groupings  will  arise 
in  France — one,  probably  centering  around  the  Repub- 
lican Alliance,  which  Avill  oppose  collectivism,  and  the 
other,  grouped  around  the  Radicals  and  nationalist  So- 
cialists, which  will  advocate  collectivism.  In  addition 
to  these  parties,  the  Unified  Socialists  will  always  exist. 
But  whenever  the  latter  threaten  the  Government,  it  is 
equally  certain  that  the  two  bourgeois  combinations  will 
unite  to  overthrow  them.  The  Clerico-Monarchists  like- 
wise will  exist — a  ghostly  community — until  the  old 
nobilitj^  becomes  only  a  historical  tradition. 

It  may  be  hoping  too  much  to  prophesy  the  elimina- 
tion of  all  but  these  three  major  groupings  in  France.^" 

"In  the  first  dcays  of  the  12th  Cliambcr  of  Deputies  (1919- 
1923),  cncourapjinfT  indications  Avere  given  of  the  desire  to  elimin- 
ate and  to  consolidate  parliamentary  groups.  Attempts  were  mado 
by  the  Eadicals,  led  by  M.  Ilcrriot,  to  form  a  Union  dcs  Gauchcs, 
out  of  the  two  old  groups  of  the  Radical  Socialists  and  tlic  Ro- 

138 


PARTY  REALIGNMENTS 

The  fmal  settlement  and  elimination  of  old  issues  may 
not  materially  affect  present  party  alignments ;  the  inde- 
pendence dear  to  the  Frenchman  and  the  attitude  of 
je  m'cn  ficlie  may  prevent  any  serious  readjustment  of 
parties  and  the  stabilization  of  the  party  regime. 

However,  it  hardly  need  be  recalled  that  a  successful 
party  government  is  not  dependent  upon  the  elimination 
of  all  l)ut  a  majority  and  a  minority  party.  Even  in 
England,  the  home  of  party  governments,  there  are 
four  or  five  parties,  the  smallest  one  of  which,  the  Irish 
Home  Rulers,  held  the  balance  of  power  in  Parliament 
for  years.  In  the  German  elections  of  January  19,  1919, 
under  the  new  Republic,  six  parties  received  a  consider- 
able number  of  seats.  In  the  Italian  elections  of  No- 
vember 16,  19""^,  six  parties  polled  great  numbers  of 
votes.  In  the  Spanish  elections  of  1919,  as  many  as  twelve 
parties  likewise  secured  a  sprinkling  of  seats  in  the 
Cortes.  Finally  under  the  Bolshevist  dictatorship  in  Rus- 
sia, fifteen  or  more  groupings  were  brave  enough  to  ex- 
press different  remedies  for  the  hierarchy  which  at- 
tempted to  keep  them  silent.  Thus  the  multiplicity  of 
parties  is  not  limited  to  France  alone,  or  caused  by  any 
special  defect  of  the  French  political  mind.  There  is, 
moreover,  a  strong  probability  that  the  Third  Republic 
may  yet  enjoy  the  benefits  of  a  stable,  party  government. 
Some  scholars,  notably  ]\Ioisei  Ostrogorski,  believe  that 
party  regimes  in  all  countries  will  give  way  to  temporary 
organizations,  springing  up  to  accomplish  some  reform, 
dissolving  again  upon  its  achievement.     Although  this 

publicans  of  the  Left.  Because  of  the  vital  difference  between 
these  two  groups,  the  union  naturally  failed.  But  upon  tlie  15th 
of  January,  1920,  a  union  of  the  group  of  the  Republicans  of 
the  Left  with  the  group  of  the  Radical  Left  was  effected.  This 
united  the  forces  of  tlie  Democratic  Alliance  into  what  was  called 
the  Group  of  the  Republican  Democratic  Left. 

139 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tendency  is  visible  in  France  (as  the  activities  of  the 
various  electoral  reform  leagues  show),  it  is  not  likely 
to  do  away  completely  with  permanent  parties  in 
France,  because,  as  noted  above,  party  programs  are 
really  philosophies,  which  remain  after  the  achieve- 
ment of  many  of  their  immediate  demands. 


CHAPTER  V 

WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  TIIK  "  R.  P.  "  ^ 
Bcaucoup  pcnscnt  qu'il  vaut  viicux  ne  rien  cluiiiger. — Midas. 

I 

Purely  electoral  issues  have  induced  lively  discus- 
sions and  important  differences  throughout  the  course 
of  modern  French  history.  Two  revolutions — those  of 
1830  and  1848 — were  in  a  large  part  caused  by  them; 
Ministries  have  come  to  power  and  have  fallen  on  their 
account.  Universal  manhood  suffrage  has  existed  in 
France  since  the  time  of  the  Constituent  Assembly -of 
May  4,  1848,  a  body  which  was  elected  upon  that  basis. 
Although  in  1850  the  principle  of  universal  manhood 
suffrage  was  virtually  abrogated  for  a  time  by  requir- 
ing a  three-year  domicile  as  an  electoral  qualification, 
its  full  acceptance  has  long  since  ceased  to  make  it  a 
possible  political  issue  in  France.  But  lately,  there  has 
arisen  a  demand  for  a  further  extension  of  the  suffrage, 
first,  to  women,  and  secondly,  by  the  so-called  plural  or 
multiple  vote. 

French  women  already  may  vote  for  members  of  the 
conseUs  de  prudlwmmcs,  arbitral  bodies  comi)()scd 
equally  of  employers  and  employees,  and  for  judges  of 

*  Tho  "  li.  P. "  is  the  French  nickname  for  proportional  rep- 
resentation {representation  proportionnelle). 

141 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  commerce  courts.  But  as  they  do  not  otherwise 
possess  the  ballot,  a  movement  has  naturally  arisen  for 
its  acquisition,  following  those  in  other  countries.  But 
because  of  the  French  conception  of  a  woman's  sphere 
in  life,  the  French  feminist  movement  has  not  yet  ob- 
tained either  the  following,  adherents,  or  the  temper  of 
its  counterpart  in  America  or  England.  To  quote  an 
eminently  French  opinion :  ' '  The  Frenchwoman  is  no 
feminist  as  yet.  She  has  little  faith  in  the  political  sys- 
tems devised  by  mere  men,  and  thinks  she  wields  far 
more  power  in  her  informal  way  than  she  could  ever 
exert  if  she  were  an  elector. ' '  ^ 

This  French  attitude  was  perhaps  better  illustrated 
by  the  replies  received  during  a  symposium  which  a 
popular  review  conducted  in  the  winter  of  1918-1919. 
In  this  connection  Professor  Edouard  Barthelemy 
W' rote :  ' '  Political  dualism  in  families  must  not  be 
risked.  A  legal  political  dualism,  in  case  of  dissension, 
would  certainly  disintegrate  the  home  .  .  .";  while 
M.  G.  Deherme,  a  prominent  editor,  expressed  himself 
even  more  frankly:  ''The  feminists  are  barbarians  and 
enemies  of  woman,  since  they  wish  to  make  a  beast  of 
her  by  lucre  and  pride,  degrade  her  in  the  factory,  and 
disgrace  her  by  the  promiscuity  of  the  street  and  by 
dissoluteness.  The  progress  of  civilization  has  always 
consisted  in  the  increasing  preeminence  of  persuasion 
and  devotion  over  constraint,  of  the  spiritual  over  the 
temporal,  and  therefore  in  the  extension  of  feminine  in- 
fluence."^ These  arguments  singularly  approach  those 
until  recently  heard  in  America. 

But  the  feminists  have  two  things  in  their  favor :  First, 
the  very  important  part  which  French  women  jilayed 

*  p].  Saillions,  Facts  about  France,  276. 

'  Jc  Sdi-f  Tout,  issues  of  Jamiiiry-Fcbrviary,  1919. 

142 


I 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

in  the  war;  seeoiul,  their  greatly  needed  lielp  in  tlie  solu- 
tion of  moral  problems.  It  may  be  true  tliat  French 
women  did  not  engage  in  gratuitous  war- work  as  ex- 
tensively as  did  Anieriean  or  English  women.  They 
were  indeed  cxeluded  (the  majority  of  them,  at  least) 
from  such  a  comparatively  nonessential  work,  by  the 
very  vital  necessity  of  maintaining  the  greater  part  of 
the  economic  system  of  France.  32,000  women  were  em- 
ployed upon  the  railways  and  684,000  in  munition 
works;  countless  peasant  women  tilled  the  soil  and  fed 
their  sons  and  husbands,  engaged  in  the  unproductive 
work  of  war.  Their  heroic  work  in  sustaining  the  indus- 
trial processes  of  the  country,  as  well  as  in  carrying  on 
works  of  mercy  in  the  French  armies,*  earned  for  them 
the  unending  gratitude  of  the  country.  This  experience 
also  gave  them  a  much  needed  lesson  in  independence, 
organization,  and  solidarity.  As  a  result  many  women 
partially,  at  least,  lost  the  customary  conception  of  their 
inevitable  domesticity.  Moreover,  the  enormous  de- 
mands which  the  task  of  reconstruction  is  making  upon 
French  women  and  the  necessity  of  taking  the  places 
of  men  fallen  in  battle,  are  still  further  contributing  to , 
the  movement  whi  h  seeks  to  grant  them  rights  com- 
mensurate with  the  duties  they  now  willingly  and  joy- 
ously perform.  Organizations  such  as  the  French  Union 
for  Woman  Suffrage  (having  eighty  departmental 
groups),  the  National  Council  of  French  Women  (com- 
posed of  one  hundred  and  fifty  women's  associations), 
the  French  League  for  Women's  Rights,  the  Women's 
•  Fraternal  Union,  the  Society  for  the  Improvement  of 
the  Condition  of  Women,  and  even  such  journals  as  La 
Vmx  des  Femmes  (extremely  Socialistic  though  it  he), 

*  The  French  Kcd  Cross  has  a  membership  of  over  25,000. 

143 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

illustrate  the  widespread  organization  supporting  this 
campaign  for  woman  suffrage. 

As  for  the  moral  problems  of  France,  Parliament  has 
not  even  attempted  a  serious  legislative  solution.  Alco- 
holism is  the  first  of  these  problems.  By  a  decree  of 
1851,  drinking  places  were  subject  to  supervision  and 
license  by  local  authorities;  but  these  restrictions  were 
completely  removed  by  a  law  passed  in  1880,^  and  now 
in  force,  which  provides  that  any  person  desiring  to 
open  a  cafe,  or  to  engage  in  the  retailing  of  liquors,  has 
only  to  serve  a  notice  on  the  mayor  of  the  town  in  which 
he  resides.'^  Permission  cannot  be  refused  any  one  wish- 
ing to  sell  liquors,  unless  he  has  been  convicted  of  cer- 
tain serious  crimes.  The  sale  of  liquor  is  restricted  only 
by  the  power  of  local  authorities  to  forbid  drinking 
places  within  certain  distances  from  schools,  cemeteries, 
churches,  hospitals,  etc., — a  power  which  it  is  under- 
stood is  never  exercised.  The  effect  of  this  law  has  been 
to  increase  the  number  of  drinking  places  in  France 
from  179,000  in  1872  to  1,070,451  in  1913,— one  for 
every  thirty-nine  inhabitants.  Despite  the  worthy  ef- 
forts of  the  lAgue  Nationale  contre  I'Alcoolisiftie,  the  per 
capita  consumption  of  absinthe  doubled  between  1907 
and  1911,  and  the  consumption  of  100  per  cent  alcohol 
tripled  between  1830  and  1912. 

Parliamentary  efforts  to  control  this  ever-growing  evil 
have  almost  always  failed,  largely  because  of  the  wine- 
merchant  element  within  the  legishitui'c.  Aside  from 
the  prohi1)ition  of  absinthe,  heavy  taxes  on  drinks,  and 
the  state  monopolization  of  industrial  alcohol  during  the 

'  For  tlic  decree  of  December  29,  1851,  see  A.  Carpcnticr,  Codes 
ft  Lois  pour  la  France,  I'AUjeric  et  Ics  Colonics,  ii,  457.  For 
the  law  of  July  17,  1880,  s.ee  ibid.,  858. 

"  Excc[)t  in  Paris,  ■where  notification  must  bo  filed  Avitli  tho 
I)rofecture  of  police. 

144 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

war,  every  controlling  measure  has  been  defeated.  For 
example,  on  the  14th  of  IMarch,  1918,  ]\I.  Siegfried  asked 
the  Chamber  to  prohibit,  for  the  period  of  the  war,  the 
sale  to  consumers,  on  the  place  or  to  be  carried  away, 
of  all  drinks  containing  more  than  18  per  cent  alcohol. 
The  measure  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  442  to  43,  a  sig- 
nificant majority.  The  Government  even  refused  to 
entertain  a  suggestion  tliat  "drinkless  days"  be  inaugu- 
rated as  a  measure  of  war  economy. 

However,  Parliament,  though  not  choosing  to  curtail 
the  sale  of  liquors,  attempted  (by  a  law  passed  October 
1,  1917)  to  punish  drunkenness.  It  imposed  a  fine  upon 
any  one  found  in  a  state  of  ''manifest  drunkenness,"* 
the  penalty  increasing  to  imprisonment  for  three  days 
for  the  second  offense,  and  from  six  days  to  a  month  for 
the  third  offense,  in  addition  to  the  fine.  The  law  further 
deprived  habitual  drunkards  of  electoral  and  certain 
other  civil  rights.  It  prohibited  shops  from  selling 
liquors  to  minors  of  less  than  eighteen.  Any  one  who 
succeeded  in  getting  such  a  minor  intoxicated  became 
liable  to  imprisonment  from  six  days  to  a  month.  The 
law,  however,  has  remained  a  dead  letter,  despite  its 
moderateness.  It  offers  a  very  good  example  of  the  use- 
lessness  of  legislation  when  unsupported  by  public 
opinion. 

The  inability  of  man-composed  Parliaments  or  munici- 
pal bodies  to  curtail  this  vice  has  led  such  men  as 
Joseph  Reinach  and  Senator  Herriot  to  ask  that  women 
should  be  given  the  vote,  at  least  in  municipal  and  de- 
partment elections,  wnth  the  principal  hope  that  they 
will  secure  the  enactment  of  restrictive  if  not  prohibitive 
laws. 

This  demand  for  moral  purification  has  also  extended 
to  prostitution,  which  at  present  is  subject  to  practically 

145 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

no  control  by  municipal  authorities.  The  chief  argu- 
ment for  woman  suffrage  is  therefore  an  appeal  to 
their  moral  superiority.  Whether  or  not  that  moral 
superiority  can  be  any  more  effectively  exercised 
through  the  ballot  than  it  is  now  through  persuasion 
and  example,  is  another  question. 

The  two  distinctively  French  arguments''  against 
woman  suffrage  are  economic  and  clerical.  Although 
great  numbers  of  women  entered  the  war  industries, 
they  were  largely  compelled  to  do  so  through  economic 
needs, — that  is,  by  poverty.  It  is  this  class  of  women 
who  want  the  ballot  and  who,  it  is  feared,  would  be  the 
only  ones  to  use  it.  The  women  of  the  higher  classes 
did  not  enter  French  industries  because  they  were  under 
no  economic  compulsion.  Their  patriotism  exercised  it- 
self in  more  philanthropic  and  non-remunerative  war 
work.  Thus  they  have  not  experienced  the  same  feeling 
of  feminine  solidarity  as  have  their  poorer  sisters.  Ac- 
cording to  the  conservatives,  the  women  of  the  better 
families  of  France,  with  few  exceptions,  do  not  want 
the  right  to  vote,  and  would  not  exercise  it  if  it  were 
granted  to  them ;  and  their  neglect  of  the  ballot  would 
disproportionally  increase  the  political  power  of  the 
labor  and  Socialist  vote,  aided  by  the  support  of  women 
in  industry. 

The  anticlerical  argument  is  substantially  this: 
France  is  still  nominally  a  Catholic  nation.  Although, 
many  men  have  come  to  oppose  Catholic  dogma  and  its 
influence,  large  numbers  of  women,  because  of  their 
more  emotional  and  religious  natures,  are  still  complete- 
ly controlled  by  the  priesthood — so  the  argument  goes. 
The  anticlericals  fear  that  the  priesthood  will  utilize  its 

'For  the  Trcncli  aifjiiment  in  general  against  woman  suffrage, 
SCO  I"]smcin,  Vroit  Constitutionncl  (5th  cd.j,  300-304. 

146 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

religious  iiifluoneo,  as  it  lias  so  frequently  done  before, 
to  obtain  political  advantages;  in  other  "words,  it  is 
feared  that  the  priesthood  will  dictate  what  candidates 
its  women  parisliioners  should  vote  for,  under  fear  of 
displeasure  of  God  and  the  Church.^  This  argument, 
very  energetically  urged  in  the  debate  on  the  Suffrage 
Bill  in  IMay,  1919,  seems  to  be  of  little  real  value.  The 
control  of  the  Church  over  its  members  appears  nomi- 
nal, even  in  religious  affairs ;  while  many  women  of  the 
working  classes, — at  least  the  feminists  imbued  with  So- 
cialist teachings, — are  decidedly  anti-Catholic. 

The  Church,  one  would  naturally  think,  would  be  op- 
posed to  woman  suffrage.  Yet,  possibly  because  of  the 
prospect  of  increasing  its  political  power,  it  has  taken  an 
advanced  stand  on  the  question.'  At  a  Journee 
Diocesaine,  held  on  the  19th  of  February,  1919,  in  Paris, 
a  report  of  the  "Action  social  de  la  femme"  was 
adopted,  stating  that  if  the  right  to  vote  w^ere  granted 
to  them,  women  were  under  the  moral  duty  of  exercis- 
ing it,  and  asking  that,  in  the  future,  this  duty  be 
taught  young  girls  by  the  Church, 

Legislative  activity  for  woman  suffrage  began  in 
1906  wath  the  introduction  of  a  bill  by  ]\I.  Dussausoj^, 
granting  women  the  ballot  in  municipal  affairs,  and  in 
the  election  of  general  councilors.  The  proposition  was 
adopted  by  the  Commission  on  Universal  Suffrage,  but 
discussion  was  delayed  during  four  years,  finally  to 
be  dropped. 

Later  projects  are  numerous.  In  1918,  ]\L  Magniex, 
deputy  from  the  Somme,  drew  up  another  proposition, 
which  granted  the  ballot  to  women  in  municipal,  can- 

'  For  this  and  otlier  arguments,  see  three  articles  by  Louis 
Narquet,.  on  "La  Frangaise  de  demain  d'apres  sa  psychologic  de 
guerre,"  Revue  Blcue,  Sept.  28,  Oct.  12,  Oct.   27,   1918. 

147 


CONTEMPORAEY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tonal,  legislative,  and  senatorial  elections,  under  the 
same  conditions  as  it  is  exercised  by  men.  Senator  Mar- 
tin also  advocated  the  unrestricted  riglit  to  vote  for 
women  above  twenty-five  years  of  age.  During  the  de- 
bate on  the  electoral  bill  in  April,  1919,  ]\I.  Louis  An- 
drieux  moved  an  amendment  to  include  woman  suf- 
frage in  the  bill.  Although  it  was  defeated  by  a  vote 
of  325  to  116,  the  Commission  on  Universal  Suffrage 
promised  to  introduce  it  later  as  a  "special  measure." 
This  promise  was  in  part  fulfilled  by  the  introduction 
of  the  so-called  Flandin  bill,  which  granted  women  the 
limited  right  to  participate  in  the  election  of  municipal, 
arrondissement  and  general  councilors.  They  were 
not,  however,  to  vote  for  members  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.  This  bill  came  up  for  discussion  on  Tuesday, 
May  20th,  1919.  It  was  evidently  a  compromise  between 
the  Feminists  and  their  opponents, — a  compromise 
necessitated,  the  Commission  urged,  by  Senate  op- 
position. But  this  did  not  satisfy  the  Chamber,  and, 
after  vigorous  arguments  in  support  of  granting  the 
complete  right  of  suffrage  to  women,  from  two  former 
prime  ministers,  Rene  Viviani  and  Aristide  Briand,  the 
Bon  amendment  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  329  to  95, 
giving  the  women  identical  suffrage  rights  with  men. 
Although  some  believed  that  the  opponents  of  suffrage 
had  voted  for  the  integral  right  in  the  belief  that  the 
Senate  would  kill  the  entire  measure,  it  was  generally 
felt  that  the  Chamber  was  at  least  sincerely  desirous  of 
acknowledging  the  country's  debt  of  gratitude  to  the 
women  of  France. 

The  measure  thus  passed  by  the  Chamber  was  sent  up 
to  the  Senate.  No  one  seemed  to  expect  tliat  this  body 
would  ratify  tlie  bill.  The  arguments  against  it  weighed 
too  heavily  with   these  conservative  dignitaries.     Upon 

148 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

May  22  tlie  Senate  appointed  a  coniniission  to  examine 
the  bill ;  and  on  the  IStli  of  July,  the  Coininission  re- 
ported it  unfavorably.  It  in  still  pending  before  the 
Upper  Cliain])er,  but  tliore  is  slif^ht  clunicc  of  its  passage. 

On  October  7,  1919,  the  Deputies  i)assed  a  resolution 
urging  the  Senate  to  act  on  the  Chamber's  Woman  Suf- 
frage bill. 

On  the  Senate's  failure  to  act  before  the  elections  of 
November  16th,  L' Excelsior,  a  Paris  newspaper,  held  a 
mock  election  for  the  Deputies  upon  the  IGth,  in  Paris, 
at  which  the  women  might  vote.  The  candidates  voted 
upon  were  identical  with  those  of  the  general  election. 

II 

Plural  voting  has  been  advocated  under  some  very 
unique  forms.  On  April  4,  1919,  M.  Roulleaux-Dugage 
introduced  an  amendment  to  an  electoral  bill  under  dis- 
cussion, to  the  effect  that  fathers  of  families  should  be 
given  a  vote,  in  addition  to  their  own,  for  every  one  of 
their  children:  He  again  introduced  a  similar  proposi- 
tion during  the  debate  on  woman  suffrage  which  read: 

Any  person  enjoyint^  French  nationality,  whatever  his  age 
or  sex,  possesses  a  right  of  political  suffrage  which  is  the 
corollary  of  his  civil  personality.  The  father  of  a  family 
exercises  the  right  of  suffrage  for  himself  and  for  all  the  per- 
sons legally  placed  under  his  civil  authority,  that  is  to  say, 
for  his  legitimate  wife  and  for  his  minor  children  of  both 
sexes,  legitimate  or  recognized. 

The  idea  that  every  person,  irrespective  of  age  or  of 
sex,  is  entitled  to  the  "right  of  political  suffrage,"  is 
indeed  a  novel  one.  P>ut  it  is  also  pointed  out  that  there 
are  about  11,000,000  voters  in  France;  over  7,000,000  of 
them  are  either  bachelors  or  the  fathers  of  but  one  or 

119 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

two  children ;  only  4,000,000  are  fathers  of  three  or  more 
children.  The  first  class,  which  represents  but  16,000,- 
000  inhabitants,  has  one  vote  for  about  every  two  per- 
sons; w^liile  the  fathers  of  large  families,  representing 
23,000,000  people,  have  less  than  one  vote  for  each  six 
persons — obviously  an  injustice  if  the  premise  of  the 
argument  is  correct.  This  innovation  is  also  urged  to 
secure  another  end  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  coun- 
try, viz.,  as  a  reward  and  stimulus  to  large  families.^ 
But  there  is  considerable  doubt  both  as  to  the  right 

°  The  depopulation  question  '  in  France  is  generally  considered 
serious;  •with  the  exception  of  twenty-one  departments,  the  death 
rate  is  annually  in  excess  of  the  birth  rate;  nearly  2,000,000 
out  of  the  11,000,000  families  have  no  children  whatever.  Since 
1867  the  Prussian  population  has  increased  four  times  faster 
than  the  French. 

Figures  compiled  by  the  Ministry  of  Labor,  published  in  Le 
Temps  for  October  8,  1919,  show  that  the  depopulation  crisis  in 
France  is  increasing. 

For  the  two  years  1918  and  1917  mortality  figures  were  as 
follows : 

1918  1917 

Births 399,041  343,310 

Deaths 788,016  613,148 

Excess  of  Deaths  over  Births 389,575  269,838 

Marriages 177,872  158,508 

Divorces 8,821  5,572 

The  executive  committee  of  the  National  Congress  of  Natality 
and  Population,  wliich  held  a  national  congress  at  Nancy,  Septem- 
ber 25-28,  1919,  has  urged  the  following  program  to  overcome 
this  crisis: 

1.  The  Family  Vote. 

2.  Correction  of  ' '  fiscal  inequalities ' '  weighing  upon  heads  of 
numerous  families. 

3.  Allotments,  premiums  and  gifts  to  families  with  a  large 
number  of   children. 

4.  (Jamj)aign  against  poor  housing  and  for  sanitary  and  com- 
fortable  lodgings  for  large  families. 

5.  Su{)[)rcssion  of  abortion,  neo-Malthusian  proi)agan(la,  and 
prostitution. 

6.  (.'reation  of  a   National   Oflice  of    Natality. 

7.  The  exem[)tion,  in  times  of  peace,  of  fathers  of  largo 
families  from  military  service. 

150 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

of  a  child  to  llie  ballot  (even  if  exercised  by  the  father 
as  a  trustee),  or  as  to  the  effect  of  such  a  iiK^asure  upon 
increasing  the  size  of  families.  To  otfer  an  additional 
vote  as  a  solution  of  the  depopulation  question  appears 
so  weak  that  it  is  a  wonder  it  is  seriously  considered.  It 
is  sip^nificant,  however,  that  M.  Roulleaux-Dugage's 
amendment  nearly  succeeded  in  passing — and  was  only 
defeated  by  the  vote  of  219  to  200.  Moreover,  no  less 
than  eleven  societies  interested  in  measures  of  reform 
are  sponsoring  the  idea,  in  addition  to  many  of  the  can- 
didates at  the  recent  election  (November,  1919). 

Still  another  phase  of  the  plural  voting  plan  is  urged 
(for  different  reasons,  however,)  by  Maurice  Barres,  the 
president  of  the  League  of  Patriots. 

In  an  ingenious  appeal  to  sentiment  and  patriotism, 
Maurice  Barres  advocates  the  plural  vote  as  a  recogni- 
tion and  memorial  of  the  sacrifices  of  the  dead.  For 
every  member  of  a  family  killed  upon  the  battlefield, 
he  would  give  a  "family"  vote  to  be  cast  by  the  father, 
mother  or  widow,  as  the  case  may  be.  Thus  he  would 
create  a  "family"  instead  of  a  "father's"  vote,  as  advo- 
cated in  M.  Roulleaux-Dugage's  plan.  The  "family 
vote"  was  formulated  in  an  amendment  to  the  electoral 
bill,  and  was  introduced  by  Jules  Delahaye,  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  on  April  19,  1919.  This  amend- 
ment gave  the  right  to  vote  to  the  widows,  or  in  their 
default,  to  the  mothers  of  soldiers  killed  by  the  enemy; 
it  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  375  to  113. 

All  of  these  projects  of  plural  voting,  while  finding 
a  certain  following,  appear  to  be  rather  fanciful  as 
well  as  inconsistent  with  the  trends  of  modern  democ- 
racy. The  progress  of  electoral  reform,  in  recent  times, 
has  been  away  from — rather  than  toward — the  system 
of  plural  ballots.     Some  of  these  projects  introduced  in 

151 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  French  Chamber,  projects  which  only  a  politically 
imaginative  Frenchman  can  devise,  illustrate  the  length 
to  which  the  theory,  so  prevalent  in  France,  of  the  right 
of  representation  of  interests  as  opposed  to  that  of  the 
nation,  can  be  permitted  to  go.  That  these  s^'stems  of 
plural  voting  violate  the  simplest  maxims  of  sovereignty, 
that  thej^  misrepresent  and  misplace  the  will  of  the  na- 
tion, and  that  they  are  practically  impossible  of  applica- 
tion, is,  without  deep  study,  apparent. 

Ill 

But  the  greatest  electoral  issue  in  France  has  not 
been  so  much  in  the  extension  of  suffrage  as  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  methods  through  which  suffrage  is  exer- 
cised and  in  the  devising  of  means  by  which  one  voter 
may  enjoy  as  much  influence  as  another.  The  "rotten 
boroughs"  of  England,  the  old  three-class  tax-qualifica- 
tion system  in  Prussia,  and  the  practice  of  "gerryman- 
dering" in  the  United  States,  through  which  great  num- 
bers of  voters  have  been  deprived  of  their  ballots,  are 
approximated,  to  a  much  less  extent,  in  France  by  a 
faulty  method  of  election  known  as  the  scrutin  d'arron- 
dissement. 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  elected  by  districts, 
known  as  arrondissements  (until  the  law  of  1919),  each 
electing  one  deputy,  unless  its  population  exceeds  100,- 
000.  In  the  latter  case  a  new  district  is  formed,  elect- 
ing another  deputy  for  every  100,000  or  fraction  there- 
of.^'* The  vital  question  in  France  has  been  whether  there 
should  be  a  large  number  of  small  districts,  such  as  the 
arrondisscment,  each  electing  a  deputy,  independently 

"A  new  districting  is  made  after  every  quinquennial  census; 
the  last  law  fixing  these  districts  was  of  March  27,  1914,  based 
on  the  census  of  1911.  The  number  of  districts  was  set  at  602. 
Tlie  return  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  increased  the  number  to  626. 

152 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

of  the  others ;  or  whether  there  should  be  a  smaHer  num- 
ber of  larger  districts,  such  as  the  department,  each 
electing  several  deputies  on  a  general  ticket,  as  Presi- 
dential electors  in  tlie  United  States  are  ordinarily 
chosen. 

The  issue  has  therefore  been  between  the  scrutin 
d'arrondissement  and  the  scrutin  de  liste.  The  former 
method  of  election  was  established  in  1875,  although 
Gambetta  and  Rieard  vigorously  demanded  the  latter. 
The  sturdy  arguments  of  these  Radicals,  however,  final- 
ly led  to  the  adoption  of  the  scriitin  de  liste  in  1885. 
But  it  was  only  in  use  for  four  years.^^  In  fact,  at  that 
time  the  ease  with  which  General  Boulanger,  making 
use  of  the  "multiple  candidacy"  privilege,  threatened 
to  win  the  elections,  led  to  its  hurried  repeal  by  the 
Republicans.  To  control  departmental  elections  was 
within  the  physical  power  of  the  Government ;  but  to 
dominate  arrondissement  elections,  so  numerous  were 
the  districts,  was  an  impossible  task.  From  1889  to 
1919,  this  old  arrondissement  system  was  consequently 
maintained. 

Despite  long  established  usage,  the  scrutin  d^ arron- 
dissement is  open  to  some  grave  objections.  The  elec- 
toral district  is  so  restricted  in  extent  that  the  election 
of  a  deputy  depends  too  often  upon  the  promises  he 
makes  to  local  interests.  He  usually  regards  himself  as 
the  mandataire  of  a  restricted  and  privileged  district, 
in  the  service  of  which  he  neglects  the  wide  interests  of 
*Ha  nation  toute  enticre,"  as  the  Constitution  of  1791 
defined  it. 


"For  the  "organic  law"  of  November  30,  1875,  see  Les  Con- 
stitutions Mndcrnes,  i,  24.  For  the  law  of  June  16,  1885, 
establishing  the  scrutin  de  liste,  see  ihid.,  35;  for  the  law  of  Feb- 
ruary  13,   1889,  repealing  it,  see  ibid.,  36. 

153 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

The  restricted  size  of  the  arrondissement  also  makes 
bribery  more  probable.  The  use  of  money  and  wine  has 
been  a  feature  of  many  elections.  The  Chamber  Com- 
mission on  Universal  Suffrage,  as  far  back  as  1905,  in  its 
report  on  the  Klotz  bill  said  that  the  deputy  was  too 
often  nothing  more  than  a  veritable  local  "charge  d'af- 
faires" at  Paris.  For  this  reason  he  had  little  time  to 
consider  propositions  of  law  because  the  obligation  of 
his  arrondissement  needed  his  exclusive  attention.  In 
regard  to  bribery,  the  commission  was  "struck  by  the 
increasingly  preponderant  part  played  by  money  in  the 
elections.  ..."  "But  what,"  it  asks,  "can  be  said  of 
the  scandalous  habit  of  certain  districts,  happily  rare, 
where  wine  distributed  broadcast  takes  the  place  of  dis- 
cussion and  a  program?  .  .  .  Such  practices  constitute  a 
double  danger:  they  falsify  the  expression  of  na- 
tional sovereignty,  and  they  demoralize  the  locality 
where  they  are  practiced." 

Furthermore,  the  arrondissement  method  permits  the 
effectual  control  of  elections  by  the  Government.  There 
is  little  question  but  that  by  bringing  pressure  through 
the  Sous-prcfet  (the  administrative  head  of  the  arron- 
dissement), the  Government  is  tempted  to  interfere  in 
elections  to  secure  its  own  ends.^^  The  Sous  prefet  some- 
times appears  to  be  little  more  than  the  "election  agent" 
of  the  Prefect,  whose  advancement  depends  upon  his 
swinging  the  elections  in  a  sense  favorable  to  the  Govern- 
ment, The  evil  of  such  an  interference,  Avhich  has  long 
been  practiced  in  France, ^^  is  tolerated  because  nearly 
every  party  has  in  turn  profited  by  it. 

"At  least  in  the  elections  in  country  districts;  city  elections 
arc  nioro  difficult  to  control. 

"  Tlio  Provisional  (iovoniincnt  durinjif  tlic  devolution  of  1848, 
througli  Lc<Iru-Kollin,  Minister  of  tlic  Interior,  boldly  issued  writ- 

154 


WOMAN  SUFFUALlE  AXl)  THE  "U.  !»." 

But  the  greatest  objection  to  the  scrutiii  d'arrondisse- 
ment  is  the  undue  representation  this  system  gives  cer- 
tain sections  of  the  country.  According  to  the  law,  an 
arrondissement  containing  100,000  inhabitants,  or  a  frac- 
tion thereof,  is  entitled  to  choose  a  deputy.  This  provi- 
sion of  the  law  has  led  to  the  greatest  injustice  and  in- 
equality. For  example,  in  two  arrondissemcnts,  one 
containing  100,000  inlia])itants  and  another  containing 
100,002  inhabitants,  tlie  first  will  have  one  deputy;  and 
the  second,  after  being  divided,  will  have  two.  The 
first  deputy,  therefore,  represents  100,000  inhabitants; 
the  last  two  each  represent  50,001,  a  manifest  injustice. 
There  are  many  instances  bearing  out  this  hypothesis. 
For  further  example:  ^* 


GROUP   A 

City 

Names  of  Voters 

Puget-Theniers 

6,827 

Gex 

liriancon 

Sisteron 

Barcelonnette 

6,557 
6,375 
5,973 
3,443 

29,175 

GROUP   B 

Nantes  (3rd  district) 

Versailles  (1st  district) 

37,018 
32,506 

Sarlat 

32,149 

Sceaux  (2nd  district) 

32,920 

134,593 

ten  instructions  to  the  departmental  agents  defining  these  duties: 
"Through  the  elections  which  are  going  to  take  place,  you  (the 
political  agents)  hold  in  your  hands  the  destinies  of  France." 
Gaston  Bouniols,  Ilistoirc  de  la  Revolution  dc  1848,  86.  The  gov- 
ernment of  Na])oleon  III  interfered  with  elections  to  a  greater  ex- 
tent perhaps  than  any  other  government  before  or  after  it.  For 
the  "official  candidates,"  etc.,  see  de  la  Gorce,  Uistoire  du  Second 
Empire,  ii,   191-194. 

"  Adapted   from   Rapport   57,   Doc.   Pari.,   Chamb.    Sess.    Ord., 
1907. 

155 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Thus  29,175  voters  in  five  arrondissements  (Group  A) 
elect  five  deputies,  one  for  every  5,835  voters ;  while 
134,593  voters  in  four  arrondissements  (or  districts, 
Group  B)  elect  only  four  deputies,  one  for  every  33,648. 
One  vote  in  the  A  Group  has,  therefore,  about  five  times 
the  weight  of  one  in  the  B  Group ;  the  town  of  Bareelon- 
nette  with  its  3,443  voters  has  the  same  representation 
as  the  third  district  of  Nantes,  with  its  37,018.  In 
other  words,  a  Barcelonnette  voter  has  ten  times  the 
electoral  strength  of  one  in  Nantes. 

The  scrutin  de  liste  would  in  a  measure  overcome 
these  inequalities.  For  example,  in  the  department  of 
the  Isere  there  are  eight  arrondissements.  Under  the 
scrutin  d'arrondissement,  each  arrondissement  elects  one 
deputy,  separately  from  the  others.  Under  the  scrutin 
de  liste,  the  whole  department  would  elect  eight  deputies 
upon  a  general  ticket.  Hence  minorities,  now  voiceless 
in  the  arrondissement,  by  combining  forces  throughout 
the  department,  might  secure  a  representation.  This 
possibility  will  bring  many  to  the  polls  who  hitherto 
may  have  stayed  away  because  of  the  hopelessness  of 
making  their  ballots  count.  Furthermore,  the  enlarged 
district  would  be  a  prerequisite  to  any  of  the  schemes 
of  proportional  representation  which  the  Chamber  has 
favored.  Under  any  such  plan,  more  than  one  candi- 
date would  have  to  be  elected  by  an  electoral  district. 
Hence  a  change  from  the  arrondissement  electing  one 
candidate, — to  the  department  (or  other  enlarged  dis- 
trict) electing  several  candidates — is  a  necessity  if  this 
measure  securing  minority  representation  is  to  be  made 
practicable. 

In  later  years,  the  agitation  for  proportional  repre- 
sentation has  not  only  been  combined  with  the  demand 
for  the  scrutin  de  liste,  but  it  has  also  been  even  more 

156 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

insistently  urged.  The  demand  for  this  reform  arose 
from  causes  common  to  all  countries.  Any  strictly  ma- 
jority system,  whether  it  be  under  the  scriitin  d'arron- 
dissement  or  scrutin  de  liste,  is  really  unrepresentative 
of  the  will  of  the  nation,  and  virtually  amounts  to  the 
rule  of  an  organized  minority.  As  the  following  table 
will  illustrate,  in  every  French  election  since  1881  the 
unrepresented  votes  have  been  more  numerous  than 
those  who  actually  secured  a  representation: 


Voters  represented 
by  deputies  elected 

Voters  not  repre- 
sented 

1881 

4,778,000 
3,042,000 
4,520,000 
5,513,000 
4,906,000 
5,159,000 
5,209,000 
5,300,000 

5,600,000 

1885 

6,000,000 

1889 

5  800  000 

1893 

5,930,000 

1898 

5,633,000 

1902 

5,818,000 

1906 

6,830,000 

1910 

6,739,000 

In  the  vote  on  the  law  governing  the  Separation  of 
the  Church  and  State  (passed  July  3,  1905)  the  ma- 
jority consisted  of  341  deputies,  representing  2,647,315 
voters,  while  the  total  number  of  those  registered 
equaled  10,967,000.  The  average  percentage  of  voters 
represented  in  the  total  number  of  elections  between 
1876  and  1906  was  45  per  cent;  while  55  per  cent  of  the 
electorate  had  no  representation  whatever.  Even  under 
the  scrutin  de  liste  method  in  1885  all  of  the  thirty-two 
seats  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  from  the  departments 
of  the  Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais  were  secured  by  the  votes 
of  267,900  Conservatives,  202,000  Republicans  going 
without  representation.^^ 

"Professor  Esmoin,  on  tlie  other  hand,  says  that  the  representa- 
tion of  minorities  is  likely  to  menace  the  very  principle  of  au- 
thority and  of  political  sovereignty.  See  his  Droit  Constitutionnel 
(5th  ed.),  263-297. 

157 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Obviously,  this  condition  is  contrary  to  ]\Iirabcau's 
famous  dictum:  "Representative  assemblies  should  be 
comparable  to  geographical  maps  which  reduce  all  the 
elements  of  the  country  in  their  proper  proportions, 
without  the  more  considerable  elements  forcing  the  lesser 
to  disappear."  The  strong  desire  to  remedy  the  exist- 
ing contradiction  by  some  system  of  proportional  repre- 
sentation has  been  crystallized  in  an  organized  agitation 
which  the  League  for  Proportional  Representation  has 
insistently  carried  on  since  the  beginning  of  the  present 
century. 


IV 


Parliamentary  activity  respecting  the  adoption  of  the 
scrutin  de  liste  and  proportional  representation  began  in 
1905.  M.  Louis  Buyat  then  deposited,  in  the  name  of  the 
Commission  on  Universal  Suffrage,  a  report  upon  the 
Klotz  proposition  providing  for  both  of  these  mcasures.^^ 
To  carry  out  the  latter,  the  voter  was  to  be  given  as 
many  votes  as  there  were  places  to  be  filled,  with  the 
liberty  of  casting  as  many  of  these  votes  as  he  wished 
for  a  single  candidate.  The  Commission  on  Universal 
Suffrage  of  the  legislature  of  1906-1910,  of  which  M. 
Charles  Benoist  was  president  and  ]\I.  Alexandre 
Varenne,  the  rapporteur,  combined  a  number  of  pro- 
jects calling  for  the  scrutin  de  liste  and  the  "R.  P.," 
as  the  Keprcsentation  proportionelle  is  called.  Despite 
the  opposition  of  the  Clemenceau  IMinistry,  the  Cham- 
ber took  up  the  discussion  of  the  bill  in  October,  1909. 
While  the  debate  was  in  progress,  the  Clemenceau  Min- 

"  Journal  Ofjiciel,  Doc.  Pari.,  Cliamb.  Scss.  Ord.,  1905,  3«9.  For 
an  extensive  treatise  upon  French  electoral  reform  up  to  1910, 
see  Jules  Chardon,  La  Reforme  Electorale  ev.  France. 

158 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

istiy  was  voted  out  of  office  upon  a  foreign  affairs  issue 
and  was  succeeded 'by  the  Briand  Ministry.  The  Cham- 
ber had  already  passed  the  proposed  bill  by  sections ; 
but  on  November  8,  1909,  the  President  of  the  Council 
declared:  "The  immediate  vote  of  such  a  drastic  re- 
form would  create  a  grave  situation,  dangerous  to  the 
Republican  regime."  He  also  declared  that  the  country 
had  not  expressed  itself  upon  the  matter.  Asking  for 
a  vote  of  confidence,  he  was  given  it  by  the  Chamber 
(by  a  vote  of  291  against  245).  Thus  the  whole  project 
was  for  the  time  being  rejected  and  the  Parliament  of 
1906-1910  came  to  an  end  with  the  matter  of  electoral 
reform  still  pending. 

But  the  elections  of  the  spring  of  1910  revealed  an 
insistent  and  continuing  demand  for  the  reform.  Out 
of  597  deputies  elected,  271  were  on  record  as  favoring 
the  scrutin  de  liste  and  proportional  representation. 
The  remainder,  with  the  exception  of  thirty-five  defend- 
ers of  the  status  quo  and  about  100  "non-declarants," 
were  all-  in  favor  of  some  sort  of  a  change.  It  was  esti- 
mated that  out  of  8,517,000  votes  cast,  the  principle  of 
electoral  reform  received  1,162,333  and  that  of  the  pro- 
portional representation,  4,442,800,  a  majority  of  200,- 
000  for  the  "R.  P."  In  the  face  of  such  an  expression 
of  public  opinion  the  Briand  Ministry  recognized  that 
some  reform  "was  necessary  and  just,"  that  "it  is  even 
necessary  for  the  future  of  parliamentary  control,  that, 
while  reserving  for  the  majority  the  preponderance 
which  rightfully  belongs  to  it,  the  minority  of  opinions 
expressed  by  universal  suffrage  should  be  given  due 
consideration."^^  This  was  an  adroit  change  of  face 
and  policy.     The  Government  thereupon  introduced  a 

"  Duguit,  Traits  de  Droit  Constitutioiinel,  i,  385. 

159 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

bill  (June  30,  1910),  instituting  the  scrutin  de  liste 
and  the  electoral  quotient  system  of  proportional  rep- 
resentation, and  extending  the  life  of  the  Chamber  from 
four  to  six  years.  While  the  bill  was  pending  the  Briand 
Ministiy  fell.  Little  progress  was  made  in  the  matter 
under  the  two  succeeding  ]\Iinistries  of  Monis  and  Cail- 
laux.  Discussion  of  the  bill  was,  however,  renewed 
May  29,  1911.  When  the  Poincare  Ministry  came  into 
office  in  the  beginning  of  1912,  the  President  of  the 
Council  openly  declared  himself  for  the  reform;  and 
owing  to  his  strong  insistence,  the  Chamber  passed  a 
bill,  comprising  most  of  the  features  of  the  Briand  mea- 
sure (July  10,  1912),  by  a  vote  of  339  to  217.  It  was 
the  Senate,  however,  which  now  rejected  the  principle 
of  proportional  representation  (in  its  session  of  March 
18,  1913)  ;  although  on  the  10th  of  June,  1913,  it  voted 
a  substitute  project  establishing  the  scrutin  de  liste, 
without  proportional  representation.  A  second  time 
(November  18,  1913),  under  the  Barthou  Ministry,  the 
Chamber  voted  a  project  of  electoral  reform,  including 
proportional  representation,  by  a  vote  of  333  to  225.  But 
the  Senate's  conservatism  again  rejected  the  Chamber's 
bill  on  the  10th  of  March,  1914. 

These  failures  once  more  made  electoral  reform  a  pop- 
ular issue  in  the  general  elections  of  April  8,  1914.  As 
a  result,  602  Deputies  were  elected,  320  of  whom  had  de- 
clared themselves  as  favorable  to  the  scrutin  de  liste  and 
proportional  representation,  100  who  were  favorable  to 
the  scrutin  de  liste  and  the  "representation  of  minori- 
ties," 100  who  were  favorable  to  the  scrutin  de  liste 
pure  and  simple,  40  who  emitted  no  opinion  on  the 
subject,  and  finally  only  40  who  were  categorical  par- 
tisans of  the  existing  scrutin  d'arrondissement. 

On  the  2nd  of  July,  1914,  in  connection  with  the 

160 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

Benoist  proposition  to  establish  both  the  scrutin  de  liste 
and  proportional  representation,  the  Chamber  adopted 
the  following  resolution : 

The  Chamber  has  resolved  to  realize  an  electoral  reform  by 
acloi)tin2:  the  system  of  proportional  rei)resentati()n.  It  asks 
the  Coininission  of  Universal  Suffrage  to  prepare  a  bill  for 
enactment  without  delay.^^ 

But  upon  the  10th  of  July,  the  Commission  of  Uni- 
versal Suffrage,  by  a  vote  of  20  to  13,  rejeeted  Article 
I  of  the  project  which  M.  Groussier,  its  rapporteur, 
submitted.  Before  further  action  could  be  taken,  the 
Chamber  adjourned  on  the  13th  of  July.  On  the  3rd 
of  August,  Germany  declared  war  upon  France,  and  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  electoral  reform  was  neces- 
sarily postponed  until  the  return  of  peace. 


The  official  life  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  would 
have  expired  normally  in  May,  1918,  but  the  exigencies 
of  the  war  compelled  the  enactment  of  laws  postponing 
all  legislative  elections  until  the  close  of  hostilities.^^ 
Almost  immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  armistice  in 
November,  the  Paris  newspapers  commenced  a  campaign 
for  the  holding  of  the  elections.  But  as  a  preliminary 
requisite,  it  was  urged  that  the  long-deferred  question 
of  electoral  reform  be  given  a  solution,  a  reform  which 

"Duffuit,  Manuel  de  Droit  Constitutionne'l,  176. 

"The  first  law  was  passed  December  24,  1914;  it  adjourned  the 
Senate  elections  of  1915  (Scries  B)  ;  other  laws  postponing 
elections  for  municipal,  general  and  arrondissement  councils,  were 
passed  April  15,  1916,  and  July  31,  1919.  The  law  postponing 
the  election  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  was  passed  December 
31,  1917. 

161 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

had  been  agitated  since  1905,  which  the  country  had  re- 
peatedly approved  and  which  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
on  several  occasions  had  voted  to  adopt. 

The  newspapers  were  insistent  upon  the  reform,  not- 
ably Le  Temps.  Most  of  the  political  parties,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Radicals,  had  favored  the  scrutin  de 
liste  and  proportional  representation.  It  was  of  some 
significance,  therefore,  that  the  Radical  party  in  Febru- 
ary, 1919,  changed  from  its  original  position  to  agree 
to  the  compromise  measure  which  had  just  been  submit- 
ted to  the  Chamber.  Other  organizations  such  as  the 
Civic  League  urged  the  reform.  But  the  Government 
remained  noncommittal;  M.  Clemenceau  had  always 
vigorously  opposed  proportional  representation  for  the 
reason  that  caused  the  Radicals  generally  to  oppose  it — 
from  the  fear  that  Catholic  supremacy  might  be  estab- 
lished. His  Ministry,  through  ]\I.  Pams,  ]\Iinister  of  the 
Interior,  therefore  took  the  position  that  -it  had  not 
come  to  power  on  that  issue  and  must  consequently  place 
the  entire  responsibility  for  the  enactment  or  rejection 
of  the  bill  on  Parliament.  As  the  debate  subsequently 
proved,  the  Clemenceau  Ministry,  however,  used  its  in- 
fluence secretly  to  oppose  the  reform  in  question. 

As  a  result  of  this  agitation,  M.  Dessoye,  on  behalf  of 
the  Commission  of  Universal  Suffrage,  laid  a  project  be- 
fore the  Chamber  (30th  of  January,  1919).  Frankly 
a  compromised  measure,  this  project  called  for  the  de- 
partmental scrutin  de  liste;  it  abolished  second  or  sup- 
plementary elections  (used  when  a  candidate  did  not  re- 
ceive a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  the  first).  It  also 
provided  that  ballots  be  supplied  and  distributed  at 
public  expense,  that  there  be  one  deputy  for  every 
75,000  inhabitants  or  major  fraction  therefore,  that  dep- 
uties be  elected  by  a  majority  vote,  as  formerly;  but  in 

162 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

case  no  majority  was  maintained  that  the  seats  be  dis- 
posed of  by  proportional  representation. 

The  de])ate  on  the  })ill  histed  over  a  month, — from 
March  14th  to  April  I8II1.  The  Commission  justified 
the  partial  "proportional  representation"  feature  of  the 
bill  as  the  only  kind  of  project  which  the  Senate  would 
ratify.  However,  to  the  surprise  of  every  one,  this  did 
not  satisfy  the  Chamber.  On  April  8th,  Article  I  of  the 
proposition,  "The  members  of  the  Chamber  are  elected 
by  the  scrutin  de  liste  in  a  single  election,"  was 
debated.  After  the  passage  of  the  first  line,  ending  in 
scrutin  de  liste,  had  been  discussed,  M.  Bracke 
moved  an  amendment  substituting  for  the  words 
of  the  next  line,  "in  a  single  election,"  those  of,  "by 
proportional  representation."  This  three-word  amend- 
ment, rejecting  the  Commission's  compromise  and  in- 
stalling complete  proportional  representation,  was 
adopted  by  a  vote  of  235  to  201.  The  next  day  tlie  in- 
tegral  reform  was  again  voted  for  by  a  majority  of  100. 
Many  felt  that  this  was  a  move  of  the  opponents  of  the 
reform  to  secure  the  adoption  of  a  measure  so  radical 
that  the  Senate  would  kill  it  entirely.  Others  thought, 
however,  that  the  reform  had  at  last  triumphed. 

The  Commission  modified  the  remainder  of  the  bill  in 
accordance  with  the  twice-expressed  desire  for  complete 
proportional  representation.  Opponents  of  the  reform 
obstructed  its  progress,  hoping  to  delay  discussion  until 
after  the  Easter  recess,  which  would  mean  postponing  it 
indefinitely.  Finally,  on  the  15th  of  April,  the  Chamber 
did  another  strange  thing.  Article  XII  was  under  dis- 
cussion, containing  the  actual  application  of  a  complete 
proi)ortional  system,  as  amended  to  meet  the  Chamber's 
desire.  But  I\I.  Bouff andean,  a  Radical,  at  this  point 
introduced  an  amendment  which  almost  identically  re- 

163 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

produced  the  Commission's  original  project  of  partial 
proportional  representation.  Despite  the  vigorous  oppo- 
sition of  M.  Bracke,  the  Chamber  adopted  it  by  a  vote 
of  235  to  177.  After  twice  repudiating  the  Commis- 
sion 's  hybrid  proposition,  it  had  returned  to  it.  This  in- 
decision and  pliability  in  the  hands  of  effusive  leaders, 
by  no  means  increased  the  Chamber's  prestige.  But  it 
■was  characteristically  French. 

These  tactics  were  commented  upon  by  a  clever 
writer,  thus: 

The  Deputies  are  not  partisans  of  the  Dessoj'e  system,  nor 
of  proportional  representation;  neither  do  they  favor  the  scru- 
tin  d'arrondissement,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  who  have 
made  it  a  matter  of  pi'inciple.  The  majority  of  them  wish 
merely  to  be  reelected — and  this  is  the  secret  of  their  Ma- 
chiavellism.  As  they  are  good  ser\'ants  of  the  country,  their 
desire  is  nothing  more  than  patriotic !  ^° 

Another  noticeable  feature  of  the  debate  was  the  part 
M.  Briand  took  in  it ;  espousing  a  reform  for  the  defeat 
of  which  he  was  at  one  time  largely  responsible,  he 
now  made  several  spectacular  addresses  in  its  support. 
On  the  18th  of  April,  M.  Pams,  the  Minister  of  the  In- 
terior, and  M,  Briand  engaged  in  a  lively  tilt,  in  which 
the  latter  accused  the  Government  of  secretly  trying  to 
defeat  the  measure.  After  several  exchanges  of  clever 
repartee,  M.  Briand  appeared  to  emerge  the  victor. 

On  the  18th  of  April  the  bill,  as  amended,  was  passed 
in  the  Chamber  by  a  vote  of  287  to  138.  The  compro- 
mise measure,  calling  for  the  scrutin  de  liste  and  partial 
proportional  representation,  now  w'ent  before  the  Sen- 
ate. Fear  that  this  body,  as  it  had  done  before,  would 
reject  any  measure  embodying  the  principle  of  propor- 

"  Midas,  in  " Sur  kfi  Ciradins,  dans  Ics  Couloirs,"  L'Europo 
Nouvelle,  April   19,   1919. 

164 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

tional  represontation,  was  increased  by  the  appointment 
on  the  15th  of  May,  of  a  commission  headed  by  Senator 
Berard,  a  vigorous  defender  of  the  scrutin  d'arrondisse- 
ment.  It  was  composed  of  twenty-seven  members,  four- 
teen of  whom  were  avowed  opponents  of  tlie  Chamber's 
bill.  AVlien  the  Commission  finally  reported  back  to  the 
Senate  it  was  found  that  it  had  gone  so  far  as  to  admit 
in  principle  the  scrutin  de  liste  and  the  double  election 
feature  in  case  no  one  received  a  majority,  while  it  com- 
pletely rejected  the  principle  of  the  representation  of 
minorities,  even  the  compromise  plan  included  in  the 
Chamber's  bill.  Upon  the  21st  of  June,  however,  M. 
Paul  Strauss  introduced  an  amendment  which  embodied 
in  principle  the  Chamber's  proposition.  The  amended 
bill  differed  from  the  original  one  passed  by  the  Cham- 
ber only  in  the  matter  of  the  public  supply  and  distribu- 
tion of  ballots.  The  Senate  believed  that  candidates 
should  themselves  bear  this  expense.  It  was  carried  by 
a  vote  of  120  against  90.  Upon  Thursday,  June  26, 
this  bill  passed  by  a  vote  of  134  to  0.  Thus,  despite 
the  prophecy  of  M.  Delahaye  that  the  law  meant  "the 
invasion  of  the  Chamber  by  the  Bolsheviki,"  the  Senate 
finally  ratified  this  long-delayed  and  much-desired  re- 
form.      , 

The  Chamber,  upon  the  4th  of  July,  voted  the  first 
four  articles  of  the  Senate  bill.  On  the  7th  it  accepted 
the  entire  proposition  by  a  vote  of  308  to  103. 

The  law  as  finally  promulgated  upon  the  12th  of  July 
provides  (Article  I)  that  the  members  of  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  be  elected  by  the  department  scrutin  de 
liste.  Each  department  (Article  II)  elects  one  deputy 
for  every  75,000  inhabitants  of  French  nationality  (or 
the  major  fraction  thereof).  Each  department  elects 
at  least  three  deputies  upon  a  general  ticket;  and  until 

165 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

a  new  census  is  taken,  it  will  have  the  same  number  as 
it  formerly  elected.  The  department  (Article  III)  is 
the  electoral  district.  When  the  number  of  deputies  to 
elect  is  greater  than  six,  the  department  is  to  be  divided. 
Each  division  will  elect  at  least  three  deputies.  This 
division  will  be  made  by  law.  No  one  can  be  a  candi- 
date (Article  IV)  in  more  than  one  district.  The 
declarations  or  platforms  of  candidates  may  be  collec- 
tive or  individual. 

The  tickets  (Article  V)  will  be  constituted  for  each 
district  by  groups  of  candidates  who  sign  a  duly  legal- 
ized declaration.  A  ticket  cannot  have  a  number  of 
candidates  exceeding  the  number  of  deputies  to  be 
elected  in  the  district.  Any  isolated  candidate  is  con- 
sidered as  forming  a  ticket  alone ;  but  his  declaration 
must  be  signed  by  at  least  100  voters  of  the  district. 
The  "tickets"  (Article  VI)  are  to  be  deposited  at  the 
prefecture  after  the  opening  of  the  electoral  period — at 
least  five  days  before  election  day.  These  tickets  are 
registered  by  the  prefect;  but  those  carrying  more  than 
the  number  of  deputies  to  be  elected,  or  those  carrying 
names  of  candidates  inscribed  upon  another  ticket,  can- 
not be  registered.  A  candidate  inscribed  on  a  ticket 
(Article  VII)  can  only  be  taken  off  of  it  at  his  own  re- 
quest— which  shall  be  made  to  the  prefect  at  least  three 
days  before  the  election.  New  candidates  may  be  in- 
scribed (Article  VIII)  on  any  ticket  at  any  time  up 
to  five  days  previous  to  the  election.  Two  days  before 
the  election  (Article  IX)  the  candidates  will  be, posted 
at  the  different  places  of  election  at  the  expense  of  the 
prefecture. 

Any  candidate  (Article  X)  who  receives  the  absolute 
majority  of  the  votes  cast  is  proclaimed  elected.  If  any 
scats  still  remain,  or  in  case  no  one  receives  an  absolute 

166 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

majority,  the  seats  will  be  disposed  of  by  determining, 
first,  the  electoral  quotient  by  dividing  the  number  of 
voters,  deductions  being  made  for  null  and  blank  bal- 
lots, by  the  number  of  deputies  to  elect.  After  deter- 
mining the  average  number  of  votes  cast  for  each  ticket 
by  dividing  the  total  number  of  votes  which  the  ticket 
received  by  its  candidates,  this  average  is  divided  by  the 
electoral  quotient  to  determine  the  number  of  seata 
which  each  ticket  will  obtain,  if  any.-^    A  single  candi- 

"  The   exact   working   of   this   Electoral   Reform   Bill   is  shown 

by  the  following  hypothetical  election  results  from  the  district 
of  the  Eance : 

Registered  Voters :   72,684.     Voters 63,272 

Blank    or   Canceled    Ballots    3,032 

Actual  Votes  cast   60,240 

Absolute  majority   30,121 

6  deputies  to  elect. 
Quotient:     60,240-^6=10,040. 

List  A  List  B  List  C  List  D 

32,645  18,123  15,247  5,164 

29,827  16,247  14,6291  4,032 

29,640  15,822  12,172  3,292 

25,274  12,659  8,624  1,123 

18,401  8,404  6,018  1,119 

12,524  4,031  5,101                     

148,311     ■  75,286  61,791  14,730 

Average  number  of  votes  for  Ticket  A  (with  six  candidates)  : 

148,311-^6=24,718. 
Average  for  Ticket  B  (with  six  candidates)  : 

75,280-^6—12,547. 
Average  for  Ticket  C   (with  six  candidates)  : 

61,791-^6=10,299. 
Average  for  Ticket  D   (with  five  candidates)  : 

14,730^-5=2,946. 

The  first  candidate  in  Ticket  A  received  32,645,  or  more  than 
the  absolute  majority  of  30,121;  he  is  therefore  elected.  Ticket 
A  is  further  entitled  to  two  more  seats  because  the  quotient  of 
10,040  goes  into  its  average  of  24,718,  twice.  Ticket  B  is  en- 
titled to  one  seat,  because  the  quotient  only  goes  into  its  average 
of  12,547  once.  Ticket  C  is  also  entitled  to  one  seat  for  it 
has  an  average  of  10,299.  Ticket  D  receives  no  seat  for  its 
average  is  only  2,946.     One  seat  still  remains  to  be  disposed  of; 

167 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

daey  (Article  XI),  if  it  does  not  obtain  an  absolute 
majority,  will  not  figure  in  the  division  of  seats  until 
the  candidates  belonging  to  other  tickets  and  having  ob- 
tained more  votes  than  it,  are  proclaimed  elected.  In 
case  of  equality  of  votes  (Article  XII)  the  election  goes 
to  the  oldest  candidate.  If  a  seat  belongs  equally  to 
several  tickets,  it  is  given  to  the  candidate  having  the 
most  votes,  or  in  case  of  equality,  to  the  oldest.  The 
candidate  can  be  declared  elected  only  if  the  number  of 
his  votes  is  superior  to  one  half  of  the  average  number  of 
the  votes  of  the  ticket  of  which  he  is  a  part.  "When  the 
number  of  voters  is  not  greater  (Article  XIII)  than 
half  of  those  registered  or  if  no  ticket  obtains  the  elec- 
toral quotient,  no  candidate  is  declared  elected,  and  a 
new  election  is  called  within  fifteen  days.  If  in  this 
election,  no  ticket  receives  the  electoral  quotient,  the 
seats  are  given  to  the  candidates  who  have  obtained  the 
most  votes. 

A  report  of  the  election  (Article  XIV)  of  each  com- 
mune is  made  in  duplicate,  one  copy  going  to  'the  secre- 
tary of  the  mayor ;  the  other  is  sealed  and  mailed  to  the 
prefect  to  be  turned  over  to  the  Committee  on  Recount 
(Recensement) .  This  Committee  (Article  XV)  is  cre- 
ated in  every  department,  meeting  at  the  chef -lieu  of  the 
department,   in    public,    sitting   at    the    latest   by    the 

and  according  to  the  law,  it  goes  to  the  ticket  having  the  largest 
average,  or  A.     Therefore  there  are  elected: 

Four  candidates  of  Ticket  A 

32,645   (absolute  majority) 

29,827   (quotient) 

29,640   (quotient) 

25,274  (seat  going  to  ticket  having  largest  average) 

One  candidate  of  Ticket  B 

18,12.3   (quotient) 

One  candidate  to  Ticket  C 

15,247   (quotient) 

168 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

Wednesday  f()llowin<i:  tlie  election.  Tliis  Committee  is 
composed  of  the  president  of  the  Civil  Tribunal,  and  the 
four  members  of  the  General  Council  having  served  the 
longest,  or  in  case  of  equality,  being  the  oldest. 

In  case  of  a  vacancy  due  to  any  cause  (Article  XVI), 
an  election  may  be  held  within  a  delay  of  three  months, 
except  in  cases  when  the  vacancy  occurs  within  six 
months  before  the  regular  time  for  the  renewal  of  the 
Chamber.  In  such  a  case  no  special  election  will  be  held. 
The  present  law  (Article  XVIII)  will  apply  to  the  de- 
partments of  Algeria  and  to  the  colonies  which  will  con- 
tinue to  return  their  present  number  of  deputies.  A 
later  laAV  will  determine  the  application  of  the  reform  to 
Alsace  and  Lorraine.  Previous  legislation  contradicting 
the  law  (Article  XIX)  is  declared  void.^^ 


VI 


The  effect  of  partial  proportional  representation  upon 
the  composition  of  the  Chamber  and  indeed  its  effect 
on  French  parties  in  general  will  be  interesting  to 
watch.  During  the  debate  in  the  Chamber  it  was  argued 
that  the  representation  of  minorities  could  be  secured 
only  by  definite  party  groupings.  It  was,  moreover, 
held  that  France,  especially  since  the  Sacred  Union,  had 
no  well-defined  party  system,  and  that,  therefore,  the 
proposed  reform  would  not  succeed. 

"In  the  first  week  of  March,  1920,  the  Commission  of  Uni- 
versal Suffraj^e  examined  the  electoral  law  of  July  12,  1919,  with 
a  view  to  its  amendment.  By  a  vote  of  11  to  3  it  was  decided 
not  to  return  to  the  old  majority  system.  By  a  vote  of  10  to  1 
it  was  decided  to  do  away  with  the  present  partial  system  of 
partial  proportional  representation.  It  is  very  probable  that  the 
Commission  will  eventually  favor  an  integral  system  of  propor- 
tional representation,  entirely  discarding  the  present  compromise. 

169 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

All  indications,  however,  point  to  the  strengthening 
of  parties  by  this  reform.  Certainly  parties,  which 
through  unfortunate  geographic  location  or  dispersion 
of  their  members  have  hitherto  been  excluded  from 
proper  representation,  will  be  strengthened.  Under 
proportional  representation,  it  is  very  probable  that  the 
Right  will  secure  some  representation  from  such  dis- 
tricts, as  the  Sancerrois,  eastern  Nivernais,  and  the 
Morvan,  from  which  the  majority  system  has  hitherto 
excluded  it.  It  is  believed  that  the  possibility  of  m.aking 
every  vote  effective  will  have  the  tendency  to  encourage 
minority  parties,  to  develop  their  organization,  and  to 
bring  party  issues  more  into  prominence. 

The  abolition  of  supplementary  elections  (the  method 
hitherto  employed  in  case  no  cne  received  a  majority) 
will  do  much  toward  breaking  up  party  combinations 
and  "bargains"  on  second  ballots.  As  noted  previously, 
it  was  through  this  means  that  the  Bloc  of  the  Left  so 
long  remained  in  power  and  that  the  Socialists  and 
Radicals  won  so  many  electoral  successes.  For  example, 
in  the  Card,  in  the  Herault,  and  in  the  Haute-Garonne, 
even  the  conservative  parties,  in  case  their  candidate 
was  hopelessly  defeated  at  the  first  election,  threw  their 
votes  to  Socialist  candidates  in  the  second  election  held 
two  weeks  later, — in  order  to  defeat  the  Radicals.  (Thus 
Louis  Bernard,  elected  at  Vigan  as  a  Socialist  by  a  vote 
of  7,125,  received  only  the  votes  of  liis  party  at  the  first 
election,  viz.,  1,749.)  In  other  districts,  such  as  in  the 
Valenciennes,  the  Socialists  have  received  the  help  of 
the  Radicals. 

These  combinations — usually  undesirable  from  the 
standpoint  of  party  integrity — proportional  representa- 
tion and  single  elections  will  do  much  to  overcome.  The 
final  result  of  this  new  law  may  be  a  reduction  of  the 

170 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  AND  THE  "R.  P." 

Socialist  and  Radical  elements  in  the  Chamber.  What- 
ever the  eventual  result,  France  now  has  the  assurance 
that  its  Chamber  of  Deputies  will  more  nearly  corre- 
spond to  popular  sym])alhies  and  that  it  will  be  com- 
posed of  stronger  and  more  representative  forces  than 
has  before  been  possible. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    1919    ELECTIONS 


Nfm^  ne  voulons  pas  la  cnntrc-revolution,  mais  Ic  contraire  de 
la  revolution. — Joseph  de  Maistre. 


The  day  before  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  signed  by 
Germany  (June  27th),  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  pro- 
ceeded to  the  election  of  a  Special  Commission  of  Sixty 
to  examine  the  Treaty.  This  Commission  selected  Rene 
Viviani  as  its  president  and  M.  Barthou  as  its  rappor- 
teur,— two  former  prime  ministers.  Throughout  the 
month  of  July  the  Commission  heard  M.  Clemenceau  and 
other  members  of  the  French  Peace  Delegation  in  defense 
and  in  explanation  of  the  Treaty  clauses.  Finally,  it 
voted  35  to  1  to  approve  it;  on  the  5th  of  August  M. 
Barthou  presented  his  report  to  the  Chamber. 

Opposition  to  the  Treaty  came  from  two  sources:  first, 
the  Socialists;  second,  the  Conservatives.  On  the  15th 
of  July,  the  National  Council  of  the  Socialist  party 
voted,  despite  the  protests  of  such  high-minded  men  as 
Albert  Thomas,  to  instruct  its  deputies  to  vote  against 
ratification.    This  motion  was  passed  by  the  overwhelm- 

'  The  sources  for  this  account  of  the  French  elections  are: 
La  Prcsse  de  Paris  and  Le  Tamps,  for  the  period  covered.  Ac- 
counts ^iven  in  Ij' Europe  NouvcUc,  La  l\cvuc  Polituiuc  ct  Parlc- 
mcntairc,  La  Ecvue  des  Deux  Mondvs,  La  Eevuc  do  Paris,  and  per- 
sonal correspondence,  are  also  used. 

172 


THE  1019  ELECTIONS 

ing  majority  of  1,420  to  54.  The  Socialist  objection  to 
the  Treaty  was  based  upon  its  "imperialistic"  features. 
In  the  debates  in  the  Chaml)er,  Marcel  Seml)at  attacked 
particularly  the  Danzig  settlement,  saying  it  would  al- 
ways be  a  source  of  irritation  between  France  and  Ger- 
many. Jean  Longuet  demanded  the  independence  of 
Ireland,  Egypt,  and  India.  He  took  particular  excep- 
tion to  the  Austrian  settlement  which  forever  separated 
Austria  from  Germany,  unless  the  Allies  expressly  de- 
cided otherwise. 

From  the  other  extreme  opposition  was  nearly  as 
•strong.  It  was  led  by  Louis  Marin  who  insisted  that 
the  dominant  position  held  by  France  at  the  end  of  the 
war,  had  been  bartered  away  needlessly ;  and  that 
France  had  not  even  secured  adequate  "guarantees" 
against  future  attacks.  Maurice  Barres  and  Charles 
Benoist,  conservatives,  expressed  their  regret  that  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  had  not  been  given  to  France, 
while  Franklin  Bouillon  and  Charles  Chaumet  were  es- 
pecially caustic  in  their  denunciation  of  the  Treaty's 
shortcomings. 

Both  M.  Clemcnceau  and  M.  Tardieu  vigorously  de- 
fended the  Treaty  from  the  charge  that  it  failed  to  safe- 
guard France.  Both  pointed  out  that  Ft-ance  had  one 
of  two  choices  before  it  at  the  Conference:  an  alliance 
with  England  and  the  United  States,  or  the  annexation 
of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  The  French  Peace  Dele- 
gation had  believed  that  the  former  was  by  far  the 
preferable. 

But  M.  Barthou  raised  a  point  which  it  was  more  diffi- 
cult for  ]\I.  Clemenceau  to  answer.  What  guarantees 
did  the  treaty  supply  if  tlh'  United  States  Senate  failed 
to  ratify  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant?  M.  Clemen- 
ceau replied  that  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Treaty 

173 


CONTEMPORAEY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

would  function  immediately  after  its  ratificaticn  by 
three  of  the  four  principal  powers,  regardless  of  the 
United  States.  But  a  Socialist  Deputy  pointed  out  very 
keenly  that  if  America  rejected  the  Covenant,  France 
would  be  left  alone  in  a  League  with  those  who  did  not 
believe  in  it.  Furthermore,  there  was  no  indication  that 
America  would  ratify  the  treaty  of  Alliance  with  France 
if  it  refused  to  accept  the  Covenant.  If  it  did  reject  the 
Covenant  but  ratify  the  treaty  of  Alliance,  the  latter 
could  not  function  because  it  was  inextricably  tied  up 
with  the  League  of  Nations.  For  this  reason  M.  Barthou 
suggested  that  the  Chamber  should  change  the  terms 
of  the  Alliance  so  as  to  make  it  completely  independent 
of  the  League. 

The  Prime  IMinister,  however,  vigorously  repulsed  all 
suggestions  as  to  the  amendment  or  ''reservation"  of 
the  Treaty.  He  made  it  clear  that  the  Chamber  had  to 
reject  the  Treaty  ensemhle  or  ratify  it  ensemble,  that 
it  had  to  take  it  or  leave  it  in  the  form  which  he  pre- 
sented it  to  them.  He  made  this  categorical  position  evi- 
dent not  only  upon  the  Barthou  suggestion  as  to  the  Al- 
liance but  also  upon  the  Lefevre  motion  demanding 
complete  German  disarmament.  In  an  energetic  speech 
before  the  Chamber,  M.  Clemenceau  declared  that  he 
would  tolerate  no  motion  wliich  it  would  be  necessary  to 
refer  to  the  Allies  for  approval  before  the  Treaty  was 
definitely  ratified.  The  Chamber  amenably  followed  his 
direction  by  rejecting  the  Lefevre  motion,  on  Septem- 
ber 30th,  by  a  vote  of  262  to  188.  This  was  in  striking 
contrast  to  the  tactics  employed  in  the  United  States 
Senate  shortly  afterward. 

The  Chamber  was  by  no  means  satisfied  with  the 
Treaty  from  tlio  stand])()int  of  reparation  and  of  mili- 

174 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

tary  guarantees.-  But  it  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  Prime  Minister  had  produced  the  best  possible  treaty 
which  a  strange  combination  of  circumstances  had  per- 
mitted. Consequently,  it  ratified  the  Treaty  on  the  2nd 
of  October  by  the  strong  majority  of  372  to  53.  P^'orty- 
nine  Unified  Socialists  voted  against  it,  as  also  did 
Franklin  Bouillon  and  Louis  JNlarin.  There  were 
seventy-three  abstentions,  thirty-three  of  whom  were 
Unified  Socialists,  including  Albert  Thomas  and  Alexan- 
dre Varenne.  Eighteen  Radicals  and  about  half  a  dozen 
Conservatives  refused  to  vote.  On  October  11th  the  Sen- 
ate unanimously  ratified  the  Treaty,  and  on  the  follow- 
ing day  the  President  of  the  Republic  promulgated  its 
ratification. 

The  opposition  to  the  Treaty  therefore  assumed  nearly 
the  same  alignment  as  had  the  former  opposition  to  the 
war;  that  is,  it  was  a  question  of  the  Socialists  versus 
the  patriotic  parties.  The  Treaty  vote  added  another 
count  in  the  indictment  against  the  "Unifies";  it  pro- 
vided one  of  the  issues  which  the  November  election 
was  called  upon  to  settle.  As  for  the  conservative  oppo- 
nents of  the  Treatj^,  they  were  insignificantly  few.  Their 
opposition  did  not  assume  party  dimensions ;  the  issue 
created  by  their  rejection  of  the  Treaty  was  therefore 
largely  a  personal  one  between  each  conservative  and 
his  constituency.  There  were,  then,  three  clear-cut  is- 
sues before  the  voters :  The  first  was  that  of ,  liolshe- 
vism  (outlined  at  the  Socialist  Piaster  congress)  ;''  the 
second  was  that  of  the  Clemenceau  Treaty,  as  just  indi- 
cated; the  third  was  that  of  State  participation  in 
industry.*  ' 

'See  pp.  443  ff.,  452  ff. 

•See  pp.  112-128. 

*  For  a  discussion  of  this  issue,  see  pp.  302-339. 

175 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 


II 

Two  national  party  conventions  of  especial  interest 
were  held  in  the  month  of  September.  The  first  of  these 
was  held  by  the  Unified  Socialists,  beginning  on  the  11th 
of  September ;  450  delegates,  representing  104,000  mem- 
bers, were  present.  The  chief  purpose  of  tliis  congress 
was  primarily  to  effect  a  reconciliation  of  the  old  ma- 
jority with  the  extremists,  which  the  Easter  congress 
had  failed  to  bring  about.  Many  of  the  old  majority 
had  voted  for  military  credits  in  express  contradiction 
of  the  decision  reached  at  the  Easter  congress,  and  some 
of  them  had  also  declared  their  intention  of  voting  for 
the  Peace  Treaty.  The  extremist  elements  insisted  on  the 
exclusion  of  these  deliberate  violators  of  party  law  from 
the  party.  But  those  more  interested  in  winning  the 
November  elections  than  in  purifying  party  ranks,  cau- 
tioned a  more  moderate  policy.  In  this  they  were  suc- 
cessful. By  a  vote  passed  by  1,427  to  490,  the  Congress 
decided  merely  to  censure  or  "blame"  those  who  had 
hitherto  violated  party  discipline.  With  this  moral 
punishment,  they  would  be  allowed  to  remain.  Conse- 
quently, the  Socialist  press  proclaimed  that  party 
"unity"  had  been  preserved  and  that  the  party  would 
enter  the  elections  with  a  compact  front.  A  motion  of 
equal  significance  was  passed  by  a  vote  of  1,163  to  133, 
It  forbade  any  coalition  whatsoever  of  Socialist  candi- 
dates with  candidates  of  even  the  most  advanced  bour- 
geois parties.  This  obviously  included  the  Radicals. 
As  to  the  future,  the  party  satisfied  its  qualms  of  con- 
science by  repeating  its  frequently  violated  determina- 
tion to  exclude  automatically  any  Socialist  representa- 
tive who  again  voted  military  credits. 

176 


THE  1019  ELECTIONS 

The  snbsecinoiit  action  of  tho  Socialist  Fodoration  of 
the  Seine  completely  offset  this  concession  to  the  old 
majority  and  definitely  disrupted  the  ranks  of  the  So- 
cialist jiarty.  The  Federation  voted  to  exclude  from  a 
Socialist  ticket  of  candidates  to  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties any  member  of  the  party  who  refused  to  give  the 
proper  "revolutionary  guarantees."  Naturally  this  was 
unsatisfactory  to  the  old  majority.  It  was  a  poor  con- 
cession which  permitted  them  to  remain  within  the 
party  but  which  refused  to  allow  them  to  be  Socialist 
candidates  for  office.  Unsuccessful  efforts  were  made 
by  Pierre  Renaudel  and  others  to  change  the  Federa- 
tion's decision;  but  on  October  26th  it  reaffirmed  its 
intention  to  keep  the  ex-majoritaires  from  its  tickets  in 
the  coming  elections.  As  a  result,  three  elements  of  the 
"Unifies"  revolted  and  formed  a  party  of  their  own, 
known  as  the  Dissident  Socialists.  These  elements  in- 
cluded the  old  ex-ma jorltaires  who  had  voted  for  military 
credits,  some  of  those  who  had  refused  to  vote  against  the 
Peace  Treaty,  and  others  who  objected  to  the  presence  of 
such  men  as  Jean  Longuet  and  Jacques  Sadoul  upon  a 
Socialist  ticket.  Jacques  Sadoul  was  a  former  French 
officer  w'ho  had  been  convicted  by  a  council  of  war  for 
desertion  and  for  giving  intelligence  to  the  enemy.  He 
had  been  sentenced  to  death ;  but  so  far  he  had  escaped 
this  fate  by  seeking  employment  with  the  Ukrainian 
Bolsheviki.  About  twenty-five  or  thirty  deputies  joined 
this  organization ;  and  it  included  such  men  as  Veber, 
Aubriot,  Groussier  and  Rozier.  The  creation  of  this  in- 
surgent group  definitely  disrupted  the  ranks  of  the  So- 
cialist party  as  those  who  had  watched  the  growth  of 
the  differences  within  it,  had  prophesied.  However, 
the  new  group  did  not  renounce  the  theories  of  Social- 
ism for  it  proclaimed  its  adherence  to  the  principles  laid 

177 


CONTEMPORAEY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

down  in  tlie  International  Congresses  of  Amsterdam  of 
1904  and  of  Lucerne  in  1919.^ 

Upon  the  21st  of  September  the  Radical  party  held 
their  convention  in  Paris.  The  principal  matter  of  de- 
liberation was  the  reconstruction  of  the  old  Bloc.  At 
the  "petit  congres"  in  July,  a  strong  element  in  the 
party  had  been  resolutely  opposed  to  association  with 
the  Right,  and  had  favored  a  rapprochement  with  the 
Unified  Socialists ;  it  had  demanded  a  revival  of  the  old 
battle  cry  of  pas  d'enncmis  a  gauche.  But  the  Bracke 
motion,  passed  at  the  Socialist  congress  in  September, 
condemned  the  Radicals  as  much  as  any  other  party. 
Consequently  it  definitely  stopped  the  efforts  of  the 
Radicals  to  align  themselves  with  their  more  advanced 
brethren.  The  only  other  alternative  before  the  party 
was  to  enter  an  alliance  with  bourgeois  elements.  The 
decision  was  finally  reached  to  enter  into  an  entente 
with  Republican  Socialists  and  other  Republicans  who 
believed  in  anticlerical  legislation.  With  timeworn  in- 
sistence, tlie  Radicals  still  harped  upon  clericalism  which 
to  them  seemed  to  be  a  greater  enemy  than  Bolshevism. 
By  "other  Republicans,"  they  meant  the  Democratic 
Alliance.  They  expressly  excluded  the  new  party  of 
the  New  Democracy,  and  tacitly  excluded  the  Republican 
Federation  or  Progressists,  Finally,  a  common  program 
for  this  "cartel,"  as  it  was  called,  was  drawn  up. 

Ill 

The  movement  for  a  coalition  of  parties  against  the 
Socialists,  as  noted  in  a  previous  chapter,  was  started 

"April  8,  3920  {Tcmj^s,  April  9),  those  elements  orpfanized  a 
new  Socialist  party,  drawing  up  a  constitution,  etc.,  and  electing 
Paul   Aubriot  as  president. 

178 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

early  in  the  year  of  1919.  The  Democratic  Alliance  as- 
sumed from  the  first  tlie  leadership  in  tliis  movement. 
But  the  personal  hostility  of  ]\I.  Chaumet,  who  was  in 
charge  of  the  Alliance 's  propaganda,  toward  M.  Cleraen- 
ceau  was  somewhat  damaging  to  the  Alliance's  prestige. 
M.  Chaumet  was  so  open  in  his  criticism  of  M.  Clemen- 
ceau  that  in  September,  Andre  Tardieu  and  M.  Ignace, 
both  member^  of  M.  Clemenceau's  Government,  resigned 
their  membership  in  the  Democratic  Alliance.  The 
executive  committee  of  the  latter  announced  that  M. 
Chaumet 's  opinion  was  not  that  of  the  party,  but  that 
it  did  not  believe  in  controlling  the  individual  opinions 
of  its  members.  But  despite  this  explanation,  the  party 
lost  adlierents. 

On  the  5th  of  October  a  meeting  was  called  by  the 
National  Socialist  party  to  organize  a  Bloc  of  all  Repub- 
licans against  the  Unified  Socialists.  Adolphe  Carnot, 
President  of  the  Alliance,  presided  at  this  meeting.  The 
Radicals  were  not  represented,  obviously  because  of  the 
presence  of  elements  from  the  Right,  such  as  the  Liberal 
Action  party.  The  assemblage  adopted  the  following 
motion : 

Considering  that  for  the  reconstruction  of  France,  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  advances  of  the  Republic  and  for  the 
jiroteetion  of  all  public  liberties,  it  is  necessary  for  every  citizen 
to  unite  atjainst  Bolshevism  represented  by  the  Unified  Socialist 
party,  this  ^atherino;  aflirms  the  necessity  of  establishing  a 
sini]cle  Republican  ticket,  composed  of  upright,  energetic  and 
competent  citizens,  resolved  to  assure  social  peace  by  the 
association  of  Labor  and  Capital,  by  the  development  of  eco- 
nomic prosperity  of  the  country,  and  by  the  grandeur  of 
Republican  France. 

The  Republican  Federation,  or  the  Progressists,  ad- 
hered to  this  newly  created  "Bloc  National  Republicain" 

179 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

upon  the  14th  of  October.  Such  was  the  beginning  of 
the  bourgeois  coalition  against  the  Socialists. 

Meanwhile  additional  complications  arose  on  account 
of  Radical  obstinacy.  The  first  split  arose  over  the 
"cartel"  known  as  the  National  Union  of  Republicans, 
to  which  the  Radical  Congress  of  September  21st  had 
agreed.  The  Democratic  Alliance  insisted  that  the  Rad- 
icals permit  the  Republican  Federation  to  join  it.  Many 
Radicals  were  bitterly  opposed  to  association  with  these 
Progressists;  for  the  original  Bloc  of  1902  had  been 
formed  expressly  against  them.  However,  in  view  of  the 
Socialist  peril,  the  moderates  in  the  party  agreed  to  a 
compromise.  It  was  finally  agreed  that  Adolphe  Carnot, 
President  of  the  Alliance,  would  personally  stand  re- 
sponsible, over  his  signature,  for  every  member  of  the 
Republican  Federation  that  desired  to  join  the  "cartel." 
Upon  these  terms  the  Radicals  promised  their  adherence. 

Sometime  in  October,  by  a  process  which  press  dis- 
patches refuse  to  reveal,  this  "cartel"  was  merged  into 
the  National  Bloc.  The  latter  organization  had  become 
well-organized  under  the  Presidency  of  M.  Carnot.  The 
members  of  this  Bloc  in  the  department  of  the  Seine 
were :  The  Republican  Democratic  Alliance,  the  Repub- 
lican Federation,  the  National  Republican  Union  (which 
seems  to  be  the  old  "cartel"),  the  Federation  of  Repub- 
lican Democrats,  the  Liberal  Action  party,  the  National 
Socialist  party,  the  Civic  League,  the  Democratic 
League  of  Moral  and  Social  Action,  and  the  Radicals. 

The  program  of  the  National  Republican  Bloc  called 
for: 

(1)  Energetic  opposition  to  Bolshevism,  Civil  War  or 
class  dictatorship; 

(2)  Government  and  parliamentary  reform  to  assure 
the  separation  of  powers,  ministerial  stability,  and  the 

180 


THE  1919.  ELECTIONS 

employment  of  technical  experts  in  the  administrative 
services ; 

(3)  The  reorganization  of  public  sei-vices; 

(4)  Sliort-term  military  service  and  the  democratic 
organization  of  the  national  defense; 

(5)  Liberty  of  conscience,  maintenance  of  local  laws 
and  the  mutual  respect  of  beliefs ; 

(6)  Encouragement  of  private  initiative  and  the  asso- 
ciation of  labor  and  capital; 

(7)  The  right  to  organize  and  the  extension  of  the 
civil  capacity  of  syndicates ; 

(8)  Social  reforms — development  of  social  insurance 
and  cheap  housing; 

(9)  The  fulfillment  of  engagements  toward  war  vet- 
erans and  the  inhabitants  of  invaded  regions. 

IV 

The  French  legislature  came  to  the  end  of  an  extra- 
legally  long  existence  upon  the  19th  of  October,  1919. 
From  that  time  until  the  16th  of  November,  the  date 
finally  set  for  the  legislative  elections,  domestic  politics 
occupied  public  interest.  Twenty  days  before  the  16th, 
tlie  electoral  period  was  officially  opened;  after  that 
date  nominating  petitions  could  be  filed  with  the  proper 
authorities.  Also  certain  restrictions  upon  public  as- 
semblies and  advertising  were  removed.  Five  days  be- 
fore the  16(11  the  filing  period  came  to  an  end.*' 

'  One  of  the  interesting  things  attendant  upon  French  elec- 
tions is  the  limitation  on  advertising.  Originally  (by  a  lavv'  of 
July  29,  1881),  candidates  might  paste  bills  upon  every  kind  of 
public  building  and  edifice,  etc.,  except  churches.  During  every 
electoral  period,  the  artistic  monuments  of  the  French  Republic 
used  to  be  marred  ■uith  electoral  ndvertisements.  By  a  law 
passed  in  1902,  the  mayois  were  empowered  to  prevent  the  past- 
ing of  bills  on  monuments  and  buildings  of  an  artistic  character. 
Another  law  passed  in  the  same  year  prohibited  any  campaign 

181 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Scenes  of  disorder  were  numerous  and  undignified 
during  the  electoral  period.  The  Socialists  even  had  the 
audacity  to  break  up  meetings  of  the  National  Bloc  by 
cat-calls  of  the  "Social  Revolution"  and  "Vive  Lenin 
and  the  Social  Republic!"  At  a  meeting  in  the  Passy 
quarter,  held  on  November  13th,  when  a  Bloc  candidate, 
M,  Evain,  referred  to  the  "wave  of  idleness"  which 
was  overflooding  Paris,  workingmen  in  the  balcony  be- 
came violent.  They  flung  chairs  and  other  missiles  at 
the  stage  and  succeeded  completely  in  dispersing  the 
meeting  as  well  as  breaking  a  few  bones  of  those  par- 
ticipating in  it.  Upon  the  same  day  an  attempt  was 
made  to  assassinate  Georges  IManclel,  who  had  been  the 
secretary  of  M.  Clemenceau ;  and  who  was  a  candidate 
for  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  from  Bordeaux. 

The  elections  were  also  featured  by  the  alleged  at- 
tempt of  the  Socialists  to  close  down  every  newspaper 
in  Paris,  excepting  their  own.  This  was  done  by  means 
of  a  printers'  strike,  and  as  a  result  practically  every 
bourgeois  paper  in  Paris  was  forced  to  suspend  publi- 
cation. The  Socialists  obviously  hoped  to  get  a  monop- 
oly upon  publicity  by  this  move.  But  they  were  de- 
feated by  the  fusion  of  fifty  of  the  Paris  papers  into 

advertising  which  made  use  of  the  colors  of  the  French  flag — 
red,  white  and  blue.  Finally,  a  sweeping  reform  was  made  by 
a  law  passed  March  20,  1914,  whose  purpose  was  to  establish 
complete  equality  between  candidates  lor  office,  so  far  as  ad- 
vertising was  concerned.  This  law  strictly  limited  the  amount 
of  advertising  and  bill-posting  to  special  emplacements  set  aside 
for  that  purpose  by  the  municipal  authorities.  Tlius  each  can- 
didate or  ticket  was  granted  the  same  amount  of  space.  The 
number  of  these  boards  st>t  aside  for  advertising  was  strictly 
limited:  five  in  communes  having  500  voters  or  less;  ten  in  other 
communes,  plus  one  for  every  ;?,000  voters  or  fraction  greater 
than  2,000,  in  communes  having  more  than  5,000  voters.  Any 
bill  posting  done  outside  of  these  public  bill-boards  is  pro- 
hibited under  penalty  of  fine.  See  Duguit,  Manuel  de  Droit 
Constitutionncl,  371-72. 

182 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

one  edition,  known  as  La  Presse  de  Paris,  the  first  num- 
ber of  which  appeai'cd  on  November  11.  This  combina- 
tion paper  appeared  both  morning  and  evening.  About 
half  of  it  was  given  over  to  editorial  expression.  Each 
of  the  contributing  papers  alternated  in  writing  edi- 
torials, a  dozen  or  fifteen  appearing  daily.  All  but 
three  of  the  papers  which  combined  in  La  Presse  de 
Paris  supported  the  National  Bloc.  Those  who  opposed 
it  were  La  Democratte  NouvcUe  and  L' Action  Frangaise, 
which  supported  their  respective  parties,  and  La  Voix 
Nationale,  which  leaned  toward  the  Royalists.  On 
election  day  La  Presse  de  Paris  had  a  circulation  of 
6,000,000. 

At  no  time  during  the  campaign  was  there  any  doubt 
as  to  the  result  of  the  election.  The  Socialists  them- 
selves seemed  to  realize  that  their  doctrine  of  the  Social 
Revolution  was  completely  unacceptable  to  the  greater 
part  of  the  nation.  Consequently  their  campaign  em- 
phasized present  economic  distress  and  the  necessity 
for  immediate  reform. 

For  example,  one  flaming  document  asked  ''citizens" 
to  vote  for  Socialist  candidates  for  these  reasons: 

In  unitedly  supporting,  as  so  many  of  you  are,  the  pro- 
gram of  the  Socialist  party  which  represents  your  aspirations 
and  your  class 'interests,  you  not  only  will  support  candidates 
ready  to  struggle  in  your  name: 

For  the  Maintenance  of  the  Eight-Houb  Day  and  the 
Right  to  Organize; 

For  the  Harmonizing  op  Political  Institutions  with 
the  New  Economic  Necessities; 

For  the  Taking  Over,  for  the  Benefit  of  the  Nation, 
OP  all  the  Great  Systems  of  Transport,  of  Insurance,  of 
Great  Steel  Factories,  Etc.; 

For  a  Single  Service  op  National  Education  Gratu- 
itously Accessible  at  Every  Stage; 

183 


CO'NTEMPORAKY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

For  Universal  Disarmament  of  Which  the  Disarma- 
ment OF  Germany  Must  be  the  Preface; 

But  you  will  have  done  much  more: 

You  will  have  responded  by  your  own  progi'ess  to  the  prog- 
ress of  your  brothers  of  labor  throughout  the  civilized  world. 

You  will  have  struck  at  the  roots  of  a  regime  which,  resting 
upon  the  antagonism  of  competing  interests,  is  only  able  to 
maintain  war  as  a  permanent  state. 

You  will  have  contributed  to  establish  The  True  Republic 
in  which  a  pretended  political  equality  will  not  be  condemned 
as  a  falsehood  by  economic  inequalities. 

You  will  have  assured  The  Disappearance  of  Classes,  and 
by  this  very  fact,  you  will  have  established  conditions  of  con- 
stant peace  between  individuals  and  between  nations. 

Such  a  manifesto  could  have  emanated  from  the  Radi- 
cals as  well  as  from  the  Socialists.  Uniquely  Socialist 
theories  were  veiled  under  insignificant  catchwords  as 
"The  True  Republic."  Demands  for  complete  revolu- 
tion, so  insistently  urged  at  party  congresses,  were  now 
noticeable  by  their  absence.^  Moreover,  many  Socialist 
Deputies  carried  on  their  campaign  upon  a  nationalistic 
platform.  Despite  the  party's  official  attitude  toward 
the  war,  many  candidates  openly  supported  the  Allied 
cause.  So  in  reality  the  Socialists  acknowledged  defeat 
from  the  beginning. 

Aristide  Briand,  one  of  the  most  outstanding  figures 
in  French  political  life,  played  a  very  disappointing 
part  in  the  election  campaign.  Naturally  M.  Briand  has 
I)olitical  ambitions.  But  at  the  same  time  he  is  a  true 
patriot  and  an  able  leader.  As  Prime  IMinister  upon 
six  different  occasions  he  has  shown  the  highest  type 

'"As  a  matter  of  fact,  Socialist  deputies  would  obtain  very 
few  votes  if  they  did  not  manage  to  convince  the  general  public 
that  they  are  very  reasonable  people,  great  enemies  of  the  old 
practices  of  bloody  men,  and  solely  occupied  in  meditating  on  the 
jthilosopliy  of  future  law."  Georges  Sorel,  lic/lcctions  on 
Violence,  107. 

184 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

of  statcsmaiisliip.  lie  exhibited  his  great  power  in  the 
conciliatory  i)art  he  played  in  the  struggle  with  the 
Church  in  1905-1907.  He  frequently  attacked  the  Clem- 
enceau  IMinistiy  during  the  annistice,  figuring  promi- 
nently in  the  debates  on  electoral  reform,  on  woman 
suffrage  and  on  the  eight-hour  day.  Despite  the 
shadow  which  rests  upon  his  last  ]\Iinistry  on  account  of 
the  Greek  fiasco,  he  remains  a  powerful  leader  at  the 
Palais  Bourbon. 

At  the  end  of  the  w^ar  M.  Briand  realized  the  necessity 
of  organizing  a  great  Republican  party  to  fight  social 
disorder  and  monarchical  reaction.  It  seems  that  he  was 
trjang  to  resume  the  work  he  started  with  the  Federa- 
tion of  the  Left  in  1914.  In  August,  1919_,  he  made  a 
speech  at  St.  Etienne  which  was  so  widely  misinter- 
preted that  it  completely  deprived  him  of  further  lead- 
ership in  a  bourgeois  coalition.  In  this  speech  he  said 
the  time  had  come  to  put  an  end  to  the  Sacred  Union, 
because  it  had  contained  both  Royalists  and  Socialists 
who  were  avowed  enemies  of  the  Republic — now  that 
the  war  was  over  Republicans  should  rid  themselves  of 
their  temporary  bedfellows.  Furthermore,  the  contin- 
uance of  the  Sacred  Union  would  mean  necessarily 
vague  programs  and  the  submersion  of  the  real  issues 
before  the  country.  Therefore  he  favored  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  great  Republican  party  upon  definite, 
clear-cut  issues.  Objecting  to  the  principles  laid  doAvn 
in  this  speech,  M.  Jonnart,  ex-Governor  General  of 
Algeria,  engaged  in  a  lively  debate  with  M.  Briand 
in  the  columns  of  Le  Temps;  ^  he  interpreted  M. 
Briand 's  remarks  as  a  desire  to  hold  himself  aloof  from 
a  Republican  coalition  against  the  Bolsheviki.  This 
obviously  was  not  M.  Briand 's  meaning;  but,  neverthe- 

"  Letters  published  iu  Le  Temps,  August  25,  1919. 

185 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

less,  he  found  moderates  turning  away  from  his  leader- 
ship. 

The  ascendancy  of  M.  Briand  was  also  prevented  by 
the  fact  that  he  is  a  Socialist  in  doctrine.  It  will  be 
recalled  that  he  was  one  of  the  original  members  of  the 
Republican  Socialist  party.  Although  he  and  his  party 
differ  completely  with  the  Unified  Socialists  upon  the 
class  struggle,  he  believes  in  increased  goyernment  own- 
ership and  interference  in  private  industry.  Upon  Oc- 
tober 31st  he  made  a  speech  at  Nantes  in  which  he  out- 
lined his  platform  of  political  and  religious  reforms. 
Le  Temps  afterwards  inquired  why  he  did  not  definitely 
disclose  his  plan  of  economic  reconstruction.  Did  M. 
Briand  believe  in  an  extension  of  State  Socialism  or  did 
he  believe  in  the  restoration  of  private  initiative?  The 
natural  fear  that  M.  Briand  was  a  collectivist  deprived 
him  of  the  support  of  those  opposed  to  the  increase  of 
the  industrial  power  of  the  State.  As  for  the  Radicals, 
they  are  INI.  Briand 's  most  bitter  enemy  because  he  has 
preached  a  policy  of  reconciliation  with  the  Church  for 
many  years.  Naturally  the  Unified  Socialists  detest 
him.  So  this  statesman  found  himself  not  socialist 
enough  for  the  Socialists,  not  radical  enough  for  the 
Radicals,  and  not  conservative  enough  for  the  Con- 
servatives. M.  Clemenceau's  popularity  added  to  the 
almost  tragic  isolation  in  which  M.  Briand  was  placed. 
However,  M.  Briand  proved  his  attachment  to  the  Na- 
tional Bloc  by  refusing  to  run  on  a  ticket  from  liis  home 
district  in  the  Loire  because  it  excluded  members  of  the 
Democratic  Alliance.  But  he  was  nominated  on  a  ticket 
from  the  Lower  Loire,  and  elected  to  the  Chamber.  His 
victory  was  one  of  personality  and  not  of  leadersliip.  He 
goes  back  to  the  Chamber  a  free  lance,  and  without  an 
organized  following. 

186 


THE  I'JJ'J  ELECTIONS 


Although  every  sign  pointed  to  the  overwhelming  vic- 
tory of  the  National  Bloc,  it  by  no  means  united  every 
bourgeois  party  against  the  Socialists.  The  first  in- 
surgent was  the  Republican  Committee  of  Commerce 
and  Industry  which,  shortly  after  the  Bloc's  formation, 
refused  to  join  it  because  of  the  presence  of  the  Radicals. 
The  Committee  implied  an  unwillingness  to  associate 
itself  with  any  party  proclaiming  the  doctrine  of  State 
Socialism.  The  next  faction  to  withdraw  was  the  New 
Democracy  party,  headed  by  Lysis.  This  party  stated 
with  poorly  feigned  self-interest,  since  it  had  no  repre- 
sentatives in  the  Chamber,  that  the  Bloc  was  merely  a 
device  to  secure  the  reelection  of  deputies  whose  incom- 
petence had  been  repeatedly  proved.  This  party  placed 
tickets  in  three  out  of  the  four  districts  in  Paris.  Among 
its  candidates  w^ere  Andre  Cheradame  and  Victor  Cam- 
bon.  The  party  was  successful  in  polling  a  total  vote 
of  only  about  22,000,  and  it  did  not  win  a  single  seat 
in  the  Chamber. 

Thirdly,  the  Royalists  refused  to  join  the  Bloc — or 
rather,  they  were  not  invited  to  join  it  because  of  their 
avowed  hostility  to  the  Republic.  Consequently  L' Action 
FranQaise  placed  tickets  in  every  one  of  the  districts 
in  Paris — for  the  first  time  in  its  history.  It  polled  about 
40,000  votes,  and  it  succeeded  in  electing  Leon  Daudet, 
one  of  the  editors  of  L' Action  Franqaise,  to  the  Chamber, 

A  fourth  opponent  to  the  Bloc  was  found  in  a  few 

Catholics  who  believed   that  the  anticlericalism   of  the 

Radicals  was  a  greater  enemy  than  the  Bolshevism  of 

-  the  Socialists.     Happily  the  majority  of  the  Catholics 

did  not  openly  harp  upon  the  clerical  issue.     But  La 

187 


CONTE]\rPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Croix,  the  leading  clerical  journal,  illustrated  its  re- 
ligious bias  by  demanding  "pas  de  cartel"  with  can- 
didates who  did  not  promise  to  work  for  the  modifica- 
tion of  existing  clerical  legislation.  However,  this  atti- 
tude was  offset  by  such  pastoral  letters  as  that  from 
Mgr,  Amette,  archbishop  of  Paris,  dated  October  31, 
1919.  It  advised  Catholic  voters  that  it  was  better  to 
vote  for  candidates  from  whom  useful  service  to  the 
country  could  be  expected,  although  they  did  not  prom- 
ise to  satisfy  Catholic  demands — than  for  others  whose 
platform  might  be  more  "perfect,  but  whose  defeat 
would  more  certainly  run  the  risk  of  opening  the  door 
to  the  enemies  of  religion  and  of  social  order"; — a  ref- 
erence to  the  Unified  Socialists. 

A  very  interesting  feature  of  French  elections  is  the 
part  played  by  the  Catholic  clergy  in  advising  their 
parishioners  how  to  vote.  With  few  exceptions,  Catho- 
lics receive  pastoral  letters  which  lay  down  the  prin- 
ciples which  should  guide  them  in  the  exercise  of  their 
electoral  duties.  Many  of  these  principles  are  of  com- 
mon morality;  others  are  strictly  clerical.  The  whole 
spirit  of  the  letters  is  naturally  directed  toward  in- 
fluencing elections  so  that  the  "legitimate  interests"  of 
the  Church  shall  not  be  harmed.  The  Catholic  clergy 
apparently  feel  it  a  divinely  imposed  duty  to  guide  po- 
litical thought  from  a  religious  point  of  view. 

The  final  bourgeois  opponents  of  the  Bloc  were  odds 
and  ends  of  "dissident"  groups.  Some  were  opponents 
of  M.  Clemenceau,  such  as  Gustave  Tery,  editor  of 
L'CEuvre.  Others  were  Radical  Socialists  who  opposed 
association  with  the  parties  of  the  Right.  Thus  the 
Radical  Socialist  group  of  the  Radical  Federation  of  the 
Seine  on  November  24th  denounced  "the  treason  of  the 
Radicals  who,  under  cover  of  the  National  Bloc,  have 

188 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

become  the  accomplices  of  the  worst  reaction."  They 
demanded  the  restoration  of  the  old  Bloc  of  the  Left. 
Other  dissidents  were  Republican  Socialists  such  as 
Paul  Painleve,  IM.  Clemenceau's  predecessor  as  Prime 
Minister.  He  insisted  on  placing  tickets  in  the  field 
against  those  of  the  National  Bloc;  and  he  was  responsi- 
ble for  splitting  the  vote  of  the  Bloc  in  Paris  between 
three  tickets,  upon  which  such  men  as  General  Sarrail 
and  Professor  Aulard  ran.  Much  sympathy  has  been 
expressed  in  America  for  M.  Painleve  because  of  his  de- 
feat (his  defeat  is  by  no  means  certain,  for  the  Com- 
mission on  Recount  decided  to  refer  his  seat  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  which  was  convened  in  extraor- 
dinary session  on  December  8  for  decision).  But  if  M. 
Painleve  had  entered  heartily  into  the  National  Bloc 
instead  of  doing  everything  he  could  to  oppose  its  suc- 
cess, he  doubtless  would  have  been  returned  to  the 
Chamber  without  a  question.^ 

These  examples  will  show  that  the  bourgeoisie  were 
by  no  means  solidly  united  against  the  Socialists.  In 
Paris  alone,  ten  different  tickets  appeared  upon  the  bal- 
lot. In  the  departments  the  confusion  was  even  worse. 
Here  party  coalitions  usually  did  not  exist.  Usually 
the  Liberal  Action  party  would  run  a  separate  ticket; 
sometimes  it  would  be  the  Democratic  Alliance  and  more 
often,  the  Radicals  who  refused  to  combine.  Programs 
of  the  widest  variance  were  announced  by  those  depart- 
ments in  which  hlocs  could  be  effected.  Thus  the  Repub- 
lican Union  of  the  Isere  was  so  conservative  that  it 
asked  for  the  resumption  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
Pope,  repeal  of  anti-Catholic  legislation,  and  the  pro- 
portional division  of  school  funds.     These  were  distinc- 

"  The  Chamber  of  Deputies  declared  M.  Painleve  legally  elected 
on  January  23,  1920. 

189 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tively   Catholic   measiures  to  which   no   Radical  would 
agree. 

In  other  words,  the  coalition  activities  in  the  Novem- 
ber election  completely  bore  out  the  oft-repeated  accusa- 
tions against  the  lack  of  French  organization.  These 
activities  were  totally  decentralized.  The  National  Bloc 
in  Paris  maintained  no  control  over  the  few  Mocs  estab- 
lished throughout  the  provinces.  In  fact,  it  was  unable 
to  create  them  in  most  departments  on  account  of  local 
disagreements  among  parties.  So  the  attempt  to  fuse 
all  bourgeois  parties  against  the  Unified  Socialists  was 
not  so  successful  and  the  fusion  was  not  so  complete 
as  both  the  French  and  American  press  reported.  It 
was  not  as  narrow  and  it  did  not  function  as  well  as 
the  Sacred  Union.  The  reason  for  this  was  quite  evi- 
dent :  the  menace  of  Bolshevism  was  by  no  means  as  real 
to  France  as  the  menace  of  Germany  had  been.^*'  There 
was  no  fear  of  Bolshevist  invasion.  If  Bolshevism  should 
win  it  would  be  a  purely  moral  victory,  for  even  if  So- 
cialist majorities  were  returned  to  the  Chamber,  every 
Frenchman  knew  that  Soviet  methods  would  never  be 
instituted.  The  bourgeois  character  of  many  of  the  So- 
cialist candidates  was  an  eloquent  testimony  to  that. 

VI 

Very  oddly,  one  of  the  strongest  factors  in  bringing 
about  the  formation  of  the  National  Bloc  was  the  Elec- 
toral Law  of  July,  1919.     Under  the  provisions  of  this 

'"Voting  in  this  election  was  not  as  heavy  as  it  was  represented 
to  be.  In  the  first  district  of  Paris,  for  exami)le,  there  were 
68,000  abstentions  out  of  260,000  registered;  in  the  second  dis- 
trict, there  were  53,000  abstentions  out  of  221,000  registered;  in 
the  third  district  there  were  G4,0()0  abstentions  out  of  254,000; 
and  in  tho  fourth  district  102,000  abstentions  out  of  380,000 
registered. 

190 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

law,  the  bourp:oois  jiartics  were  oblif^cd  to  unite,  if  the 
compact  and  well-disciplined  organization  of  the  Unified 
Socialists  was  not  to  win. 

For  example,  if  the  National  Bloc  in  Paris  should 
muster  92,000  votes  and  if  the  Socialist  ticket  should  re- 
ceive 70,000,  all  of  the  Bloc  candidates  would  be  elected, 
because  they  all  receive  a  majority.  However,  if  the  Re- 
publican vote  should  be  divided  between  two  tickets,  this 
advantage  would  be  overcome.  Thus  if  the  Bloc  vote 
should  be  split  between  two  tickets,  each  receiving  46,- 
000  votes,  and  if  the  Socialists  should  maintain  their 
70,000,  the  Socialists  would  receive  the  majority  of  the 
seats.  If  there  are  five  deputies  to  elect,  the  Bloc  would 
receive  all  five,  in  the  first  case.  In  the  second  case, 
when  the  Bloc  vote  is  divided,  the  Socialists  w'ould  win 
three  seats,  and  each  of  the  Republican  pai-tics,  one 
seat.  In  both  cases  the  Socialist  ticket  poll  exactly  the 
same  number  of  votes.  But  in  the  first  case,  where  the 
Republicans  are  united,  the  Socialists  would  receive  no 
seats;  while  in  the  second  case,  where  the  Republicans 
are  divided,  they  (the  Socialists)  would  win  three  seats 
— a  majority  of  one. 

"When  it  dawned  upon  the  bourgeois  parties  that  such 
would  be  the  result  of  the  election  law,  a  great  clamor 
arose.  Although  they  had  voted  for  it  originally,  they 
now  denounced  it  as  another  device  of  the  Socialists  to 
win  the  elections.  This  argument  together  with  the 
arrondissementer's  fear  of  losing  his  seat  led  to  at- 
tempts in  the  Chamber  to  postpone  the  application  of 
the  electoral  law  until  the  elections  of  1923.  Fortunately 
this  attempt  was  unsuccessful,  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  election  law  became  one  of  the  greatest  auxiliary 
factors  in  cementing  the  different  factions  of  the  bour- 
geois parties.    In  the  face  of  a  united  and  well-organized 

191 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

opposition,  such  as  the  Unified  Socialists  presented,  fac- 
tional groupings  had  little  hope  to  survive. 


VII 

The  events  of  the  election  day  itself,  November  16th, 
may  be  passed  over  with  little  comment.  There  was  no 
disorder;  and  there  was  a  heavy  vote  cast. 

The  results  were  not  known  until  the  30th  of  Novem- 
ber, and  even  then  sixteen  seats  had  not  been  disposed 
of.  The  composition  ^^  of  the  new  Chamber  ^-  may,  how- 
ever, be  summarized  as  follows : 


Republicans  of  Left . . 
Radical  Socialists .... 
Republican  Socialists . 
Unified  Socialists .... 
Dissident  Socialists . . 

Progressists 

liberal  Action 

Conservatives 


Reelected 

New 

Total 

55 

78 

133 

77 

66 

143 

18 

9 

27 

35 

33 

68 

5 

1 

6 

34 

99 

133 

14 

55 

69 

12 

19 

31 

250 

360 

610 

"  These  figures  are  taken  from  La  Bcvue  Politique  ct  Parlc- 
mcntairc  for  Dee.   10,   1919. 

"In  the  Bas-Khin  there  were  160,957  voters  in  1914;  in  1919, 
after  the  elimination  of  tho  (jcrnian  elements,  there  were  155,707. 
Of  these,  i;50,737  voted.  The  fact  that  there  were  no  more 
eliminations  seems  to  show  that  the  election  was  conducted 
fairly.  Alsace  did  not  return  a  sinj^le  Socialist  or  Kadical  to 
tho  Chamber.  In  both  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  "patriotic"  or  pro- 
French  candidates  were  returned,  and  the  election  was  ample 
evidence  of  tho  desire  of  tho  provinces  to  return  to  France.  See 
two  articles  in  La  licvuc  dcs  Dctix  Mondcs  for  December  15, 
1919,  on  "  TjC  Vote  do  I'AJsacr,"  by  P.  Douraon,  and  "Le  Vote 
(h*  la  Lorraine  Libereo,"  by  P.  Braun.  Alsace-Lorraino  wfis  al- 
lotted 24  seats — 8  for  tho  Moselle,  7  for  tho  llaut-lihiu,  and  2 
for  the  Bas-Khin  by  party  representation. 

192 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

The    Chambor    of    ]914:^'    compared    with    that    of 
1919: 


1914 

1919 

Difference 

Republicans  of  Left 

77 
257 

30 
101 

36 
32 

27 

133 

143 

27 

68 

6 

133 

69 

31 

gain  —  56 

Ra(li(!al  Socialists 

Republican  Socialists 

Unified  Socialists 

loss  — 114 
loss  —  3 
loss  —  33 

Dissiilent  Socialists 

gain  —  6 
gain—  97 
gain  —  37 

Progressists 

Liberal  Action 

Conservatives 

gain  —     4  '* 

"  By  party  representation. 

"The  classification  of  tlie  new  Chamber  by  profession  may  also 
bo  interesting  to  note.     It  contains: 

140  lawyers. 

41  doctors  or  surgeons. 

50  manufacturers. 

52  proprietors. 

52  agriculturists. 

27  merchants. 

32  professors. 

44  publicists  and  men  of  letters. 

5  secondary  school  teachers. 

13  engineers. 

8  ju<lges. 

5  diplomats. 

4  Catholic  priests  (all  from  Alsace  and  Lorraine). 

3  Protestant  ministers. 

10  avoues. 

4  notaries. 

4  members  of  the  Council   of  State. 

4  chefs  de  cabinet  of  the  ministries. 

6  druggists. 

5  bankers. 

3  heads  of  societies. 

2  generals   and    20    former   officers    (by   profession). 

1  vice-admiral  and  three  naval  oflicers. 

11  former   government   employees. 

8  employees  of  the  public  services. 

16  employees  of  commerce  or  of  banks,  etc. 

4  entrepreneurs  of  public  works. 
15  workers   of    different   professions. 

1  architect.. 

1  agr6g6  (a  degree  higher  than  a  doctor  of  i)Iiilo.sophy). 

1  business  agent. 

2  aviators. 

193 


CONTE^IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

The  combined  loss  of  the  four  Socialist  parties  above, 
in  the  1919  Chamber,  is  141  seats.  The  gain  of  the 
parties  of  the  Center  and  the  Right  is  194. 

These  figures  portray  three  striking  results. 

The  first  was  the  reduction  of  the  Unified  Socialist 
representation  from  101  to  68.  On  the  face  of  it,  this 
meant  a  national  repudiation  of  the  Socialist  party.  In 
reality,  however,  it  meant  quite  a  different  thing,  for 
the  Socialists  polled  300,000  more  votes  in  1919  than  in 
1914  (1919,  1,700,000;  1914,  1,400,000). ^^  If  this  be  so, 
how  can  the  reduction  in  Socialist  representatives  be 
explained?  The  explanation  lies  not  so  much  in  the 
National  Bloc  as  in  the  electoral  law. 

This  law  provided  for  the  redistricting  of  France ; 
as  a  result  population  in  different  districts  was  equal- 
ized ;  and  whatever  advantage  the  Socialists  had  held 
unfairly  was  overcome.  Consequently  .they  lost  seats. 
On  the  other  hand,  election  by  the  majority  principle  in 
the  law  of  July  12  also  worked  against  the  Socialists, 
many  of  whose  candidates  would  have  been  elected  un- 
der a  complete  system  of  proportional  representation. 
Tliis  is  true  of  the  fourth  district  of  Paris,  a  strong 
la1)or  district,  where  the  Bloc  ticket  of  fourteen  candi- 
dates was  elected  by  absolute  majority  over  the  Socialist 
ticket  headed  by  Jean  Longuct.  Although  the  latter 
ticket  polled  a  total  of  1,570,602  votes  against  the  2,102,- 
411  votes  which  the  Bloc  ticket  received,  it  did  not  re- 
ceive a  single  seat.  The  Bloc  ticket,  under  the  majority 
principle,  received  all  fourteen.  Under  a  system  of  com- 
plete proportional  representation    (with  such  a  vote), 

"In  1914,  8,700,000  votes  were  cast  in  France,  exclusive  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  In  November,  1919,  only  fi, 800,000  were  cast 
(includinpf  Alsace-Lorraine)  a  decrease  of  1,900,000.  The  Social- 
ist vote  in  1914  was  therefore  16  per  cent  of  the  total;  wliilo 
in  1919  it  was  25  per  cent. 

194 


I 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

the  Socialists  would  have  received  six  out  of  the  four- 
teen seats,  eight  going  to  the  Bloc. 

Consequently  it  is  a  mistake  to  believe  that  the  French 
Socialists  have  lost  any  real  popular  support  during 
the  last  five  years.  In  fact,  it  appears  that  they  have 
gained.  In  a  sense  the  nation  has  repudiated  Social- 
ism, for  the  Bloc  holds  550  seats  in  the  Cham])er.  But 
the  nation  presented  no  different  attitude  toward  Social- 
ism in  1919  than  in  1914.  In  both  elections  three  fourths 
of  the  10,000,000  voters  in  France  pronounced  against 
it.  But  a  solid  body  of  Socialist  votes  remains  intact, 
increased  somewhat  by  the  recent  adherence  of  some 
maleontented  Radicals.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French 
Socialist  party  has  repudiated  the  extreme  leadership 
which  for  the  last  several  years  has  controlled  it,  for 
the  most  violent  directors  of  the  party  have  been  de- 
feated. Of  the  fourteen  candidates  on  the  Socialist 
ticket  in  the  fourth  district  of  Paris,  Jean  Longuet  was 
the  lowest,  receiving  111,015  votes,  while  the  highest 
candidate,  M.  Laval,  received  114,147.  M.  Longuet  con- 
sequently was  defeated,  and  his  downfall  can  be  inter- 
preted only  as  an  express  repudiation  of  his  leadership. 
Likewise  Jacques  Sadoul  was  third  lowest  on  the  Social- 
ist ticket  in  the  third  district.  ]\OI.  Brizon  and  Eaffin- 
Dugens,  two  of  the  deputies  to  go  to  Kienthal,  were  de- 
feated, as  was  also  M.  Mayeras.  M.  Loriot  was  not  in  the 
Chamber.  Hence  it  is  quite  evident  that  the  extreme 
elements  of  the  Socialist  party  must  carry  on  their  activ- 
ities outside  of  parliamentary  circles.  But  the  Socialist 
vote  nevertheless  revealed  the  fact  that  there  were  still 
nearly  2,000,000  voters  in  France  who  were  devoted  to 
the  principles  of  Socialism. 

The  second  feature  of  the  election  was  the  reduction 
of  the  Radical  representation  from  257  to  143,  a  loss  of 

195 


CONTEIVIPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

114.  Part  of  this  loss  was  also  probably  due  to  the 
new  election  law.  But  it  appeared  to  be  more  largely 
caused  by  the  policies  supported  by  the  Radical  party, 
outlined  in  another  chapter :  their  perpetuation  of  the 
anticlerical  issue ;  their  support  of  Caillaux  and  other 
persons  charged  with  treason;  and  their  insistence  on 
State  Socialism.  The  opinion  of  the  country  on  the 
latter  point  is  indicated,  to  some  extent,  by  the  defeat 
of  M.  Clementel,  Minister  of  Commerce,  and  author  of 
the  "Consortium"  policy;  of  M.  Morel,  Undersecretary 
of  Liquidation  of  War  Supplies,  around  whom  many 
stories  of  scandal  in  regard  to  the  liquidation  of  sup- 
plies had  centered,  and  M.  Colliard,  IMinister  of  Labor, 
as  well  as  two  other  members  of  the  Government.  The 
elections  may  be  called  a  personal  victory  for  M.  Clem- 
enceau;  but  they  certainly  were  a  defeat  for  M.  Clem- 
enceau's  party,  and  also  for  the  collectivist  policy  of  his 
Government. 

The  third  point  of  interest  in  the  elections  was  the 
large  gain  of  the  Conservative  parties.  The  Progressist 
representation  was  increased  from  36  in  the  old  Chamber 
to  133  in  the  new ;  the  Liberal  Action  group  was  increased 
from  32  to  69 ;  the  Conservatives  was  increased  from 
27  to  31,  5  of  the  new  deputies  of  this  latter  category 
coming  from  L' Action  Frangaise.  The  Republicans  of 
the  Left  or  the  Democratic  Alliance  increased  from  77 
to  133.  The  total  number  of  deputies  in  tlie  new  Cham- 
ber, pk>dge<l  to  fight  against  the  State  Socialism  and  ex- 
treme anticlericalism  of  the  Radical  and  Unific  party  is 
366.  The  combined  Radical,  Rej)ublican  Socialist,  Dis- 
sident Socialist  and  Unified  Socialist  vote  is  only  244. 
So  it  seems  that  the  opponents  of  bureaucracy  will  have 
an  opportunity  to  reform  the  abuses  which  they  have  so 
caustically  criticized. 

106 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

For  the  first  time  in  twenty  j^ears,  France  has  a  con- 
servative Chamber.  It  is  one  of  the  most  conservative 
in  the  history  of  the  Third  Republic.  The  Radicals  and 
the  Unified  Socialists  have  lost  the  balance  of  power. 
If  it  lies  anywhere,  it  is  with  the  Democratic  Alliance, 
to  which  the  political  leadership  of  the  country  has 
apparently  fallen. 

Apart  from  the  purely  party  significance  of  these  elec- 
tions, there  were  many  personal  incidents  of  interest. 
In  the  district  of  Seine-et-Oise  the  Radicals  entered  a 
ticket,  headed  by  Franklin  Bouillon,  M.  Clemenceau's 
bitterest  enemy,  against  the  Bloc  ticket,  headed  by  An- 
dre Tardieu,  M.  Clemenceau's  warmest  friend.  The  Rad- 
ical ticket  and  ]\I.  Bouillon  were  overwhelmingly  de- 
feated. Charles  Chaumet,  another  opponent  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  was  likewise  defeated.  In  Paris 
three  anarchist  tickets  appeared  on  the  ballot;  they  re- 
ceived a  combined  vote  of  121 !  M.  Lafferre,  ]\Iinister  of 
Public  Instruction,  a  vigorous  Free-]Mason,  was  defeated, 
probably  on  account  of  his  fraternal  attachments.  Rene 
Renoult,  until  last  fall  President  of  tlie  Radical  party 
and  chairman  of  the  Army  Commission  of  the  Cham- 
ber, was  also  defeated."  Prince  Murat  was  elected  on 
a  Bloc  ticket  from  the  district  of  Lot.  General  Sarrail, 
a  compatriot  of  Painleve,  was  defeated  in  Paris.  His 
rejection  may  be  taken  as  public  disapproval  of  the  po- 
litical ends  which  he  was  alleged  to  have  served  during 
the  war.  On  the  other  hand,  General  Castleneau,  ]\Iar- 
shal  Foch's  Chief  of  Staff,  was  elected.  It  was  he  who 
countermanded  tlie  order  to  evacuate  Verdun ;  for  this 
he  certainly  deserved  pu])lic  recognition.  Four  Senators 
who  entered  the  campaign  for  seats  in  the  Chamber  of 

"  Both  ho  and  M.   Clemcntel  were  later  elect^'d  to   tlie  Senate. 

197 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Deputies  were  elected.  Among  them  was  Edouard  Her- 
riot,  the  new  President  of  the  Radical  party.  lie  is  in 
the  rather  novel  position  of  being  Mayor  of  the  city  of 
Lyons,  ex-Senator  from  the  Rhone  and  now  a  member  of 
the  Chamber.  The  move  appears  to  be  a  bid  for  the 
Premiership. 

On  the  11th  of  January,  1920,  the  elections  for  the 
Senate  were  held.  These  elections  are  not  by  direct, 
popular  vote,  but  by  departmental  electoral  colleges 
composed  of  (1)  the  deputies  from  the  department,  (2) 
members  of  the  general  council,  (3)  members  of  the 
arrondissement  councils  in  the  department,  (4)  repre- 
sentatives from  the  communes  likewise  situated  in  the 
department. 

The  result  of  this  election  did  not  greatly  modify  the 
composition  of  the  Senate  so  far  as  parties  were  con- 
cerned. Two  hundred  and  forty  seats  were  to  be  filled, 
2^-4  of  which  had  been  occupied  by  Senators  whose 
terms  had  expired  or  who  had  died  in  office.  Fourteen 
seats  were  allotted  to  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  two  had 
been  held  by  life  Senators  who  had  become  deceased. 
According  to  the  law  passed  in  1884,  such  seats  are  to 
be  awarded  to  certain  departments  by  lot  at  the  death 
of  their  original  incumbents.^^  These  two  places  were 
awarded  in  this  manner  to  the  departments  of  Loiret 
and  Loire-et-Cher. 

M.  Poincare,  the  retiring  President  of  the  Republic, 
was  elected  to  the  Senate  without  even  entering  his  can- 
didacy, lie  was  elected  from  the  Meuse  by  a  vote  of 
742  to  30.  A  few  defeated  candidates  for  election  to 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  November,  were  elected  to 

"Sco  Article  TIT,  Law  of  December  9,  1884,  in  F.  R.  Darestc, 
Jycs  Constitutions  Mudcrncs,  3H. 

198 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 


the  Senate,  such  as  MM.   Clementel,  Lafferre,  and  de 
IMonzie. 

The  results  niav  be  tabulated  as  follows : 


Conservatives 

Prof^rcssists 

Republicans  of  Left . 

Radicals 

Rejjublican  Socialists 
Unified  Socialists 


Old  Senate 

New 

Gain 

27 

28 

1 

22 

31 

9 

45 

G8 

23 

129 

lOG 

1 

5 

4 

2 

2 

Loss 


23 


VIII 

On  January  13th,  1920,  the  new  Parliament  was  offi- 
cially called  into  existence.  M.  Paul  Deschanel  was 
reelected  President  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  by  a 
vote  of  445  to  10.^*  In  the  Senate,  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  de- 
feated the  incumbent,  Antonin  Dubost,  for  the  presi- 
dency of  that  body,  by  a  vote  of  147  to  125  (January 
14th). 

Although  it  came  as  a  surprise  to  the  world,  the  de- 
feat of  M.  Clemenceau  for  the  presidency  of  the  Repub- 
lic, was  to  have  been  expected.  France  perhaps  would 
have  liked  to  see  M.  Clemenceau  President.  His  popu- 
larity with  the  country  was  immense,  and  it  would  have 

"The  following  vice-presidents  were  elected:  MM.  Raoul  Peret, 
Lefcbvro  du  Prey,  Andre  Lefevre,  Francois  Arago;  secretaries: 
Paul  Simon,  Barcty,  Henri  Auriol,  Maurisson,  Joseph  Barthelemy 
(the  distinguislied  professor  of  politics),  Jean  Erlich,  Laurent 
Eynac,  Andre  Payer;  qucstors:  MM.  Saumande,  Lenail,  Duclaux- 
Monteil.  On  account  of  his  election  to  the  presidency  of  tho 
Eepublic,  M.  Deschanel  resigned  his  position  as  head  of  the 
Chandler.  His  place  was  filled  by  Eaoul  Peret,  who  was  elected 
on  February  12. 

These  sixteen  officials  constitute  the  "bureau"  of  the  Cliamber. 
The  Bureau  handles  all  the  business  routine  of  tho  legislative 
body;  the  secretaries  keep  tho  records  and  count  the  votes  when 
there  is  a  division;  tho  qucstors  have  charge  of  the  finances. 

199 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

liked  to  confer  upon  him  the  highest  honor  which  the 
Republic  could  bestow.  Many  of  his  enemies  also 
wished  to  place  M.  Clemenceau  in  an  office  which  would 
force  his  retirement  from  active  politics.^^ 

But  the  election  of  a  French  President,  unlike  the 
election  of  Deputies,  is  removed  from  the  impress  of 
public  opinion.  Chosen  as  he  is  by  the  National  As- 
sembly,-"  the  President  owes  his  election  largely  to  party 
maneuvers  and  party  considerations.  M.  Clemenceau, 
when  forced  to  become  a  candidate  for  this  office  at  his 
friends'  behest,  found  himself  without  a  party.  The 
Radical  party,  to  which  he  nominally  belonged,  con- 
tained his  most  bitter  enemies.  The  Republican  Left, 
which  had  won  sweeping  victories  in  the  November 
elections,  was  opposed  to  the  domestic  policies  for  which 
M.  Clemenceau  stood.  The  Unified  Socialists,  whose  de- 
featism and  Bolshevism,  Clemenceau  had  vigorously 
fought,  naturally  refused  to  vote  for  him.  This  factor, 
added  to  the  fact  that  he  lacks  the  social  graces  and  the 
temperament  which  have  characterized  the  French  presi- 
dency, led  to  M.  Clemenceau 's  defeat  and  to  the  election 
of  Paul  Deschanel.^^ 

His  defeat  may  be  looked  upon  as  an  act  of  ingi'ati- 

"  The  results  of  this  election  were: 

M.  Deschanel  734 

M.  Jonnart 66 

M.   Clemenceau    56 

M.    L.    Bourgeois    6 

M.  .Tacquos  Sadoul   1 

Scattered    3 

Blank   and  void    23 

889 
^  The   National   Assonihly  is   composed   of  the  members  of   the 

Chamber  of  Dei)uties  and  the  Senate  meeting  in  one  body. 
"Speaking  of  the  defeat  of  M.  ('lemenceau,  one  of  the  editors 

of  Tm  linmc  Poliluiuc  ct  VarJcmcntaire  (Feb.  10,  1920),  says: 
"In   fact,   this   Warwick   was   overthrown   at  the  very   moment 

200 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

tude.  He  had  saved  France  from  a  German  victory; 
and  he  deserved  well  of  La  Patric.  But  other  great  men 
of  France,  as  well  as  of  other  countries,  have  suffered 
a  similar  fate.  M,  Thiers,  who  headed  the  provisional 
government  of  France  from  1871  to  1873,  whose  tears 
secured  the  mitigation  of  the  peace  terms  which  Bis- 
marck wished  to  impose  upon  France  after  the  capitula- 
tion of  Paris  in  Januaiy,  1871,  whose  diplomacy  raised 
France's  position  among  nations  and  whose  statesman- 
ship laid  the  foundation  for  its  political  and  economic 
regeneration, — was  forced  into  resignation  by  a  political 
cabal.  M.  Clemenceau  will  find  sympathy,  as  M.  Thiers 
probably  did,  in  the  realization  that  in  politics  virtue 
is  its  own  reward. 

Paul  Deschanel,  the  new  President  of  France,  is  well 
qualified  to  continue  the  traditions  of  the  office.  A 
scholar,  an  orator,  and  a  typical  French  gentleman,  he 
will  preside  over  the  Elysee  Palace  with  charm  and 
equipoise.  lie  probably  will  be  content  with  the  social 
duties  with  which  in  the  past  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public has  occupied  himself.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
is  a  possibility  that  he  will  attempt  to  assert  executive 
prerogatives  which  hitherto  have  been  exercised  by  the 

when  he  believed  he  had  only  to  stretch  forth  his  hand  to  tako 
possession  of  the  crown.  And  he  was  succeeded  by  a  man  who,  a 
week  before  the  Congress,  did  not  even  wish  to  be  a  candidate  so 
long  as  his  chances  seemed  compromised  by  the  eternally  pro- 
claimed glory  of  his  opponent.  But  scarcely  a  month  has  passed 
since  these  events  have  taken  place,  and  the  great  Frenchman  of 
yesterday  is  already  forgotten.    .    .    . 

"Why  was  he  thus  removed  from  power?  In  truth,  because  his 
mistakes  and  his  defects  have  been  too  evident  for  a  year.  Nous 
7i'(ivons  phis   Clemenceau:    c'est   in  juste,   mais  preferable." 

These  mistakes  the  writer  enumerates  as  administrative  incap- 
acity, prodigious  pride,  anil  an  impulsive  temperament.  Although 
this  characterization  may  be  too  severe,  it  was  nevertheless  held 
by  many  deputies  who  feared  that  Clemenceau,  once  elected 
president,  might  establish  a  dictatorship  such  as  Boulanger  at- 
tempted. 

201 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

]Ministr3\  In  politics,  M.  Deschanel  is  a  member  of  the 
Republican  Alliance.  He  is  a  reformer  of  the  classical 
school,  but  at  the  same  time,  a  conservative  -who  prob- 
ably reflects  as  well  as  any  man  could,  the  opinions  of 
bourgeois  France. 

Following  parliamentary  usage  as  well  as  his  own  in- 
clination, M.  Clemenceau  resigned  as  President  of  the 
Council  (January  18,  1920)  immediately  after  the  elec- 
tion of  M.  Deschanel  as  President  of  the  Republic.  On 
the  19th  of  January,  M.  Alexandre  Millerand  formed  a 
cabinet. ^^     The  appointment  of  M.  Millerand  as  Prime 

"The  Millerand  Ministry  was  composed  as  follows: 

President  of  the  Council  and  Minister  of  Foreign  affairs:  Alex- 
andre Millerand  (deputy). 

Minister  of  War:   Andre  Lefevre   (deputy). 

Minister   of   Marine:    LanHry    (deputy). 

Minister  of  Justice:  Gustave  Lhopitcau  (senator). 

Minister  of  Finance:  Francois  Marsal  (not  a  member  of  parlia- 
ment). 

Minister  of  the  Interior:  Steeg  (senator). 

Minister  of  Commerce:  Isaac  (deputy). 

Minister  of  Agriculture:  Henri  Ricard,  Agriculturist  (not  a 
member  of  parliament). 

Minister  of  Public  Works  and  Transports:  Le  Trocquer   (deputy). 

Minister  of   Colonies:    Albert  Sarraut    (deputy). 

Minister  of  Public  Instruction  and  Fine  Arts:  Andre  Honnorat 
(deputy). 

Minister  of  Labor:  Jourdain   (deputy). 

Minister  of  Social  Hygiene:  J.  L.  Breton  (deputy). 

Minister  of  the  Liberated  Regions:  Ogier  (secretary-general  of  tlio 
liberated   regions,  not  a  member  of  Parliament). 

The  Nine  Undersecretaries  of  State  are: 

President  of  the  Council:    Reibel    (deputy). 

Interior:    Robert   David    (deputy). 

Finances:    E.  Brousse   (deputy). 

Food  Supply:  R.  Thoumyre  (deputy). 

Ports   and   Merchant  Marine:    Paul   Bignon    (deputy). 

Hydraulic   I'ower:    Borrel    (deputy). 

Posts  and  Telegraplis:  L.  Descliamps  (deputy). 

Agriculture:  Queuillo  (deputy). 

Aeronautics  and  Ai'rial  Transportation:   P.  L.  Flandin    (deputy). 

Professional  Education:  Coiipat  (not  a  member  of  Parliament). 
Tho  Cabinet  is  thus  composed  of  eighteen  (l("i)uties,  two  senators, 

and  four  members  who  arc  not  members  of  parliament. 

202 


TTTE  1919  ELECTIONS 

Minister  in  sonic  ways  might  have  been  antieipated.  As 
Governor  of  Alsace-Lorraine  he  had  made  a  notable  rec- 
ord and  he  had  been  actively  engaged  in  public  life  for 
a  great  many  years.  However,  by  political  profession 
he  was  a  Republican  Socialist,  intimately  associated 
with  such  men  as  Viviani  and  Painleve.  Yet  there  was 
no  question  of  his  patriotism.  And  as  he  was  reputed  to 
be  in  favor  of  renewing  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
Vatican,  he  was  probably  acceptable  to  the  Conserva- 
tives ;  at  the  same  time,  his  socialistic  ideas  recommended 
him  to  the  parties  of  the  Left.  But  on  the  other  hand, 
his  Ministry  is  sure  to  be  fraught  with  difficulty.  He 
apparently  has  overlooked  the  fact  that  the  new  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  is  overwhelmingly  Centrist  in  composi- 
tion, for  seventeen  out  of  the  twenty-four  members  of 
his  Cabinet  are  Republican  Socialists  and  Radicals.  As 
such,  the  Cabinet  certainly  fails  to  represent  the  Cham- 
ber. Furthermore,  the  war  and  ]\I.  Clemenceau's  Min- 
istry have  left  to  M.  ]\Iillerand  problems  which  will  re- 
quire the  greatest  tact  and  statesmanship  to  solve.  Of 
these,  the  financial  problem  is  perhaps  the  most  serious. 
France  has  a  national  debt  of  5,161  francs  per  head.  Her 
budgetary  demands  for  the  year  1920  -^  exceed  17,000- 
000,000  francs,  not  including  war  pensions  or  interest 
charges  on  loans  for  reconstruction,  while  so  far,  means 
for  meeting  but  10,000,000,000  of  these  expenditures  have 
been  provided.  M.  Clemenceau's  JMinister  of  Finance, 
Louis  Klotz,  pinned  his  hopes  on  the  German  indemnity 
for  the  ultimate  solution  of  France 's  difficulty.  But  the 
l)rospect  of  securing  this  indemnity  seems  to  grow 
dimmer  wuth  succeeding  days.  Hence  M.  Millerand's 
task  is  becoming  stupendous. 

*'  In  1914:  tho  budget  was  only  5,000,000,000.     See  also  Appen- 
dix B. 

203 


CONTEIMPORAKY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

The  new  Chamber  of  Deputies  was  organized  into 
groups  on  January  30,  1920.  Nine  of  them  filed  lists 
of  members  with  the  President  of  the  Chamber.  They 
were  as  follows: 

Republican  and  Social  Action   4G  membei-s 

Republican  Democratic  Entente   183 

Republican  Democratic  Left   93 

Independents 29 

"Non-inscrits"   21 

Radical  and  Radical  Socialists    86 

Unified  Socialists   68 

Republicans  of  Left 61 

Republican  Socialists  ^^  20 


613 


.The  creation  of  such  a  large  number  of  groups  (al- 
though three  less  than  those  in  the  1914  Chamber)  was 
somewhat  disappointing.  There  seemed  to  be  no  reason 
why  the  most  of  them  could  not  have  coalesced  into  two 
large  groups — Conservative  and  Liberal. 

The  "Independent"  group  still  includes  the  Conserv- 
atives, the  pure  Nationalists  (including  the  IMonarch- 
ists),  and  a  part  of  the  old  Liberal  Action  party,  whose 
parliamentary  group  has  now  disappeared. 

The  "Republican  Democratic  Entente"  had  also  ex- 
isted in  the  old  Chamber,  where  it  had  arisen  from  a 
combination  of  some  Progressists  and  the  riglit  wing  of 
the  Democratic  Alliance.  Tliis  group  now  stands  for  a 
Centrist  policy.  In  addition  to  the  Progressists  and  the 
members  of  the  Alliance,  it  contains  about  forty  mem- 
bers of  the  former  Liberal  Action  group.     Under  the 

"  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Aristide  Briand  has  finally 
enrolled   himself    with   the   Repiihlican   Socialists. 

"See  Journal  Officiel,  Seance  dii  30  Janvier  1920,  Chambre 
des  Deputes. 

204 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

leadership  of  its  President,  ]\I.  Arago,  this  group  seems 
to  be  geniiin(>ly  and  somewliat  successfully  attempting  to 
unite  the  moderate  Republicans  into  one  organization. 
Its  success  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  it  is  already  the 
largest  group  in  the  Chamber. 

Unfortunately,  there  were  some  Republicans,  in- 
cluding many  members  of  the  Democratic  Alliance,  who 
refused  to  join  the  "Entente."  They  had  formerly 
constituted  the  groups  of  the  Republicans  of  the  Left 
and  1jie  Radical  Left.  In  the  1920  Chamber  most  of  the 
members  of  these  two  groups  have  united  into  the  ' '  Re- 
publican Democratic  Left."  Among  its  prominent  mem- 
bers are  ]\IM.  Andre  Lefevre,  Barthou,  Berard,  and 
Boret. 

Still  other  members  of  the  Democratic  Alliance  (old 
Republicans  of  the  Left)  refused  to  unite  with  either 
of  the  above  groups.  Consequently,  they  formed  or 
rather  maintained  the  old  group  of  the  "Republicans  of 
the  Left."  A  few  progressists  and  moderates,  disturbed 
at  the  preponderance  of  the  liberals  in  the  Entente, 
have  also  joined  this  group.  MM.  Ignace,  Loucheur, 
Tardieu,  Le  Trocquer,  and  Paul  Simon  are  among  its 
prominent  members. 

The  "Action  Republicaine  et  Sociale"  is  an  entirely 
new  group.  It  has  been  formed  by  the  younger  men  of 
the  Chamber,  belonging  to  nearly  every  party  from  the 
Catholics  to  the  Republican  Socialists.  The  group  de- 
sires to  work  without  regard  to  party  lines,  and  places 
social  reform  in  the  foremost  part  of  its  program. 

The  three  groups  of  the  Unified  Socialists,  the  Radi- 
cals, and  the  Republican  Socialists  exist  as  they  were 
in  the  lOU  Chamber.^^ 

"Sec  L'Kuropc  Nouvdlc,  "Sur  Lcs  (i radius,  dans  Ics  Cou- 
loirs," February  7th  and  14tli,   1920,   and  December  27,   1919. 

205 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

The  question  arises:  what  may  be  expected  of  this 
new  Chamber?  In  the  first  place,  there  is  slight  prob- 
ability that  the  National  Bloc  will  remain  intact.  Its 
centrist  and  conservative  elements  will  doubtless  hold 
together ;  the  Radicals  proper  may  also  adhere.  But  the 
Radical  Socialists,  the  extreme  Left  of  the  Radical 
party,  will  unquestionably  separate  themselves  from  the 
Bloc  and  probably  come  to  an  understanding  with  the 
Unifies.  Such  was  the  intention  of  the  Radical  Socialist 
group  of  the  Radical  Federation  of  the  Seine,  above 
quoted.  But  even  if  the  eighty-six  members  of  this 
group  do  cooperate  with  the  Unified  Socialists,  the  Ex- 
treme Left  will  only  have  some  130  votes  to  oppose  to  the 
rest  of  the  Chamber.  But  the  chief  significance  of  the 
intention  of  the  Radical  Socialists  to  side  with  the  Bol- 
sheviki  is  that  it  marks  a  growing  cleavage  between 
them  and  the  Radicals  proper.  The  problem  of  unity 
between  the  Right  and  the  Left  divisions  of  this  party 
has  been  very  grave.  The  Radicals  believed  it  was  solved 
at  the  Pau  Congress  in  1913;  but  the  National  Bloc  of 
1919,  and  the  official  decision  of  the  party  to  cooperate 
with  the  parties  of  the  Right,  again  opened  up  this 
wound.  Its  existence  will  be  fatal  to  future  party  suc- 
cesses, just  as  divisions  among  the  Unified  Socialists 
have  decreased  their  strength  and  prestige.  In  neither 
party  are  there  signs  of  recuperation.  It  may  prove 
true  that  Radicalism  will  be  consumed  by  its  own  chil- 
dren and  bring  upon  itself  an  abrupt  end. 

Secondly,  it  is-  probable  that  the  new  Chamber  will 
be  unalterably  opposed  to  the  State  Socialist  policies 
inaugurated  by  the  Clcmenceau  Government  and  wliich 
the  Left  now  insistently  urges.  However,  the  Demo- 
cratic Alliance  and  the  Liberal  Action  party,  if  not  the 

20G 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

more  conservative  orgfanizations,  are  pledged  to  a  plat- 
form of  soeial  reform  and  la})or  amelioration. 

From  the  standpoint  of  foreign  poli(;y,  the  Cliamber 
will  probably  support  a  Ministry  which  will  restore 
French  dii)lomacy  npon  its  old  basis.  This  will  un- 
doubtedly occur  if  the  United  States  refuses  to  lend  its 
aid  to  European  affairs.  If  the  League  of  Nations  does 
not  materialize  and  if  America  rejects  the  Alliance,  the 
French  Chamber  will  doubtlessly  demand  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Rhine.  It  will  support  a  policy  which  will 
build  up  a  network  of  alliances  protecting  France  from 
Germany.  It  will  purchase  these  alliances  with  con- 
cessions in  principle ;  i,  e.,  it  will  consent  to  the  Italian 
annexation  of  Fiume  and  the  Polish  annexation  of 
Eastern  Galicia  in  return  for  pledged  support.  Finally, 
the  Chamber  will  stand  for  a  policy  of  aggressive  na- 
tionalism. 

As  to  clericalism,  the  Catholics  now  have  a  fighting 
chance  to  secure  the  repeal  of  existing  anticlerical  legis- 
lation. Despite  the  assertion  of  Stephen  Pichon  last 
June  that  there  was  no  prospect  for  the  resumption  of 
diplomatic  relations  Avith  Rome,  a  recognition  of  the 
temporal  authority  of  the  Pope  is  by  no  means  impossi- 
ble.^^ Le  Jaurnal  des  Debats  is  already  advocating  such 
a  recognition ;  and  former  Prime  IMinister  Viviani  and 
Aristide  Briand  are  even  quoted  as  being  in  favor  of  it. 
The  Liberal  Action  party's  demand  for  the  proportional 


"  In  a  speech  made,  February  6th,  1920,  Premier  Millerand 
saiil  that  a  resumj)tion  of  relations  with  the  Vatican  was  pos- 
sible. If  diplomatic  relations  arc  renewed,  however,  it  is  not 
probable  that  the  separation  regime  in  Franv^e  will  be  altered 
in  any  way.  See  an  article,  entitled  "A  propos  de  la  politique 
reli(jieiisc,"  Journal  dcs  Debats,  Edition  Hebdomadaire,  Feb.  6, 
1920. 

207 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

division  of  school  funds  and  the  separate  maintenance 
of  Catholic  schools  also  may  possibly  be  granted. 

French  conservatism  has  won  the  day.  Upon  it  rests 
a  tremendous  responsibility.  If  it  shows  an  ability  to 
solve  outstanding  social  questions,  the  present  organiza- 
tion of  society  will  undoubtedly  be  maintained,  and  the 
conservatives  will  remain  in  power.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  it  turns  a  deaf  car  to  genuine  demands  for  recon- 
struction and  if  it  stubbornly  maintains  outworn  formu- 
las, its  days  will  be  numbered.  The  French  people  may 
be  driven  in  despair  from  one  extreme  of  the  so- 
cial order  to  the  other.  Although  Socialism  has  its 
vital  defects  it  may  appear  to  them  to  be  superior  to 
the  "stupidity"  and  rock-like  immobility  of  the  present 
regime.  This  belief,  which  can  be  acquired  only  through 
generations  of  abuse,  is  the  one  force  of  sufficient 
strength  to  bring  about  the  advent  of  Socialism  in 
France.  In  this  respect  Socialism  is  in  practically  the 
same  stage  in  France  as  it  is  in  the  United  States.  Its 
surest  preventive  is  neither  in  force  nor  in  a  reign  of 
terror ;  it  is  in  a  righteous  policy  of  social  reform.  The 
French  conservatives  are  thoroughly  aware  of  tlieir  re- 
sponsibility. They  have  the  interest  of  the  whole  nation 
at  heart.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  they 
will  use  their  opportunity  to  heal  the  burning  sores 
with  which  France  so  long  has  been  afflicted. 


IX 


The  Socialist  Congress,  wliich  was  held  at  Strassburg 
the  251h  of  February,  1920,  illustrated  the  growth  of  the 
extremist  tendencies  witliin  tlie  party.  This  Congress 
had  been  preceded  by  a  meeting  of  the  Socialists  of  the 

208 


THE  1919  ELECTIONS 

Department  of  the  Seine  (February  8,  1020),  at  which  a 
program,  to  be  placetl  before  the  Strassburg  convention, 
was  discussed.  The  chief  question  of  importance  was 
tliat  of  adherence  to  the  Third  Internationale — the  same 
subject  which  liad  caused  so  much  debate  at  the  Easter 
Congress,  Three  motions  were  introduced,  calling  for 
(1)  adherence  to  the  present  Internationale,  (2)  recon- 
struction of  the  present  or  Second  Internationale,  (3) 
unconditional  adherence  to  the  Moscow  or  Third  Inter- 
nationale. The  extremists  had  gained  control  of  the 
Socialist  organization  of  the  Seine  so  completely  that  the 
Loriot  motion  demanding  immediate  adherence  to  the 
Bolshevist  organization  was  adopted. 

The  victory  of  the  "Ultras"  in  the  Seine  Congress 
presaged  a  severe  struggle  by  them  for  the  control  of 
the  Strassburg  convention.  Here  three  motions  were 
likewise  'introduced.  The  "Reconstructionist"  motion, 
which  proclaimed,  first,  that  none  of  the  fundamental 
declarations  of  the  IMoscow  Internationale  were  incon- 
sistent with  the  essential  principles  of  Socialism ;  that 
the  principle  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  in 
so  far  as  it  might  be  utilized  to  assure  the  transition 
from  a  capitalist  to  a  socialist  regime,  was  the  basis  of 
every  revolutionary  conception ;  and  that  the  creation 
of  workingmen's  councils  and  Soviets  was  a  legitimate 
method  of  exercising  proletariat  power.  Thus  the  first 
part  of  this  motion  was  an  indorsement  of  the  Russian 
Bolsheviki  and  their  principles.  Secondly,  the  motion 
provided  that  the  French  Section  of  the  Second  Inter- 
nationale should  withdraw  immediately  from  the  old 
organization,  and  that  they  should  call  a  meeting,  in 
cooperation  with  the  German  Independent  Socialists, 
of  the  members  of  the  Third  Internationale,  to  effect  a 
platform  upon  which  they  all  could  stand.     This  mo- 

209 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tion  was  important  because  it  reallj^  meant  the  eventual 
adhesion  of  the  French  Socialists  to  the  Third  Interna- 
tionale of  ]\Ioscow.  But  of  even  greater  significance,  it 
meant  that  the  French  party  must  expel  its  members 
who  were  opposed  to  Bolshevist  principles.  This  point 
was  clearly  brought  out  by  Loriot  in  the  debates:  The 
Russian  Socialists  will  not  associate  themselves  with 
opponents  or  even  lukewarm  sympathizers  of  their  doc- 
trines. 

The  second  motion  was  that  introduced  by  the  Kien- 
thalians.  It  called  for  an  unconditional  and  immediate 
adherence  to  the  Third  Internationale.  It  was  an  un- 
abashed declaration  in  favor  of  the  principles  of  Bol- 
shevism and  their  adoption  in  France. 

The  third  motion  was  introduced  by  M.  Renaudel, 
representing  the  old  majority,  now  so  pitifully  reduced, 
which  had  supported  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  This 
motion  was  for  adherence  to  the  Second  Internationale, 
providing  certain  etanges  were  made  in  its  organization 
and  its  program. 

The  vote  on  these  motions  was :  The  Reconstruction- 
ist  motion,  3,031 ;  the  Third  Internationale  motion, 
1,G22;  the  Second  Internationale  motion,  337. 

Thus  4,652  votes  were  cast  in  favor  of  withdrawal 
from  the  old  Internationale.  Although  the  motion  sup- 
ported by  the  Longuet  element  (the  Reconstructionist 
motion)  had  been  adopted,  it  was  a  virtual  victory  for 
the  Kienthalians  for,  as  shown  above,  it  (the  Recon- 
stnietionist  motion)  was  openly  sympathetic  with  the 
Bolshevist  program.  Furthermore,  the  devoted  followers 
of  Loriot,  measured  by  the  supporters  of  his  motion, 
had  increased  at  a  rate  which  must  have  been  alarming 
to  those  who  still  hoped  that  the  Socialists  would  de- 
vote themselves  to  the  needs  of  the  country,  rather  than 

210 


THE  1019  ELECTIONS 

to  the  sterile  expression  of  "fraternal"  sympathies.  It 
will  be  remembered  lliat  at  the  Easter  Conpjress  the 
Loriot  element  numljered  less  than  a  seventh  of  the 
members  of  the  convention.  At  Strassburg  it  had  in- 
creased to  over  one-half. 

This  rapid  devolution  toward  the  Left  thus  proceeded 
unhindered  by  the  results  of  the  November  elections. 
The  extremist  leaders  Avho  now  controlled  the  Socialist 
party,  desi)ite  the  fact  that  they  had  been  defeated  at 
the  polls,  profited  little  by  the  lessons  of  that  election. 
Perhaps  their  very  defeat  had  but  increased  their  dis- 
regard for  the  will  of  France  and  their  desire  to  in- 
augurate a  minority  rule.  It  is  needless  to  add  that  this 
extremism  will  result  only  in  the  impairment  of  the 
unity  of  the  party  and  in  the  diminution  of  its  parlia- 
mentary strength. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE    DEMAND    FOR    A    NEW    CONSTITUTION 


Tant  que  I'idee  rcpublicaine  ne  se  sera  pas  reconciliee  avec 
I'idee  autoritaire,  la  democratie  frangaise  restera  inorganique  et 
discutee. — Henry  Leyret. 


The  Government  of  the  Third  Republic  is  perhaps  the 
most  abused  and  criticized  in  the  world.  This  criticism 
does  not  come  from  foreigners  dissatisfied  with  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  French  Government  fulfills  its  inter- 
national obligations  or  in  which  it  represents  its  people. 
But  it  comes  and  comes  vigorously  from  Frenchmen 
themselves.  There  are  a  multitude  of  explanations  for 
this.  The  French  temperament  is  critical  and  the 
"demon  of  reforms"  governs  it  in  a  tyrannical  fashion. 
Dissatisfaction  is  always  rampant  among  a  few.  More- 
over, history  has  left  its  survivors,  from  the  Monarchy, 
the  Empire,  and  the  Commune,  who,  through  the  cur- 
tain of  a  roseate  past,  magnify  ancient  virtues  and 
multiply  present  vices.  The  warning  of  Joseph  de 
Maistre,  "Misfortune  to  bad  governments,  thrice  mis- 
fortune to  those  who  try  to  mend  them, ' '  does  not  daunt 
their  demands  for  political  reconstruction. 

The  charges  against  the  parliamentary  form  of  gov- 
ernment in  France  are  the  most  varied.  For  the  Royal- 
ists,  Leon   Daudet  arraigns  "this   antiquated,    useless, 

212 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

expensive,  and  fatal  instrument,  called  Parliament,  an 
institution  which  can  only  live  on  civil  discords  which 
it  stirs  up  and  exploits."^ 

The  Party  of  the  New  Democracy,  although  not  de- 
nouncing the  Republic  as  organically  evil,  attacks  its 
present  malfunctioning  as  responsible  for  the  com- 
mercial and  industrial  ills  of  France  as  well  as  her 
political  misfortunes.  These  reformists  point  to  the 
fact  that  during  the  history  of  the  Third  Republic, 
France  has  failed  to  advance  as  a  material  power.  Com- 
pared with  Germany  she  has  woefully  and  fatally  lagged 
behind. 

If  France  is  to  be  thoroughly  renovated  after  the  war, 
the  government  "must  be  purged  on  the  inside  of  the 
band  of  adventurers  and  parasites  who  have  taken  pos- 
session of  the  Republic  .  .  .  and  transformed  it  into 
an  immense  employment  bureau  ..."  for  their  friends. 
* '  To-day  progress  has  ceased.  The  mockery  of  the  cleri- 
cal peril  is  worn  out.  The  people  are  aware  that  what 
they  defended  was  not  the  Republic,  but  very  simply  the 
privileges,  positions  and  favors — the  seats  of  Deputies, 
the  profiteers  of  the  Republic  of  Comrades.  .  .  .  The 
Republic  is  common  property.  No  one  any  longer  can 
think  of  confiscating  it  to  his  profit  or  to  the  profit  of  a 
sect,  but  unanimous  opinion  is  that  it  must  be  reformed 
to  be  rendered  habitable.  .  .  ."^ 

In  addition  to  these  somewhat  far-fetched  attacks, 
there  are  many  who  seriously  believe  that  parliamentary 
government  in  France  will  always  be  inlierently  and 
hopelessly  defective.  They  have  no  hope  that  the  French 
party  regime  will  ever  approach  the  stability  which  is 
necessary  for  a  satisfactory  parliamentary  government. 

^L' Action  Fran^aise,  Dec.  1.3,  1918. 
'La  Democratic  NouvcUc,  May  3,   1919. 

213 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

But  in  its  place  they  really  advocate  a  government  based 
on  the  principle  of  the  Separation  of  Powers,  such  as 
exists  in  the  United  States,  with  an  executive  of  fixed 
tenure,  and  independent  of  parliamentary  control.  On 
the  other  hand,  many  believe  that  the  Constitution  of 
1875  is  being  violated,  that  its  provisions  have  been  de- 
serted, especially  in  the  reduction  of  some  members  of 
the  government  to  impotency  and  the  elevation  of  others 
to  virtual  supremacy.  They  therefore  demand  a  clari- 
fication of  the  powers  of  each  governmental  branch,  and 
although  they  are  not  clear  as  to  the  powers  they  would 
grant  to  each,  they  are  very  insistent  upon  elevating  the 
power  of  the  Executive,  and  making  him  a  force  coordi- 
nate with  Parliament.  To  effect  this,  a  new  constitu- 
tion really  becomes  necessary. 

The  distinction  between  a  government  based  upon  par- 
liamentary responsibility  and  one  based  upon  the  Sep- 
aration of  Powers  is  very  marked.  The  essentials  of 
the  former  have  already  been  noted.^  The  latter,  which 
Montesquieu  *  popularized  and  which  the  American  Gov- 
ernment put  into  practice,  assumes  the  existence  of  three 
governing  departments :  the  legislative,  the  executive 
and  the  judiciary,  the  two  former,  at  least,  deriving 
their  powers  from  the  electorate.  Each  functions  in 
its  own  sphere  and  limits  the  other  by  a  carefully  de- 
vised system  of  checks  and  balances.  Thus  the  legisla- 
ture makes  the  laws,  but  subject  to  the  veto  power  of 
the  President  and  the  annulling  power  of  the  judiciary. 
The  legislature  itself  is  divided  into  two  bodies,  each  of 
which  prevents  usurpation  by  the  other.  The  Presi- 
dent or  executive  administers  the  government,  limited 
by  the  legislative  ratification  of  appointments,  appro- 

*  See  p.  46. 

*See  Montesquieu,  The  Spirit  of  the  Laws,  Book  XI. 

214 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

priation  of  funds,  directions  of  law,  and  when  neces- 
sary, by  impeachment.  The  judiciary'  really  possesses 
no  positive  powers;  it  merely  prevents  encroachments; 
in  turn  it  is  indirectly  influenced  by  the  appointive  and 
financial  power  of  the  executive  and  the  legislature. 
Such  a  system,  based  upon  the  existence  of  bodies  of 
nearly  equal  powers,  constantly  offsetting  each  other,  is 
directly  opposed  to  the  parliamentary  theory,  based  on 
the  supremacy  of  the  legislative,  from  which  emanates 
both  the  executive  and  the  judiciary  power.^ 


II 


In  point  of  fact,  the  French  Constitution  of  1875  does 
not  definitely  assert  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  prin- 
ciples. France  has  a  Republican  form  of  government 
to-day,  not  through  choice  but  through  circumstance. 
Consequently,  its  structure  has  been  molded  hy  custom 
and  usage,  even  in  violation  of  the  spirit  of  its  funda- 
mental document.  The  Constituent  Assembly  of  1871-75 
was  Roj^alist  in  composition,  and  had  no  intention  of 
bequeathing  a  Republic  to  the  State.  If  it  .had  not  been 
for  the  obstinacy  of  the  Count  of  Chambord  and  his  in- 
sistency that  * '  The  king  reigns  and  governs, ' '  it  appears 
likely  that  the  monarchy  would  still  exist.  But  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  of  1871  did  not  represent-JFrench  .opin- 
ion upon  this  point,  for  it  had  been  elected  purely  upon 
an  issue  of  peace  with  Germany,  The  Republicans,  led 
by  Gambetta  and  Clemenceau,  were  not  for  peace ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  INIonarchists  were,  and  the  coun- 
try, completely  disarmed  by  the  diplomatic  and  military 

"Judiciary  to  the  extent  of  itself  passing  on  the  constitu- 
tionality of  laws. 

215 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

stupidity  of  Napoleon  III,  was  for  peace,  whatever  tlie 
cost.  Consequently  a  majority  of  Monarchists  were 
elected  to  this  Assembly  whose  original  purpose  was  to 
"decide  on  the  question,  whether  the  war  ought  to  he 
continued,  and  on  what  canditions  peace  ought  to  he 
made."^ 

But  it  did  not  stop  when  this  was  achieved.  Neces- 
sity compelled  it  to  declare  a  provisional  government; 
in  August,  1871,  Thiers  was  given  the  title  of  President ; 
and  he  directed  the  government  until  he  was  forced  to 
retire  two  years  later.  His  successor,  Marshal  INIac- 
Mahon,  was  elected  for  a  term  of  seven  years  (law  of  the 
Septennate,  November  20,  1873).  Meanwhile  debate 
continued  between  the  Royalists,  divided  among  them- 
selves, and  the  Republicans.  As  the  result  of  these  divi- 
sions, and  of  the  country's  repugnance  to  the  renewal 
of  the  monarchy,  a  governmental  system  was  designed 
as  a  mere  modus  vivendi,  operative  only  so  long  as 
neither  royalist  nor  republican  tendency  became  domi- 
nant. As  a  result,  the  constitution  was  no  complete 
chart  of  governmental  powers  and  limitations,  contain- 
ing individual  guarantees,  such  as  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury philosophers  had  designed,  or  sueli  as  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution  embodied.^  On  the  contrary,  it  was 
composed  of  only  five  fundamental  laws  ^  which  created 

°  G.  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  i.  .'H. 

'  Many  lef^al  autliorities  take  the  position  that  personal  liber- 
ties are  still  f^uarantecd  to  Frenchmen  by  the  Declaration  of  the 
Kights  of  Man  of  1789,  despite  tlic  fact  that  the  Constitution 
of  1875  does  not  renew  this  declaration.  They  hold  that  any 
law  abridging  these  liberties  would  be  unconstitutional.  See 
Duguit,  op.  cit.,  220,  and  Esniein,  Droit  Constitutionncl  (.Ith  ed.), 
499. 

"These  laws  were  (1)  on  the  organization  of  the  Senate,  Feb- 
ruary 24,  187.');  (2)  on  the  Organization  of  the  Public  Powers, 
February  2-'),  187.5;  (3)  on  the  Relation  of  Pulilic  Powers,  July 
16,  1875;    (4)   on  the  Election  of  Senators,  August  ."5,  1875;    (5) 

21  (i 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

certain  public  powers,  and  established  their  relationship 
and  method  of  election.  Those  laws  made  no  direct 
mention  of  the  Repu])li(',  although  they  did  speak  of  the 
President  of  the  Republic  in  defining  his  functions;  it 
was  not  until  the  amendment  of  1884  that  "the  Re- 
publican form  of  government"  was  mentioned.  The  Con- 
stituent Assemblies  of  1791,  of  1793,  and  of  the  Year  III, 
preceded  their  work  by  a  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of 
Man;  and  the  Assembly  of  1848  prefaced  its  Constitu- 
tion by  defining  its  purpose  as  the  establishment  of  the 
Republic;  but  the  laws  of  1875  made  no  mention  either 
of  it  or  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people.  They  are 
silent  upon  the  nature  of  the  State,  its  extent  and  its 
limitations.  No  mention  is  made  of  even  the  annual 
budget  or  the  judiciary. 

But  as  is  so  well  known,  no  new  Constitution  was  de- 
vised at  the  end  oi  MacMahon's  Scptennate  in  1879. 
Although  the  accession  of  M.  Grevy  to  the  presidency 
definitely  assured  a  Republican  form  of  government,  the 
Constitution  originally  designed  as  a  makeshift,  still  re- 
mains the  law  of  the  land. 

It  appears  that  the  framers  of  these  laws  of  1875  were 
partly  inspired  by  the  theory  of  parliamentary  responsi- 
bility, necessary  to  a  constitutional  monarchy,  and  by 
the  theory  of  the  separation  of  powers,  so  dearly  held  in 
1791  and  in  1848.  Professor  Duguit  denies  that  this 
latter  conception  influenced  the  Assembly.  He  says: 
"The  Assembly  of  Versailles  had  too  much  experience 

on  the  Election  of  Deputies,  November  30,  1875.  Amendments 
have  been  made  to  these  laws  in   1879,   1884,  1885. 

See  Lcs  Hcglemcnts  des  Assemblees  Legislatives,  edited  by 
Felix  Moreau  and  Joseph  Delpeeh,  ii,  France,  179-263.  This 
work  gives  in  addition  to  extracts  from  the  Constitutional  and 
Organic  Laws,  the  Regulations  governing  the  procedure  and  organ- 
ization of  the  French  Senate  and  Chamber  of  Deputies. 

217 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

with  political  affairs  to  consider  for  a  moment  as  the 
basis  of  the  political  legislation  it  was  to  vote,  the  meta- 
physical theory  of  the  division  of  sovereignty  into  dis- 
tinct powers.  .  .  . "  ^ 

But  if  the  Assembly  was  not  inspired  by  this  doctrine, 
it  very  indistinctly  recognized  the  other.  In  fact,  it 
appears  to  have  attempted  to  incorporate  both.  The 
French  laws  of  1875  provide  for  a  legislative  body  of 
two  houses,  the  Chamber  and  the  Senate.  Both  repre- 
sent the  entire  nation,  although  the  first  is  elected  di- 
rectly and  the  second  indirectly.^"    The  executive  power 

•  Leon  Duguit,  Manuel  de  Droit  Constitutionnel,  157.  However, 
in  another  place  Prof.  Duguit  seems  to  contradict  himself  and  even 
to  confuse  the  essential  difference  between  a  government  of 
parliamentary  responsibility  and  one  of  separation  of  powers.  On 
page  198,  after  mentioning  the  cheeks  the  Constitution  of  1875 
placed  upon  the  President  and  the  Chambers,  he  says,  "Notwith- 
standing these  precise  provisions,  France  certainly  does  not  prac- 
tice the  parliamentary  system.  The  political  preponderance  be- 
longs exclusively  to  the  Parliament,  and  in  Parliament  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  President  of  the  Eepublic  is  in  f  j,ct 
no  longer  considered  as  a  representative  organ  of  the  national 
will,  the  equal  of  Parliament,  but  simply  as  an  executive  agent, 
a  parliamentary  clerk.  .  .  .  Thus  without  being  expressly  vio- 
lated, the  Constitution  of  1875  has  been  deformed;  it  estab- 
lished a  parliamentary  regime;  and  up  to  the  war  we  have  come 
to  a  sort  of  an  oligarchical  regime  where  omnipotence  belongs 
to  a  group  of  politicians  who  do  not  represent  even  a  numerical 
majority  of  the  electoral  body."  But  the  essential  nature  of  a 
parliamentary  regime  is  the  subordination  of  the  executive  to  it; 
as  we  shall  try  to  point  out,  even  the  President  is  not  the  execu- 
tive; the  real  executive  being  a  Ministry  ordinarily  chosen  from 
Parliament  and  virtually  by  Parliament  itself.  As  long  as  this 
system  is  maintained,  the  President  will  always  be  a  "parlia- 
mentary clerk."  Prof.  Duguit 's  confusion  between  these  two 
types  of  government  is  general  throughout  France;  those  urging 
an  independent  and  powerful  President  do  not  see  that  such  a 
creation  would  instantly  kill  the  theory  and  the  practice  of 
parliamentary    responsibility. 

"The  Chamber  is  elected  as  described  in  the  chapters  preceding; 
the  Senate  originally  was  composed  of  75  Senators  chosen  by 
the  National  Assembly,  and  225  ordinary  Senators  chosen  by 
departmental  electoral  colleges,  formed  of  the  deputies,  general 
councilors,    the   arrondissemcnt   councilors,    and   one    elected   delc- 

218 


I 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

is  vested  in  a  President,  elected  every  seven  years  by  a 
joint  session  of  the  Chamber  and  the  Senate,  sitting  as 
the  National  Assembly  at  Versaillcs.^^  Here  the  first 
contradiction  of  the  theory  of  separation  of  powers  and 
of  parliamentary  responsibility  appears.  Under  the 
former  theory,  the  President  should  be  elected  by  the 
general  electorate,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  order  to 
assure  his  independence  from  Parliament.  But  the 
French  Constitution  provides  that  he  shall  be  elected  by 
Parliament,  thus  necessarily  making  him  dependent 
upon  Parliament,  as  the  theory  of  parliamentary  re- 
sponsibility would  do  in  the  case  of  the  IMinistry.  But 
the  Constitution  again  returns  to  the  Separation  theory 
by  providing  that  he  "is  responsible  only  in  case  of 
higli  trea.son."^2  Thus  in  his  origin  he  is  dependent  on 
Parliament;  in  the  exercise  of  this  power  he  is  theoreti- 
cally not  responsible  to  it.  But  to  prevent  the  abuse  of 
such  a  fictitious  independence,  the  Constitution  further 
says  that  "the  Ministers  are  solidarily  responsible  be- 
fore the  Chambers  for  the  general  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  individually  for  their  personal  acts."  ^^  This 
provision  is  certainly  based  on  the  theory  of  parlia- 
mentary responsibility.  The  Separation  theory  is  again 
returned  to  by  providing  the  President  with  a  suspen- 
sive veto  and  the  right  of  adjournment.  But  the  ob- 
trusion of  the  executive  into  the  legislative  power,  in 
accordance  with  the  English  theory,  is  assured  by  grant- 
ing him  the  initiative  in  lawmaking  and  the  right  of 
dissolution  of  the  Chamber.    But  here  again,  the  theory 

gate  from  each  municipal  council.  An  amendment  of  1884  abol- 
ished the  life  senators,  and  granted  a  greater  number  of  delegates 
to  the  munieipal  councils,  according  to  size. 

"Article  II,  law  of  February  25,  1875. 

"Ibid.,  Article  VI. 

"  Ibid. 

219 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

of  checks  and  balances  bobs  up  by  making  the  assent 
of  the  Senate  necessary  for  the  Chamber 's  dissolution. 

In  theory,  the  French  Constitution  granted  the  Presi- 
dent, many  of  the  powers  of  the  executive  of  both  a 
parliamentary  and  congressional  government,^*  accentu- 
ated by  the  extreme  centralization  of  government  activi- 
ties. If  he  were  allowed  to  exercise  them  with  the  free- 
dom of  an  executive  under  a  government  based  on  the 
principle  of  the  Separation  of  Powers,  such  as  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  he  would  become  a  powerful, 
independent  and  perhaps  aggressive  authority.  This 
power  would  be  increased  by  the  added  authority  in 
legislative  affairs  which  the  Constitution  grants  him. 
Consequently,  there  grew  up  the  idea  of  ministerial 
responsibility,  first  used  under  the  presidency  of  Mar- 
shal MacMahon ;  and  the  acts  of  the  President  have  not 
only  been  controlled  by  his  Ministry,  it  being  necessary 
for  some  one  of  them  to  countersign  presidential  acts, 
but  it  has  arrogated  to  itself  nearly  all  of  the  Presi- 
dent's theoretical  powers.  The  President  has  neces- 
sarily become  what  the  English  King  became  when  Eng- 
lish parliamentarism  asserted  itself — a  symbol  of  power 
with  its  substance  held  elsewhere.  The  French  Presi- 
dent has  fared  even  worse  than  the  English  King.  As 
Sir  Henry  Maine  put  it,  the  Kingiof  England  rules  but 
does  not  govern,  but  the  President  of  France  neither 
governs  nor  rules;  he  has  become,  as  Casimir-Perier 
somewhat  bitterly  remarked  after  his  resignation  (he 
held  the  ofifice  for  only  180  days),  a  mere  master  of 
ceremonies.  lie  is  paid  a  salary  of  $240,000,  and  given 
a  spacious  residence  at  the  Elysee  Palace,  enabling  him 
to  enjoy  a  brilliant  social  existence.     He  guards   the 

"Article  III,  law  of  February  25,  1875. 

220 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEAV  CONSTITUTION 

hospitality  of  the  nation  toward  foreigners,  to  a  certain 
extent  he  personifies  the  State,  and  he  contributes  to  the 
continuity  of  the  government,  sadly  distui-bed  by  pass- 
ing cabinets.  Aside  from  this,  he  is  dependent  on  Par- 
liament for  his  election  and  on  his  IMinisters  for  the 
exercise  of  executive  power." 

The  Constitution,  in  creating  a  responsible  Ministry 
and  an  irresponsible  President,  even  though  it  theoreti- 
cally endowed  the  latter  with  vast  powers,  really  cre- 
ated two  executives,  both  of  which  could  not  exist  under 
either  form  of  government.  Under  a  government  of  the 
separation  of  powers,  the  Ministry  is  solely  responsible 
to  the  President.  Under  the  theory  of  parliamentary 
responsil)ility,  the  IMinistry  is  responsible  to  the  Parlia- 
ment ;  this  can  only  mean  that  Parliament  may  poten- 
tially, at  least,  control  the  acts  of  the  Ministry.  The 
Ministry  cannot  be  subject  to  Parliament  and  to  the 
President  at  the  same  time.  Legally  dependent  upon 
Parliament,  the  Ministry  is  under  no  obligation  to  the 
President,  whom  it  controls  by  the  necessity  of  counter- 
signing his  measures.  By  this  means,  the  President  is 
bound  to  the  Ministry  and  to  Parliament.  In  sum,  a 
strong  independent  President  and  a  responsible  IMinis- 
try are  as  inconsistent  under  the  French  Government  as 
an  absolute  King  and  a  responsible  Cabinet  would  be 

"The  duties  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  were  eloquently 
described  by  a  writer  in  La  Bevue  Politique  ct  Parlcvicntaire  (Feb. 
10,  1920),  as  follows: 

"M.  Poincare  has  given  the  example  of  seven  years  of  dis- 
interested service,  even  going  to  the  point  of  abnegation.  Indeed 
a  particularly  difficult  task  for  such  an  intelligent  man!  To 
occupy  the  highest  office  in  the  Republic  and  to  be  nothing;  to 
understand  everything,  to  be  able  to  say  nothing,  except  to  people 
who  do  not  hear  you;  to  see  everything  being  done,  but  not  to  be 
allowed  to  command  that  something  l)e  done; — is  certainly  a  sor- 
rowful t;isk,  especially  in  these  troublesome  times  in  wliich  tlic 
fate  of  tiie  Republic  is  daily  at  stake." 

221 


CONTEMPORAKY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

under  tlie  British  Government.  If  parliamentarism  is 
to  dominate,  a  strong  President  cannot  exist. 

It  "was  very  far  from  the  intention  of  the  framers  of 
the  French  Constitution  thus  to  reduce  the  President. 
On  the  contrary,  as  seen  from  his  wide  grant  of  powers, 
they — a  monarchist  majority — wished  to  elevate  his 
authority.  As  a  concession  necessary  to  even  a  consti- 
tutional monarchy,  a  Ministry  was  created,  responsible 
to  Parliament.^®  But  no  provision  was  made  that  mem- 
bers of  the  Ministry  should  be  chosen  from  members  of 
Parliament,  a  custom  invariably  followed  in  England, 
and  almost  necessary  to  secure  parliamentary  control. 
In  France,  although  a  majority  of  the  Ministers  are 
usually  taken  from  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  or  the 
Senate,  Cabinets  often  contain  members  having  abso- 
lutely no  connection  with  either  legislative  body.^^ 

Furthermore,  although  the  right  was  incorporated  in 
the  Constitution,  the  President,  as  we  have  seen  in  a 
previous  chapter,^®  has  never  used  the  right  of  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Chamber  since  1877.  Thus  the  people  have 
been  given  no  opportunity  to  pass  on  the  merits  of  a 
parliamentary-executive  struggle ;  and  as  Parliament 
can  always  overthrow  a  ]\Iinistry,  while  nothing  can 
overthrow  Parliament,  the  latter,  until  the  regular  elec- 
tions, reigns  supreme.  The  revival  of  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  dissolution  seems  to  be  essential  if  the  theory 
of  parliamentary  responsibility  is  to  be  fully  carried  out. 

"  For  a  thorough  description  of  the  government  of  France, 
Poincare's  Tfow  France  Is  Governed,  is  of  value.  The  latest  work 
is  Joseph  Barthelemy 's,  Le  Gouvernement  de  la  France,  Payot 
et  Cie,  Paris. 

"MM.  Loucheur  and  Claveille,  on  the  1917  Clcmcnceau  Cabinet 
■were  not   members  of  Parliament. 

"Seo  p.  70. 


222 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 


III 


The  weaknesses  arising  from  these  constitutional  in- 
adequacies have  led  to  the  demand  for  a  strengthened 
presidency.  The  reformist  organization,  the  National 
Association  for  the  Organization  of  Democracy,  headed 
by  Probus,  demands  a  President  chosen  by  regional  as- 
semblies, to  serve  for  a  term  of  six  years.  This  would 
in  a  measure  sever  his  original  dependence  on  Parlia- 
ment. The  association  also  demands  that  the  IMinisters 
be  named  by  the  President  and  be  responsible  only  to 
him.  The  political  program  of  the  Party  of  the  New 
Democracy  likewise  asks  that  the  ''President  be  chosen 
by  the  Chambers  of  Commerce  and  the  general  Coun- 
cils of  the  country  .  .  .  who  will  propose  laws  and 
select  his  Ministers  from  men  of  Avorth,  no  matter  from 
what  circles  they  come."^^  The  Party  even  demands 
that  members  of  Parliament  be  specifically  excluded 
from  ministerial  positions.  The  Liberal  Action  party 
asks  for  the  extension  of  presidential  powers,  and  the  so- 
called  plebiscHaires  owe  their  name  to  a  demand  for  his 
popular  election;  the  conservative  press  generally  de- 
plores executive  impotency  and  asks  for  the  actual  par- 
ticipation of  the  President  in  the  government. 

Most  of  these  organizations  demand  that  the  Presi- 
dent's election  be  taken  away  from  Parliament-  and 
placed  with  the  people,  either  by  direct  vote  or  by  the 
creation  of  an  electoral  college,  apart  from  Parliament. 
Tliere  is  considerably  more  agitation  for  the  latter  than 
the  former.  If  this  cliange  is  ever  effected,  it  will  open 
the  way  for  his  resumption  of  power.    But  this  involves 

"  This  program  is  daily  printed  in  La  Democratie  Nouvelle. 

223 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

a  much  greater  problem — that  of  the  relation  of  the 
Ministry  to  the  President  and  to  Parliament. 

The  I\Iinistry  cannot  continue  in  a  responsible  rela- 
tionship with  Parliament  if  the  President  is  to  become 
independent.  The  two  things  are  mutually  inconsistent. 
If  the  President  is  to  be  independent  of  parliamentary 
control,  he  must  be  his  own  Prime  Minister,  direct  Gov- 
ernment policies  himself,  and  act  as  the  real  head  of  the 
government.  His  Cabinet  will  assume  the  same  respon- 
sibility as  the  American  Cabinet  assumes,  an  individual 
obligation  to  the  President  alone.  This  will  mean  the 
total  suppression  of  ministerial  responsibility,  the  fixity 
of  ministerial  tenure,  the  suppression  of  parliamentary 
control,  in  a  word,  the  substitution  of  a  government 
based  on  a  separation  of  powers  for  the  present  form 
based  on  parliamentary  responsibility,  partial  as  it  is. 

There  are  at  least  two  other  reforms  urged  to  remedy 
present  defects,  and  which  will  complete  the  separation 
of  powers  in  the  French  Government.  The  first  of  these 
is  in  strengthening  the  French  Senate.  The  long  term 
(nine  years)  of  its  members  and  its  indirect  system  of 
election  naturally  make  it  conservative.  In  the  spring 
of  1919  it  defeated  the  Chamber's  bill  granting  govern- 
mental officials  the  right  to  organize  r°  until  recently  it 
repeatedly  rejected  Chamber  bills  of  electoral  reforms  ;^^ 
it  appears  to  have  also  defeated  the  bill  for  woman's 
sufi^rage.  Still  it  feels  the  weight  of  opinion,  as  its 
passage  of  the  eight-hour  law  shows.  Its  opposition, 
however,  seems  to  be  the  chief  source  of  its  influence ; 
and  as  it  is  gradually  lessening,  the  conservative  ele- 
ments demand  a  rebirth  of  power.  Many  ask  a  change 
in   the  manner  in  which  the   Senate   is   chosen.     The 

=%S(<o    p.    :5.')4. 
"See  p.   160.' 

224 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

Radical  party  has  gone  as  far  as  to  ask  its  direct  elec- 
tion ;  others  demand  an  electoral  college  from  which, 
deputies  are  eliminated.  In  addition  to  freeing  it  from 
this  legislative  trammel,  a  more  active  assertion  of  the 
Senate's  power,  especially  in  ministerial  control,  is 
urged.  Theoretically,  the  French  Senate  has  identical 
powers  with  those  of  the  Chamber,  except  in  the  matter 
of  money  bills.  The  Senate,  in  addition,  acts  as  a  High 
Court  of  Justice.  According  to  the  Constitution,  the 
Ministry  is  as  much  responsible  to  the  Senate  as  to  the 
Chamber.  But  it  is  very  seldom  that  a  law  of  any  im- 
portance originates  in  the  Senate ;  the  Government  pro- 
jects are  usually  first  introduced  in  the  Chamber,  From 
the  legislative  standpoint,  the  Senate  acts  as  a  mere 
ratifying  body. 

In  the  past  the  Senate  has  exercised  some  control  over 
the  IMinistry.  By  votes  of  lack  of  confidence,  refusal  of 
credits,  political  opposition,  or  personal  action,  it  caused 
the  overthrow  of  the  Tirard  Cabinet  in  1890,  the  Bour- 
geois Cabinet  in  1896,  the  Caillaux  Cabinet  in  1912  and 
the  Briand  Cabinet  in  1913,  Question  of  confidence  have 
been  asked  from  it  by  the  Dupuy  Cabinet  in  1899  on 
the  question  of  expropriation,  by  the  Waldeck-Rousseau 
Cabinet  in  1900  on  the  law  of  amnesty,  by  the  Rouvier 
Cabinet  in  1905  on  the  law  of  separation,  and  by  the 
Clemenceau  Government  in  1908  on  the  purchase  of  the 
Western  railway.^-  But  aside  from  these  examples,  the 
Senate  now  never  attempts  to  overturn  a  IMinistry,  and 
if  it  were  to,  it  is  doubtful  if  a  IMinistry  would  resign. 
Despite  the  demand  for  the  reassertion  of  the  Senate's 
equality  of  powers,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  that  body 
can  occupy  a  place  coordinate  with  the  Chamber,  in  a 

"These  cases  are  cited  in  Leyrct,  Le  Gouverncmcnt  ct  le  Parle- 
mcnt,  86. 

225 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

government  based  on  parliamentary  responsibility.  In 
England  the  interference  of  the  Ilonse  of  Lords  in  the 
legislation  of  the  Commons  has  become  so  inconsistent 
that  by  the  terms  of  the  Parliament  Act  of  1911  money 
bills  passed  by  the  latter  become  effective  without  the 
consent  of  the  Lords,  and  other  public  bills,  having  been 
passed  by  the  Commons  in  three  successive  sessions, 
though  rejected  by  the  Lords  in  each  of  these  sessions, 
likewise  become  effective.'^  From  the  parliamentary 
standpoint,  the  Senate  cannot  readily  reflect  the  chang- 
ing opinion  of  the  country  because  of  its  indirect  election 
and  fixed  tenure.  There  is  no  provision  in  the  French 
Constitution  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Senate.  It  is  not 
intended  that  it  shall  be  a  popular  but  a  deliberative  body 
of  restraint.  Although  this  is  its  virtue  in  a  government 
based  on  the  separation  of  powers,  it  is  absolutely  incon- 
sistent with  the  parliamentary  system  in  which  the  legis- 
lative body  controlling  the  Ministry  must  be  directly  re- 
sponsible to  the  people.  In  fairness,  it  must  be  added 
that  under  the  French  system,  where  the  right  of  dis- 
solution of  tlie  Chamber  is  never  exercised,  it  is  just  as 
logical  for  the  Senate  as  for  the  Chamber  to  vote  a 
Ministry  out  of  office  on  the  ground  of  being  a  re- 
sponsible body.  However,  if  such  a  principle  were  ad- 
mitted, a  very  difficult  situation  might  arise  in  which 
the  Senate  would  vote  confidence  in  a  IMinistry,  at  the 
same  time  and  upon  the  same  issue  as  the  Chamber 
passed  a  vote  of  lack  of  confidence.  So  long  as  the 
theory  of  ministerial  responsibility  is  retained,  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  see  how  two  branches  of  the  legislature  can 
exercise  concurrent  powers. 

The  other  reform,  certainly  part  of  the  Separation 

"For  details  of  this  Act,  see  F.  A,  Ogg,  The  Governments  of 
Europe,  112-113. 

226 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

of  Powers  llioory,  tlioiigli  it  may  not  be  ineonsistent  with 
Parliamentarisni,  is  the  cstal)lisliment  of  a  Supreme 
Court.  Tlie  Constitution  of  1875  overlooked  the  ju- 
diciary, and  the  Court  of  Cassation  has  never  attempted 
to  pass  upon  the  constitutionality  of  laws.  The  only 
distinction  between  an  ordinary  and  constitutional  law 
is  a  formal  one ;  the  Presidents  of  the  two  'legislative 
houses  frequently  rule  upon  the  constitutionality  of 
propositions  placed  before  the  Chambers.^*  If  Parlia- 
ment finds  itself  definitol}^  obstructed  by  a  constitutional 
provision,  which  it  rarely  does  because  the  Constitution 
of  1875  contains  few  limitations,  it  can  itself,  meeting 
as  the  National  Assembly  and  "by  a  majority  vote,  amend 
the  Constitution.  Thus  Parliament  is  the  interpreting 
and  the  amending  power  of  the  Constitution.  This  is 
indeed  contrary  to  the  Separation  of  Powers  theory, 
where  the  Constitution  is  interpreted  by  the  courts  and 
where  amendments  cannot  be  passed  solely  by  legislative 
enactment. 

Friciids  of  a  Supreme  Court  wish  it  to  assure  the 
metaphysical  liberty  which  Montesquieu  asserted  would 
be  destroyed  "if  the  power  of  judging  is  not  separated 
from  the  legislative  and  executive  power.  If  it  were 
joined  to  the  legislative  power,  control  over  the  life 
and  the  liberty  of  citizens  would  be  arbitrary,  because 
the  judge  would  be  the  legislator.  If  it  were  joined  to 
the  executive  power,  the  judge  would  have  the  force  of 
an  oppressor." 

The  New  Democracy  party  advocates  "a  supreme 
court,  composed  of  enlightened  men,  chosen  for  a  long 

"On  April  4,  1'J19,  President  Deschanel  of  the  Chamber  ruled 
the  Raynaud  resolution  askiiitr  the  government  to  securo  complete 
German  disarmament,  unconstitutional  on  tlic  grounds  that  it 
interfered  with  Article  VTTT  of  the  law  of  July  2G,  1875,  giving 
the  President  sole  power  in  treaty  negotiations. 

227 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

period,  watching  over  the  constitutional  laws  and  nulli- 
fying abusive  acts  of  power."  The  Liberal  Action 
party,  to  assure  the- guarantee  of  religious  liberty,  re- 
moved from  the  "caprices  of  parliamentary  majorities," 
also  advocates  a  ''rigid  Constitution  confided,  as  in  the 
United  States,  to  the  care  of  an  independent  Supreme 
Court. ' '  ^*  The  National  Association  for  the  Organiza- 
tion of  Democracy  calls  for  a  similar  reform.^® 

^  Quoted  in  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  486. 

"'  The  attitude  of  the  Progressist  Ecpublieans  toward  the  pres- 
ent French  Government  may  be  understood  from  the  following 
excerpt  from  their  program: 

"For  forty  years  the  Eepublic  has  been  erected,  or  rather, 
encamped,  as  bad  as  it  is,  upon  the  ruins  of  the  Imperial  palace, 
itself  hastily  rebuilt  with  the  rubbish  of  former  ruins,  upon  a 
soil  formed  of  fourteen  centuries  of  monarchy,  .  .  .  For  forty 
years  we  have  followed  the  jaaradox  of  making  a  democracy  live 
without  the  organs  of  a  democracy;  so  although  the  monarchical 
organs  have  been  abolished,  the  democratic  organs  have  not  been 
created  and  the  vital  functions  (of  government)  are  no  longer 
carried  out.  Thus  we  present  to  the  world  the  spectacle  of  a 
Eepublic  in  which  essential  liberties  are  not  guaranteed,  and 
where  every  power  is  overlapped  and  confused,  without  a  moderat- 
ing force  to  control,  limit  and  divide  them.  In  a  monarchy  this 
power  exists  and  is  naturally  affirmed  in  the  king.  In  a  democracy, 
invaded  by  a  parliament,  where  it  is  none  the  less  necessary,  this 
can  only  bo  done  by  a  supreme  tribunal  of  adjudication — from 
whence  comes  the  necessity  of  establishing  a  Sui^remo  CourL 

"To  be  unlimited  (in  power)  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  worst 
faults  of  parliamentary  government  such  as  we  practice  it;  but 
this  is  not  the  only  nor  even  the  first  defect  which  must  bo 
remedied.  The  crisis  in  the  parliamentary  regime  is  evident.  .  .  . 
The  true  cause,  the  fundamental  cause,  is  the  fact  that  the 
balance  ia  broken  between  our  political  institutions  and  our 
social  state.  This  parliamentarism,  so  awkwardly  imitated  from 
the  English,  a  system  which  suited  England  chiefly  in  tho 
seventeenth  or  eighteenth  century,  and  which  is  already  much  less 
suited  to  contemporary  England,  this  regime  which  is  based  upon 
an  aristocracy  or  at  least  a  bourgeoisie,  upon  a  very  intelligent, 
moral  and  independent  governing  clnss,  as  disinterested  as  men 
can  be,  it  is  not  impossible  to  adapt  to  a  democracy;  but  it  must 
bo  adapted  to  it.  One  of  tho  great  problems  of  the  future  will 
certainly  consist  in  rci'stablishing  this  lost  equilibrium,  in  placing 
political  institutions  and  ])arti('ularly  parliamentary  institutions  in 
harmony  with  the  social  state.  ..." 

Quoted  from   tho  account  of   tlie  "Congr&a  do   1912,"   under 

228 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

The  Supreme  Court  is  undoubtedly  an  essential  insti- 
tution in  a  government  of  the  Separation  of  Powers. 
But  in  a  parliamentary  government,  it  again  appears 
to  be  anomalous  and  an  interference  in  the  will  of  the 
nation  expressed  through  a  responsible  Parliament  and 
Ministry.  The  place  of  the  Supreme  Court  may  be  a 
question  apart  from  that  of  Parliamentarism;  but  even 
as  a  feature  in  a  Separatist  government,  it  has  been  se- 
verely criticized.  The  United  States  has  been  the  chief 
example  of  its  use ;  it  is  indeed  true  that  the  court  has 
exercised  a  tremendous  power  and  that,  as  de  Tocque- 
yille  said,  "in  the  hands  of  the  judges  of  the  Supreme 
Court  the  peace,  the  prosperity,  and  the  very  existence 
of  the  Union,  reposes."  But  it  is  a  matter  of  doubt 
Avhether  we  have  been  spared  any  of  the  turpitudes 
in  which  the  supposedly  ill-considered  action  of  French 
and  English  parliamentarism  has  resulted. 


IV 


If  these  reforms  are  ever  inaugurated  in  France,  they 
will  result  in  the  conduct  of  the  government  by  an  ag- 
gressive and  independent  President,  in  complete  charge 
ol  the  public  administration ;  in  the  assertion  by  the 
Senate  of  powers  commensurate  with  those  of  the 
Chamber;  in  a  Ministry  subordinate  and  responsible 
only  to  the  President  whose  tenure  of  office  will  be  fixed 
by  law;  in  a  Supreme  Court  to  adjudge  the  relations 
of  each.  Such  reforms  will  necessitate  a  new  Constitu- 
tion, and  these  organizations  complete  their  demands  for 

Programme  du  Parti,  brocliure  issued  by  the  Federation  Fepub- 
licaine.  This  part  of  tho  program  is  repeated  in  substance  in 
1913   and   1914. 

229 


CONTEm'ORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

reform  by  asking  for  the  calling  of  a  Constituent  As- 
sembly. Their  adoption  would  mean  the  complete  sub- 
mersion of  the  French  cabinet  as  it  is  to-day  constituted 
as  well  as  the  position  of  the  Prime  ]\Iinistcr,  or  as  he  is 
called  in  France,  the  President  of  the  Council.  It  would 
likewise  mean  that  Parliament  would  no  longer  cause 
the  fall  of  a  Ministry.  In  sum,  French  parliamentary 
government  would  be  completelj^  overthrown.  The 
French  reformists  appear  to  hide  this  result,  but  an 
examination  of  the  implications  of  their  demands  will 
indicate  that  such  an  outcome  would  be  inevitable. 

Generally  speaking,  something  is  to  be  said  for  both 
forms  of  government.  Theoretically,  the  ministerial  re- 
sponsibility theory  is  much  the  more  democratic.  The 
division  of  sovereignty  among  three  distinct  powers  has 
no  real  basis.  Such  a  conception  holds  that  the  finality 
of  power  is  in  the  gouvcrnants,  and  that  its  exercise  can 
be  controlled  only  by  its  balanced  division  between  them. 
Such  a  conception  further  looks  upon  the  gouvernes, 
the  electorate,  as  a  ward  in  the  charge  of  the  gouver- 
nants.  Although  the  latter  must  have  their  powers  peri- 
odically renewed,  the  exercise  of  those  powers  is  the- 
oretically subject  to  no  control.  But  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  source  of  all  power  must  come  from  the 
gouvernes  who  are  at  the  same  time  gouvernants,  merely 
exercising  a  power  of  surveillance  and  control.^''  At 
least,  such  is  the  theory  under  a  government  of  parlia- 
mentary responsibility, — that  the  people  are  supreme. 
Now  the  advantage  of  the  Separation  of  Powers  is  that 
it  checks  hasty  and  harmful  action  on  the  part  of  a 

'^  Tho  great  objection  to  Prof.  Duguit's  theory  (sec  p.  358) 
is  that  lie  regards  tlie  gouvcrnants,  the  stronger,  in  periiiniuMit  and 
irresponsible  possession  of  power  over  tlie  gouvernes,  tlic  weaker; 
in  reality,  the  gouvcriuivls  are  mere  agents  of  the  gouvernes ; — by 
no  means  stronger,  often  weaker. 

230 


DEMAND  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

legislative  bodj'  subject  to  no  restraint.  But  in  so  far 
as  controlling  the  different  organs  of  government,  it 
does  not  appear  to  function  any  better  than  (or  as  well 
as)  a  parliamentary  government.  As  for  the  ill-consid- 
ered acts  of  a  single  legislative  body,  arising  from  pas- 
sion and  from  misinformation,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  increased  study  being  given  to  public  affairs,  outside 
of  legislative  circles,  in  the  press  and  at  the  universities, 
is  gradually  sweeping  away  the  ignorance  with  which 
public  opinion  formerly  might  have  been  charged.  Also, 
the  character  of  men  serving  in  legislative  bodies,  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  is  inferior  both  as  to  the  knowledge 
of  affairs  and  in  capacity  of  judgment  to  that  of  the 
men  who  direct  public  thought  outside  of  legislative 
circles.  The  latter,  in  fact,  usually  control  the  decisions 
of  Congressmen.  In  the  last  analysis,  it  is  public 
opinion,  the  gouvemes,  which  decides.  From  this  stand- 
point, a  parliamentary  government  more  surely  reflects 
the  popular  w^ill. 

The  conflicts  between  the  65tli  and  the  66tli  Con- 
gresses and  President  Wilson  have  certainly  illustrated 
the  defects  of  a  government  based  on  the  Separation  of 
Powers  theory.  Opponents  of  the  President,  some  of 
them  opponents  of  the  war,  were  speakers  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  and  heads  of  congressional  commit- 
tees on  which  the  functioning  of  the  government  was 
dependent.  Filibustering,  the  blocking  of  appropria- 
tions, and  other  obstructionist  measures  were  used  in  the 
attempt  to  hinder  the  exercise  of  executive  power.  Of 
more  international  importance  was  the  Senate  opposi- 
tion to  the  Peace  Treaty.  The  country,  through  the 
press,  business,  social  and  religious  organizations, 
seemed  to  demand  the  ratification  of  the  Peace  Treaty 
and  to  desire  a  League  of  Nations.     But  because  of  the 

231 


CONTEI^IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

provisions  of  our  Constitution,  a  minority  (one-third) 
in  one  branch  of  the  legislature,  in  the  Senate,  is  able 
completely  to  block  ratification.  Such  a  situation  could 
not  long  exist  under  a  parliamentary  government.  If 
at  any  time  a  difference  between  the  executive  and  the 
legislative  powers  should  arise,  the  former  would  dis- 
solve the  latter,  the  country  would  decide  the  issue,  and 
the  power  decided  against  would  find  itself  out  of  office. 
In  the  particular  case  of  the  Treaty,  under  such  a  sys- 
tem, members  of  Congress  would  run  for  reelection  on 
a  platform  standing  for  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  un- 
amended, its  adoption  with  amendments  or  reservations, 
or  its  complete  rejection.  The  decision  would  be  with 
the  country.  Ordinarily,  as  suggested,  these  defects  in 
America  are  overcome  by  the  forces  of  public  opinion. 
But  under  our  form  of  government  there  is  no  legal  and 
forcible  way  of  making  this  public  opinion  felt,  if  the 
Senate  or  Congress  stubbornly  closes  its  ear  to  it. 

Aside  from  the  general  objection  to  the  theory  of  the 
Separation  of  Powers,  there  are  others  peculiar  to 
France  itself,  which  will  work  against  its  adoption  there. 
We  have  spoken  elsewhere  of  the  centralization  of  power 
in  France,  the  vesting  of  which  in  an  independent  execu- 
tive would  be  of  the  greatest  danger.^^  This  danger  is 
exaggerated  by  the  fear  of  the  reestablishment  of  a  pop- 
ular dictatorship.  Even  yet,  the  defenders  of  the  Re- 
public are  haunted  by  the  chilling  apparition  of  the 
Napoleonic  Empire.  Napoleon  Bonaparte  will  ever  be 
enshrined  among  the  French  Immortals  even  though  his 
body  may  not  lie  witliin  the  Pantheon.  Ilis  is  a  name 
to  summon  sentiments  which  the  anonymity  of  Parlia- 
ments can  never  arouse.  Napoleon  appealed  to  the 
people.    No  ordinary  despot,  he  declared: 

"See  pp.  340,  341,  373-3S4. 

2',V2 


UEiMANI)  FOR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

I  am  the  emperor  of  the  peasants,  of  the  })lebeians  of 
France.  In  spite  of  all  that  has  passed,  you  see  how  the 
people  return  to  me.  There  is  sympathy  between  us,  because 
I  am  arisen  from  the  ranks ;  I  am  different  from  the  privileged 
classes. 

And  the  French  people  have  shown  the  same  devotion 
to  his  descendants  as  they  did  to  hira ;  it  was  illustrated 
in  the  manner  in  which  they  elected  Louis  Bonaparte 
to  the  Assembly  under  the  Second  Eepublic;  in  the  4,- 
000,000  majority  they  gave  him  for  the  Presidency  over 
General  Cavaignac ;  and  finally  in  the  tremendous  ma- 
jority of  nearly  7,000,000,  which  approved  his  estab- 
lishment of  the  Second  Empire.  Even  though  the  peas- 
ants may  have  thought  they  were  voting  for  Napoleon  I, 
Napoleon  III  and  his  descendants  still  inspire  a  dread 
in  the  defenders  of  the  Republic.  The  country  and  the 
commercial  populations  of  France,  reenforced  by  their 
disdain  for  petty  politicians,  can  be  readily  captured 
by  a  leader  of  persuasive  powers. 

This  fear  has  not  only  extended  to  the  line  of  the 
Napoleons,  but  also  to  such  others  as  General  Boulanger 
who  have  tried  to  overturn  the  Republic.  General  Bou- 
langer was  Minister  of  War  from  January,  1886,  to 
May,  1887.  On  account  of  the  adoption  of  certain  army 
reforms  and  his  popularization  by  music-hall  songs,  he 
became  associated  as  the  leader  of  the  movement  of 
"revanche"  against  Germany.  Due  to  the  apathy  of 
the  Government  toward  this  movement,  he  was  very  free 
in  his  criticism;  and  in  1887,  while  commanding  an 
army  corps,  he  was  arrested  for  remarks  made  against 
the  Government.  Supported  by  a  band  of  malcontents, 
composed  largely  of  Orleanists,  he  soon  attracted  a  great 
popular  following;  in  1888  and  1889  he  was  elected 
Deputy  from  several  districts;  and  the  Government  mo- 

233 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

mentarily  feared  a  coup  cVctat,  overturning  it  and 
establishing  Boulanger  as  President,  independent  of 
parliamentary  control ;  a  position  which  it  M'as  certain 
he  would  eventually  turn  over  to  the  royalty.  But  the 
General  did  not  have  the  courage  of  his  illustrious 
predecessors;  and  from  fear  of  prosecution  by  the  Gov- 
ernment, he  fled  to  Brussels,  where  in  1891  he  committed 
suicide.  The  Senate  subsequently  convicted  him  of  mal- 
feasance, and  it  was  later  definitely  established  that 
he  was  in  the  pay  of  the  Royalists,  the  Duehesse  d'Uzes 
having  furnished  him  with  a  fund  of  three  million 
francs. 

At  the  time  of  the  Dreyfus  affair,^^  another  attempt 
was  made  to  overthrow  the  Republic  by  a  motley  coterie 
of  nationalists  such  as  Andre  Buffet,  Paul  Deroulede 
and  Jules  Guerin.  The  stern  action  of  the  Senate  like- 
wise  prevented   or   at  least   punished    their   attempt.^" 

^  The  Dreyfus  case  was  that  of  a  Jew,  Captain  Alfred  Dreyfus, 
who  in  1894  was  tried  and  convicted  of  giving  military  informa- 
tion to  Germany.  On  January  5,  1895,  he  was  conducted  to  the 
courtyard  of  the  Ecole  Militaire  in  Paris  and  publicly  degraded, 
and  then  exiled  on  the  lie  du  Diable,  althougli  he  repeatedly 
declared  his  innocence.  Finally,  upon  the  suicide  of  Colonel  Henry 
who  confessed  to  have  committed  a  forgery,  upon  which  evidence 
Dreyfus  was  convicted,  and  on  the  agitation  of  the  Socialists  and 
Liberals  against  an  obviously  anti-Semitic  and  nationalist  move- 
ment, the  Court  of  Cassation  ordered  a  retrial.  Another  court 
martial  sat  at  Eennes  in  1899;  he  was  again  convicted  but 
pardoned  by  President  Loubct.  The  question  was  again  opened 
in  1906  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  which  declared  tlie  decision  an- 
nulled. Dreyfus  was  reinstated  in  the  army;  and  it  is  understood 
he  served  as  a  Colonel  in  the  Great  War  and  was  decorated  for 
bravery. 

"'  The  Senate  has  justified  its  existence  in  the  Eepublic  by  the 
part  it  has  played  as  a  High  Court  of  Justice.  It  has  acted 
in  this  capacity  on  four  occasions:  (1)  In  1889,  for  the  first  time, 
it  adjudged  Boulanger,  Henri  Rochefort  and  Count  Dillon,  his 
henchmen,  (2)  in  1S99  it  tried  Deroulede,  I^Iarcel  Habert,  Buffet, 
Guerin,  etc.,  and  condemned  them  to  banislimont,  (3)  1901,  it 
comlemned  M.  de  Lur-Saluces  to  5  years'  banishment,  (4)  August 
1918,  it  banished  M.  Malvy,  former  Minister  of  the  Interior,  for 

234 


i 


DEMAND  l^^OR  A  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

These  various  efforts  made  to  overturn  tlie  Republic 
have  led  to  the  streiigtliening  of  the  legislative  side  of 
the  government  as  being  the  most  difficult  to  overcome. 
The  creation  of  a  strong,  independent  executive  -would 
immediately  lay  the  position  open  to  seizure  or  usurpa- 
tion by  the  Royalists.  That  this  fear  is  still  real  may 
be  shown  by  a  motion,  unanimously  adopted  by  the 
National  Congress  of  the  Radical  Socialist  Party  in 
1903,  condemning  the  Government  for  having  appointed 
a  former  Boulangist  as  Consul-General  to  New  Orleans.'^ 

At  the  Congress  of  Tours  in  1913  a  motion  for  the 
abolition  of  the  Senate  was  voted  down  by  this  same 
party,  chiefly  on  the  ground  that  as  a  High  Court  of 
Justice,  the  Senate  is  the  bulwark  of  the  Republic. 

Now  that  the  Republic  is  firmly  established,  it  may  be 
that  these  fears  will  subside.  Naturally  they  will  exist 
much  longer  than  their  cause.  Until  they  are  overcome, 
a  government  of  the  Separation  of  Powers  is  not  likely 
to  be  established.  If  the  defects  of  the  present  party 
regime  are  not  remedied,  if  the  right  of  dissolution  is 
not  recognized,  and  if  Ministers  are  not  chosen  from 
the  Parliament,  it  seems  certain  that  French  parliamen- 
tarism, with  its  defects  as  well  as  its  virtues,  will  con- 
tinue to  exist. 

five  years.  It  is  now  trying  M.  Caillaux  in  that  capacity  (April, 
1920). 

"  See  Armand  Charpentier,  Le  Parti  Radical  et  Radical-Social- 
iste  d,  travcrs  scs  Congrcs,  3G7. 


CHAPTER  yill 


SYNDICALISM :    PROGRAM    AND    TACTICS 


Un  peu  de  desordre  est  profitable  d  la  liberie;  comme  I'erreur, 
temoignage    de    I'activite    inventive,    est    utile    a    la    science. — ■ 

Maxime  Leroy. 


The  point  of  departure  and  the  point  of  arrival  of 
Syndicalism  and  Socialism  are  identical.  Both  demand 
the  creation  of  a  new  society  in  which  the  capitalist  is 
suppressed.  To  both  ]\Iarxian  formulas  and  conceptions 
are  common  property.  The  difference  between  the  two 
appears  to  be  in  the  means  by  which  a  ]\Iarxian  society 
is  to  be  erected.  Socialism,  at  least  of  the  old  French 
school,  demands  its  conquest  by  the  acquisition  of  politi- 
cal power.  Syndicalism,  inspired  by  the  philosophies  of 
Georges  Sorel,  Lagardclle,  and  Berth,  on  the  other  hand, 
denies  the  worth  of  political  means  and  asserts  that 
direct  action  alone  is  powerful  enough  to  introduce  the 
new  order.  Direct  action  means,  first,  the  general 
strike^  so  to  disorganize  means  of  production  that  capi- 

*  See  Chapters  IV  and  V,  Georges  Sorel,  Ecflections  on  Violence. 
G.  Sorol's  distinction  between  Socialism  and  Syndicalism  is  of 
interest:  "Parliamentary  Socialists  may  bo  compared  to  the 
officials  whom  Napoleon  made  into  a  nobility  and  who  labored 
to  strengthen  the  State  bequeathed  by  the  Ancient  Regime.  Kevo- 
lutionary  Syndicalism  corresponds  well  enongli  to  the  Napoleonic 
armies  whoso  soldiers  accomplished  such  lieroic  acts,  knowing  all 
the  time  they  would  remain  poor.  What  remains  of  the  Empire? 
Nothing   but  tho  epic  of   the   Grand   Armeo.     What   will   remain 

236 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

tal  will  be  obliged  to  eapitulale.  It  means  also  the  boy- 
cott ;  and  although  the  Syndicalists  are  not  loud  in  pro- 
claiming the  doctrine  in  France  now,  it  means  sabotage, 
— the  destruction  of  instruments  of  production.  To  the 
out-and-out  anarchists  who  form  the  left  wing  of  the 
French  Syndicalist  movement,  it  may  mean  assassina- 
tion and  destruction  by  bombs. 

The  labor  union,  according  to  the  Syndicalists,  is  the 
natural  organ  for  carrying  on  the  class  struggle.  In 
fact,  outside  of  the  union, — the  organized  force  of  labor, 
— there  can  be  no  class  struggle.  The  Syndicalists,  fur- 
thermore, plan  the  government  of  their  new  society  upon 
the  basis  of  the  union  and  groups  of  unions.  Although 
Socialism  is  satisfied  with  political  democracy  as  it  now 
is,  for  the  political  foundation  of  the  communist  state, 
Syndicalism,  repudiating  parliaments,  governments  and 
laws,  places  the  complete  direction  of  public  and  indus- 
trial affairs  in  its  labor  bodies.  Unions  in  cooperation 
with  each  other  will  suffice  for  the  needs  of  society. 
Syndicalism  is  sufficient  unto  itself.- 

The  French  organization  which  includes  the  expo- 
nents of  the  theory  of  revolutionary  Sj^ndicalism,  is  the 
Confederation  Gcnerale  du  Travail  (the  General  Con- 
federation of  Labor),  popularly  known  as  the  C.  G.  T. 
It  claims  to  have  from  900,000  to  2,300,000  members  af- 
filiated with   it,    ranging  from   day-laborers  to   school 

of  the  present  Socialist  movement  will  be  the  epic  of  the  strikes. ' ' 
Eeflcctions,  299. 

M.  Sorel  also  says:  "Syndicalists  do  not  propose  to  reform 
the  State,  as  the  men  of  the  eighteenth  century  did;  they  want 
to  destroy  it,  because  they  wish  to  realize  this  idea  of  Marx's  that 
the  Socialist  revolution  ought  not  to  culminato  in  tho  replacement 
of  one  governing  minority  by  another  minority.  ..."  Reflections 
on  Violence,  12;5. 

'  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  differences  between  Socialism 
and  Syndicalism,  see  Bertrand  Russell 's  Froposed  Roads  to  Free- 
dom. 

237 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

teachers  and  dramatists.^  The  Confederation  itself  is 
the  product  of  a  series  of  under-organizations  which 
have  the  union  as  their  fundamental  basis.  About  two 
thousand  of  these  unions  are  associated  in  the  federa- 
tion. They  in  turn  are  grouped  into  forty-three  na- 
tional federations  of  industry,  each  representing  a  sep- 
arate industry,  delegates  from  which  compose  the  Con- 
federation. The  worker  joins  the  union  of  his  trade,  the 
union  joins  the  federation  of  its  industry,  and  the  feder- 
ation adheres  to  the  C.G.T.  In  addition  to  these  federa- 
tions of  national  industry,  the  C.G.T.  is  composed  of 
the  Bourses  du  Travail,  which  are  local,  regional  or  de- 
partment groupings  of  unions  of  all  industries.  This 
grouping,  therefore,  is  not  by  industry  but  by  region. 
No  labor  union  can  become  a  part  of  the  Confederation 
if  it  is  not  nationally  federated  or  if  it  does  not  belong 
to  a  Bourse  du  Travail  or  to  some  other  kind  of  union 
of  department,  regional  or  local  groups.  Each  organiza- 
tion, whether  national  federation  or  Bourse  du  Travail, 
affiliated  with  the  C.  G.  T.,  is  represented  by  one  dele- 
gate, the  total  number  of  these  delegates  forming  the 
confederal  committee.*  The  General  Confederation  of 
Labor  is  divided  into  two  sections,  corresponding  to  its 
composition,  (1)  the  section  of  the  federations  of  indus- 
try, and  (2)  the  section  of  the  federation  of  the  Bourses 
du  Travail.  Each  section  has  its  own  officers.  The  con- 
federal committee,  formed  of  the  union  of  the  officers 
of  these  two  sections,  directs  the  entire  federation.  The 
organization   has   three   important   committees,    one   on 

'.See   pp.   352,   366. 

*Tliis  is  a  V(!ry  undemocratic  provision  as  a  locnl  Bourse  du 
Travail  is  given  the  same  representation  as  a  national  federation 
containing  many  times  as  many  members. 

238 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

strikes,  one  on  control,  ami  one  on  llie  vsupervisioii  of 
La  Vaix  du  Pcuple,  the  official  paper  of  the  federation.^ 

Ever  since  the  complete  independence  of  the  C.  G.  T. 
was  announced  at  the  Congress  at  Havre  in  1912,  it  has 
remained  aloof  from  the  Socialist  part}'',  although  So- 
cialist candidates  have  received  thousands  of  votes  from 
Syndicalist  memhers.  The  Syndicalists,  despite  their 
theoretical  opposition  to  political  Socialism,  nevertheless 
vote  for  Socialist  candidates  in  preference  to  the  bour- 
geoisie. The  C.  G.  T.  prided  itself,  before  the  war,  upon 
its  abstention  from  political  affairs.  Three  different  fac- 
tions, however,  were  to  be  recognized  in  the  organiza- 
tion: First,  the  revolutionary  element  which  saw  in 
Sj-ndicalism  an  entire  sufficiency  for  labor's  needs,  and 
which  therefore  demanded  an  immediate  revolution  and 
the  erection  of  a  labor  State.  Second,  the  Gucsdists, 
who  believed  in  the  use  of  legislative  as  well  as  direct 
action  and  favored  collaboration  with  the  Socialists. 
Third,  the  reformists,  who  did  not  believe  that  the  Syn- 
dicalist movement  should  go  beyond  the  urging  of  pure- 
ly economic  demands. 

The  Syndicalist  organizations  rallied,  as  did  the  So- 
cialists, to  the  support  of  the  war.^  M.  Jouhaux,  the 
secretary-general  of  the  C.  G.  T.,  served  on  a  govern- 
ment committee  of  "national  relief,"  along  with  an 
archbishop,  a  rabbi,  a  Protestant  minister,  a  Royalist, 

°  For  a  history  of  syndical  organization  in  France,  of  tlic  dif- 
ferent tendencies  in  the  syndicalist  movement,  and  of  tlie  extent 
of  syudical  organization  among  agricultural  workers,  see  M. 
iNInrtin  Saint-Leon,  Syndicdiismc  Ouvricr  et  Syndicalisme  Agri- 
cole,  Taris,  Fayot  Co.,"  ]020. 

"  Before  the  war  tlie  Government  kept  a  list  of  the  names  of 
revolutionary  workmen,  known  as  "  Le  Carnet  B, "  who  were  to 
be  arrested  on  the  outbreak  of  war.  When  the  war  came  these 
men  were  not  arrested,  but  were  trusted.  For  two  years  France 
went  without  a  strike. 

239 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

and  a  Radical.  A  representative  of  the  C.  G.  T.  served 
on  a  government  committee  for  war  factory  personnel; 
a  representative  likewise  was  on  the  committees  of  Eco- 
nomic Action  and  the  National  Cooperative  Federation. 
As  proof  of  its  entrance  in  the  field  of  political  action, 
the  C.  G.  T.  repeatedly  demanded  the  repression  of  the 
censorship,  the  granting  of  an  amnesty,  non-interven- 
tion in  Russia,  and  the  raising  of  the  state  of  siege.  It 
joined  the  Socialists  in  a  manifesto  addressed  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson  upon  his  first  arrival  in  Paris  in  December, 
1918.  It  also  joined  a  Socialist  and  Radical  protest 
against  the  condemnation  of  MalvJ^  Its  official  existence 
was  recognized  by  the  Government  in  the  appointment  of 
M.  Jouhaux  as  the  representative  of  French  Labor  at 
the  Peace  Conference.  Moreover,  the  C.  G.  T.  was  of- 
ficially frank  in  its  denunciation  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence. Thus,  in  a  multitude  of  ways,  it  has  definitely 
entered  the  political  world.''' 

During  the  five  years  of  the  war,  the  C.  G.  T.  was 
controlled  by  such  moderates  as  M.  Jouhaux.  But 
toward  the  end  of  the  war  a  strong  minority  movement 
arose  under  the  leadership  of  Pierre  Monatte,  editor  of 
La  Vie  Ouvricre,  w^hich  drew  its  chief  support  from  the 
International  Woodworkers'  Union  and  the  Metal 
Workers. 

II 

The  moderates  and  the  extremists  of  the  C.  G.  T. 
compromised  upon  a  program  of  Minimum  Demands 
which  were  published  by  the  confederal  committee  in 
December,  1918.     After  asserting  that  the  solution  of 

'See  an  article  on  French  labor  by  Albert  Thomas,  in  the 
London  Times   (French  number)   of  September  6,  1919. 

240 


SYNDICALISM :  PROORAIM  AND  TACTICS 

the  present  crisis  rests  exclusively  upon  the  lahoring 
class,  it  admits  that  it  will  not  "l)e  sufficient  to  change 
the  political  order  by  making  the  revolution,"  for  the 
development  of  production  must  be  increased.  But  to 
realize  immediate  reforms  "is  not  to  abdicate  the  ideal 
of  the  revolution ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  to  prepare  for 
the  new  order  toward  which  we  are  giiided."^  This  is 
certainly  a  moderate  statement  compared  with  those 
which  the  advocates  of  the  general  strike  and  sabotage 
were  making. 

The  program  asked  for  the  creation  of  a  league  of  na- 
tions, the  abolition  of  protective  tariffs,  the  end  of  eco- 
nomic wars,  the  creation  of  an  office  of  international 
transportation  to  divide  raw  materials  among  nations, 
and  general  disarmament. 

It  asked  that  the  individual  liberties,  suspended  dur- 
ing the  war,  be  reestablished. 

Under  the  caption  of  "the  Rights  of  Labor,"  it  de- 
manded that  labor  no  longer  be  treated  as  a  commodity, 
that  the  equality  of  the  two  sexes  be  recognized,  that 
functionaries  be  given  the  right  to  organize,  and  that 
collective  bargaining  regulate  wages  and  conditions  of 
labor.  It  asked  for  an  eight-hour  day  in  commerce,  in- 
dustry and  agi-iculture,  and  for  the  prohibition  of  night- 
work  in  bakeries,  etc.,  and  in  any  industry  in  which 
women,  or  children  of  less  than  eighteen  years,  are  em- 
ployed. It  asked  that  the  compulsory  school  period  be 
prolonged  to  fourteen  years. 

It  demanded  the  creation  of  a  national  economic 
council,  upon  w-hich  unions  should  have  responsible 
representatives,  to  draw  up  the  general  principles  of 
demobilization  and  economic  reconstruction. 

*  Brochure  (listributcd  by  the  confederal  committee. 

241 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

It  asked  that  the  devastated  regions  be  reconstructed, 
not  by  private  contractors,  but  by  collective  organiza- 
tions of  producers,  consumers,  and  government  officials. 
"Workers'  lodgings  and  public  "playgrounds  should  be 
created  by  municipalities. 

The  program  insisted  that  property  is  a  trust,  held  by 
individuals  for  the  good  of  society,  and  that  the  nation 
should  watch  over  the  exercise  of  property  rights  which 
owe  their  value  to  the  protection  of  society.  If  it  is  not 
desirable  that  the  State  directly  produce  everything,  the 
program  asserted  that  the  production  of  necessities 
should  be  minutely  regulated  (i.  e.,  the  conditions  of 
labor  and  the  division  of  profits)  by  the  State.  Such  a 
control  should  be  exercised  in  industries  which  still  per- 
mit the  play  of  initiative  and  competition. 

But  whenever  a  private  monopoly  gains  control  of  raw 
materials,  products,  or  organizations,  the  program  says 
that  the  State  should  appropriate  it  for  society.  The 
State  must '  *  establish  its  social  right  to  collective  wealth 
and  to  the  means  of  producing  or  exchanging  it. ' '  Pub- 
lic monopolies  should  not  be  operated  by  the  old  central- 
ized statism,  but  by  decentralized  and  autonomous 
groupings  of  producers,  consumers  and  government  of- 
ficials. 

The  C.  G.  T.  also  demanded  measures  against  alco- 
holism, poor-housing,  unemployment,  and  disability. 

The  program  declared  that  a  foreign  worker  is  en- 
titled to  all  the  privileges  of  French  union  organizations 
and  should  receive  the  same  salary  as  a  French  laborer 
for  the  same  work.  The  recruiting  of  foreign  labor 
should  be  controlled  ])y  the  lal)or  organizations  of  the 
country  of  emigration. 

It  also  asked  that  social  insurance  be  extended  to 
cover  the  total  amount  of  the  salary  of  a  victim  of  a 

242 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

labor  accident  during  his  incapacity.  Industrial  dis- 
ease sliould  be  considered  in  the  same  category  as  acci- 
dents. 

As  measures  to  combat  the  cost  of  living,  it  asked  the 
abolition  of  tariffs  and  the  octroi,  and  tlie  creation  of  a 
public  service  of  alimentation  upon  which  there  should 
be  Labor  representatives. 

As  will  be  noted  at  once,  the  program  of  the  C.  G.  T, 
is  very  much  more  moderate  and  practical  than  that  of 
the  Socialist  party.  The  C.  G.  T.  offers  some  veiy  defi- 
nite functions  for  the  Society  of  Nations  to  perform; 
the  Socialists  condemn  the  League  as  an  organ  of  capi- 
talism. The  C.  G.  T.  engages  in  no  defense  or  justifica- 
tion of  ]\Iarxian  theories  as  do  the  Socialists.  It  makes 
no  sweeping  accusations ;  it  speaks  neither  of  the  revolu- 
tion nor  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  It  affirms 
the  supremacy  of  the  State  and  asserts  the  doctrine  that 
private  property  is  but  a  trust  from  the  State  to  be 
exercised  for  the  good  of  collectivity.  Although  this 
program  was  doubtless  framed  with  many  arriere- 
pensees,  it  was  a  serious  effort  toAvard  French  recon- 
struction which  others  outside  of  the  labor  world,  such 
as  the  Radical  part}',  could  have  endorsed.  A  victory 
for  the  moderates,  the  program  was  naturally  an  object 
of  scorn  for  the  extremists  who  believed  that  the  revolu- 
tion by  direct  action  was  the  sole  legitimate  object  of  the 
C.  G.  T.  At  any  rate,  the  realization  of  these  Minimum 
Demands  now  became  the  official  aim  of  the  C.  G.  T.  by 
the  First  of  May,  the  Labor  Day  of  Europe.  If  the 
country  by  that  time  did  not  see  fit  to  grant  these  de- 
mands, the  C.  G.  T.  insinuated  that  it  would  not  return 
to  work  until  compliance  had  been  secured. 


243 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

III 

Labor  agitation  was  stimulated  by  the  unrest  follow- 
ing the  armistice,  an  unrest  which  grew  steadily  because 
of  the  uncertainty  of  the  peace  negotiations.  The  cost 
of  living,  la  vie  chere,  and  the  consequent  inadequacy  of 
salaries  were  even  a  greater  force  in  provoking  discon- 
tent. 

French  wages  are  inconceivably  low.  According  to 
the  publications  of  the  Ministry  of  Labor,^  the  average 
salaries  of  agricultural  workers  are  800  francs  a  year. 
Journeymen  printers  receive  a  daily  wage  of  4  fr.  06 ; 
tanners,  3  fr.  35 ;  saddlers,  3  fr.  50 ;  shoemakers,  3  f r. 
24 ;  tailors,  3  fr.  73 ;  wheelwrights,  3  f r.  37 ;  coopers,  3 
fr.  68 ;  cabinet  makers,  3  f r.  99 ;  upholsterers,  4  fr.  15 ; 
carpenters,  4  fr.  15 ;  joiners,  3  fr.  86 ;  coppersmiths,  4 
f r.  46 ;  tinworkers,  3  f  r.  89 ;  plumbers,  4  f r.  04 ;  black- 
smiths, 4  f r.  20 ;  locksmiths,  3  f  r.  82 ;  masons,  3  f  r.  94 ; 
day-laborers,  2  fr.  67.  Mine  workers  receive  an  average 
of  1,300  francs  ($260)  a  year;  employees  in  commerce, 
about  1,200  francs  (.$240)  ;  railway  labor  received  4 
or  5  francs  a  day. 

The  Government  paid  its  laborers  even  less ;  thus  the 
roadkeepers  received  from  500  to  1,000  francs  a  year; 
foresters,  975  francs ;  prison-keepers  in  the  provinces, 
1,365  francs;  mail-carriers,  800  to  1,200  francs  in  the 
country ;  canal-kocpers,  500  to  700  francs ;  customs  col- 
lectors, 1,100  to  1,200  francs.  Such  a  salary  was  vir- 
tually a  starvation  wage,  even  before  the  war. 

It  was  little  wonder,  consecpiently,  that  repeated  de- 
mands were  made  for  increases  to  keep  up  with  the  tre- 
mendous bounds  which  the  cost  of  living  made  during 

"  (Quoted  in  Lysis,  Vers  la  Democratic  Nouvelle,  65. 

244 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 


the  five  years  of  the  war  as  elsewhere.  This  cost  rose 
out  of  all  proportion  to  the  rise  in  wages.  If  one  con- 
siders whok^sale  prices  in  France  in  1914  as  100,  this 
increase  would  be  denoted  as  follows: 


December,  1914 113. 

June,  1915 140.3 

January,  1916 1G6.7 

June,  iniC).  .  . 192.4 

January,  1917 207.8 


June,  1917 271  8 

January,  1918 279. 

June,  1918 380. 

September,  1918 410.6 


Retail  prices  likewise  increased,  but  not  to  the  same 
extent.  Thus,  the  retail  price  of  food  products  in- 
creased in.  towns  of  more  than  100,000,  233  per  cent 
between  July,  1914,  and  April,  1918.  In  other  words, 
it  would  take  $233  to  buy  at  the  latter  date  what  $100 
bought  before  the  war.  According  to  figures  published 
in  Le  Petit  Journal  ^"^  the  price  of  beef,  mutton,  pork, 
and  veal  increased  nearly  six  times  between  1914  and 
March,  1919 ;  eggs,  cheese  and  butter  increased  four 
times.  Eggs  were  selling  in  the  spring  of  1919  at  nine 
cents  a  piece;  and  butter  rose  from  forty  cents  in  1914 
to  two  dollars  a  pound  in  1919.  According  to  the  stat- 
istics of  the  C.  G.  T.,  it  would  take  9,000  francs  ($1,800) 
a  year  for  a  family  of  two  to  live  upon  decently — an 
amount  far  greater  than  the  average  laborer  or  even 
professional  salaried  man  received.  In  comparison  with 
other  countries,  it  would  take  sixty-two  cents  in  Paris  to 
buy  what  forty  cents  purchased  in  New  York  or  thirty- 
five  cents  bought  in  London ;  making  the  cost  of  living  in 
Paris  from  fifty  to  seventy-five  per  cent  higher  than  in 
New  York  or  in  London. 

Despite  the  cfi'orts  of  the  Government  through  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  so-called  Vilgrain  booths,  in  which 
the   Government  sold   goods  directly  to  the   consumer, 


^i"  Issue  of  March  13,  1919. 


245 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

succeeding  months  did  not  diminish  the  cost  of  living, 
itself  parti}'  caused  by  a  stupid  Government  control." 
This  factor  led  to  much  discontent  which  took  the  form 
of  repeated  strikes.  The  strikes  upon  the  transportation 
lines  in  Paris  in  the  latter  part  of  January,  1919,  were 
among  the  first.  The  men  asked  for  a  wage  increase  of 
two  francs  a  day,  shorter  hours  and  other  reforms; 
but  the  strike  came  to  an  abrupt  end  on  the  25th  of 
January  by  the  Government  requisition  and  operation 
of  the  "metros"  on  a  military  basis,  it  being  understood 
that  the  demands  would  be  settled  favorably  later.  At 
the  same  time  and  later  the  electricians,  the  street- 
sweepers,  who  before  the  war  received  twenty  dollars  a 
month,  the  employees  in  the  great  banking  firms,  such 
as  the  Credit  Lyonnais  and  the  Bourse,  whose  salary  at 
the  end  of  four  years'  service  was  only  ninety  cents  a 
day,  the  women  employees  in  the  department  stores,  who 
demanded  a  salary  of  at  least  forty  dollars  a  month, 
stopped  work  in  what  appeared  to  be  thoroughly  just 
demands  for  a  living  wage. 


IV 


It  was  perhaps  of  some  significance  that  the  C.  G.  T., 
instead  of  directing  its  energies  toAvard  the  increase  of 
wages  during  the  early  months  of  the  armistice,  occu- 
pied itself  with  securing  the  "eight-hour  day"^^  one  of 
the  most  important  of  its  ]\Iinimum  Demands.  On 
March  5th,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Railway  Fed- 
eration wrote  to  M.  Clemenceau,  saying  that  the  men 

"See   pp.   314-332.      Also   Appendix   B. 

"For  an  excellent  treatise  upon  French  labor  legislation,  see 
Paul  Pic,  Traite  dc  Legislation  Industricllc. 

246 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

were  absolutely  determined  upon  the  immediate  realiza- 
tion of  this  reform.  At  a  session  of  tlie  Confederal 
Committee  of  the  C.  G.  T.,  from  March  22nd  to  25th, 
the  matter  of  the  application  of  the  eight-hour  day  was 
taken  up.  The  committee  resolved  that  the  "efforts  of 
all  organizations  must  be  coordinated  to  assure  a  demon- 
stration of  power  and  of  will  on  the  first  of  IMay, 
1919.  After  the  warning  which  the  manifestation  of 
the  first  of  May  will  express,  it  will  fall  upon  the  Fed- 
erations ...  to  limit  the  period  of  negotiations  and  to 
fix  a  date  for  the  application  of  the  demand."  Thus  if 
Parliament  refused  to  pass  a  law  to  that  effect  or  if 
the  employers  refused  to  install  the  eight-hour  day,  the 
C.  G.  T.  was  determined  to  force  it  upon  them. 

During  the  month  of  April,  a  propagandist  campaign 
for  the  eight-hour  day  was  very  effectively  carried  on 
throughout  France.  Graphic  appeals,  in  writing  and 
by  cartoon,  were  made  to  laborers  everywhere  to  sup- 
port the  demands  of  the  C.  G.  T.,  and  especially  to 
cooperate  in  the  May  Day  celebration.  About  the  first 
of  April,  seven  of  the  principal  national  federations 
belonging  to  the  C.  G.  T.  organized  a  "cartel"  to  pro- 
mote the  agitation  of  the  eight-hour  reform  and  to  lay 
plans  for  the  first  of  May.  This  "cartel"  was  formed 
of  representatives  of  the  federations  of  the  railway 
workers,  the  miners,  the  dock  employees,  the  marine 
workers,  the  firemen,  the  transport  workers,  and  the 
metal  workers.  They  pledged  their  own  organizations 
to  a  complete  cessation  of  work  on  the  first  of  Maj',  and 
persuaded  other  organizations  not  represented  in  the 
"cartel,"  such  as  the  clothing  workers,  the  butchers  and 
the  men  in  the  building  trades,  to  cease  work  also. 

Hastened  by  the  threatening  attitude  of  different 
labor  organizations  and  the  disturbance  which  featured 

247 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  Jaures  manifestation  of  Sunday,  April  6,  1919,  the 
Government  laid  a  project  before  the  Chamber  granting 
the  eight-hour  day.  The  text  of  this  law  provided  that 
the  duration  of  work  for  laborers  of  either  sex  or  of 
any  age  in  industry  and  commerce  should  not  exceed 
eight  hours  a  day  or  forty-eight  hours  a  week.  Admin- 
istrative regulations  were  to  determine  what  delays  and 
under  what  conditions  this  day  would  be  installed  in 
each  industry.  These  regulations  were  to  be  drawn  up 
only  after  both  employers'  and  employees'  organizations 
had  been  consulted. 

On  the  17th  of  April,  1919,  discussion  upon  this  pro- 
ject was  opened  by  Albert  Thomas  who  asserted  that 
labor  would  produce  as  much  in  eight  as  in  ten  hours. 
M.  Thomas  moved  an  amendment  to  the  bill  providing 
that  the  salary  of  the  reduced  day  remain  the  same  as 
formerly.  Upon  the  assurance  of  M.  Colliard  that  the 
law  carried  such  guarantees,  the  amendment  was  de- 
feated by  a  vote  of  253  to  233.  But  M.  Briand  again 
showed  his  magnetic  power  by  reintroducing  the  iden- 
tical amendment  and  vigorously  asserting  its  necessity. 
After  a  lively  debate  with  the  Minister  of  Labor,  his 
amendment  was  finally  carried  by  a  show  of  hands. 
Immediately  afterward  the  whole  bill  was  passed.  On 
the  23rd  of  April  the  Senate  voted  the  law  without  mod- 
ification. Thus  one  of  the  chief  points  in  the  Minimum 
Demands  of  the  C.  G.  T.  had  been  won  without  direct 
action,  but  by  a  sort  of  threatening  persuasion. 

The  conservative  element,  although  timorous  in  ex- 
pressing its  opinion,  felt  that  the  adoption  of  this  law 
at  such  a  time  was  harmful.  Despite  whatever  logic 
there  was  in  the  theory  that  men  would  do  as  much  in 
eight  as  in  ten  hours,  it  was  certain  that  they  would  not 
do  so  until  after  a  period  of  readjustment.    But  it  was 

248 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

just  at  this  time  that  France  needed  to  devote  all  its 
energy  to  reconstruction  i)r()l)lems.  A  shortened  work- 
ing day  would  exaggerate  tiie  cost  of  living,  give  Labor 
more  leisure  to  be  exploited  by  unscrupulous  -leaders, 
and,  on  the  whole,  retard  the  recjuickening  of  French 
life."  Labor,  however,  assumed  that  the  strategic  time 
to  force  this  reform — that  is,  the  time  when  its  force  was 
the  strongest  and  the  Government's  the  weakest — had 
come.  Unquestionably  it  was  a  great  measure  in  Labor's 
amelioration ;  but  it  had  issued  out  of  a  purely  class 
struggle  in  which  Labor  had  proved  its  superior  force. 


The  passage  of  the  law  did  not  lessen  preparations 
for  the  fete  of  the  First  of  May.    Although  the  principle 

"  For  a  very  fair  statement  of  this  point  of  view  and  for  a 
general  discussion  of  the  effects  of  the  eight-hour  law,  see  an 
article  in  La  Bevue  Bleue  October  11,  1919,  entitled  ^^La  Journee 
de  huit  hcurcs,"  by  Paul  Pic,  professor  of  law  in  the  University 
of  Lyons. 

In  February,  1920  (Temps,  Feb.  14),  the  Lille  Cliamber  of  Com- 
merce passed  a  resolution  asking  for  the  modification  of  the  eight- 
Iiour  day  law.  It  stated  that  this  law  liad  disorganized  branches 
of  production,  decreased  activity  in  the  mines,  industry,  and  trans- 
portation, that  it  had  led  to  increased  prices  in  manufactures, 
and  of  foremost  importance,  it  had  led  to  a  coal  shortage. 

The  output  of  the  French  mines  in  1919,  excluding  the  mines  of 
Lorraine,  was  only  about  19,500,000  tons  compared  with  26,322,- 
000  tons  produced  in  1918,  and  28,929,000  in  1917.  At  a  con- 
ference of  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works  on  January  25,  1920, 
it  was  estimated  tliat  tlie  requirements  of  coal  exceed  the  present 
possibilities  by  40  per  cent. 

It  is  difficult  to  explain  the  decrease  in  coal  production  except 
by  the  lessened  productivity  of  labor.  It  would  naturally 
be  supposed  that  with  the  demobilization  of  troops  and  the  advent 
of  peace,  coal  production  would  be  increased.  It  is  but  natural, 
therefore,  for  the  belief  to  arise  that  the  diminution  of  coal 
production  has  been  largely  caused  by  the  reduction  of  the  hours 
of  labor.  The  liours  of  labor  in  mines,  however,  were  not  regu- 
lated by  the  ordinary  eight-hour  law,  but  by  the  Dufaure  min- 
ing law. 

249 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

of  the  eiglit-liour  day  had  been  secured,  doubled  efforts 
were  still  necessary  to  secure  its  application  to  industry. 
Curiously  enough,  the  fete  of  the  First  of  May  had  its 
origin  in  the  United  States.  In  1886  a  Federation  of 
Trades  Unions  decided  at  a  convention  held  in  Chicago 
to  fight  for  the  eight-hour  day,  not  by  appeal  to  Con- 
gress or  legislatures,  but  by  refusing  to  work  after  May 
1st  until  it  was  granted.  The  First  arrived  and  with  it, 
5,000  strikes;  by  the  end  of  the  month  the  eight-hour 
day  had  been  granted  to  nearly  250,000  workmen.  The 
labor  organizations  in  France  followed  this  American 
example  at  the  third  Congress  of  the  National  Federa- 
tion of  Syndicates  in  1888  where  a  resolution  was 
adopted  deciding  that  on  Sunday,  February  10,  1889, 
every  labor  union  in  France  should  petition  the  prefec- 
ture for  an  eight-hour  day  and  a  minimum  wage.  On 
the  24tli,  they  were  to  return  for  a  response,  accom- 
panied by  as  much  of  a  manifestation  as  possible.  The 
manifestation  occurred  and  was  so  successful  that  the 
International  Labor  Congress  at  Paris  decided  to  or- 
ganize an  international  manifestation  in  every  country 
and  of  all  laborers.  The  date  of  May  1,  1890,  was  de- 
cided upon  by  the  French  Socialists.  But  the  Paris 
unions,  under  the  influence  of  conservative  elements, 
declared  themselves  against  the  demonstration.  Despite 
this  opposition,  however,  the  manifestation  was  held.  It 
was  chiefly  marked  by  the  presentation  to  INI.  Floquet, 
President  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  of  a  petition 
requesting  the  eight-hour  day,  by  a  delegation  of  work- 
men, while  troops  kept  the  boulevards  cleared  of  those 
who  wished  to  parade.  The  First  of  May,  1891,  was 
more'  disquieting  and  it  resulted  in  many  arrests.  But 
successive  celebrations  lost  their  belligerent  features 
and  more  and  more  tended  to  become  purely  a  holiday 

250 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

in  nature.  The  pacific  character  of  these  fetes  was 
overcome  by  the  organization  of  the  C.  G.  T.  in  1900, 
which  immediately  commenced  agitation  for  direct  ac- 
tion. La  Voix  du  Peuple  in  its  number  of  May  1,  1903, 
advocated  the  American  theory  of  strikes  to  bring  about 
the  eight-hour  day.  Adoi)ting  this  point  of  view,  the 
Confederated  Congress  at  Bourges  in  ]1904  decided  that 
after  I\Iay  1,  1906,  no  worker  should  consent  to  work 
more  than  eight  hours  a  day.  Since  that  time  every 
May  Day  has  been  used  to  present  forci])ly  labor's  de- 
mands to  the  public  and  to  the  employers.  The  Con- 
gress at  Havre  in  1912  advocated  the  eight-hour  day 
and  the  forty-four  hour,  or  English,  week.  The  eight- 
hour  day,  as  noted,  was  again  advocated  in  the  Mini- 
mum Demands  of  1918.  Despite  the  passage  of  the  law 
incorporating  this  reform,  ]\Iay  Day,  1919,  was  more 
than  ever  calculated  to  impress  the  French  public  with 
the  strength  and  the  unity  of  the  working  classes. 

The  specific  demands  which  the  C.  G.  T.  asked  its 
organizations  to  urge  on  the  First  of  May,  were  ar- 
ranged as  follows: 

To  demand: 

The  eight-hour  day. 

An  amnesty  for  all. 

Rapid  and  complete  demobilization. 

A  just  peace  and  disarmament. 

To  protest  against: 

Intervention  in  Russia. 

The  form  of  the  present  tax  on  wages. 

The  state  of  siege. 

The  censorship. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  nearly  all  of  these  de- 
mands were  purely  political.     They  definitely  marked 

251 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  evolution  of  the  C.  G.  T.  toward  the  attainment  of 
political  ends  by  direct  action.  But  now  that  the  chief 
economic  demand  (the  eight-hour  day)  had  been  met, 
Labor  leaders  cautioned  against  violence.  Thus  the  Rail- 
way Federation,  upon  the  17th  of  April,  resolved  that 
"the  first  of  May  should  not  be  ...  a  cause  of  economic 
disorder."  On  the  18th,  the  C.  G.  T.  published  an 
a-ppeal,  defining  the  nature  of  the  manifestation :  ' '  The 
demonstration  will  be  made  with  calm  and  dignity.  To 
show  thoroughly  what  the  force  of  Labor  can  do  when 
it  is  disciplined,  work  will  be  resumed  the  second  of 
May  in  order  that  the  value  of  our  efforts  may  be 
judged." 

When  April  30th  arrived,  the  "cartel"  had  done  its 
work  well.  Preparations  had  been  made  for  the  almost 
complete  cessation  of  work  uix)n  the  following  day  in 
every  district  of  France.  Trains  were  to  stop  for  only 
three  minutes,  commencing  at  10  o  'clock ;  but  city  trans- 
portation facilities,  even  taxicabs,  were  to  stop  for  the 
entire  day.  The  post-office  employees  were  to  go  to  work 
two  hours  late  and  stop  two  hours  early.  No  news- 
papers were  to  be  published  except  La  Yoix  du  Peuple, 
the  official  organ  of  the  C.  G.  T.  The  Paris  Stock  Ex- 
change was  to  close.  No  hotels  or  restaurants  were  to 
serve  meals;  guests  were  not  even  to  be  given  hot  water 
to  shave  with.  In  Paris  it  was  estimated  that  750,000 
would  have  to  go  hungry.  Barber  shops  were  to  do  no 
business;  theaters,  music  halls, — all  places  of  entertain- 
ment,— were  to  be  dark.  Even  the  electric  plant  work- 
ers were  to  stop  for  two  hours.  The  Central  INIarkets 
were  also  to  be  closed.  In  short,  a  nation-wide,  silent 
but  impressive  strike  had  been  arranged  for,  to  prove 
that  labor  was  the  essential  factor  in  the  industrial 
world.      As    La    Vagwe    said,    "If    Labor    stops,    life 

252 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

stops.  .  .  .  But  is  Gold,  the  king  of  the  earth,  then 
nothing?  Yes,  it  is  notliing.  .  .  .  And  wlioever  has 
gold  by  privilege  or  by  birth,  and  does  not  earn  it  by 
labor,  is  supported  by  us  who  work.  They  eat  our 
corn,  inhabit  our  houses,  wear  our  clothes,  ride  in  our 
automobiles,  smoke  our  cigars.  .  .  ,  Then  are  they  para- 
sites? Yes,  they  are  parasites  like  the  mistletoe  on 
the  apple  tree." 

In  addition  to  the  general  strike  throughout  France, 
a  great  manifestation  or  parade  througli  the  streets  of 
Paris  had  been  planned.  The  direction  of  these  mani- 
festations was  obscure  from  the  first,  and  it  did  not 
fully  appear  until  after  the  fete  had  occurred.  But 
the  Government  upon  the  29th  of  April  did  what  many 
labor  leaders  and  Socialists  suspected  it  would  do, 
namely,  it  issued  a  note  forbidding  any  attempt  at  a 
Labor  parade  on  May  1st.  Consequently  it  was  with 
many  fears  that  the  Parisian  population  saw  the  light 
of  this  eventful  day. 

In  the  provinces  the  day  passed  like  a  New  England 
Sabbath.  There  was  little  activity  of  any  kind — even 
the  street  cars  refused  to  run.  In  the  afternoon  mass 
meetings  were  held  at  which  resolutions  were  adopted, 
asking  for  amnesty  and  the  raising  of  the  state  of 
siege,  and  protesting  against  intervention  in  Russia, 
At  the  close  of  the  meetings,  processions  formed  in  thQ 
streets  headed  by  the  "Red"  Flag,  while  the  crowds 
sang  the  "Internationale."^^     There  were  no  attempts 

"The  words  of  the  "Internationale"  are  as  follows: 

II  n  'est  pas  de  sauveur  supreme, 
Ni  Dieu,  ni  Cesar,  ni  tribun. 
Producteurs,  sauvons-nous  nous-memcs! 
Decretons  le  salut  commun! 

253 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

on  the  part  of  the  authorities  to  break  up  these  provin- 
cial manifestations,  to  capture  the  "Red"  Flag,  or  to 
muffle  the  communist  hymn.  Throughout  the  provinces 
the  First  of  May  passed  without  disorder  or  expressed 
ill-will. 

Things  were  different  in  Paris.  A  steady,  drizzling 
rain,  lasting  nearly  the  whole  day,  came  as  a  providen- 
tial help  to  the  French  police.  Their  task  was  to  stop 
the  great  demonstration  from  the  Place  de  la  Concorde 
to  the  Place  de  la  Republique,  which  the  C.  G.  T.  in- 
sisted should  be  cari'ied  on,  in  defiance  of  the  Govern- 
ment's prohibition.  The  morning  passed  quietly;  work 
everywhere  had  ceased.  Except  for  meals  served  out 
of  rear  doors  and  many  drinks  surreptitiously  secured 
through  temporary  "blind  pigs,"  idleness  reigned  su- 
preme. But  early  in  the  afternoon,  every  street  lead- 
ing to  the  Place  de  la  Concorde  had  been  barred  by  a 
cordon  of  police,  the  Republican  Guard  and  detach- 
ments of  cavalry  and  infantry.    Unable  to  get  through, 

Les  rois  nous  saoulaient  de  fumees, 
Paix  entre  nous,  guerre  aux  tyrans! 
Appliquons   la   greve   aux   armees, 
Crosse  en  I'air  et  rompons  les  rangs! 
S'ils  s'obstinent,  ccs  cannibales, 
A  faire  de  nous  des  heros, 
lis  sauront  bientot  que  nos  balles 
Sont  pour  nos  propres  generauxl 

Scfrain 

Debout!  les  damnes  de  la  terrel 
Debout!  les  formats  de  la  faim! 
La  raison  tonne  en  son  cratdre, 
C  'est   1  'eruption    de    la   fin. 
Du  passe  faisons  table  rase, 
Foule  esclavc,  debout,  debout! 
Lo  mondo  va  changer  de  base": 
Nous  ne  sommes  ricn,  soyons  tout! 

Quoted  in  W.  Morton  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  197, 
footnote. 

254 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

groups  of  workingmon  finallj^  gatliored  in  the  Rue 
Royale  in  front  of  the  Church  of  the  Madeleine,  where 
they  succeeded  in  forcing  their  way  beyond  the  first 
line  of  the  troops  and  the  police.  Cheering  the  poilus 
who  allowed  them  to  pass,  they  succeeded  in  getting 
into  the  Place  de  la  Concorde,  But  here  the  cavalry 
charged  and  the  parade  was  dispersed  into  groups,  each 
one  of  which  became  the  object  of  a  police  attack.  The 
manifestants  rushed  to  get  out  of  the  place,  and  the 
poilus  again  let  them  pass.  A  number  of  injuries  re- 
sulted. Whenever  a  "Red"  Flag  was  shown  it  was 
captured,  and  the  "Internationale"  was  squelched  with 
the  aid  of  a  fire-hose. 

Labor  leaders  now  attempted  to  reorganize  the  crowd 
at  the  Gare  du  Nord  and  the  Gare  de  I'Est.  The 
crowds  succeeded  in  breaking  through  the  police  cor- 
dons and  in  barricading  themselves  behind  the  station's 
gates.  On  the  arrival  of  new  crowds  the  police  began 
to  attack;  blood  flowed  freely  and  Red  Cross  ambu- 
lances found  much  to  do.  With  the  attacks  of  the  po- 
lice, the  mobs  became  more  violent,  breaking  windows 
and  tearing  up  tile  for  ammunition.  The  police,  it  was 
charged  by  the  Socialists,  drew  their  revolvers  and  fired 
steadily  for  four  minutes.  Seventy-five  minor  casual- 
ties resulted  from  the  fracas,  and  one  boy,  Charles 
Lome,  was  killed.  The  fusillade  eventually  succeeded 
in  breaking  up  the  mob.  ]\Ieanwhile,  three  Socialist 
Deputies,  MM.  Marcel  Cachin,  Paul  Poncet,  and 
Mayeras,  together  with  ^M.  Jouhaiix,  the  secretary  of 
the  C.  G.  T.,  were  trying  to  restore  order  among  the 
workingmen  and  to  parley  with  the  police.  But  they 
were  all  caught  in  one  of  the  assaults,  and  the  three 
Deputies  were  slightly  injured  in  body  and  mortally 
ruffled  in  dignity. 

255 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

The  First  of  May  in  Paris  ended  with  a  total  casualty 
list,  according  to  the  Prefect  of  Police,  of  428  wounded 
police,  nearly  as  many  wounded  civilians,  and  one  boy 
killed ;  118  arrests  had  been  made.  The  Socialist  argu- 
ment was  that  the  Government  had  hopelessly  antago- 
nized the  laboring  classes  by  its  refusal  to  tolerate  the 
manifestation,  a  right  which  the  Declaration  of  the 
Rights  of  Man  gave  to  them.  If  the  Government  had 
followed  the  policy  in  Paris  which  it  had  followed  in 
the  departments,  peace  and  order  would  have  been 
maintained. 

However,  there  was  widespread  criticism  from  the 
public  directed  toward  Labor.  Thus  La  Democratie 
Nouvelle  wrote : 

The  holders  of  public  authority  no  longer  give  orders  to 
the  citizens  in  the  name  of  the  law,  but  it  is  the  C.  G.  T.  In 
the  name  of  whom?  In  what  capacity ?  Can  such  a  condition, 
in  a  free  democracy,  be  tolerated?  This  is  a  nameless  tyr- 
anny !^^ 

The  Socialist  press  was  naturally  jubilant  at  the 
outlawry  of  the  mobs, — this  was  a  precursor  of  the 
Revolution.    Marcel  Cachin  wrote  in  L'Humanite: 

At  no  moment  in  no  country  has  the  First  of  May  been 
observed  with  such  fullness  and  Avith  such  unanimity.  Labor 
for  the  first  time  has  given  the  spectacle  of  its  all-powerful 
discipline  and  of  its  decisive  imjiortanee.  As  for  the  blood- 
shed, it  falls  entirely  upon  the  head  of  the  Government  who 
has  taken  it  upon  himself  to  oppose  a  peaceful  workers' 
movement  by  a  formidable  preparation  of  troops  and  of  po- 
hce.io 

In  the  same  number  Daniel  Renoult  more  bitterly 
attacked  M.  Clemenceau  as  follows : 

"Issue  of  May  .3,  1919. 
"Issue  of  May  2,  1919. 

256 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRvVM  AND  TACTICS 

This  most  incoherent  and  incapable  of  all  men,  .  .  .  has 
one  domain  in  which  he  rules :  the  police.  At  attacking  women 
and  children  in  tlie  streets,  M.  Georges  Clemenceau  is  a 
master. 

VI 

The  subsequent  action  of  the  Labor  and  Socialist 
leaders  largely  destroyed  whatever  sympathy  they  orig- 
inally had  with  the  French  people.  The  explanations 
given  by  the  Government  for  its  action  before  the  Cham- 
ber were  also  illuminating. 

The  Socialist  group  at  the  Chamber,  on  May  2nd, 
protested  against  the  Government's  interference  with 
the  parade,  and  decided  to  interpellate  it  upon  its 
actions.  The  administrative  commission  of  the  party, 
on  May  3rd,  took  similar  action,  congratulating  Labor 
for  its  disciplined  conduct,  and  placing  entire  respon- 
sibility for  the  riots  upon  the  Government.  Of  greater 
importance  was  the  resignation  of  M.  Jouhaux,  secre- 
tary-general of  the  C.  G.  T.,  from  his  position  as  labor 
delegate  of  the  French  Peace  Delegation.  In  a  letter 
to  M.  Clemenceau,  condemning  the  Government  for  sup- 
pressing the  manifestation,  he  said : 

The  principles  of  right  and  liberty  are  not  only  valuable 
in  diplomacy.  The  people  have  a  right  to  them.  ...  In  for- 
bidding a  demonstration  which  you  knew  would  be  entirely 
])a('ifie,  in  setting  your  police  and  the  aniiy  against  the 
Parisian  workers,  in  maltreating  with  an  unforgettable  bru- 
tality, men  and  women  who  only  made  use  of  an  essential 
liberty  granted  to  their  comrades  in  every  other  country,  you 
have  disregarded  the  devotion  and  the  sacrifice  which  the 
working  class  exhibited  during  the  war. 

The  resignation  of  M.  Jouhaux  was  followed  by  that 
of  two  others, — two  Socialist  Deputies  from  the  positions 

257 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

of  general  commissioners  in  the  Government, — ]M.  Bouis- 
son,  commissioner  for  the  merchant  marine,  and  M. 
Compere-Morel,  commissioner  for  agriculture.  It  will 
be  recalled  that  at  the  last  Congress  the  Socialist  party 
voted  to  cease  immediately  all  participation  in  a  bour- 
geois ministry.  The  delays  which  had  prevented  such 
a  cessation  were  now  overcome,  but  the  incident  of  the 
First  accelerated  this  separation  from  the  Government. 
Consequently  the  administrative  commission  of  the 
Socialist  party  "decided  as  a  result  of  the  incidents  of 
the  First  of  May  in  Paris,"  to  ask  the  two  Deputies  to 
resign  without  delay.  The  Socialists  thus  completed 
the  policy  which  their  Congress  had  adopted  of  declaring 
war  on  the  Government.  They  crowned  their  unreason- 
ableness on  May  6th  by  an  interpellation  which  was 
opened  by  Marcel  Cachin,  who  criticized  the  concentra- 
tion of  troops  in  Paris  and  again  asserted  the  peaceful 
intent  of  the  manifestation.  After  considerable  debate, 
M.  Pams,  Minister  of  the  Interior,  rose  to  respond  to 
the  interpellation  for  the  Government.  But  before  he 
could  say  a  word,  M.  Ernest  Lafont  demanded,  in  the 
name  of  the  Socialists,  if  the  Minister's  declaration  was 
to  be  the  only  one  which  the  Government  would  make 
and  if  the  President  of  the  Council,  M.  Clemenceau,  was 
not  to  explain  his  policy.  M.  Pams  replied  that  accord- 
ing to  parliamentary  custom,  and  as  the  police  were 
under  his  control,  he  had  come  to  respond.  The  Social- 
ists would  not  even  permit  him  to  finish ;  but,  with  the 
exception  of  three,  rising  in  a  group,  they  all  left  the 
Chamber  in  silence.  The  Socialists  had  talked  a  great 
deal  about  liberty,  but  as  M.  Delahaye  remarked  in  the 
debate,  they  did  not  care  to  grant  liberty  to  others,  even 
the  liberty  of  explanation.  There  seemed  to  be  little 
justification  for  their  ill-reasoned  action. 

.    258 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

M,  Pams  then  very  calmly  proceeded  to  explain  the 
Government's  position.  It  was  the  Government's  desire 
to  permit  the  manifestation  upon  the  First  of  May,  but 
it  felt  that  it  was  its  duty  to  take  precautions  in  certain 
questionable  centers.  It  had  authorized  the  prefects 
throughout  the  departments  to  permit  manifestations 
on  condition  that  the  labor  organizations  promise  to 
maintain  order.  At  Paris,  however,  things  were  differ- 
ent. Certain  sections  were  inhabited  by  dangerous  and 
foreign  elements,  zealous  to  overturn  order.  The  Gov- 
ernment had  awaited  propositions  from  the  C.  G.  T., 
as  to  means  of  safeguarding  such  a  manifestation.  The 
C.  G.  T.  manifested  no  desire  whatever  to  talk  the  mat- 
ter over.  But  upon  the  17th  of  April,  the  Minister  said, 
the  C.  G.  T.  itself  warned  its  members  of  the  dangers 
of  a  manifestation;  and  it  was  not  until  the  28tli  that 
it  announced  its  decision  to  hold  one.  This  decision 
appeared  to  have  been  taken  against  the  will  of  the 
majority.  A  man  by  the  name  of  Bertho,  an  anarchist, 
freed  from  a  prison  terra  of  two  years,  urged  the  Syn- 
dicalists to  hold  the  parade.  The  measure  was  passed 
by  a  majority  of  only  nine,  with  many  members  ab- 
sent. After  this  decision,  the  promoters  still  refused 
to  ask  the  Government  for  the  authorization  necessary 
under  the  state  of  siege.  With  such  conditions,  the 
Government  could  only  guard  the  public  security.  It 
had  tried  to  conciliate  the  mobs;  it  had  ordered  the 
troops  not  to  be  armed.  The  crowds  had  wounded  one 
fifth  of  the  police  force.  After  asserting  the  sincere 
desire  of  the  Government  for  social  reform,  M.  Pams 
said,  "No  reform  and  no  progress  can  be  accomplished 
in  a  civilized  nation  except  with  order  and  public 
peace." 

Although  the  statements  of  the  Minister  and  the  as- 
259 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

sertions  of  the  C,  G.  T.  were  contradictory  on  some 
points,  the  Chamber  completely  vindicated  the  former 
by  a  vote  of  confidence  of  338  to  1.  The  Socialists  and 
the  C.  G.  T.  were  again  on  the  defensive ;  and  they  were 
in  a  donbly  embarrassing  position  on  account  of  their 
rather  humorous  withdrawal  from  the  Chamber. 


VII 

Rumors  were  afloat  to  the  effect  that  the  C.  G.  T. 
would  soon  hold  another  manifestation,  as  a  protest 
against  the  First  of  May.  But  nothing  came  of  it  im- 
mediately, and  no  unusual  disturbances  in  the  Labor 
world  occurred  during  the  month  of  May.  Beginning 
with  the  last  days  of  ]\Iay,  however,  and  continuing 
through  June,  France  experienced  widespread  and  per- 
sistent strikes.  The  first  cause  of  these  strikes  was  the 
failure  of  the  Government  to  apply  the  eight-hour  day. 
Although  June  1st  had  been  the  date  set  for  its  applica- 
tion, employers  and  employees  could  not  agree  on  its 
details.  Wage  increases  were  another  demand ;  the  com- 
position of  so-called  discipline  councils  upon  which  la- 
borers were  to  be  represented,  was  yet  another.  The 
metallurgists  and  the  subway  employees  were  among 
those  who  threatened  to  stagnate  French  industry  com- 
pletely. Space  does  not  permit  the  discussion  of  the 
economic  demands  and  results  of  these  strikes.  An  at- 
tempt will  be  made,  however,  to  show  the  political  as- 
pirations of  some  of  them  and  why  they  failed. 

Although  originally  all  of  these  strikes  were  for  di- 
rect, economic  purposes,  indications  of  a  change  in  ob- 
jective were  soon  apparent.  On  June  5th  it  was  an- 
nounced that  the  iron-workers  of  Ivry  had  adopted  the 
following  purely  political  resolution : 

2G0 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

The  iron  woi'kers  of  Ivi"y,  15,000  in  munber,  prolesl  cner- 
g'elically  against  intervention  in  Russia ;  tliey  demand  imme- 
diate demobilization  and  tlie  innnediate  liberation  of  political 
and  military  prisoners.  They  place  the  realization  of  these 
demands  along'  with  their  others;  and  they  are  thoroughly  de- 
cided not  to  go  back  into  the  shops  until  all  of  these  questions 
have  been  settled. 

This  was  the  supreme  extension  of  the  Syndicalist 
plan, — the  control  of  the  government  by  direct  action. 
If  successful,  there  was  a  hope  that  from  such  a  con- 
trol, possession  of  the  government  might  eventually  be 
secured,  a  possession  which  was  the  incarnate  desire 
of  both  Socialists  and  Syndicalists.  Similar  expressions 
came  out  of  St.  Denis,  where  on  June  4th  the  following 
motion  was  voted: 

The  Inter-syndical  committee  of  St.  Denis,  transformed 
into  a  strike  committee,  decides  to  enter  into  relations  with  the 
regional  inter-syndical  com-mittees  to  examine  ...  if  it  is 
not  time  to  ask  the  C.  G.  T.  to  make  the  necessary  moves 
upon  the  government  to  oblige  it  to  leave  to  the  proletariat 
the  care  of  the  destinies  of  the  country. 

This  w'as  one  more  advance  toward  the  desire  for 
proletariat  control. 

The  strikers  on  the  Paris  subways,  however,  resisted 
this  revolutionary  movement,  for  on  June  5tli  they 
"affirmed  on  their  honor  that  the  strike  ...  is  ex- 
clusively economic.  ..."  Likewise  the  Administrative 
Commission  of  the  C.  G.  T.,  recognizing  the  hopelessness 
of  concerted  action  for  any  other  than  material  pur- 
poses, on  June  7th  declared  that  "these  strikes  have 
their  origin  in  the  resistance  encountered  to  the  appli- 
cation of  the  eight-hour  day.  ...  No  one  can  deny  the 
economic  character  of  these  movements.  .  .  .  The  work- 

261 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ing  class  intends  to  conserve  the  original  character  of 
these  strikes."  Thus  the  anarchist  and  syndicalist 
agitators  at  work  in  divers  federations  received  a  direct 
check  from  the  supreme  Labor  body. 

But  even  this  did  not  silence  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment, for  the  Union  of  the  Syndicates  of  the  Seine  at 
the  same  time  published  a  note  registering  "with  satis- 
faction, the  new  spirit  of  the  working  classes  which  no 
longer  limits  their  aspirations  to  ends  of  a  uniquely 
material  order."  And  the  Railwaj^  Federation  passed 
a  defiant  resolution  which  read:  "Considering  that 
the  Russian,  Hungarian,  and  German  revolutions  have 
the  only  governments  which  apply  the  principles  which 
we  have  always  defended ;  and  that  capitalist  expropria- 
tion remains  the  principal  object  of  our  propaganda 
and  our  action,  ...  we  favor  immediate  action  to  stop 
the  circulation  of  all  trains  carrying  troops  and  war 
supplies,  except  leave  trains,  in  order  to  prevent  the 
enterprises  of  the  Government  against  the  strikes  in 
course,  against  the  peoples  in  revolution,  and  against 
refractory  soldiers." 

If  the  railwaymen  had  been  successful  in  carrying 
out  this  policy,  their  complete  victory  over  the  Govern- 
ment and  Labor's  assumption  of  power  would  have  been 
assured. 

At  the  same  time  agitation  for  a  general  and  sympa- 
thetic strike  grew  up ;  at  a  meeting  of  the  "cartel," 
on  June  10th,  it  was  decided  to  "apply  measures  of 
solidarity  which  will  rapidly  assure  the  victory  of  the 
professional  demands  af  the  miners  and  the  marines." 
Meanwhile,  the  C.  G.  T.  had  been  won  over  to  the  idea 
of  a  political  strike,  internationally  organized,  and  was 
conferring  with  labor  delegates  from  England  and 
Italy.     On  the  24th  of  June  the  metal  workers  asked 

262 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

the  "cartel"  to  support  their  demands  by  a  general 
strike  also.  But  after  a  long  and  vigorous  debate,  the 
idea  of  a  sympathetic  strike  was  given  up.  The  "cartel" 
refused  to  support  such  a  strike  in  the  case  of  the 
metal  workers,  but  "it  declared  itself  in  favor  of  an 
international  demonstration,  which  was  already  being 
organized. 

This  international  strike  was  decided  upon  at  South- 
port,  England,  upon  the  27th  of  June.  In  agreement 
with  British  and  Italian  Labor  leaders,  the  C,  G.  T. 
decided  to  hold  a  twenty-four  hour  demonstration 
against  (1)  the  imperialism  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  (2) 
Allied  intervention  in  Russia,  and  for  (3)  immediate 
demobilization,  (4)  full  amnesty,  and  (5)  the  reestab- 
lishment  of  constitutional  liberties.  The  only  economic 
demand,  one  which  the  strike  could  not  hope  to  settle 
but  rather  to  attenuate,  was  for  (6)  the  reduction  of 
la  vie  chere. 

In  accordance  with  this  agreement,  the  C.  G.  T.  or- 
ganized elaborate  plans  for  a  nation-wide  strike,  sur- 
passing in  extent  that  of  the  First  of  May.  No  de- 
mands were  to  be  made  for  the  improvement  of  Labor 
conditions;  it  was  not  a  question  of  using  the  bargain- 
ing power  of  Labor  to  force  Capital  to  terms  possible 
for  it  to  make.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  another  po- 
litical demonstration,  a  protest  against  so-called  bour- 
geois oppression  and  stupidity.  If  it  succeeded  it  would 
prove  the  tremendous  political  power  of  the  proletariat 
and  would  be  of  fundamental  importance  to  the  Syn- 
dicalists and  the  Socialists,  being  the  first  step  in  or- 
ganizing Labor  for  the  purpose  of  completely  assum- 
ing the  direction  of  society  by  force. 

The  strike,  however,  did  not  occur,  or  rather  it  was 
"postponed," — again  proving  the  impossibility  of  or- 

263 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ganizing  Labor  in  a  demonstration  from  -which  it  would 
receive  no  direct  value.  The  reasons  for  the  failure  of 
this  strike,  which  had  been  set  for  the  21st  of  July, 
were  three.  The  first  was  the  firm  attitude  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. As  members  of  the  C.  G.  T.,.the  railway  men, 
the  members  of  the  postal  and  telegraph  service,  and 
other  Government  officials  were  planning  to  obey  the 
orders  of  the  Supreme  Labor  Body  to  strike  on  the 
21st.  This  would  have  resulted  in  the  disruption  of 
vital  public  services  which  the  Government  decided  it 
could  not  tolerate.  Consequently,  on  the  10th  of  July, 
after  a  special  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  M. 
Claveille,  Minister  of  Transportation,  addressed  a  note 
to  the  federation  of  railway  men,  which  stated  that  the 
stoppage  of  transportation,  especially  during  the  time 
of  reconstruction  and  of  demobilization,  "would  con- 
stitute a  veritable  crime  against  the  nation."  Those 
who  hindered  the  operation  of  the  public  services  upon 
the  21st,  were  threatened  with  prosecution  before  the 
Councils  of  War.  A  similar  note  was  sent  by  other 
Ministers  to  functionaries  in  their  services.  This  firm 
attitude  of  the  Government,  although  defied  by  the  C. 
G.  T.  authorities,  was  somewhat  disquieting  to  the  rank 
and  file  of  their  following,  who  did  not  relish  the  man- 
handling which  the  Council  of  War  usually  gave  offend- 
ers brought  before  it.  This  perhaps  was  one  of  the 
greatest  causes  for  the  strike's  failure. 

A  second  reason,  and  one  arising  from  the  first,  was 
the  attitude  which  many  of  the  organizations  of  the 
C.  G.  T.  took  toward  the  strike.  Like  the  Socialist 
party,  the  C.  G.  T.  was  divided,  rather  indistinctly,  into 
Conservative  and  Radical  factions.  The  Conservatives, 
led  by  M.  Jouhaux  and  including  most  of  the  func- 
tionaries lately  adherent  to  tlie  C.  G.  T.,  were  for  the 

2G4 


SYNDICAI.ISM:  rJi()(;i^AAl  AND  TACTICS 

strike  in  a  lukcwann  lasliioii,  or  not  at  all.  The  Kadi- 
cals,  wlio  now  wore  getting  the  supremacy,  were  com- 
pletely for  the  strike;  while  the  extreme  Radicals  were 
dissatisfied  with  a  mere  strike  of  twenty-four  hours. 
They  advocated  a  strike  of  unlimited  duration,  to  end 
only  when  the  workers  should  have  appropriated  the 
goods  and  control  of  society.  Beginning  with  the  First 
of  May  and  through  tactics  familiar  to  unscrupulous 
minorities,  it  seemed  as  if  the  Radicals  were  going  to 
force  their  hand. 

However,  the  demand  for  another  strike  on  the  21st 
of  July,  made  for  no  apparent  economic  purpose,  and 
in  defiance  of  the  Government's  prohibition,  was  re- 
sented by  many  of  the  semi-bourgeois  elements  of  the 
C.  Gt.  T.,  who  had  joined  it  because  of  its  great  bar- 
gaining i)ower,  merely  to  secure  salary  ameliorations. 
On  the  8th  of  July,  the  men  on  the  Paris-Etat  railway 
declared  that  they  were  firmly  attached  to  the  pursuit 
of  professioiial  demands,  but  that  they  opposed  wdth  all 
their  force  the  commands  of  the  C.  G.  T.  to  engage  in 
a  political  strike.  Despite  a  renewed  appeal  from  the 
C.  G.  T.  on  the  14th  of  July,  the  P.  L.  ]\I.  railway  men 
who  met  in  Dijon  the  next  day,  made  a  similar  declara- 
tion. The  employees  of  the  ]\Iidi  line,  in  a  meeting  at 
Toulouse,  likewise  decided  not  to  strike.  At  a  gathering 
in  Strassburg,  the  delegates  of  sixteen  labor  organiza- 
tions, representing  78,000  to  80,000  members  in  Alsace 
and  Lorraine,  highly  disapproved  of  this  strike,  which 
was  "inspired  by  purely  political  reasons."  The  agri- 
cultural syndicates  of  Montpellier  unanimously 'revolted 
against  the  strike ;  on  the  16th  the  dramatic  artists 
decided  not  to  join  it ;  while  different  organizations  of 
functionaries  sent  in  protests  daily. 

The  third  reason  for  calling  off  the  strike,  and  that 
265 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

■which  the  C.  G.  T.  leaders  named  as  the  principal  one, 
was  the  assurances  given  by  the  Clemenceau  Govern- 
ment. The  President  of  the  Council  called  the  leaders 
of  the  C.  G.  T.  into  conference  with  him  on  the  18th 
of  July.  He  assured  them  that  the  Government  would 
take  every  means  to  prevent  the  strike,  but  that  it 
would  also  speed  up  demobilization,  introduce  a  project 
of  amnesty,  freeing  150,000  prisoners,  and  immediately 
solve  the  cost  of  living.  During  the  interview,  M.  Jou- 
haux  received  a  note  stating  that  M.  Boret,  Minister 
of  Agriculture,  had  just  fallen  at  the  Chamber  by  a 
.vote  of  227  to  213,^'^  upon  a  motion  condemning  the  eco- 
nomic policy  of  the  Government.  He  did  not  open  the 
note  until  after  the  session,  and  labor  leaders  asserted 
that  the  outcome  of  the  conference  would  have  been 
different  if  he  had.  The  press,  however,  stated  that  M. 
Jouhaux  was  already  aware  of  the  Minister's  defeat 
from  a  delegate  arriving  late. 

At  any  rate,  on  the  evening  of  the  18th,  after  a  long 
session,  the  Administrative  Commission  of  the  C.  G.  T. 
adopted  a  resolution  which  stated: 

After  studying  the  situation,  it  rejects  the  measures  taken 
by  the  Government  concerning  the  cost  of  living,  but  recog- 
nizes the  new  situation  created  by  the  vote  of  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  which  has  heard  the  voice  of  the  working  class 
condemning  the  economic  policy  of  the  Government; 

It  recognizes,  on  the  other  hand,  the  dispositions  drawn  up 
under  the  menace  of  the  projected  strike,  concerning  amnesty 
and  demobilization; 

It  therefore  deems  that  a  new  examination  of  the  situation 
has  become  necessary,  .  .  .  and  that  the  demonstration  of 
July  21  shall  be  postponed. 

"►Sec  p.  .^2G. 

26G       ' 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

In  this  manner  the  greatest  effort  made  in  France 
to  bring  abont  an  exclusively  political  strike,  failed. 
Along  with  those  previously  cited,  this  attempt  showed 
the  improbability  of  securing  the  adherence  of  work- 
men to  a  movement  in  which  no  other  than  political  de- 
mands are  to  be  made.  Proudhon's  words,  "Jamais 
au  grand  jamais,  il  ne  satisfera  les  appetits  dc  la  multi- 
tude, procedat-il  a  un  partage  general.  .  .  .  L'Ouvrier, 
I'ignorant,  I'insolent,  I'intraitable,  tetu,  veut  etre  le 
maitre  des  fabriqucs,  maitre  de  I'Etat,  qu'il  pretend 
gouv^rner;  11  a  pris  au  pied  de  la  lettre  sa  sou- 
verainete,"  may  be  true  so  far  as  the  desires  of  Labor 
are  concerned.  But  when  it  comes  to  realizing  them, 
the  cost  is  too  much. 

The  failure  of  these  strikes  which  had  been  attempted 
for  other  than  purely  economic  reasons,  is  perhaps  the 
most  convincing  answer  to  the  whole  argument  of  Syn- 
dicalism which  Georges  Sorel  so  effectively  advances  in 
his  interesting  book,  entitled.  Reflections  mi'  Vio- 
lence. M.  Sorel  believes  that  the  enthusiasm  of  revo- 
lution, brought  about  by  the  burning  conviction  that 
existing  conditions  are  unrighteous,  is  the  only  force 
which  can  stimulate  workingmen  to  that  high  plane  of 
sacrifice  necessary  to  introduce  the  Marxian  order.  Con- 
flict is  the  very  essence  of  faith,  even  in  religion,  he 
asserts;  whenever  Catholicism  succeeds  in  stamping  out 
Protestantism  and  has  no  other  enemies  to  conquer,  its 
followers  soon  lose  the  holy  zeal  which  once  inspired 
them.  If  Labor  is  to  be  content  with  purely  economic 
gains,  it  will  never  be  aroused  to  the  consciousness  of 
its  full  grandeur  and  the  potentiality  of  its  o^vn 
strength.  "When  working-class  circles  are  reasonable, 
as  the  professional  sociologists  wish  them  to  be,  M-hen 
conflicts   are   confined   to    disputes   about   material   in- 

267 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

terests,  there  is  no  more  opportunity  for  heroism  than 
when  agricultural  syndicates  discuss  the  subject  of  the 
price  of  guano  with  manure  merchants.  ,  .  . "  ^^ 

The  recent  efforts  of  the  French  syndicalists  to  carry 
out  this  theory  must  be  disappointing  to  the  doctri- 
naires who*  have  furnished  them  with  their  principles. 
Perhaps  the  working  classes  are  as  incapable  of  real 
"heroism"  to-day  as  the  capitalists.  Perhaps  the  very 
comfort  which  they  derive  from  a  period  of  inflated 
wages  and  from  the  benefits  of  concerted  action  has 
dulled  their  souls  to  the  essential  "injustice"  of  the 
place  which  they  now  hold  in  the  existing  social  order. 

Whatever  be' the  reason,  French  experience  seems  to 
establish  the  fact  that  direct  action  has  its  limitations. 
The  strike  is  a  powerful  weapon  when  it  is  used  for 
the  accomplishment  of  immediate  and  "reasonable" 
ends  (despite  M.  Sorel).  But  when  its  purpose  lies 
beyond  this  point  and  attempts  to  secure  the  fulfillment 
of  some  political  end — of  benefit  to  working  people 
generally,  but  not  affecting  them  intimately  and  indi- 
vidually as  does  a  wage  increase — the  strike  is  likely  to 
fail.^"  The  very  materialism  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
Marxian  order  permits  of  no  martyrs  except  when  the 
end  to  be  achieved  is  immediately  at  hand. 

Furthermore,  society  is  demanding  that  direct  action 


"  Beflcctions  on  Violence,  246. 

"The  amount  of  wages  lost  by  tlie  strikes  in  June,  1919,  was: 

Francs 

Metal  workers '  strike   1 2.'5,()()l),()()() 

Chemical  workers    29,000,000 

18,000   transport  workers    , 58,500,000 

26-(lay  strike  in  mines   58,500,000 

270,000,000 
Tiie  kno\vle(i(2;e  of  these  tremen<lous  losses  is  an  ample  deterrent 
to  strikes  witliout  an  economic  purpose. 

268 


SYNDICALISM:  PROGRAM  AND  TACTICS 

for  the  acc'omplislinient  of  political  oiuls  give  Avay  to 
political  action.  It  demands  that  it  be  spared  the  con- 
stant interruptions  which  industrial  disorders  enforce. 
For  this  reason,  and  because  of  the  limitations  of  direct 
action,  the  creation  of  political  parties  by  Labor  seems 
to  be  inevitable.  In  fact,  if  Labor  will  give  up  its  fre- 
quently muttered  threat  of  direct  and  open  revolution, 
the  development  of  political  organizations  among  work- 
ingmen  is  to  be  welcomed. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE   PRESS  AND   THE   CENSORSHIP 


II  faut  que  I'ecrivain  puisse  tout  dire,  mais  il  ne  saurait  lui 
etre  pei-mi.'i  de  tout  dire,  de  toute  manirre,  en  toutes  circon- 
stances  et  a  toutes  sartes  de  personnes. — Anatole  France. 


Occupying  a  very  large  part  in  political  life,  French 
newspapers  are  quite  as  important  as  parties.  In  fact, 
they  constitute  one  of  the  most  unique  characteristics 
of  French  politics,  while  they  reflect  in  an  illuminating 
manner  the  qualities  of  Gallic  temperament.  Unlike 
American  newspapers  which  at  least  feign  an  aloofness 
from  party  groupings  and  an  independence  in  opinion, 
more  fictitious  than  real,  French  papers  are  frankly 
partisan;  they  openly  ally  themselves  with  party  doc- 
trines if  not  with  party  groupings.  They  serve  some 
cause  with  the  greatest  intensity ;  th-ey  turn  every  politi- 
cal news  item  to  their  own  profit,  regardless  of  content. 
Thus  the  Royalist  press  does  not  confine  itself  to  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  justice  or  the  injustice  of  some  particular 
Labor  demand.  But  after  playing  the  trouble  up  to 
complete  hopelessness,  it  cries  for  the  return  of  the 
King  as  the  only  solution.  Similarly,  the  Socialist 
press  will  never  discuss  a  matter  such  as  foreign  policy 
upon  its  merits.  Instead  of  weighing  the  respective 
claims  of  the  Czechs  and  the  Poles  to  Teschen,  for  ex- 

270 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSTTTP 

ample,  it  dispatches  the  whoh^  matter  as  another  in- 
stance of  Allied  imperialism  which  the  hourgeoisie  can 
never  eradicate. 

There  is  nothing  lukewarm  about  French  news- 
papers,— they  have  no  half-way  opinions.  Instead  of 
being  swayed  by  political  thought,  they  attempt  to 
direct  it.  Editors  are  chosen,  when  they  do  not  choose 
themselves,  chiefly  because  of  their  ability  for  pungent 
criticism.  The  advantage  of  this  stimulating  feature  of 
the  French  paper  is  that  it  arouses  a  vigorous,  healthy 
public  opinion  upon  political  subjects.  But  at  the  same 
time,  it  is  very  difficult  actually  to  judge  French 
opinion  from  these  printed  utterances.  Their  eifusive- 
ness,  the  fact  that  they  are  always  in  the  service  of 
some  cause,  necessitates  their  being  discounted  as 
authoritative  representatives  of  French  thought.  To 
judge  French  people  by  their  newspapers  would  be  like 
judging  the  American  people  by  several  dozen  Ap- 
peals to  Reason,  or  Meiwces.  Representing  a  small  ele- 
ment of  thought,  perhaps,  each  paper  more  often  is  an 
excrescence  rather  than  the  substance  itself. 

A  French  paper  is  not  an  institution ;  it  is  a  personal- 
ity. Ordinarily  much  smaller  than  the  most  diminutive 
rural  weekly  in  America,  the  war  cut  its  size  down  to 
four  pages  four  times  a  week  and  two  pages  three  times 
a  week.  The  small  proportions  of  a  French  newspaper, 
coupled  with  the  predominant  position  the  editorial 
plays,  make  it  a  purely  individualistic  aifair.  The 
editorial  always  appears  on  the  first  page,  and  often  in 
larger  type  than  the  articles  surrounding  it.  There  are 
usually  two  or  three  of  the  editorials  occupying  the 
greater  part  of  the  sheet,  while  the  news  is  crowded  off 
to  the  side  or  on  the  back.  There  is  absolutely  no  ano- 
nymity about  a  French  paper.     If  editorials  are  not 

271 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

sidled,  as  they  usually  are,  every  one  knows  who  writes 
them,  and  the  editor's  name  must  always  appear  on  the 
top  of  the  sheet.  The  editorial  is  very  personal;  it  ac- 
cepts full  responsibility  for  everything  it  says ;  but  this 
is  no  deterring  factor,  for  it  pounds  everything  and 
everybody.  It  has  life,  it  is  important,  and  consequent- 
ly it  is  read. 

The  small  dimensions  of  the  French  paper  have  sev- 
eral advantages.  First,  it  allows  men  and  movements  of 
limited  means  to  start  a  journal  and  give  public  ex- 
pression to  their  ideas.  Liberty  of  opinion  in  America, 
so  far  as  its  printed  expression  is  concerned,  is  largely 
a  constitutional  fiction,  because  of  the  tremendous  cost 
of  a  newspaper  establishment.  In  France,  how^ever, 
any  one  can  go  to  Paris  and  put  a  paper  into  every 
kiosque,  competing  with  the  wealthiest  sheets  in  town. 
News  does  not  matter  so  much,  so  long  as  the  editor  is 
able  to  write.  As  for  printing,  there  are  any  number 
of  plants  ready  to  run  his  stuff  off.  The  more  startling 
and  the  more  original  his  paper  is,  the  more  it  will  sell. 
From  among  the  present  diversity  of  French  opinion, 
he  is  practically  certain  of  finding  enough  readers  at 
least  to  pay  expenses. 

At  the  same  time,  the  small  size  of  the  French  news- 
paper makes  it  liable  to  ready  purchase.  On  all  sides 
one  hears  of  this  and  that  edition  being  bought  over, — 
either  to  stop  attacks  or  to  commence  them.  The  secret 
funds  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  are  liberally  spent 
in  subsidizing  pro-Government  newspapers.^  In  fact, 
many  Frenchmen  accuse  Le  Temps  of  receiving  such 
support.  Gustave  Ilerve  and  La  Victoire  arouses  much 
more  suspicion.     His  transformation  has  been  remark- 

*In  peace  times  they  amount  to  1,000,000  francs  a  year;  during 
the  war  this  sum  was  increased  to  an  annual  figure  of  25,000,000. 

272 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSTITP 

able.  Originally  one  who  urged  the  peasantry  to  plant 
their  "country's  flag  in  the  dung-heaps"  (which  won 
for  him  the  appellation  of  "Sans-Patrie"  IIer\'e),  he 
became  so  thoroughly  nationalistic  shortly  after  the  war 
that  he  was  expelled  from  the  Socialist  party.  He  has 
even  appeared  to  desert  liberal  principles,  for  in  the 
Flume  trouble,  La  Victoire  urged  the  settlement  of  the 
question,  not  upon  principle,  but  with  the  sole  view 
of  maintaining  Italian  friendship,  whatever  the  cost. 
The  friends  of  M.  Herve  say  he  has  undergone  a  real 
change  of  heart.  His  enemies,  with  a  sly  wink,  say  it 
is  money  that  has  done  it.  Although  Americans  are 
rather  incredulous  at  believing  such  accusations,  to 
Frenchmen  they  offer  a  very  logical  explanation  for  an 
otherwise  inexplicable  somersault. 

The  case  of  Le  Journal,  which  Senator  Humbert, 
MM.  Lenoir,  Desouches,  and  Ladoux  were  accused  of 
trying  to  purchase  with  German  funds  for  defeatist 
puri)oses,  was  a  better  founded  example  of  corrup- 
tion. The  case  came  to  trial  in  the  early  spring  of  1919. 
Although  the  Senator  was  acciuittcd,  the  other  gentle- 
men were  convicted  of  dealing  witli  the  enemy.  As  the 
Senator  now  owns  Lc  Journal,  and  as  it  is  one  of  the 
most  widely  read  papers  in  France,  its  reputation  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  harmed  by  the  accusations  made 
against  it. 

Le  Bonnet  Bouge  case  was  a  still  more  notorious 
example.  Although  its  editor,  M.  Almereyda,  was  mys- 
teriously killed  in  prison,  another  gentleman  connected 
with  it,  ]\I.  Duval,  Avas  convicted  of  receiving  several 
hundred  thousand  francs  in  IMay,  1917,  from  Germany, 
as  a  reward  for  defeatist  propaganda.  After  a  long 
trial  before  the  Council  of  War,  he  was  sentenced  to 

273 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

death  and  shot  at  Vincennes;  seven  of  his  accomplices 
were  likewise  convicted. 

The  case  of  Le  Populaire,  Jean  Longuet  's  minoritaire 
Socialist  paper,  is  perhaps  the  most  scandalous  of  all. 
It  has  been  repeatedly  accused  of  being  financed  by 
German  funds,  an  accusation  made  plausible  by  Lon- 
guet's  German  connections,  he  being  a  grandson  of 
Karl  IMarx.  Throughout  the  war  it  led  an  insistent 
campaign  against  the  war  and  against  the  Government 
in  power.  Some  Frenchmen  explain  why  Le  Populaire 
was  never  suspended  from  publication  bj^  a  very  choice 
piece  of  scandal:  That  Clemenceau  is  Longuet 's  god- 
father! an  explanation  made  the  more  interesting  be- 
cause both  gentlemen  are  now  professed  atheists. 
Whether  such  an  accusation  is  true  or  not,  it  is  an  in- 
teresting side  light  upon  the  workings  of  French  poli- 
tics. At  any  rate,  during  the  Socialist  Congress  at 
Easter,  Socialist  opponents  were  delighted  at  the  insin- 
uation which  Pierre  Renaudel,  the  former  editor  of 
L'TIumanite,  the  official  paper  of  the  party,  made  upon 
April  21  when  Longuet  was  taunting  Renaudel  as  to 
the  decline  of  its  circulation  under  his  management. 
At  this,  in  the  midst  of  a  tremendous  uproar,  Renaudel 
angrily  replied:  "Where  docs  Le  Populaire  get  its 
money  from?"  M.  Longuet  denounced  the  implication 
as  villainous;  the  Congress  appointed  a  committee  of 
inquiry;  while  L' Action  Fray^-gaise,  which  at  one  time 
or  another  during  the  war  had  accused  most  of  its  con- 
temporaries of  treason,  gloated  over  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  another  of  its  accusations. 

These  examples  will  show  how  surcharged  the  at- 
mospliere  of  Paris  journalism  is  with  recrimination  and 
accusation.  Tlie  cliarges  are  seldom  establislied  and  less 
frequently  repudiated.     A  paper's  reputation,  instead 

274 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

of  being  injured  by  them,  seems  to  be  improved.  At 
any  rate,  it  api)ears  that  they  flourish  under  it. 

Tlie  small  size  of  the  French  press  contributes  to 
multiplicity  in  number.  New  York  City  may  have  a 
dozen  morning  papers ;  Paris,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
at  least  fifty.  Not  only  in  newspapers,  but  in  every 
class  of  periodical,  there  is  the  greatest  fecundity. 

Although  the  predominance  given  to  editorials  may 
be  the  greatest  strength  of  the  French  paper,  it  is  also 
in  many  instances  the  chief  source  of  its  weakness.  In 
fact,  the  papers  Avhich  are  the  most  partisan  in  edi- 
torial policies  are  least  informed  as  to  news.  They 
prefer  to  occupy  space  with  editorials;  news  which 
they  do  print  is  colored  to  suit  their  partisanship.  The 
Socialist  press  is  perhaps  the  most  at  fault  in  this  re- 
spect. Although  a  large  part  of  the  laboring  class 
loyally  support  L'llummiite,  they  are  forced  to  buy  an- 
other paper  if  they  want  to  know  what  is  going  on.  At 
the  Socialist  Congress  in  April,  Jean  Longuet,  editor  of 
Le  Populaire,  said  he  would  never  print  any  news 
against  the  Bolsheviki  because  that  task  is  being  ably 
performed  by  the  bourgeois  press.  Other  papers,  such 
as  L' Action  Frangake,  for  the  Royalists,  and  La  Demo- 
cratie  Noiivelle,  for  the  new  party  of  that  name,  have 
the  same  fault  to  a  less  extent. 

A  different  angle  of  the  French  conception  of  news 
is  illustrated  by  the  celebrated  Landru  case.  Landru 
was  a  modern  Bluebeard,  accused  of  seducing  and 
murdering  a  large  number  of  beautiful  women  in  a 
country  villa.  Investigations  were  excitedly  carried  on 
for  months,  resulting  principally  in  the  exhuming  of 
cats  and  other  pets  of  the  departed  women.  The  ease 
filled  enormous  amounts  of  space  in  all  the  Paris  papers, 
and  it  became  a  prominent  subject  of  conversation.   But 

275 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

according  to  some  French  newspapermen,  the  case  was 
a  newspaper  fiction,  solely  created  to  keep  tlie  public 
interest  from  moping  upon  the  stupidity  of  the  Peace 
Conference  l^  Although  this  story  was  somewhat  belied 
by  the  fact  that  accusations  were  being  made  after  the 
Peace  Conference  had  closed,  they  may  prove  to  be  a 
consummating  touch  to  a  masterful  work  in  human 
psychology. 

The  inadequacy  of  the  news  service  of  the  purely 
political  press  is  overcome  by  a  number  of  very  reli- 
able papers  in  Paris  which  simply  denominate  them- 
selves as  Republican.^  Nominally,  they  are  non-partisan 
and  independent;  and  they  follow  no  fixed  editorial 
policy.  Le  Matin,  Le  Journal,  Le  Petit  Journal,  and 
Le  Petit  Parisien  are  journals  of  this  type.  Their  news 
service  is  usually  accurate  and  complete;  and  although 
some  Frenchmen  scoff  at  them  as  "shopkeepers' 
papers,"  it  is  surprising  to  note  that  they  have  a  larger 
circulation  than  the  purely  political  papers.  Their 
popularity  justifies  their  existence.  Frenchmen  crave 
news  as  a  necessity ;  the  expression  of  political  opinion 
is  more  of  a  delicatesse. 


II 


The  chief  representative  of  the  Monarchist  and  Cath- 
olic press  is  L' Action  FranQadse,  one  of  the  unique 
■papers  in  France  despite  the  fact  that  it  possesses  but 
little  influence.     This  paper  was  originally  founded  by 

'  Tlic    Landru    case    reminds    one    of    Anatole    France's    story, 

'  Those  papers  arc  often  known  as  La  Grande  Presse,  for  they 
maintain  large  newspaper  establishments.  The  more  political 
papcra  are  known  as  La  Presse  d'()pi7iion,. 

27G 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

Henri  Vaugeois,  and  its  political  direction  is  now  in 
the  militant  hands  of  Charles  Maurras  and  Leon 
Dandet.  Tlie  latter  is  the  son  of  Alphonse  Uaudet,  the 
well-known  author  of  the  Lcttres  de  Man  MauUin, 
Tartarin  de  Tarascon,  and  other  widely  read  pro- 
ductions. Daudet,  the  younger,  daily  occupies  the  two 
left-hand  columns  of  the  L' Action  with  an  article 
usually  full  of  scathing  invective.  Intensely  per- 
sonal in  his  accusations,  he  heaps  scalding  abuse  upon 
every  public  man  from  Clemenceau  down  to  Briand. 
He  brings  the  most  inclusive  charges  and  makes  the 
most  sweeping  statements ;  the  only  wonder  is  that  he 
has  not  been  subject  to  an  endless  stream  of  libel  suits. 
These  he  has  probably  escaped  because  of  his  skill  in 
indefiniteness  and  because  there  is  practically  no  libel 
law  in  France.  He  defied  "Viviani  to  remain  in  power 
forty-eight  hours  wdthout  the  protection  of  the  censor"; 
last  April  he  accused  Briand  of  intriguing  to  overthrow 
the  Clemenceau  Ministry;  he  even  went  so  far  as  to 
name  the  cabinet  Briand  had  selected.  In  his  treason 
accusations, — and  he  takes  the  credit  for  the  conviction 
of  ]\lalvy  and  Le  Bonnet  Rouge,  he  has  used  his  powers 
to  the  greatest  advantage.  "Squint-eyed  crooks,  trai- 
tors, liars,  and  bandit-fiends,"  quail  under  his  mighty 
assaults. 

Charles  Maurras  is  the  exact  opposite  in  style  and  in 
temperament.  A  very  learned  man,  he  exhibits  little 
bitterness  in  his  editorials,  although  he  expounds  mon- 
archist doctrines  with  the  greatest  firmness.  Under  the 
title  of  La  Politique,  he  daily  occupies  two  columns  with 
a  discussion  of  everything  from  the  canonization  of 
Joan  of  Arc  at  Rome  to  the  defects  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  A  keen  and  clever  writer,  he  is  widely  read 
by  his  political  opponents. 

277 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Jacques  Bainville,  an  accomplished  diplomatic  writer, 
Maurice  Pujo,  Avho  is  usually  attacking  tlie  Socialists, 
and  Louis  Dimier,  are  other  members  of  this  remarkable 
editorial  staff.  Between  the  five  of  them,  mere  news  is 
completely  submerged. 

An  interesting  story  is  told  of  L' Action  Frangaise  ac- 
tivities during  the  war.  A  French  priest,  acting  as  cen- 
sor for  a  certain  military  unit  (and  in  that  capacity), 
obtained  some  very  damaging  information  against  the 
Government  which  he  illegally  transmitted  to  the  royal- 
ist paper.  The  information  concerned  a  German,  living 
in  France,  who  fraudulently  obtained  American  nat- 
uralization papers.  He  then  bribed  Government  officials 
so  that  several  of  his  relatives  were  taken  out  of  the 
trenches  and  sent  to  the  rear.  Naturally  the  publica- 
tion of  this  scandal  would  be  a  great  triumph  for  Leon 
Daudet,  and  undoubtedly  result  in  the  fall  of  the  Minis- 
try. But  the  Government,  in  turn,  held,  two  pieces  of 
evidence  incriminating  L' Action  Frangaise.  The  first 
was  that  the  priest  in  question  had,  while  a  censor,  re- 
vealed confidential  infonnation  from  which  the  Govern- 
ment could  stir  up  another  anticlerical  struggle;  the 
second  was  that  the  Government  had  obtained  a  list 
which  L' Action  Frangaise  had  compiled  of  army  officers 
who  at  the  time  of  a  revolution  had  promised  to  bring 
their  troops  under  the  banner  of  Philippe  VIII.  By  a 
mutual  agreement,  both  parties  kept  quiet. 

La  Vieille-F ranee  is  not  a  newspaper  and  it  can 
scarcely  be  called  a  magazine.  But  withal,  it  is  one 
of  the  most  interesting  and  most  unreasonable  publica- 
tions in  France.  It  appears  once  a  week,  and  the 
reader  is  always  assured  of  getting  his  eight  cents' 
worth.  Its  editorial  policy  is  fixed  only  upon  two 
points — it  is  uproariously  anti-Semitic,  and  as  far  as 

278 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

the  censor  permitted  it,  it  is  insistently  anti-American. 
It  contains  absolutely  no  advertising,  yet  it  consists  of 
thirty  pages  an  issue.  How  it  is  financed  is  a  popu- 
lar mystery.  It  is  generally  supposed  that  Urbain 
Gohier,  its  irrepressible  editor,  gladly  foots  the  bills  in 
order  to  appear  so  prominently  in  the  public  light.  M. 
Gohier  is  a  very  eccentric  gentleman,  and  if  hearsay  is 
reliable,  he  also  exhibits  the  common  journalistic  pro- 
pensity to  change  political  faiths  as  frequently,  almost, 
as  a  suit  of  clothes.  Ten  or  fifteen  years  ago  he  edited 
a  Socialist  paper  in  Grenoble.  Now,  however,  the  So- 
cialists and  the  Bolsheviki  are  his  principal  objects  of 
attack. 

His  unholy  hatred  of  the  Jews  is  illustrated  by  the 
following  gleanings: 

The  French  will  not  enter  Frankfort.  But  the  people  of 
Frankfort   have   never  left  Paris.  . 

Reinaeh  at  the  Figaro, 
Gruenbaum  at  the  Government, 
Stern  at  the  Chamber, 
Cahen,   Kahn,   Weill,   Basch,    Bernstein,   Rappoport,   Passim. 
Rothschild    evei-ywhere. 

Paris  is  a  suburb  of  Frankfort. 

In  its  advocacy  of  the  annexation  of  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine,  La  Vieille-France  said: 

The  Jews  will  not  allow  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  to  be 
returned  to  Gaul  because  the  populations  of  these  provinces 
are  foriowers  of  the  Catliolic  reli.uion  and  their  incorporation 
with  France  would  perhaps  brin^-  about  an  awakening  of 
our  enervated  Catholics  against  Semitism.  It  is  consequently 
necessaiy  to  choose  again  between  the  vital  interests  of  France 
and  the  will  of  Jewi-y 

There  is  an  abyss  between  the  French  and  the  German. 
But  there  are  twenty  abysses  between  the  Jew  and  the  French- 
man. 

279 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

He  proclaims  his  weekly  as  "the  rallying  point  for 
honest  and  courageous  men,"  and  he  is  so  convinced 
that  his  strength  is  the  only  protection  of  France  that 
he  announced  that  La  Vieille-France  is  the  last  ob- 
stacle which  hinders  the  complete  conquest  of  France 
by  the  Hebrews'. ' '  ^ 

]\I.  Klotz,  Minister  of  Finance ;  M.  Rothschild,  the 
great  financier;  Joseph  Reinach,  the  prominent  writer; 
M.  Mandel,  Clemenceau's  secretary,  are  all  mercilessly 
berated  merely  on  account  of  their  origin.  This  ex- 
treme position  would  be  humorous  unless  it  were  for  the 
fact  that  it  represents  a  serious  anti-Semitic  feeling  in 
France.^ 

The  most  conservative  paper  in  Paris  next  to  L' Action 
Franqaise,  if  judged  from  its  Peace  Conference  edi- 
torials, is  L'Echo  de  Paris.  At  present  directed  by 
Henry  and  Paul  Simond,  it  is  the  official  mouthpiece 
of  the  Action  Liherale  Populaire  party.  It  is  strongly 
nationalistic  in  opinion,  as  shown  by  the  frequent  edi- 
torials by  Maurice  Barres.  The  pseudonyms  oi  L'Echo  de 
Paris  are  its  distinction ;  Custos  is  a  regular  contributor 
upon  domestic  policies  ;  and  Pertinax,  a  writer  on  foreign 
affairs,  has  perhaps  attracted  wider  attention  in  Paris 
and  abroad  than  any  other  commentator  on  the  Peace 
negotiations.  His  name  and  French  chauvinism  are 
synonymous.  As  a  sturdy  reenforcement  of  his  con- 
servative philosophy,  he  possesses  an  accurate  knowl- 
edge of  foreign  history  and  politics. 

Le  Temps,  founded  in  1860  and  which  L' Action  Fran- 
qaise calls  the   "greatest   paper  in  the  Republic,"  is 

*  For  Ooliicr's  .anti-Amoricaiiisiu  see  Chapter  XV;  various  news- 
paper opinions  on  foreign  ail'airs  arc  given  there  also, 

Mt  is  a  remarkable  paradox  that  one  of  the  most  bitter  anti- 
Semitic  as  well  as  j)ro-cleriea]  papers  in  Paris,  Le  Gaulois,  is 
edited  by  a  German  Jew,  Arthur  Meyer! 

280 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSIITP 

■without  question  the  loading  journal  in  Franco ; 
strangely,  it  is  also  the  least  influential.  Larger  in  size 
than  its  competitors,  using  a  better  grade  of  paper, 
very  subdued  in  make-up,  it  presents  a  real  literary  ap- 
pearance. Its  Bulletins  du  Jour,  wliich  occupy  its  left- 
hand  column,  are  known  the  world  over  for  their 
scholarly  treatment  of  diplomatic  affairs.  Tliey  are 
also  regarded  as  being  the  mouthpiece  of  the  French 
Foreign  Affairs  office.  It  was  by  his  writing  of  this 
column  that  Andre  Tardieu  first  won  his  recognition 
as  a  diplomatic  autliority.  M.  Jean  Ilerbette  is  said 
to  write  them  now.  Le  Temps  is  the  organ  of  the  great 
bourgeoisie.  Consequently  it  is  quite  conservative  in 
policy;  but  it  has  always  stood  for  certain  reforms. 
Though  it  is  supposed  to  be  partly  subsidized  by  the 
Government,  it  does  not  hesitate  to  criticize  it  caustical- 
ly. It  was  an  ardent  critic  of  the  Government's  State 
Socialist  policies,  it  was  particularly  urgent  for  electoral 
reform,  and  the  chief  feature  of  its  foreign  policy  was 
the  destruction  of  German  unity.  Its  foreign  corre- 
spondence is  excellent  and  authentic.  Its  editorial 
policy  is  vigorous.  It  is  indeed  strange  that  it  is  not 
more  widely  read  for  it  is  a  credit  to  France  and  to 
French  journalism.  Can  it  be  that  the  chief  reason 
for  its  neglect  is  that  it  is  a  two-penny  paper  while 
the  more  popular  journals  sell  at  one?  * 

'  Among  other  members  of  the  conservative  press  may  be  men- 
tioned Lc  Gaulouf,  an  organ  of  the  old  nobility;  La  Croix,  a  cleri- 
cal paper  ■with  104  provincial  editions,  ■which  carried  on  a  vigorous 
campaign  against  the  Koiuiblic  at  the  time  of  the  Dreyfus  affair; 
L'Intransigcant,  La  Liberie,  Le  Figaro,  edited  formerly  by  the 
ill-fated  Gaston  Calmctte;  L'Ordre  Public,  just  starteil  in 
1919;  and  Le  Journal  dcs  Debnis  edited  by  Auguste  Gauvain,  a 
distinguished  diplomatic  authority.  All  of  these  papers  are  of 
some  influence;  but  they  are  more  moderate  than  their  con- 
temporaries discussed  above. 

281 


CONTEm^ORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

III 

A  paper  of  the  "milieu" — conservative,  as  shown  by 
its  anti-Wilson  attitude  and  its  attacks  on  the  Socialists, 
radical,  in  its  demands  for  internal  reform.  La  Dcmo- 
cratie  No'uvelle  is  rapidly  attracting  a  wide  reading. 
This  paper  is  a  mere  child  in  the  curious  family  of 
Parisian  papers,  but  its  husky  cries  for  domestic  reform 
assure  it  a  vigorous  growth.  It  was  founded  in  1917  by 
M.  Letailleur,  who  writes  under  the  pseudonym  of 
Lysis,  whose  books  upon  the  reorganization  of  France 
are  widely  circulated.  As  a  leader  of,  the  party  of  the 
"New  Democracy,"  this  paper  attacks  the  anti-Semitic 
movement  as  a  reopening  of  religious  struggles;  it  in- 
sists upon  the  union  of  classes  and  consequently  it  be- 
rates the  Socialists;  and  it  is  continually  offering  sug- 
gestions for  the  improvement  of  French  commerce  and 
government.  Andre  Cheradame,  whose  books  on  Pan- 
Germanism  are  well  known,  contributed  frequent 
articles  commenting  upon  the  diplomatic  situation  dur- 
ing the  Peace  Conference,  As  will  be  noted  in  another 
chapter,  JM.  Cheradame  has  a  good  grasp  of  diplomatic 
problems,  but  like  many  authorities  upon  military 
strategy,  he  shows  a  complete  lack  of  sympathy  with 
any  other  than  strictly  military  principles. 

The  Radical  Press  is  not  very  strong.  In  the  supple- 
ment of  the  brochure  giving  the  account  of  the  Thir- 
teenth Congress  of  the  Radical  and  Radical  Socialist 
party  at  Pau,  1913,  a  list  of  about  thirty-five  journals 
is  found  of  "adherents  of  the  party."  Of  these  but 
about  half  a  dozen  are  Parisian  papers,  of  which  only 
two  or  three  in  1919  were  to  be  found  in  the  news  stands. 
La  Lantcme,  bitterly  anticlerical,  was  founded  forty- 

282 


THE  TRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP      ' 

tliree  years  ago ;  Le  liappcl  is  another  Radical  i)apcr  of 
limited  circulation.  Lc  Pays,  scarcely  three  years  old, 
and  edited  by  Gaston.  Vidal,  is  a  paper  of  the  Radical 
Socialists.  L'TTomme  Lihre,  formerly  L' Homme  En- 
chainc,  until  it  had  to  change  its  name  to  continue  pub- 
lication, is  a  Radical  paper  only  in  so  far  as  it  supports 
Clemenccau,  its  former  editor.  Doubtless  because  of  its 
enforced  neutrality,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  as  widely 
read  as  in  the  early  days  of  its  belligerency.  L'CEuvre 
lias  radical  tendencies,  but  is  a  completely  independent 
paper.  It  is  also  a  child  of  the  war;  Gustave  Tery  is 
its  editor ;  his  particular  hobbies  are  regionalism  and  the 
defects  in  the  French  bureaucracy.  An  insistent  oppo- 
nent of  secrecy  at  the  Peace  Table,  it  declared  as  early 
as  November  15,  1918,  "Le  grand  jour  et  le  franc  jeu, 
voila  dcsormais  les  deux  premieres  conditions  d'un 
gouvernement  do  la  Republique  francaise. "  Tery  later 
wrote,  ' '  The  peace  of  the  world  cannot  be  assured  by  a 
few  men  whispering  in  a  salon  at  the  Palais  d'Orsay, 
outside  of  which  neither  the  peoples  nor  their  repre- 
sentatives know  anything  except  from  distorted  in- 
formation which  filters  through  the  cracks  in  the  doors 
or  through  half-split  walls." 

The  chief  weakness  of  Paris  journalism  is  that  there 
is  no  great  Radical  paper,  standing  for  the  liberal,  dem- 
ocratic principles  in  Avhicli  the  greater  part  of  the 
French  people  believe.  The  strong  papers  are  extrem- 
ist ;  that  is,  they  are  either  too  conservative  or'  too  radi- 
cal. Although  in  the  past  a  policy  of  democratic  mod- 
erateness has  been  pursued  by  provincial  papers,  no  out- 
standing journal  in  Paris  now  has  such  a  program,  and 
the  creation  of  such  a  journal  is  a  great  need. 

The  case  of  Gustavo  Ilerve  and  La  Victoire  has  al- 
ready been  mentioned.    In  politics,  La  Victoire  is  now 

283 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

supposed  to  support  national  socialism,  but  no  differ- 
ence between  it  and  the  Radical  press  can  be  seen.  In 
addition  to  Ilerve,  Andre  Liclitenberger  is  a  regular 
contributor  to  this  widely  read  sheet.  His  characteristic 
style  may  be  judged  from  the  following  squib  comparing 
Germany  to  a  restive  cow : 

"WTiat  shall  we  do  with  her?  Deprive  her  of  food  .  .  .  and 
let  her  perish  of  want  for  our  revenge  ?  What !  Take  re- 
venge on  a  brute?  No,  this  is  what  we  shall  do.  After  having 
passed  a  strong  iron  ring  through  her  nose  to  insure  against 
surprise,  we  shall  feed  and  take  care  of  her  just  so  far  as 
it  is  necessary  to  keep  her  in  a  fit  state  to  work  for  us  and  to 
supply  us  with  milk.  .  .  .  Her  horrid  calf — the  German  peo- 
ple— will  be  permitted,  at  stated  times,  to  approach  his 
mother.  For  it  won't  do  for  him  to  perish,  either.  But  it 
goes  without  saying  that  we  shall  not  let  him  enjoy  himself. 
He  will  be  endowed  with  a  good  muzzle  ornamented  with 
nails.  It  will  be  removed  long  enough  for  him  to  suck  just 
as  much  as  is  necessary.  It  will  then  be  replaced  in  order 
that  all  the  milk  which  is  not  indispensable  to  him  will  go 
to  feed  our  own  children.  ...  It  will  be  seen  that  my  rea- 
sons for  treating  Genuany  with  care  do  not  arise  from  an 
excess  of  humanitarianism,  but  rather,  I  think,  from  a  most 
concrete  and  prosaic  regard  for  our  own  interests.  ...  In 
other  words,  let  us  not  kill  the  goose  which  lays  the  golden 


IV 


A  product  of  a  very  effective  organization,  the  Social- 
ist newspapers  arc  the  most  numerous  and  the  strongest 
in  Paris.  It  is  remarkable  how  so  large  and  varied 
number  of  sheets,  representing  not  only  the  party,  but 
different  sections  of  it,  can  be  financed.  The  National- 
ists accuse  them  all  of  having  Jewish  or  German  sup- 
port ;  but  perhaps  the  real  source  of  their  success  is 
in  party  organization  and  in   the  contributions,  liow- 

284 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

ever  small,  from  a  large  class  wliicli  feels  that  its  in- 
terests are  vitally  aided  by  sympatlietie  newspapers. 

L'Humanite  is  the  most  nnicjue  and  the  most  success- 
ful attempt  at  a  newspaper  solely  and  officially  devoted 
to  and  supported  by  a  political  party.  This  paper  was 
founded  by  Jean  Jaures  sixteen  years  ago.  Under  his 
direction,  until  his  death  at  the  eve  of  the  war,  it  ex- 
i:)ericnced  few  difficulties  and  little  criticism.  The  out- 
break of  the  "war  and  its  progress,  as  we  have  seen, 
brought  about  serious  divisions  in  the  party  which 
placed  L'llumanite  in  a  difficult  position.  Pierre  Re- 
naudel  had  succeeded  Jaures  as  the  political  director 
of  the  paper.  Although  he  was  a  supporter  of  the  Gov- 
ernment and  in  sympatliy  with  the  old  majoritaire  ele- 
ment, he  did  not  openly  ally  himself  with  any  division 
because  of  his  responsil)ility  to  the  paper  which  should 
at  least  attempt  neutrality.  In  L'Humanite,  however,  he 
loyally  supported  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  As  long 
as  the  major  it  aires  kept  their  majority,  Renaudel's  posi- 
tion was  maintained.  But  he  was  subject  to  repeated 
attacks  from  the  minoritaires;  and  because  of  the  cau- 
tious policy  the  paper  was  compelled  to  adopt,  and  be- 
cause of  the  rise  of  journals  supporting  the  different 
sections  of  the  party,  the  circulation  of  L'Huniamte 
dropped  from  about  150,000  in  July,  191-4,  to  39,163  in 
August,  1918.  The  blame  for  this  decrease  was  fastened 
upon  Renaudel  by  the  minoritaires  who,  after  the  meet- 
ing of  the  National  Council  in  the  summer  of  1918,  were 
strong  enough  to  cause  him  to  resign.  A  special  com- 
mittee of  fifteen  was  then  appointed  to  supervise  the 
paper,  and  its  immediate  direction  was  confided  to  Mar- 
cel Cachin.  Culminating  events  such  as  the  Villain 
trial,  the  Easter  Congress,  and  the  demobilization  of 
many  Socialists,  made  Cachin 's  direction  a  success.    Its 

285 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

daily  sales  in  October,  1918,  amounted  to  5G,700;  but 
this  number  on  April  17,  1919,  increased  to  140,800,  or 
nearly  the  average  maintained  under  Jaures'  editor- 
ship. 

La  France  Libre  was  born  with  the  division  of  the 
Socialist  party,  it  being  only  two  years  of  age  in  1919. 
It  represents  the  elements  who  were  once  the  majori- 
taires,  the  moderate  Socialists  who  gave  the  war  their 
support.  It  opposes  the  extreme  socialism  of  Loriot; 
and  when "  the  other  members  of  the  Socialist  family 
were  cheering  the  Bolsheviki,  La  France  Libre  was  vig- 
orously criticizing  them.  Like  L'Hiimanite,  its  edi- 
torials are  usually  written  by  sympathetic  deputies.  It 
is  edited  by  Compere-Morel,  Arthur  Rozier,  and  Adrien 
Veber. 

Le  Populaire,  edited  by  Jean  Longuet,  is  the  organ 
of  the  new  majority  of  the  Socialist  party.  Although  it 
is  only  four  years  old,  this  journal  presents  some  re- 
markable features.  Its  reports  of  labor  and  Socialist 
movements  throughout  the  world  are  very  instructive. 
Openly  sympathetic  with  the  Bolsheviki,  it  was  through 
the  columns  of  Le  Populaire  that  their  response  to  the 
Prinkipo  proposal  was  given  to  the  Peace  Conference. 
M.  Chicherin,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Bolsheviki 
Government,  on  January  24,  1919,  sent  a  telegraphic  re- 
sponse to  Le  Populaire  while  the  official  reply  was  being 
transmitted  to  their  representative  in  Sweden.  This 
was  a  novel  way  of  carrying  on  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence and  it  raised  a  storm  of  criticism  against  Le  Popu- 
laire. The  editorial  staff  of  this  paper  is  notable.  Al- 
though the  editor-in-chief  is  Paul  Faurc,  Longuet  com- 
pletely dominates  it.  Phedon,  another  pseudonym,  is  the 
direct  opposite  of  Pertinax,  but  he  equals  him  in  con- 
demning the  Peace  Conference.     Possessing  a  remark- 

286 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

able  knowledge  of  international  affairs,  his  logic  fre- 
quently nettled  the  more  conseientions  supporters  of  tlie 
Conferenee ;  but  his  destructive  and  propagandist  pur- 
poses weighed  heavily  against  the  influence  of  his  arti- 
cles. Finally,  Henri  Barbusse,  one  of  the  best  known 
literary  w'riters  in  France,  is  the  literary  editor  of  Le 
Populaire.  Usually  his  novels  are  printed  in  daily  in- 
stallments before  their  publication  in  book  form. 

Still  further  "advanced,"  as  the  revolutionary  So- 
cialists prefer  to  call  themselves,  is  Le  Journal  du  Peu- 
ple,''  edited  by  Henri  Fabre.  It  now  for  four  years  has 
brought  sympathy  to  the  revolutionists,  terror  to  the 
worshipers  of  order,  and  hatred  to  Leon  Daudet.  Le 
Journal  du  Pen  pie  does  not  trouble  itself  a  great  deal 
about  news  or  even  diplomatic  discussions.  It  directs 
its  tirades  against  the  rich,  American  jazz  bands,  and 
other  matters  of  grave  politics.  Its  text  is  the  Revolu- 
tion. "^Ye  are  not  responsible  for  it — it  is  you,  the  cul- 
pables,  who  are  forcing  us  into  another  revolt  which 
will  win  what  1789  left  undone."  With  what  sarcasm, 
it  writes  en  manchettc,  "Once  more  Clemenceau  has 
been  assassinated — ^but  it  is  the  worker  Lome  who  is 
dead!" 

The  most  violent  of  the  Socialist  papers  is  La  Vague, 
a  little  four-page  weekly.  It  is  edited  by  M.  Brizon,  one 
of  the  delegates  to  the  Kienthal  conference,  and  a  com- 
patriot of  Loriot.  It  is  now  in  the  second  year  of  its 
existence.  La  Vague  announces  itself  as  "Pacifistic, 
Feministic,  Socialistic,"  while  above  all  of  these  char- 
acteristics, it  very  contradictorily  declares  itself  as  a 

'A  Joiirnal  du  Pcuple  existed  ns  early  as  lcS41;  in  1843,  how- 
ever, it  changed  its  name  to  La  licfornve,  forsaking  its  socialistic 
sympathies  for  the  democracy  of  the  Lcdru-Eollin  type.  Cam- 
hridgc  Modern  History,  xi,  24. 

287 


CONTEIVIPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

"Jmirnal  du  Conibat."  Its  editorials  are  the  most  vio- 
lent. They  range  from  the  "Fourth  Republic,"  "The 
Sabotage  of  Liberty,"  and  "The  Beast,"  to  the  "Old 
World  Condemned."  After  this,  the  "Greatest  of  all 
Wars  will  come,"  the  war  of  the  proletariat,  and  "the 
greatest  of  all  Revolutions."  "The  Worker's  Spring- 
time is  here,  the  springtime  of  new  Republics.  .  .  . 
It  is  the  springtime  of  the  new  world.  Down  with  the 
wicked  beasts  who  rove"  and  who  devour  the  fruits 
which  Labor  should  itself  procure. 

Notre  Voix  is  a  new  representative  of  the  Socialist 
press.*  As  a  typically  "intellectual"  journal  it  devotes 
itself  chiefly  to  literary  subjects.  The  series  of  cartoons, 
running  as  cover  pages,  and  strongly  reflecting  upon  the 
so-called  justice  of  the  last  war,  is  remarkable.  Some 
of  them  have  been  so  severe  that  they  have  been  sup- 
pressed by  the  censor.  The  following  poem  illustrates 
the  spirit  of  Notre  Voix: 

L'APPEL 

Nous  sommes  les  cerveanx,  les  araes  et  les  torses, 

Manqiierions-nons  de  volontc, 
.  Pourqnoi  n'osons-nous  i)as  le  beau  geste  de  force 
De  liberer  la  Liberie? 

Nous     vivons  aujourd'hui  comrne  vivent  entr'eux 

Las    eloitres  dans  les  inonasteres, 
Nous  semblons  accepter,  avec  un  coeur  heureux, 

La  loi    qui  dit :    "11  faut  se  taire." 

Le  peuple  n'est-il    done  qu'un  Ocean  qui  porte 
Les  orgueilleux  steamers     riches  de  cargaisons? 

Pourquoi  ses     flots  dresses  en  des  tenipetes  fortes 
Ne  menacent-ils  pas  les  ports  a  I'borizon'? 

*  La  Politique,  L  'Hcure,  and  La  Verite  are  three  other  Socialist 
papers. 

288 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

Etre  le  nombre    et  n'etre  rien.    MaLs  les  bles  levent 

Car  c'est  la  loi  du  Temps  et  le  droit  de  la  Seve, 
Qu'iniporte  les  vieillards  qui  serrent  le  Pouvoir, 

Fobrilement  ainsi  qu'un  avare  iin  sac  d'or. 
Qu'importe  les  peureux  dont  le  eoeur  bat  moins  fort 

Que  le  tros  lent  tic  tac  d'une  horloge. — L'Espoir 
Avec  SOS  poin2:s  tendus  ou  ses  mains  qui  travaillent 

Est  le  bon  general  qui  gaqne  la  Bataille 
Sans  enrogimenter  les  homines  en  troupean, 

Nous  voulons  un  pays  plus  large  qu'un  drapeau, 
Et  s'il  faut  pour  batir  des  lendemains  de  joie 

Abattre  les  Prisons,  les  Banqnes,  les  Palais 
Ou  TAccuse,  eoupable  ou  non,  est  une  proie 

Si  I'avenir  le  veut,  eh  bien  abattons-les. 

Mais  si  vous  n'osez  pas  ee  geste  necessaire, 

Peuples,  rosigiiez-vous, 
Portez  le  lourd  fardeau  des  impots  et  des  guerres, 

Aimez  le  baton  et  les  coups, 
Et  taisez-vous!  .  .  . 

Such  is  the  French  press.  It  now  may  be  seen  why 
the  newspapers  of  France  are  not  representative  of 
opinion.  Many  of  them  are  read  for  curiosity  and 
amusement.  The  Monarchist  will  try  to  buy  La  Vague 
every  Thursday  just  as  the  Socialist  will  do.  lie  counts 
himself  lucky  to  get  one  before  the  issue  is  sold  out. 
Likewise  people  of  all  classes  will  read  L' Action  Fran- 
caise;  and  even  though  they  may  agree  with  Baudot's 
and  Maurras'  indictments,  they  may  not  accept  their 
solutions.  The  remarkable  thing  about  the  French 
press  is  that  the  least  representative  paper  is  the  best 
edited.  This  naturally  attracts  readers  unsympathetic 
with  the  cause  for  which  the  paper  stands.  Consequently 
when  the  L' Act  ion  Franqahe  says  it  has  more  than 
doubled  its  circulation  within  the  last  four  years,  it 
does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  number  of  French 

289 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Ro3'alists  lias  increased  to  that  extent.  It  means  that  the 
^var'  has  provided  an  extraordinarily  interesting  theme 
for  the  Orleanist  journal  to  -write  "upon.  La  Vague 
claims  to  have  a  hundred  thousand  readers.  Yet  by  no 
means  are  there  a  hundred  thousand  workers  in  France 
■who  desire  an  immediate  revolution.  Frenchmen,  as 
much  as,  if  not  more  than,  Americans,  read  for  pleasure. 
Nevertheless  they  do  not  take  their  newspapers  serious- 
ly. The  extremeness  of  the  press  reacts  upon  its  influ- 
ence. It  contributes  to  its  saleability,  which,  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  newspaper,  perhaps  is  of  the  chief  im- 
portance. 


In  normal  times  the  legal  restrictions  upon  the 
French  press  are  very  limited.  Any  newspaper  may  be 
published  without  authorization  or  without  the  deposit 
of  security.  It  is  only  necessary  to  place  a  declara- 
tion with  the  proper  authority  before  publication,  giv- 
ing the  title  of  the  publication,  the  name  and  the  resi- 
dence of  the  editor,  and  the  name  of  the  establishment 
printing  it.  Every  journal  must  have  a  director  who  is 
a  French  citizen  in  full  enjoyment  of  his  civil  rights. 
Every  publication  must  bear  the  name  and  the  address 
of  the  printer.  It  is  not  necessary  that  articles  be 
signed,  as  they  usually  are ;  but  at  the  time  of  publica- 
tion of  each  issue,  two  copies  signed  by  the  director 
must  be  delivered  to  a  court  of  first  instance.  Another 
deposit  must  be  made  for  Paris  with  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior.  As  to  individual  responsibility  the  director  of 
a  paper  is  obliged  to  print  a  reply  of  any  person  whom 
he  has  named  or  designated  in  his  paper.  Furthermore, 
if  a  libelous  statement  is  printed,  both  the  director  and 

■  290 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

the  author  of  the  article  can  be  brought  before  a  cor- 
rectional court.  Journals  published  in  foreign  coun- 
tries and  those  printed  in  France  in  a  foreign  lan- 
guage are  subject  to  police  control.® 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  naturally  placed  restrictions 
upon  the  freedom  of  the  press.  On  August  5,  1914,  a 
law  was  passed  "suppressing  the  indiscretions  of  the 
press  in  time  of  war,"  which  prohibited  under  the  se- 
verest penalties,  the  publication  of  information  and  of 
intelligence  upon  everything  directly  relating  to  the 
national  defense,  except  what  the  Government  or  the 
military  authorities  should  communicate  to  it.  The  law 
specified  particularly  mobilization  operations,  the  trans- 
portation of  troops  and  of  material,  the  strength  of  the 
army,  nomination  and  changes  in  the  high  command, 
the  disposition,  location  and  movement  of  armies  and 
of  the  fleet.  The  law  finally  broadened  the  scope  of  the 
censorship  by  including  "any  information  or  article 
concerning  military  or  diplomatic  operations  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  favor  the  enemy  and  to  exercise  a  vexa- 
tious influence  on  the  spirit  of  the  army  and  of  the 
population."  The  law  was  to  become  invalid  after  the 
cessation  of  hostilities  at  a  date  to  be  fixed  by  a  Govern- 
mental decree., 

Although  this  law  was  very  broad,  giving  the  Govern- 
ment considerable  liberty  of  interpretation,  it  did  not 
'  establish  a  preliminary  censorship,  but  simply  pro- 
vided a  penalty  for  the  violation  of  the  law.  This 
penalty  was  from  one  to  five  years'  imprisonment  and 
from  two  hundred  to  a  thousand  dollars'  fine.  Although 
the  law  did  not  determine  the  authority  to  interpret 

"For  the  press  law  of  July  29,  1881,  embodying  these  pro- 
visions see  A.  Carpentier,  Codes  ct  Lois  pour  la  Franco,  I'Algerie 
ct  les  Colonies,  ii,  881. 

291 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

and  enforce  the  censorship,  it  was  generally  recognized 
that  such  a  task  would  fall  on  the  judiciary.  However, 
as  those  familiar  with  the  French  censorship  know, 
there  existed  a  preliminary  censorship — and  of  matter 
not  included  in  the  law  of  August  5,  and  it  was  the  mili- 
tary, not  the  judicial  authorities,  which  interpreted 
and  enforced  it.  Because  of  this,  it  was  natural  that 
many  newspapers  should  attack  the  censorship  admin- 
istration as  illegal ;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  censor- 
ship did  not  rest  upon  the  law  of  August  5,  but  upon 
the  declaration  of  the  State  of  Siege,  made  August  2, 
and  later  confirmed  by  a  law  of  August  5.^°  The  effects 
of  the  State  of  Siege  are  laid  down  by  a  law  passed  on 
August  9,  1849,  the  chief  result  of  which  is  to  sub- 
stitute the  military  for  the  civil  authority.^^  Normal 
guarantees  of  individuals  are  suppressed  by  it ;  military 
tribunals  are  given  cognizance  of  crimes  against  the 
safety  of  the  Republic,  against  the  Constitution,  against 
order  and  the  public  peace.  The  military  is  also  given 
the  right  of  perquisition  and  the  right  to  prohibit  pub- 
lications and  meetings  which  it  judges  of  a  nature  to 
excite  disorder.  By  this  latter  authority  the  French 
Government  maintained,  from  the  declaration  of  the 
State  of  Siege  to  October  13,  1919,  a  censorship  limited 
in  power  solely  to  its  own  judgment. 

The  establishment  of  the  censorship  was  announced 
to  the  newspapers  in  a  note,  August  4,  which  said :  ' '  The 
Government  counts  on  the  good  and  patriotic  will  of  the 

'"  In  case  of  the  ailjournnieiit  of  the  Chambers,  the  President 
of  the  Kcpublic  may  dechTro  the  8tato  of  Siege  with  tlic  con- 
sent of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  but  the  Cliambcrs  must  be 
assembled  two  days  afterward  and  either  confirm  or  reject  tho 
President's  action. 

"Tho  law  of  the  State  of  Siege,  of  August  9,  1819,  may  bo 
found  in  Codes  et  Lois  pour  la  France,  l' Algeria  ct  Ics  Colonies, 
compiled  by  A.  Carpcnticr,  ii,  431. 

292 


THE  PRESS  AND  TTIE  CENSORSHIP 

press  of  all  parties,  at  Paris  and  in  the  i)rovin.ees,  not 
to  publish  any  information  concerning  the  war,  what- 
ever may  be  its  source,  its  origin  or  nature,  without 
having  it  visecd  by  the  press  bureau  established  at  the 
Ministry  of  War." 

The  composition  of  this  bureau  varied,  but  it  was 
always  of  an  exclusively  military  character  in  member- 
ship and  in  policy.  In  the  provinces,  it  was  usually 
directed  by  commissions  created  by  the  Prefects,  subject 
to  control  by  the  press  bureau  of  the  War  Ministry  at 
Paris.  As  penalties,  the  Government  decreed  that  if  a 
paper  published  an  article  which  the  censor  refused  to 
vise,  it  was  warned  for  the  first  offense;  for  the  second, 
it  might  be  suspended  for  a  period  arbitrarily  set.  Sus- 
pension from  publication,  which  was  ordered  by  a  deci- 
sion of  the  "President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers"  was 
accompanied  by  the  seizure  of  all  the  copies  of  the  jour- 
nal suspended. 

In  three  respects,  then,  the  French  censorship  ex- 
ceeded that  established  by  Parliament  in  1914.  It  was 
administered  by  military  authorities,  it  was  preventative 
(preliminary  to  the  publication  of  an  article)  and  uni- 
versal, and  it  extended  to  matters  not  included  in  the 
law  of  August  5. 

The  censorship,  thus  constituted,  knew  no  bounds;  it 
censored  subject  matter  for  which  there  appeared  to  be 
no  justification,  news  which  was  given  complete  public- 
ity in  other  countries.  Furthermore,  it  repeatedly  dis- 
criminated in  its  applications ;  news  and  opinions  of  an 
identical  nature  were  denied  to  some  papers,  while  their 
publication  was  allowed  to  others. 

L'Europe  NauvcUe,  an  outspoken,  liberal  weekly,  felt 
the  censor's  lash  as  frequently  as  any.  Often  whole 
columns  of  foreign  news  would  appear  blank  except  for 

293 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

a  line  explaining  that  "230  lines  had  been  censored." 
On  November  9,  the  censor  prevented  it  from  saying 
that  certain  clauses  in  the  Austrian  armistice  caused 
considerable  emotion  among  the  Croats  and  Slavs,  when 
the  entire  English  and  Italian  press  was  full  of  con- 
troversies over  it.  It  was  even  prohibited  from  speak- 
ing of  the  movement  in  Spain  for  a  revision  of  the  Con- 
stitution. Likewise,  it  could  not  comment  upon  the  No- 
vember electoral  campaign  in  the  United  States  when 
L'EcJw  de  Paris  was  allowed  to  publish  unfair  dis- 
patches from  its  New  York  correspondent  about  it.  It 
was  forbidden  to  cite  certain  articles  in  the  program 
of  the  Revolutionary  Socialists  in  Switzerland,  when 
that  program  had  appeared  m  extenso  in  Le  Temps,  the 
day  before.  It  was  forbidden  in  its  Polish  dispatches  of 
November  16  to  show  how  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  na- 
tionalists in  Poland  harmed  the  democratic  movement, 
when  L'Hummiite  was  authorized  to  publish  violent  at- 
tacks against  its  chief  nationalist  leader,  Dmowsky.  It 
could  not  print  the  irredentist  demands  of  Greece,  two 
days  after  they  had  appeared  in  full  in  the  New  Europe 
in  London.  Finally,  it  was  not  allowed  to  point  out 
to  its  readers  that  the  products  of  the  Saar  valley  were 
of  an  inferior  quality  when  industrial  groups,  such 
as  the  Committee  of  Forges,  were  publicly  expressing 
such  opinions. 

French  papers  were  not  allowed  to  print  dispatches 
containing  news  of  the  rice  riots  in  Japan,  or  even  of 
the  United  States  Senate  Aircraft  Report  when  the 
entire  Allied  press  was  giving  both  events  the  fullest 
publicity.  The  military  authorities  gave  no  reasons  for 
the  censorship  of  such  articles  or  for  allowing  some 
papers  to  print  reports  denied  to  others.  Charges  were 
even  insinuated  that   papers,  Avhicli  were  refused  the 

294 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

right  to  publish  an  article,  would  turn  around  and  sell 
it  to  another  where  the  censorship  had  no  objection  to 
its  publication.  Whether  it  was  graft  or  customary 
military  stupiditj"  that  caused  this  situation,  it  justly 
aroused  a  tremendous  opposition. 

La  Vieille-F ranee  was  a  frequent,  though  a  deserved 
victim  of  the  censor's  knife.  Consequently  it  was  vio- 
lent in  the  denunciation  of  the  Government's  repressive 
policy.  President  Wilson  could  say  that  European  cabi- 
nets were  without  valor,  prudence  or  foresight,  but  Ur- 
bain  Gohier  could  not  say  what  he  thought  about  the 
American  President.  Although  the  whole  world  accused 
France  of  imperialism  and  although  everybody  de- 
fended Germany,  patriots  like  Gohier  "cannot  reply  a 
word  to  them.  We  cannot  risk  ruffling  a  German  (cen- 
sored) !" 

A  newspaper  was  started  recently  in  Paris,  called  La 
Eepuhlique  Kusse,  whose  purpose  was  to  combat  Bol- 
shevism and  Czarism  at  the  same  time.  The  censor 
naturally  allowed  its  articles  against  Bolshevism  to 
pass,  but  it  refused  to  allow  the  publication  of  an  edi- 
torial which  denounced  "the  open  or  disguised  attempts 
of  monarchist  restoration."  The  League  of  the  Rights 
of  IMan  vigorously  denounced  such  an  abuse  of  the  cen- 
sor in  the  service  of  any  party,  especially  a  party  of 
reaction. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  censorship  did  not  cease  with 
hostilities.  Some  of  its  greatest  flagrancies  occurred 
during  the  armistice.  The  case  of  L'Information,  an  in- 
dependent paper,  edited  by  Leon  Chavenon,  with  the 
reputation  of  being  one  of  the  most  sincere  and  liberal 
papers  in  Paris,  attracted  a  great  deal  of  attention.  On 
March  2,  1919,  it  published  an  article  upon  the  "Essen- 
tial Clauses  of  the  Peace  Preliminaries."     The  article 

295 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

apparently  "was  not  viseed  by  the  censor  for  upon  its 
publication  the  editor  and  the  writer  of  the  article, 
Charles  Omessa,  were  charged  with  violation  of  the  law 
of  August  5,  1914,  and  L'Informaiion  was  suspended 
for  eight  days.  M.  Chavenon  asserted  that  the  censor 
had  only  informed  him  of  its  decision  at  a  very  late 
hour  on  Saturday,  at  a  time  when  the  printing  had 
already  commenced.  When  the  censor  finally  did  send 
his  disapproval  the  article  was  immediately  removed. 
The  few  copies  already  distributed  it  was  impossible  to 
recall.  Furthermore,  the  very  same  information  had  ap- 
peared in  another  paper  the  day  before. 

Other  similar  instances  were  frequent.  On  the  8th 
of  I\Iay,  Le  Temps  published,  apparently  with  the  per- 
mission of  the  censor,  a  long  and  detailed  summary  of 
the  restitutions,  reparations  and  guarantees  contained 
in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  It  published  this  informa- 
tion in  the  face  of  a  statement  that  no  evening  paper 
would  receive  this  news  upon  that  day.  But  Le  Bon- 
sair,  the  evening  edition  of  the  L'CEuvre,  edited  by  Gus- 
tavo Tery,  had  also  arranged  for  the  publication  of  an 
identical  article;  but  the  censor  formally  forbade  its 
printing,  threatening  seizure  in  case  of  disobedience. 
Aroused  by  this  discrimination,  M,  Tery  took  the  mat- 
ter to  the  courts,  and  entered  a  "double  complaint  in 
forfeiture,"  one  of  the  most  serious  charges  in  French 
law,  with  the  Military  Governor  of  Paris  against  the 
chief  censor.  Major  Nusillard,  and  against  I\I.  Mandel, 
M.  Clemenceau's  Chef  de  Cabinet.  Mandel  has  often 
been  referred  to  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  as  Clemen- 
ceau's "Grey  Eminence,"  many  claiming  that  while  M. 
Clemenceau  was  busy  with  the  Peace  Conference,  ]\Ian- 
dol  was  the  real  Prime  IMinister.     After  the  filing  of 

296 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

this  complaint  Major  Nusillard  was  reported  to  have 
resigned,  but  to  have  subsequently  withdrawn  his  resig- 
nation. Tery  made  it  clear  that  he  thought  Mandel 
was  the  real  offender.  Regardless  of  the  outcome  of  the 
case,  it  increased  the  demand  for  the  censorship's  re- 
moval. 

During  the  last  week  of  April,  1919,  the  censor  was 
especially  stern.  Marshal  Foch  had  given  out  another 
of  his  interviews  to  the  London  papers  urging  the  an- 
nexation of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  As  a  result  of 
trying  to  reproduce  the  article  from  the  British  papers, 
Le  Bonsoir,  La  Patrie  and  La  Dcmocraiie  Nouvelle  all 
went  down  under  the  censor's  swoop.  To  obtain  this 
interesting  news,  Parisian  readers  had  to  wait  for  the 
London  mail !  In  fact,  Le  Bonsair  was  seized  three 
times  during  this  week. 

On  May  15,  the  Paris  edition  of  the  New  York  Herald 
attempted  to  print  the  measures  which  the  Allies  were 
going  to  take  in  the  event  that  the  Treaty  was  not 
signed  by  Germany.  The  information  merely  told  of 
Foch  being  ordered  to  the  Rhine  to  make  all  prepara- 
tions for  immediate  military  operations.  In  the  very 
same  number  of  the  Chicago  Trihunc,  exactly  the  same 
information  was  given  in  a  little  different  phraseology. 
The  censor  had  either  forgotten  his  decision  in  the  one 
case  when  he  came  to  the  other;  or  he  had  decided  to 
change  his  mind,  the  possession  of  which  many  papers 
were  beginning  to  doubt.  For  the  Ilerald  article  was 
suppressed  and  the  Ti'ihune's  was  passed. 

The  fact  that  the  censorship  exceeded  considerably 
the  provisions  of  the  law  which  the  Parliament  passed 
on  August  5,  1914,  joined  with  its  onerous  policy,  led  to 
early  attempts  to  put  it  upon  a  legislative  basis.     In 

297 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Marcli,  1915,  M.  Paul  ]\Ieunier  ^^  introduced  a  bill  into 
the  Chamber  declaring  the  State  of  Siege  lifted  in  Paris 
and  in  all  the  non-invaded  departments.  As  it  finally 
failed  of  passage,  M.  Meunier  in  October,  1915,  intro- 
duced a  bill  which  the  Commission  on  Civil  Legislation 
adopted  whose  object  was  to  provide  for  a  legal,  pre- 
liminary censorship  in  time  of  war,  placing  it  under  the 
control  of  the  civil  authority — the  prefect  of  police  in 
Paris,  and  the  prefects  in  the  departments,  and  to  limit 
strictly  its  application  to  articles  of  a  military  and  dip- 
lomatic character  which  would  be  of  a  nature  to  injure 
the  national  defense.  Articles  upon  interior  politics 
would  be  excluded  from  the  censorial  scissors.  The  bill 
did  not  come  up  for  discussion  until  January,  1916. 
The  debate  upon  it  occupied  all  the  sessions  from  the 
21st  to  the  25th.  Finally,  M.  Briand,  the  Premier,  ad- 
mitted that  some  errors  had  been  made  by  the  censor, 
but  he  insisted  that  the  national  defense  exacted  its 
maintenance ;  consequently  the  proposition  was  returned 
to  the  Commission. 

After  the  armistice,  the  Socialist  and  Radical  parties, 
the  C.  G.  T.,  and  many  newspaper  organizations  de- 
manded that  the  State  of  Siege  be  raised  and  that  the 
censorship  be  removed.  Because  of  the  peace  negotia- 
tions, the  Government  did  not  believe  it  wise  to  allow 
freedom  of  discussion.  But  after  the  German  signature 
of  the  Treaty,  the  editor  of  Le  Matin  (June  25,  1919) 
wrote  to  the  President  of  the  Press  Syndicate,  asking 
it  to  demand  the  raising  of  the  censorship,  now  that  the 
conference  was  virtually  closed,  in  order  that  the  French 
public  be  informed  as  equally  as  the  public  of  other 
nations.    Inspired  by  this  letter,  M.  Jean  Dupuy,  Presi- 

"  It  is  an  interesting  coincidence  that  Meunier  was  arrested  in 
the  fall  of  1919  for  having  haci  communications  with  the  enemy. 

298 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

dent  of  tlie  Syndicate,  addressed  a  letter  to  M.  Clemen- 
ceau,  upon  July  2,  asking  that  the  censorship  be  re- 
moved. On  July  8,  another  bill  sponsored  by  M.  Paul 
]\Ieunier,  demanding  the  abolition  of  the  State  of  Siege 
and  the  censorship,  came  up  in  the  Chamber  for  dis- 
cussion. M.  Stephen  Pichon,  IMinister  of  Foreign  Af- 
faires, declared  that  the  same  reasons  demanded  the 
continuance  of  the  State  of  Siege  and  the  censorship 
until  the  French  ratification  of  the  Treaty  as  existed 
during  the  peace  negotiations.  As  a  result  of  his  speech 
and  his  assurance  that  the  censorship  would  be  re- 
pealed immediately  upon  ratification  and  before  the 
time  of  the  elections,  tlie  Meunier  proposition  was  de- 
feated by  a  vote  of  256  to  202.  It  was  only  upon  the 
12th  of  October,  1919,  a  few  days  after  the  Chamber 
ratified  the  Treaty,  that  i)rcsidential  decrees  were  issued 
raising  the  State  of  Siege  and  abolishing  the  censorship. 
Thus  it  appears  that  the  French  censorship  was  of 
longer  duration  and  of  much  greater  unreasoned  sever- 
ity than  that  of  the  other  Allied  countries.  Yet  it  should 
not  be  judged  too  harshly.  During  the  war,  France, 
unlike  most  of  her  Allies,  was  the  field  of  operations, 
where  the  greatest  precautions  had  to  be  taken.  Dur- 
ing the  Peace  Conference,  she  was  the  host  of  the  world ; 
the  bitterness  apparent  everj^where  at  times,  it  was  a 
considerable  task  to  suppress.  The  discriminations,  of 
course,  cannot  be  justified.  They  appear  to  be  faults 
inherent  in  the  French  bureaucracy  and  magnified  by 
the  military  part  of  it.  In  comparison  with  the  Ameri- 
can censorship,  the  French  censorship  may  seem  unduly 
severe  and  dictatorial.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  the 
expression  of  opinion  is  much  more  free  in  France  than 
it  is  in  America  to-day.  No  efforts  were  made  to  sup- 
press the  mutterings  of  the  mincritaire  Socialists  dur- 

299 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ing  the  war.     In  America  every  one  of  them  would  have 
been  jailed  for  violating  the  sedition  acts. 

Has  the  French  Chamber  ever  expelled  its  Socialist 
members  as  the  New  York  Assembly  has  just  done? 
Jamais.  Raffin-Dugens  and  Brizon  almost  daily 
breathed  out  "seditious"  utterances,  to  which  the  Cham- 
ber replied  with  laughter, — after  all,  the  most  effective 
answer.  Frenchmen  realized  what  American  legisla- 
tors apparently  cannot  realize,  that  to  make  martyrs 
of  men  is  merely  to  increase  their  following.  Conse- 
quently, the  French  policy  was  to  await  the  commission 
of  overt  acts  before  taking  measures  to  deny  Socialist 
elements  a  right  to  be  heard.  In  so  doing,  France  has 
probably  avoided  the  very  end  which  New  York  legis- 
lators and  American  Congressmen,  if  they  persist  in 
their  suppressive  actions — will  invite, — namely,  a  revo- 
lution by  force.  If  the  French  Chamber  had  expelled 
its  hundred  Socialist  members  during  the  war,  it  would 
have  had  a  revolution  on  its  hands  in  ten  minutes. 
Why?  Because  so  long  as  these  gentlemen  were  open- 
lungedly  venting  their  opinions  at  the  tribune  of  the 
Chamber,  there  was  nothing  to  revolt  about.  They 
were  not  being  suppressed ;  they  could  work  in  the  open 
and  they  could  be  repelled  in  the  open.  The  Govern- 
ment believed  that  the  people  of  France  had  sufficient 
good  sense  not  to  succumb  to  the  "terrifying"  doc- 
trines of  Socialism,  without  the  self-asserted  guardian- 
ship of  legislatures  and  Government  officials  who,  by 
force,  might  attempt  to  conceal  from  them  doctrines 
which,  on  account  of  their  very  nature,  cannot  be  con- 
cealed. It  was  far  better  to  have  the  arguments  for 
proletariat  dictatorship  debated  in  the  forums  of  pub- 
lic assemblies,  where  they  could  be  analyzed  and  where 
their  errors  could  be  readily  pointed  out,  than  to  have 

300 


THE  PRESS  AND  THE  CENSORSHIP 

those  arguments  bottled  up  in  a  caldron  of  discontent, 
whose  seething  waters  were  sooner  or  later  bound  to 
scald  those  who  fed  the  fires  which  kept  them  hot. 

The  tolerance  of  the  "seditious"  elements  in  Prance 
during  the  war — repulsive  as  the  tactics  of  those  ele- 
ments were — was  essential  to  the  winning  of  the  war. 
If  they  had  been  "stamped  out"  by  the  "iron  force  of 
the  law,"  France  would  have  been  so  weakened  inter- 
nally that  she  would  have  had  to  sue  for  a  humiliating 
peace. 

It  may  be  an  irritation  to  the  amour  propre  of  Amer- 
ica to  say  it,  but  it  nevertheless  remains  true  that  re- 
publican France,  whose  attempts  at  self-government  we 
have  too  often  ridiculed,  can  teach  us  some  badly  needed 
lessons  in  the  basic  principles  of  democracy. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  BUREAUdLVCY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 


Si   les   Frangais   mangeaient    le   papier,    Us   seraient    le    pcuple 
le  viieux  nourri  de  la  terre. — Edouard  Herriot, 


The  French  bureaucracy  is  noted  for  its  magnitude, 
its  centralization  and  as  a  Paris  editor  has  said,  "its 
honest  sloth."  Not  only  does  it  completely  monopolize 
the  management  of  many  services  left  to  private  enter- 
prise in  other  countries,  but  it  exercises  this  manage- 
ment inefficiently  from  the  standpoint  of  public  ac- 
commodation, and  unprofitably  from  the  budgetary 
point  of  view.  Its  condition  has  led  to  the  most  insist- 
ent demand  for  administrative  reform.  This  demand, 
which  calls  for  both  the  decentralization  of  public  serv- 
ices and  the  surrender  of  present  industrial  preroga- 
tives of  the  Government  to  individuals,  is  more  urgently 
advanced  than  the  demand  for  purely  political  re- 
generation. 

Upon  the  general  weaknesses  of  this  administrative 
system  Professor  Villey  has  written : 

The  central  authority,  charged  with  decidins:  every  affair  of 
the  country,  is  overwhehued  by  an  inextricable  task.  The 
head.s  of  the  ministerial  departments  themselves  cannot  have 
a  poi'sonal  kn()wl('di,''e  of  even  the  most  imi)ortant  affairs 
and  they  liave  to  unload  them  upon  an  irresponsible  bnrcau- 

302 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

cracy.  The  questions  which  arise  in  one  district,  in  a  deter- 
mined center,  often  at  the  extreme  entls  of  the  country,  are 
treated  without  coini)etence,  often  even  settled  without  discus- 
sion. More  frequently  it  is  the  deputies  of  the  place  Avho 
decide,  and  usually  they  are  men  of  parties.  Politics  is  mixed 
up  with  every  question,  and  favoritism  is  given  a  free 
course. 

The  multiple  formalities  which  centralization  brings  with  it, 
lead  to  interminable  delays,  veiy  prejudicial  to  the  public 
interest.* 

A  complete  description  of  the  French  bureaucracy 
cannot  be  given,  but  a  few  instances  of  its  method  of 
functioning  may  be  cited. 

The  French  raihvay  system  perhaps  offers  one  of  the 
best  instances  of  the  inefficiency  of  public  industry. 
The  State  line,  and  the  Western  line,  having  a  mileage 
of  about  5,600  miles,  are  owned  and  operated  by  the 
French  Government ;  while  the  greater  lines  in  France, 
such  as  the  Paris  and  Orleans,  the  Paris,  Lyons  and 
Mediterranean,  the  Northern,  the  Eastern,  and  the  Midi 
roads  are  privately  operated  under  Government  leases. 
According  to  the  figures  of  the  Ministry  of  Public 
Works,  the  State  line  in  1913  was  the  least  profitable  of 
the  roads  in  France,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  runs 
through  one  of  the  most  richly  developed  parts  of  the 
country.  Its  gross  earnings  were  $10,560  per  mile  com- 
pared with  $26,800  per  mile  earned  by  the  Northern 
road.  The  net  earnings  would  doubtless  have  made 
the  comparison  worse.  As  for  service,  the  State  line 
is  notoriouslj'  inferior  to  the  private  roads.  At  the 
time  of  the  purchase  of  the  Western  line  by  the  Gov- 
ernment in  lf)08  it  had  a  deficit  of  $5,260,000.  In  the 
operations  of  1913,  the  Government  reached  a  deficit 

*  Eilmond  Villcy,  Lcs  Vices  de  la  Constitution  Frangaise,  138. 

303 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

upon  this  line  of  $15,280,000,  an  increase  in  one 
year  of  $10,000,000,  and  during  the  five  years  of  Gov- 
ernment operation  the  total  deficit  reached  was  nearly 
$•17,000,000.  In  technical  terms,  the  coefficient  of  ex- 
ploitation (ratio  of  operating  expense  to  income)  of  the 
State  road.  Government  operated,  in  1918  was  120  per 
cent,  in  comparison  with  that  of  the  IMidi,  which  was 
87  per  cent ;  of  the  Orleans,  which  was  85  per  cent,  and 
of  the  P.  L.  &  M,  road,  which  was  90  per  cent.  The  co- 
efficient for  the  State  road  even  exceeded  that  of  the 
private  companies  operating  in  the  devastated  regions — 
96  per  cent  for  the  Eastern  and  112  per  cent  for  the 
Northern.^ 

During  the  war  all  of  the  private  roads  were  re- 
quisitioned and  placed  under  a  military  regime  by 
authority  of  the  law  of  1889 ;  at  first,  they  were  under 
the  direction  of  the  Ministry  of  War,  and  later,  of  the 
Ministry  of  Public  Works.  The  great  majority  of  the 
military  commissioners  who  took  over  the  operation  of 
these  railways  knew  little  of  their  organization  and 
functioning.  Although  the  roads  eventually  responded 
to  the  military  needs  of  the  country,  it  was  at  nearly  a 
doubled  operating  expense.  Perhaps  this  was  to  be  ex- 
pected under  war  conditions;  but  in  addition,  the  eco- 
nomic needs  of  the  nation  were  sacrificed  by  what  ap- 
peared to  be  unintelligent  management.  After  the  close 
of  hostilities,  France  experienced  a  transportation  crisis 
which  was  one  of  the  great  causes  of  the  height  of  prices ; 
cars  could  not  be  obtained  to  meet  the  demands  of  the 

'Journql  des  Debats,  June  7,  1919. 

A  very  good  account  of  the  operation  of  the  French  rail- 
ways during  the  war  (althougli  it  docs  not  touch  directly  on  the 
effect  of  Government  operation)  will  be  found  in  La  Ecvue  Poli- 
tique et  Parlementairc,  February  10,  1920,  in  an  article  by 
Marcel  Peschaud  entitled  "La  Crise  des  Transports." 

304 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

devastated  rep:ions.  IMeanwhile,  there  were  hundreds  of 
cars  lying  idle  in  the  American  military  yards,  such 
as  at  Gievres,  which  the  French  Government  refused  to 
take  over.  Government  control  and  operation  of  rail- 
W'ays  may  have  other  justifications  than  mere  economy ; 
but  the  State-owned  and  the  State-controlled  roads  in 
France  conclusively  show  that  so  far  as  efficiency  is 
concerned,  private  roads  are  unquestionably  superior. 

Not  only  is  the  post-office  in  France  operated  by  the 
Government,  but  under  the  same  service  come  the  tele- 
graphs and  telephones.  France  has  some  13,000  post- 
offices,  16,000  public  telegraphs,  and  219,000  telephones, 
all  controlled  from  Paris.  Such  a  control  is  so  central- 
ized that  even  the  setting  up  of  a  letter-box,  the  creation 
of  a  substation,  or  the  extension  of  a  telegraph  line  must 
have  the  consent  of  the  Central  Ministry.  This  abso- 
luteness of  direction  doubtless  prevents  the  extension  of 
these  facilities.  According  to  a  statement  of  Lazare 
Weiller  in  a  report  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1915,  two  thirds  of  the  36,536  communes  in 
France  do  not  have  post-offices ;  half  of  them  do  not 
have  telephone  service,  and  a  great  number  of  them 
have  no  official  communication  with  the  outside  world 
except  through  a  daily  rural  postman.  Telegraph  offices, 
situated  in  the  mountains,  have  their  lines  blockaded 
during  tlie  winter  and  their  wires  cut ;  and  the  Govern- 
ment service  is  satisfied  to  leave  them  for  months  in  a 
useless  condition. 

On  the  29th  of  IMarch,  1919,  the  Paris  papers  pub- 
lished the  details  of  a  "Telegraph  Scandal"  which  an 
investigating  committee  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
had  unearthed.  It  charged  the  Telegraphic  Control 
Section,  of  which  ]\I.  Tannery  was  the  head,  with  scan- 
dalous abuses.     M.  Tannery,  during  the  investigation, 

305 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

admitted  that  40,000  dispatches  had  been  held  back  by 
his  section  daily.  The  majority  of  them  were  never  de- 
livered, being  thrown  into  the  basket,  and  upon  ac- 
cumulation, destroyed.  The  senders  and  those  to  whom 
they  were  addressed  were  never  informed.  On  the 
occasion  of  the  last  national  loan,  for  some  inconceivable 
reason  this  Section  stopped  and  suppressed  large  stock 
exchange  orders  and  dispatches  of  funds  for  the  loan. 
During  the  war,  it  even  destroyed  telegrams  from  muni- 
tion factories  at  Le  Creusot  and  Firminy  with  the  re- 
sult that  some  of  them  had  to  close  down  for  want  of 
supplies.  Telegrams  from  or  to  foreign  sovereigns  re- 
ceived no  privileged  treatment,  and  even  the  corre- 
spondence of  the  French  Foreign  Office  became  lost  in 
the  maze  of  treasonable  stupidity  or  intrigue  of  this 
Section.  At  first  unknown  to  the  French  Foreign  Of- 
fice, diplomatic  telegrams  sent  by  the  French  Ambas- 
sadors in  Rome  and  London  to  Spain,  were  pigeon- 
holed, as  were  telegrams  to  the  Paris  office  from  M. 
Bapst,  the  French  Minister  at  Copenhagen.  The  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  a  complaint,  said  that,  "un- 
der its  present  head,  the  Telegraphic  Control  Section  is 
an  organ  of  confusion  and  of  disorder  which  has  en- 
gendered extraordinary  abuses  and  risked  compromis- 
ing the  Government  seriously  and  hampering  its  gen- 
eral policy."  As  a  result  of  these  revelations,  M.  Tan- 
nery was  relieved  as  head  of  the  Section.  But  he  re- 
tained his  post  at  the  Cour  des  Comptes,  and  in  addi- 
tion, he  was  appointed  to  the  exchange  commission  sent 
by  the  Minister  of  Finances  to  Alsace  and  Lorraine ! 
It  was  only  after  the  Chamber  had  given  publicity  to 
its  investigation  that  he  was  finally  dismissed  from  this 
post. 

The    French    Government    operates    monopolies    in 

30G 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

matches,  gun  powder,  and  tobacco.  During  the  war  it 
increased  the  prices  of  some  of  these  articles  in  the  liope 
of  additional  revenue;  but  it  disgaiised  its  real  pur- 
pose by  informing  the  public  that  the  supply  Avas  near- 
ing  exhaustion.  Although  the  provinces  went  smoke- 
less, the  Government  saw  to  it  that  members  of  Parlia- 
ment were  amply  supplied.  As  a  reason  for  the  tobacco 
shortage,  the  Government  also  contended  that  consump- 
tion during  the  war  had  greatly  increased.  Yet  in  a 
report  made  to  the  Chamber  upon  the  27tli  of  February, 
1918,^  by  M.  Grodet,  figures  were  quoted,  showing  that 
consu'niption  had  diminished  3  per  cent  and  4  per  cent 
during  1915  and  1916,  in  comparison  with  1914;  and 
that  consumption  in  1917  was  exactly  the  same  as  that 
of  1914.  The  little  Republic  of  Andorra  was  manufac- 
turing cigarettes,  paying  customs  duties  on  them,  and 
selling  them  in  the  French  Pyrenees  for  fifteen  and 
thirty  centimes  a  package,  while  the  French  Govern- 
ment was  selling  identical  cigarettes  for  eighty  centimes 
and  a  franc.  Although  this  tobacco  incident  is  com- 
paratively insignificant,  it  illustrates  the  extravagant, 
if  not  extortionate,  character  of  a  Government  mo- 
nopoly. 

One  of  the  noticeable  failures  of  Government  opera- 
tion during  the  war  was  the  Arsenal  at  Roanne.  This 
was  a  project  of  Albert  Thomas,  a  former  IMinister  of 
Armament,  who  decided  to  erect  this  arsenal  in  Octo- 
ber, 1915.-  The  buildings  covered  an  area  of  about 
seventy-five  acres  and  the  plant  employed  workmen, 
varying  in  number  from  11,500  to  40,000.  By  Decem- 
ber 31,  1918,  the  expenditures  upon  the  plant  had 
surpassed     $56,000,000,     while     the     total     value     of 

*  Quoted  in  L  'Etatisme,  brochure  of  ' '  Union  des  Interets  Eco- 
nomiques, "  35.  ' 

307 


CONTEI\rPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  shells  produced  up  to  this  time  scarcely  came  to 
$4,000,000/  The  Roanne  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
in  a  report  made  on  the  7th  of  December,  1918, 
protested  against  the  manner  in  which  this  establish- 
ment was  being  operated.  It  accused  the  Government  of 
having  no  idea  of  continuity  in  its  development,  of  em- 
ploying irresponsible  and  incompetent  employees,  of 
exercising  no  intelligent  control,  and  of  inexcusably 
squandering  public  funds.  As  an  example  of  the  de- 
ception under  which  the  arsenal  was  operated,  the 
Chamber  cited  an  instance  when  M,  Thomas,  wishing  to 
determine  the  arsenal's  capacity,  examined  certain  ma- 
chinery for  turning  shells.  With  this  as  a  criterion  of 
the  arsenal's  productive  power,  he  pronounced  himself 
completely  satisfied.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  according 
to  the  Chamber,  the  machinery  had  been  purposely 
erected  that  morning,  and  upon  the  Minister's  depart- 
ure, again  dismantled.  In  regard  to  salaries,  a  car- 
penter, paid  three  dollars  a  day  in  a  private  concern, 
made  a  hundred  and  twenty  dollars  in  four  weeks  at 
the  arsenal.  A  laborer,  paid  fifteen  cents  an  hour  in  a 
steel  plant  at  Roanne,  was  able  by  piece  work  to  make 
five  dollars  in  three  hours  at  the  arsenal.  In  regard 
to  comparative  costs  of  production,  155  mm.  shells  at 
the  arsenal  cost  more  than  a  hundred  dollars ;  while  the 
Government  paid  private  firms  a  maximum  of  ten  dol- 
lars for  exactly  the  same  product. 

The  control  and  development  of  ports  is  another  af- 
fair directed  by  the  Central  Government.  The  port  of 
Havre  was  recognized  forty  years  ago  as  being  insuffi- 
cient for  the  needs  of  French  commerce.  Five  years 
of  agitation  were  necessary  to  secure  the  voting  of  a 

*L'Etatisme,  38.  • 

308 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCTALTS^I 

project  jirovidiiig  for  its  dcvclopmont  l)y  the  CliaTiiber, 
Avhieli  Avas  finally  achieved  in  1S82.  Nine  ycai's  were 
then  necessary  for  tlie  Senate  to  examine  the  bill. 
Finally  in  1891  it  rejected  it  to  the  extent  of  refusing: 
the  greater  part  of  its  i)rovisions.  So  the  agitation  had 
to  start  over  again  and  a  still  more  modest  project  was 
l)laced  on  foot.  Four  more  years  were  this  time  neces- 
sary for  Parliament  to  adopt  the  latter  project,  whicli 
was  done  in  1895.  Thus  nineteen  years  were  taken  to 
reach  a  decision  upon  a  necessary  public  work  which 
it  required  seven  years  more  to  carry  out.  Twenty-six 
years  elapsed  between  the  conception  and  the  achieve- 
ment of  this  project.  In  the  meantime  business  inter- 
ests languished.  Apparently  the  administration  is  not 
moved  by  their  protests ;  when  it  is,  it  votes  supplemen- 
taiy  budgets  and  makes  patchwork  additions  to  calm 
them ;  but  in  the  years  of  delay,  the  productive  capaci- 
ties of  France  are  unutilized.  As  a  result,  France  has 
few  harbors,  a  feeble  merchant  marine  and  an  inade- 
quate system  of  transportation ;  costs  of  production  are 
high  and  other  countries  easily  outdistance  her  in  com- 
mercial fields. 

In  addition  to  the  incident  of  the  port  of  Havre,  the 
development  of  the  port  of  Marseille  necessitated  a  list 
of  formalities  which  filled  two  columns  in  the  Journal 
Officiel,  a  publication  of  about  the  same  size  as,  and  cor- 
responding to  our  Congressional  Record.  The  port  ad- 
ministration is  itself  dependent  upon  six  different 
ministries. 

The  Saigon  bamboo  case  is  another  celebrated  in- 
stance of  the  workings  of  the  French  bureaucracy.  The 
French  arsenal  at  Saigon  in  the  Orient  was  in  need  of 
bamboo,  a  need  which  was  communicated  to  Paris.  It 
happened  that  Saigon  was  the  center  of  one  of  the  most 

309 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

prolific  bamboo  districts  in  the  world.  The  technical 
services  in  Paris  knew  this;  but  because  of  an  ancient 
ruling  that  colonial  arsenals  should  be  supplied  from 
home  arsenals,  they  ordered  that  bamboo  be  secured 
and  shipped  from  Toulon  to  the  Orient.  Six  months 
of  time  were  lost  in  the  transaction  as  well  as  several 
hundred  dollars.  But  that  was  immaterial  to  the  bu- 
reaucracy. It  had  acted  according  to  regulations  and 
its  own  "responsibility"  was  clear. 

Instances  of  Government  inefficiency  in  the  national 
printing  establishment,  where  expenditures  exceeded 
by  twenty-three  times  the  original  estimates;  in  the 
fountains  of  Versailles,  which  take  an  immense  amount 
of  water;  in  the  Gobelin  manufactures;  in  the  mint; 
in  the  management  of  the  Journal  Officiel;  in  the  scan- 
dal of  the  Rodin  forgeries ;  and  in  the  reconstruction  of 
the  devastated  regions,  do  not  need  citing  to  establish 
a  fact  which  Frenchmen  have  almost  come  to  tolerate 
as  an  inevitable  necessity. 

According  to  L'Q^uvre,  a  vigorous  opponent  of  the 
bureaucracy,  the  American  army,  officials  were  con- 
stantly interfered  with  in  the  erection  of  a  stadium  at 
Joinville  which  the  United  States  was  to  give  to  France. 
Arrangements  were  made  with  the  National  Committee 
of  Physical  Education  as  to  its  erection,  which  was  to 
be  completed  by  June  1,  1919.  But  subordinate  Gov- 
ernment officials  deliberately  delayed  construction  by 
petty  persecution  of  contractors  and  even  by  summonses 
against  American  drivers.  L'G^uvre  wondered  whether 
French  bureaucrats  were  deaf,  blind,  or  criminal. 

The  French  Diplomatic  Service,  from  the  standpoint 
of  training,  is  supposed  to  be  the  most  skilled  in  the 
world.     But  according  to  a  report  to  the  Chamber  by 

310 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

Louis  Marin/'  in  1912  over  a  Inindred  diplomatic  agents 
were  removed  from  their  posts  and  transferred  to  others 
either  before  they  were,  or  when  they  were  just  upon 
the  point  of  being,  acquainted  with  the  conditions  of 
their  posts.  Out  of  thirty-tAvo  legations,  only  eleven 
were  directed  by  the  same  head  between  1912  and  1914. 
Even  during  the  war,  thirty-seven  diplomatic  agents 
were  displaced  and  transferred  to  other  offices.  The 
constant  replacing  of  agents,  rendering  them  incapable 
of  acquiring  full  knowledge  of  their  posts  and  authority 
sufficient  to  regulate  affairs  to  the  satisfaction  of  both 
countries,  could  not  but  be  prejudicial  to  France. 

French  administrative  methods  in  Alsace-Lorraine 
have  caused  considerable  discontent  among  the  in- 
habitants of  these  recovered  provinces.  Contradictory 
orders,  complete  destruction  of  German  organization 
and  the  substitution  for  it  of  French  disorder,  have 
received  not  only  the  criticism  of  such  conservative 
papers  as  the  L'Echo  de  Paris,^  but  of  the  Socialist 
papers  such  as  L'Heure.'' 

In  addition  to  these  governmental  activities,  the 
French  administrative  system  practically  controls  every 
phase  of  local  government,  the  educational  system  of 
the  country,  and  a  large  army  and  navy.  The  num- 
ber of  Government  employees  engaged  in  these  enter- 
prises is  as  follows: 

Functionaries  bolonginir  AvhoUy  or  in  part  to  the  State  GG5,023 
Functionaries    belon.tiinu'   to    departments,   communes, 

colonies,  or  public  establishments 330,226 


Total   995,249^ 

^  C))uotLMl  in  Le   Corrcspondant,   January  10,  1919. 
•  Number  of  February  26,   1919. 
■'Number  of  March  1,  1919. 
'Estimate  of  budget  project  for  1913. 

311 


CONTElVrPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Furthermore,  the  number  of  civil  employees  increases 
each  year;  in  1906  they  numbered  702,596;  in  1907, 
727,792;  1908,  740,290,  and  1909,  778,565.  This  great 
number  of  citizens — it  is  generally  estimated  that  one 
out  of  every  eleven  voters  is  a  Government  official — in 
the  employ  of  the  Government  creates  a  vast  political 
problem.  The  evils  arising  from  such  a  condition  are 
plainly  apparent. 

The  French  bureaucracy  not  only  reaches  into  fields 
ordinarily  left  to  private  enterprise,  it  not  only  com- 
mits the  most  costly  blunders  in  its  activities,  it  not 
only  is  an  enormous  political  machine ;  but  it  habitually 
interferes  with  the  exercise  of  private  initiative  in  the 
realm  theoretically  left  to  it. 

Even  to  fence  a  field  along  a  public  road  or  to  change 
the  sign-plate  upon  a  street  car  in  a  small  town,  the 
approval  of  the  central  authorities  is  necessary.  Au- 
thorization is  required  also  to  build  a  shack  upon  waste 
land  for  which  a  tax  of  seven  cents  must  be  paid,  and 
which  requires  going  through  twenty-four  formalities. 
If  one  wishes  to  place  a  rowboat  upon  a  river,  sixteen 
different  negotiations  with  the  central  authorities  must 
be  gone  through.  To  fence  a  field,  nineteen  negotiations 
are  required.  It  takes  two  years  of  bargaining  to  get 
the  consent  of  the  Government  to  build  even  a  shed  upon 
a  wharf.^  These  complications,  and  this  endless  red 
tape  could  be  done  away  with  if  local  authorities  were 
empowered  to  handle  these  affairs.  There  seems  to  be 
no  reason  why  consent  of  any  nature  should  be  required 
for  such  purely  personal  and  insignificant  activities. 

Speaking  of  the  interminable  delays  of  French  func- 
tionaries, a  French  critic  writes: 

"  Seo   Ly.sis,    J'crs  la  Democratic  NouvcUc,   19 

312 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

Those  interested  can  petition,  intrii^ue,  or  vituperate  ai^ainst 
the  Goveniinent,  either  in  conference  or  throni^h  ne\vs{)apers 
.  .  .  but  they  are  viii:orously  forbidden  to  do  anythin<;  tlieui- 
selves  and  to  carry  out  the  work  which  their  own  districts 
need,  and  their  advice  has  no  effect  on  functionaries,  in  the 
matter  of  industrial  development. 

There  is  no  liberty  for  citizens  to  act;  it  is  impossible  for 
them  to  make  a  move  without  being  entangled  in  the  network 
of  authorization,  of  paper-work,  and  of  formalities,  ending 
in  an  omnipotent,  incompetent,  inert  and  incoherent  State, 
which  ,has  reserved  to  itself  the  initiative  in  eveiy  question 
interesting  national  or  regional  life,  while  it  is  capable  of 
solving  nothing  by  its  veiy  constitution.  Forty  years  of  this 
treatment  have  killed  initiative  and  originality  in  our  provinces. 
Tied  down,  held  in  leash,  our  population  leads  a  languishing 
life  and  its  faculties  little  by  little  are  atrophied.^" 

According  to  this  writer,  the  excessive  number  of  Gov- 
ernment officials  is  due  to  the  faet  that  Sialism  almost 
com})lctely  prevents  the  exercise  of  independent  occupa- 
tions whose  development  is  so  hopelessly  curtailed  by 
restrictions.  In  desperation  business  men  give  up  and 
accept  a  starvation  but  certain  wage  in  Government  em- 
ployment. "Because  of  these  precarious  conditions 
every  Frenchman  is  more  or  less  a  candidate  for  public 
employment,  toward  which  he  is  attracted  by  the  law 
of  least  resistance,  because  under  our  centralized  ad- 
ministration, the  poorly  remunerated  functionary  leads 
a  miserable  life,  but  exempt  from  anxiety ;  far  from  his 
employer,  the  State,  who  does  not  know  him  and  for 
whom  lie  is  only  a  register,  lie  works  automatically, 
without  taking  any  responsibility ;  he  is  even  forbidden 
to  take  any  initiative  and  his  advancement  is  made  by 
seniority,  w^hatever  may  be  his  merit  and  his  applica- 
tion. ..." 

^"Ihid.,  23. 

313 


CONTEMPOEARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 


II 


In  every  belligerent  country  the  war  necessitated  an 
increased  State  control  over  private  activities.  Particu- 
larly was  this  so  in  France,  where  the  Government  not 
only  assumed  supervision  of,  but  the  direct  participa- 
tion in,  industrial  processes.  Food  control  naturally 
became  imperative;  and  by  a  law  of  October  16,  1915, 
the  Ministry  of  Food  Supply  was  organized  and  en- 
trusted with  supplying  the  civilian  population  with 
wheat  and  flour.  A  credit  of  120,000,000  francs  was 
placed  at  its  disposal  and  the  Ministry  was  instructed 
to  make  an  annual  statement  of  profit  and  loss.  In  the 
first  year  of  operation,  it  had  a  deficit  of  142,156,000 
francs,  to  which  should  be  added  customs  duties  and 
registry  fees.  Later,  this  deficit  rose  to  400,000,000 
francs,  to  which  should  be  added  225,000,000  francs  in 
customs  duties,  etc.  The  policy  of  maximum  prices, 
which  has  generally  proved  futile,  was  adopted  early  in 
the  war ;  at  first,  it  was  applied  to  wheat,  oats,  rye, 
barley,  bran,  grain  offals ;  later,  it  was  extended  to 
sugar,  coffee,  potatoes,  milk,  margarine,  aliment  fats, 
edible  oils,  dried  legumes,  paraffin  and  petrol,  com- 
mercial fertilizer,  copper,  sulphate,  and  sulphur.  In 
1917,  coal,  bread  and  sugar  cards  were  instituted  which 
allowed  each  family  a  limited  ration  of  each  of  these 
commodities.  This  rationing  was  not  entirely  done 
away  with  until  the  summer  of  1919.  Its  ineffectiveness 
may  be  illustrated  by  the  sugar  famine  which  Paris 
and  the  provinces  underwent  in  April  and  May,  1919. 
Sugar  was  unobtainable  and  the  sugar  cards  were  use- 
less; although  they  entitled  tlie  holder  to  purchase  750 
grams  of  sugar  a  month,  no  sugar  could  be  found  to 
■    314 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

buy.  But  in  the  midst  of  tliis  famine,  the  Government 
in  an  "official  exphuiation"  asserted  that  it  had  amply- 
supplied  the  city  of  Paris  with  sugar  for  a  period  of  two 
months,  but  that  certain  grocers  were  deliberately 
hoarding  it  for  speculation  purposes.  This  the  latter 
hotly  denied,  at  the  same  time  pointing  out  that  the 
Government  was  allowing  confectioners  an  unlimited 
amount  for  candies  and  pastries.  Finally,  B.  Vilgrain, 
Undersecretary  of  State  for  Food  Supply,  offered  an- 
other "solution"  of  the  problem  by  securing  a  thousand 
tons  of  American  granulated  sugar,  which  he  placed  in 
the  shops  and  in  his  own  creation,  the  Vilgrain  booths, 
which  were  really  Government  stores,  supplied  by  Gov- 
ernment-purchased supplies,  transported  by  Govern- 
ment carriers.  Even  this  did  not  appear  to  relieve  the 
situation,  especially  not  in  Paris  and  certainly  not  in  the 
provinces.  The  shortage  became  so  noticeably  due  to 
Government  inconsistency  that  the  municipal  council  of 
Lyons,  in  its  session  of  June  16,  1919,  passed  a  resolu- 
tion, asking  the  Government  why  it  was  that  industries 
of  pure  luxury,  such  as  pastry-makers  and  brewers, 
were  given  sugar  when  it  was  refused  for  family  con- 
sumption. 

One  of  the  food-control  measures,  also  prompted  by 
the  necessity  for  economy  in  ocean  tonnage,  was  the 
Government  requisition  of  the  Merchant  Marine.  Un- 
der authority  of  a  law  passed  February  10,  1918,  a  Gov- 
ernment decree,  issued  five  days  later,  requisitioned  the 
entire  merchant  fleet.  According  to  the  commission 
charged  by  the  Chamber  to  examine  the  Government 
operation  of  this  fleet  it  was  found  that  under  it  im- 
portations dropped  off  839,698  tons  or  5  per  cent ;  this 
figure  would  have  amounted  to  2,500,000  tons  or  15  per 
cent  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  increased  assistance  from 

315 


CONTEMPOEARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  English  and  American  fleets.  Examples  of  boats 
with  half-filled  cargoes,  docks  loaded  down  with  goods 
awaiting  shipment  for  weeks,  ships  sent  to  ports  too 
small  for  their  draught,  are  multiple.  I\I.  Lavoinne  in 
the  Chamber  recited  an  instance  of  the  Government 
landing  22,500  quintaux  ^^  of  wheat  at  Havre  (May  23, 
1918),  and  shipping  them  by  rail  up  to  Rouen.  This 
involved  another  handling  of  the  cargo  and  the  utiliza- 
tion of  railway  transportation  sorely  needed  elsewhere, 
when  the  cargo  could  just  as  easily  have  been  taken  by 
ship  to  Rouen.  In  an  article  on  the  obstruction  of  the 
Port  of  Marseille,  in  Le  Petit  Parisien,^-  it  was  pointed 
out  that  under  private  operation  of  shipping  a  merchant 
asked  three  days  to  unload  a  ship  of  3,000  tons  at  Mar- 
seille; but  now  under  State  control  the  same  task,  in 
some  cases,  had  taken  from  the  14th  of  November  to 
the  middle  of  February.  Instances  are  known  of  cargoes 
of  eggs  making  the  voyage  three  times  from  Philippe- 
ville  to  Marseille,  before  being  finally  unloaded;  whfle 
at  the  time  of  writing  the  article,  100,000  tons  of  per- 
ishable material  were  slowly  deteriorating  at  the  port 
because  of  lack  of  attention.^^ 


Ill 

One  of  the  most  important  features  of  the  control  of 
food  and  of  industry  during  the  war  Avas  the  inter- 
ministerial  committees  and  "Consortiums"  established 

"  Quintal — a  hundredwcifjht. 

"♦Number  of   February   13,   1919. 

"As  to  the  general  extent  of  Statism  during  the  war,  Maxime 
Loroy  says,  "Salaries,  length  of  work,  prices,  the  purchase,  sale 
and  circulation  of  goods,  travel,  thought  itself,"  everything,  is 
regulated  and  controlled  by  the  State.  France  has  lost  its  former 
economic  physiognomy."     Pour  Gouvcrncr,   172. 

31G 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

by  the  Government  to  monopolize  and  distribute  impor- 
tations completely.  Unrestricted  importations  were  pro- 
hibited by  a  law  passed  May  6,  1916/*  which  at  the  same 
time  raised  tariff  rates  and  gave  the  Government  com- 
plete control  of  the  contingencies  of  foreign  materials 
to  be  brought  to  France.  This  action  was  part  of  the 
inter-Allied  plan  of  apportionment  of  resources.  It 
arose  from  the  difficulty  of  foreign  payments,  from  the 
necessity  of  giving  the  military  needs  of  the  country 
priority,  and  of  utilizing  to  the  best  advantage  the 
merchant  marine.  Finally,  the  most  powerful  and  dili- 
gent manufacturers  could  not  be  allowed  to  import 
freely  under  disrupted  war  conditions,  because  they 
would  have  exhausted  the  market  for  weaker  or  later 
competitors.  The  Government  believed  it  would  be  bet- 
ter to  divide  or  ration  supplies  methodically,  giving  to 
each  according  to  his  production  capacity.  With  this 
principle  established,  the  State  itself  became  judge  of 
tonnage  availabilities  and  purchaser  and  negotiator  for 
foreign  importations  and  payments.  Despite  the  neces- 
sity of  evading  industrial  anarchy,  the  French  Govern- 
ment could  have  acted  as  a  controlling  agency,  as  did 
the  liritish  Government;  but  it  chose  the  most  extreme 
alternative  of  State  Socialism,  and  precipitated  perhaps 
as  great  a  danger  as  the  one  it  avoided. 

By  virtue  of  the  law  of  May,  1916,  a  Government  de- 
cree of  IMarch  22,  1917,  created  a  Committee  of  Deroga- 
tions and  Prohibitions,  charged  with  determining  quar- 
terly contingents  of  importations  for  determined  prod- 
ucts and  forming  a  plan  for  the  apportionment  of  these 
contingents.^^  By  a  strange  parliamentary  procedure,  a 
law  passed  January  20,  1919,  ratified  this  decree.     The 

"See  Jourtuil  des  Economistcs,  March  15,  1919. 
"  Ibid.,  April,  1917,  105. 

317 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

first  State  institutions  arising  from  these  decrees  were 
inter-ministerial  committees,  organized  for  each  indus- 
try. Their  method  of  operation  was  illustrated  by  the 
Inter-ministerial  Committee  on  "Wool.  This  committee, 
as  disclosed  in  the  Chamber's  interpellation  of  the  Gov- 
ernment upon  June  28,  1918/^  was  charged  with  the  en- 
actment of  measures  destined  to  assure  the  supply  of 
wool  under  the  best  possible  conditions  to  the  different 
branches  of  the  French  textile  industry,  so  as  to  satisfy 
the  general  needs  of  the  country  for  goods  manufac- 
tured in  wool  (being  certain  that  the  needs  of  the 
army  .  .  .  have  priority  over  all  others).  Specifically 
this  committee  was  (1)  to  centralize  needs  of  all  kinds; 
(2)  to  establish  (the  needs  of  the  army  first  being  at- 
tended to)  the  order  of  priority  for  the  other  na- 
tional needs;  (3)  to  determine,  by  limitation,  if  neces- 
sary, the  nature  of  products  to  be  manufactured  from 
raw  materials,  and  the  labor  and  the  materials  to  be 
used;  (4)  to  fix,  in  agreement  with  unions  or  industrial 
groups  constituted  under  authority  of  the  IMinistry  of 
Commerce,  the  maximum  prices  of  transformation  for 
important  parts  in  manufacture,  such  as  combing,  spin- 
ning, dyeing,  etc, ;  to  fix  the  maximum  selling  prices  of 
products  obtained  from  these  transformations  and  de- 
livered, either  to  industry  or  to  consumers;  (5)  to  de- 
termine quantities  and  classes  of  the  different  mate- 
rials for  manufactured  products  to  be  imported  for  all 
purposes;  (6)  to  study  the  order  of  urgency  for  the 
introduction  of  diverse  products,  under  the  reservation 
that  the  materials  necessary  to  the  army  always  be 
given  priority;  (7)  to  give  advice  on  the  kinds  of  con- 
sortiums or  groups  which  it  will  be  necessary  to  form 

''Ibid.,  March  15,  1919. 

318 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

between  agents  or  manufacturers,  to  regnlari/e  indus- 
trial production  and  to  facilitate  relations  between  pro- 
ducers and  consumers,  under  the  control  of  the  Minister 
of  Commerce;  (8)  to  make  any  proposition  to  regulate 
the  sale  of  materials  of  products  of  wool  eventually, 
and,  if  necessary,  to  restrain  consumption;  (9)  to  give 
advice  on  questions  of  exportation  concerning  wool  or 
objects  manufactured  from  it;  (10)  finally,  to  examine 
all  other  questions  relating  to  this  textile  and  which 
they  judge  useful  to  submit  to  the  different  ministries 
interested. 

As  will  be  seen  from  these  powers,  such  a  committee, 
composed  only  of  Cabinet  Ministers  with  no  technical 
members  upon  it,  was  empowered  to  control  completely 
the  amount  of  raw  materials  given  to  private  industry, 
the  amount  and  price  of  output,  and  the  wages  of  labor 
engaged  upon  it.  This  was  perhaps  the  most  extensive 
task  a  modern  State  has  undertaken." 

Subjected  to  the  control  of  these  inter-rainisterial 
committees,  the  "Consortium"  was  created  with  the 
object  of  grouping  together  manufacturers  Avho  deal  in 
a  certain  raw  material.  With  a  few  exceptions,  it  was 
only  by  belonging  to  such  a  group  that  manufacturers 
could  obtain  raw  materials.  "The  consortium  ...  is 
a  species  of  joint-stock  company,  a  kind  of  cooperative 
association  which  has  as  its  shareholders  the  members 
of  a  determined  industry  and  which  enters  into  a  con- 
tract with  the  State  with  a  vicAv  to  obtaining  from  it, 
upon  certain  conditions,  the  materials  needed  bj^  this 
industry  to  function. "  ^^ 

The  contract  between  the  State  and  the  consortium 

"An  excellent  article  on  the  French  importation  policy  is  "La 
polituiite  fran{'(iise  en  mature  d'importniions,"  in  La  Sevue 
d'Economie  PolUique,  March-April,  1919,  164-189. 

"Europe  Nonvelle,  May  4,  1918. 

319 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

specified  that  the  manufacturers  lost  the  right  of  buy- 
ing, individually  or  collectively,  the  raw  materials  nec- 
essary to  their  business.  The  State  alone  could  make 
these  purchases,  that  is,  if  they  must  be  imported.  The 
consortium  therefore  received  its  raw  materials  from 
the  hands  of  the  State,  and  these  it  was  obliged  to  re- 
ceive in  whatever  amounts  the  State  should  wish  to  dole 
out,  and  to  reimburse  the  State  for  all  expenditures 
made  by  it  in  securing  the  material.  This  lot  received 
from  the  hands  of  the  State  was  then  divided  among 
the  members  of  the  consortium  according  to  determined 
rules  of  apportionment  and  at  a  price  which  the  State 
fixed  in  a  manner  to  assure  a  certain  profit  to  the  con- 
sortium, to  remunerate  the  capital  invested  in  it. 
Finally,  the  State  also  fixed  the  price  at  which  the 
products  obtained  by  the  manufacturers  by  means  of 
this  raw  material,  should  be  sold  to  the  consumer. 

An  example  of  the  composition  and  the  operation  of 
such  an  organism,  was  that  of  the  French  Oil  Com- 
panies. This  consortium  was  constituted  in  the  form  of 
a  joint-stock  company  with  an  initial  capital  of  5,000,- 
000  francs,  divided  into  10,000  shares  of  500  francs 
each.  These  shares  were  purchased  and  held  by  all  the 
manufacturers  of  oil  arising  from  foreign  grains,  such 
as  cottonseed,  flaxseed,  and  castor  oil  plants,  in  de- 
termined proportions,  according  to  the  extent  of  the 
business  of  each.  Each  member's  share  of  the  seeds 
imported  by  the  Government  was  irrevocably  fixed  by 
the  respective  stock  subscriptions.  Upon  notice  of  the 
consortium,  the  State  bought  the  seed,  passed  it  on  to 
the  consortium,  and  was  reimbursed  for  the  purchase. 
The  consortium,  in  turn,  sold  the  material  to  its  .mem- 
bers according  to  the  amount  of  stock  each  held  in  the 
consortium,    with    the    understanding    that    the    State 

320 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

would  fix  the  selling  price  of  the  seed  delivered  by  the 
consortium  to  its  members  and  also  the  price  at  which 
the  products  manufactured  from  the  seed  should  be 
sold.  By  this  means,  a  business  which  before  the  war 
aggregated  a  figure  of  more  than  a  billion  francs,  found 
itself  subjected  to  the  rigid  control  of  the  French  bu- 
reaucracy. 

This  system  of  consortiums  it  was  only  logical  to  ex- 
tend to  as  many  raw  materials  as  possible;  and  the 
]\Iinistries  of  Commerce,  of  Blockade,  of  National  Recon- 
struction, and  of  Armament  organized  consortium  after 
consortium,  extending  even  to  such  articles  as  glass- 
ware, jute,  leather  and  hides,  oils,  pit-coal,  petroleum, 
lead  and  cotton. 

The  grave  feature  of  this  policy  was  that  it  held  pri- 
vate industry  in  the  absolute  grip  of  the  State,  it  sub- 
stituted State  action,  incompetent  and  dishearteningly 
slow,  for  the  action  of  those  interested — the  bureau- 
cratic buyer,  for  the  industrial  buyer.  The  French 
Government  did  not  wish  a  simple  understanding  be- 
tween manufacturers  and  the  State  (as  the  British  Gov- 
ernment had  with  the  British  Association  of  Oil 
Brokers),  limiting  their  activities  to  the  national  wel- 
fare but  at  the  same  time  allowing  the  exercise  of  in- 
telligence and  energetic  business  ability.  But  on  the 
contrary,  the  French  administration  took  everything 
into  its  own  hands.  Although  nominally  receiving  ad- 
vice from  the  consortiums  as  to  business  needs,  it  made 
the  purchases  itself  and  enforced  them  upon  industry. 

Whether  or  not  the  Government  admitted  it,  the  re- 
sult of  this  policy  was  the  total  monopoly  of  control 
over  those  French  industries  which  utilized  imported 
raw  materials.  The  State  completely  held  the  raw  ma- 
terial.    It  tliei-efore  Ijecamo  the  absolute  master  of  in- 

321 


CONT E:\IP0RARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

dustries  dependent  on  it.  A  merchant  not  a  member  of 
a  consortium,  either  because  of  his  o-svn  unwillingness 
to  come  under  the  dictatorship  of  the  State  or  because 
of  his  inabilit}'  to  buy  the  stock  when  it  is  offered  to 
him,  is  practically  shut  out  of  raw  material,  and  if  his 
business  is  dependent  upon  it,  he  is  obliged  to  close 
down.  ''Outside  of  the  consortium,"  M.  Emmanuel 
Brousse  said  in  the  Chamber  upon  the  28th  of  June, 
'1918,  ' '  there  are  neither  raw  materials,  labor,  orders  nor 
the  possibility  of  transportation."  At  the  same  time, 
I\I.  Rene  Germond,  one  of  the  important  members  of 
the  Syndicate  of  Iron  IMerchants,  illustrated  a  similar 
result  in  these  words : 

The  consortium  regime  absolutely  prevents  retail  merchants 
from  procuring  merchandise,  because  they  cannot  belong  to  a 
consortium.  Fonnalities  must  be  gone  through  which  are  im- 
possible for  them;  they  do  not  possess  the  office  help  neces- 
sary for  all  the  paper-work  needed  to  make  out  the  orders. 
The  merchant  is  therefore  obliged  to  purchase  his  goods  from 
an  important  member  of  the  consortium.  But  the  latter 
prefers  to  sell  them  to  his  large  clients.  .  .  .  No  longer  being 
supplied,  the  retailer  finds  himself  prevented  from  carrying  on 
his  role,  so  indispensable,  of  supplying  a  small  patronage.^* 

The  partial  destruction  of  French  retail  trade  by  the 
suppression  of  freedom  of  purchase,  w'as  one  of  the  re- 
sults of  the  consortium  system ;  the  result  was  the  more 
serious  because  this  trade  paid  more  taxes  than  the 
wholesalers  did,  and  it  was  the  foundation  of  French 
industry. 

In  sum,  the  French  consortium  system  did  its  best  to 
monopolize  and  to  control  in  every  particular  the  major 
portion  of  French  industry.     It  almost  meant  the  total 

"Quoted  in  L'FAatisme,  43. 

322 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

suppression  of  freedom  of  industry  and  of  ind>istrial 
competition.  It  was  probably  a  larger  attempt  at  an 
all-inclusive  State  Socialism  than  even  the  demagogic 
advocates  of  the  theory  had  contemplated.  That  a 
group  of  inexperienced  Government  officials,  unstimu- 
lated by  business  interests,  should  attempt  intelligently 
to  determine  the  vast  needs  of  national  industry,  upon 
which  the  minds  of  thousands  of  the  most  intelligent 
men  have  been  occupied,  was  an  absurdity,  a  few  of  the 
results  of  which  may  now  be  pointed  out. 

This  inability  of  the  State  to  determine  industrial 
needs  was  partly  recognized  in  the  summer  of  1918  by 
M.  Clementel,  the  IMinister  of  Commerce.  He  consented 
to  allow  the  consortium  in  American  cotton  to  make  its 
purchases  direct ;  but  for  some  unknown  reason,  he  re- 
served the  preliminary  sanction  of  these  purchases.  This 
approval  took  so  much  time  that  when  his  signature 
finally  was  obtained,  us,ually  ten  or  twelve  days  after 
its  request,  the  market  had  changed,  prices  had 
mounted,  and  the  consortium  had  to  pay  tens  of  mil- 
lions more  for  the  product  because  of  the  intervention 
of  the  Government. 

The  State  rationing  of  industry  also  had  another  ef- 
fect. According  to  the  rules  of  the  consortium,  mate- 
rials were  divided  among  its  members  according  to  the 
amount  of  stock  originally  procured  by  each.  This  pro- 
vision absolutely  overlooked  the  varying  needs  of  differ- 
ent manufacturers.  Contraction  or  extension  of  indus- 
try had  no  influence  upon  the  amount  of  raw  material 
each  would  receive.  Consequently,  those  manufacturers 
wishing  to  develop  and  extend  production  were  handi- 
capped for  want  of  supplies ;  those  who  for  one  cause 
or  another  diminished  output  had  a  surplus  of  supplies 
on  hand.    In  the  one  Instance,  progress  was  discouraged 

323 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

and  in  the  other,  extravagance  and  waste  stimulated. 
The  result  of  the  consortium  policy  upon  general 
price  levels  was  another  indication  of  Government  in- 
efficiency. Before  the  war  there  was  practically  no  dif- 
ference in  the  price  of  cotton  in  France  and  England. 
The  first  restriction  in  French  importations  raised  the 
price  of  cotton  in  France  until  it  was  twenty-four  dol- 
lars higher  per  hundred  kilograms  than  in  England.  In 
1918  this  difference  increased  as  follows :  ^° 

Francs 

January    136.50 

February    131. 

March    150.50 

April     151. 

May     145. 

June    173.50 

July     180.50 

August    221. 

September    223. 

October    171. 

Consequently,  in  the  month  of  September  the  French 
cotton  mill  had  to  pay  223  francs  ($-44)  more  for  cot- 
ton than  the  English  mill,  and  for  a  material  which  in 
both  instances  came  from  the  United  States.  This  dif- 
ference upon  a  free  market,  subject  to  speculation, 
might  have  been  explained;  but  under  a  State  regime 
especially  designed  to  avoid  such  a  condition,  it  had  no 
justification.^^ 

Other  instances  of  a  like  effect  upon  prices  are  cited 
in  a  report  issued  by  the  Marseille  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce upon  November  26,  1918.'-     In  one  instance  the 


'"  For  the  average  of  the  ten  months  the  French  mills  ])ai(l 
168  francs  more  per  hundred  kilognims  than  tiie  England  mills. 
Multiplied  by  the  700,000  bales  imported,  this  represents  a  differ- 
ence  of   nior'.'   than   $51, 700,000. 

"  Quoted  from  L'Europc  Nouvclle,  May  4,  1918. 

"Ibid.,  December  14,  1918. 

324 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

French  Government  bouglit  rice,  a  food  necessity,  from 
Enjijland  and  resold  it  in  France  at  an  increase  of 
140  per  cent  upon  the  purchase  price.  Many  such  oc- 
currences offer  a  ready  explanation  for  the  extreme  cost 
of  living.  In  another  case  the  State  imposed  a  price 
upon  requisitioned  distilleries  for  a  liter  of  alcohol,  of 
one  franc  (.20),  which  was  100  per  cent  above  the  usual 
price.  It  then  forced  the  distilleiies  to  sell  this  alcohol, 
on  the  State's  account,  to  the  manufacturers  of  colors 
and  varnishes,  to  perfume  makers,  and  to  vinegar  manu- 
facturers for  three  francs  and  a  half.  In  the  mean- 
time, Switzerland  was  selling  exactly  the  same  alcohol 
for  forty-two  centimes ;  the  French  price  was  over  eight 
times  greater  than  the  Swiss  price. 

Newsprint  paper,  six  months  after  the  armistice,  was 
selling  for  45  francs  per  100  kilograms  in  England  and 
200  francs  in  France,  a  difference  of  over  400  per  cent. 
During  the  war,  the  Ministry  of  Armament  by  an  inter- 
Allied  agreement  obtained  a  monopoly  of  the  American 
market  on  lintcrs.  This  made  the  French  Government 
the  sole  purchaser,  which  should  have  permitted  it  to 
operate  under  extremely  favorable  circumstances.  Pri- 
vate manufacturers,  given  such  an  opportunity,  cer- 
tainly would  have  profited  by  the  monopoly.  On  the 
contrary,  it  happened  that  each  time  the  French  Gov- 
ernment decided  to  make  a  purchase,  the  price  of  linters 
went  up  one  or  two  hundred,  to  fall  again  as  soon  as 
the  Government  had  finished  its  buying. 

In  another  instance  the  French  Government  was  of- 
fered Plata  tallow  by  private  firms  at  fifty-eight  dollars 
a  ton.  Asserting  that  the  price  was  too  dear,  the  Gov- 
ernment itself  negotiated  for  the  tallows  at  a  supposed 
price  of  fifty-six  dollars  a  ton.  Despite  this  appear- 
ance that  the  State  was  a  better  buyer  than  free  com- 

325 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

merce,  its  price  amounted  to  a  great  deal  more,  for  the 
fifty-six  dollar  quotation  did  not  include  expenses  of 
purchase  operations,  such  as  cablegrams,  and  of  admin- 
istration which  a  broker  includes  in  his  prices.  These 
the  Government  can  write  off  into  general  budget  ex- 
penses, falling  upon  the  taxpayer.  Furthermore,  this 
State  purchase  included  wastes  which  the  brokers  elim- 
inated ;  moreover  it  was  of  frozen  fats,  lacking  the  qual- 
ities of  standard  tallow. 

These  instances  demonstrate  the  effect  of  the  con- 
sortium policy  upon  French  industry  and  upon  the 
French  consumer.  In  drying  up  the  wells  of  private 
enterprise  the  French  consortium  policy  seemed  to  be 
on  the  verge  of  causing  an  economic  drought.  This,  at 
any  rate,  appeared  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  when  it  voted  M.  Victor  Boret,  the  Minis- 
ter of  Agriculture,  out  of  office  because  of  the  height 
to  which  prices  were  continuing  to  rise.  On  the  18th 
of  July,  1919,  the  Chamber  voted  the  following  order 
of  the  day: 

The  Chamber,  believing  that  the  pi-iee  of  living:  has  dimin- 
ished one-half  in  Belijium  since  the  month  of  January, 
1919, 

That  the  price  of  living  has  diminished  one-quarter  in 
England  since  the  armistice, 

That  it  has  not  ceased  to  increase  in  France  since  the  same 
date, 

Judging  this  result  to  be  due  to  the  economic  policy  of  the 
Government, 

Pa.sses  to  the  order  of  the  day. 

Immediately  after  the  passage  of  this  resolution,  the 
Minister  resigned.-^ 

".Sonic  of  the  other  features  in  this  poli.'v,  namely,  tlie  general 
prohibition  of  importations,  which  caused  the  Minister's  resigna- 
tion, will  be  discussed  in  the  following  pages. 

326 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

Of  the  most  serious  importance  was  the  evident  in- 
tention of  the  State  to  continue  this  consortium  policy 
as  a  permanent  basis  of  industry  after  the  war.  Sus- 
picions to  this  effect  were  aroused  by  the  stipulations 
inserted  in  consortium  contracts  which  provided  for 
their  renewals  after  the  signature  of  peace.  M.  Clemen- 
tel,  ]\Iinister  of  Commerce,  was  accused  by  many  of  con- 
ceiving of  the  methodical  and  administrative  reorgan- 
ization of  French  industry  in  which  individual  indus- 
trial enterprise  would  be  completely  suppressed. 

Moved  by  this  prospect,  the  Bordeaux  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  in  a  session  upon  March  20,  1918,  adopted 
this  resolution: 

Whereas,  declarations  publicly  made  by  persons  in  touch 
with  the  Ministry  of  Commerce  g'ive  the  impression  that  the 
consortium  system  is  to  be  considered  ...  as  the  basis  of 
economic  organization  after  the  war; 

Whereas,  if  it  is  legitimate  and  in  certain  cases  necessary 
that,  during  hostilities,  the  public  powers,  .  .  .  conti'ol  impor- 
tations, and  the  apportionment  and  the  sale  of  certain  prod- 
ucts, it  cannot  be  admitted  that  the  Government  may  profit 
from  the  patriotic  self-denial  with  which  the  French  producers 
have  inclined  themselves  before  the  necessities  of  the  hour,  to 
prepare  an  even  partial  dispossession  of  enterprises  which 
their   capital   and   their   labor   have   successfully    established; 

Whereas,  the  regime  of  consortiums,  represented  as  a  pact 
between  the  State  and  those  interested^  is  in  fact  imposed 
upon  the  latter  by  an  administrative  measure  and  without 
any  possibility  of  discussing  the  solutions  presented  to  them, 
since  any  firm  which  does  not  adhere  to  the  combination  finds 
itself  immediately  deprived  of  raw  materials; 

Whereas,  this  regime,  which  completely  overthrows  the  con- 
ditions of  national  economic  life  and  which  places  those  upon 
which  it  is  imposed  in  a  situation  of  inadmissible  inferiority 
toward  other  French  producers,  has  been  adopted  without 
Parliament's  having  been  called  to  deliberate  upon  it,  and 
without  its  having  thought  best  to  consult  preliminarily  the 

327 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

qualified  representatives  of  the  great  economic  interests  of  the 
countiy  such  as  the  Chambers  of  Commerce  and  the  profes- 
sional g:roups; 

Whereas,  it  would  be  easy  to  show  by  precise  and  sugges- 
tive examples,  that  the  results  obtained  up  to  the  present  by 
the  consortiums  in  functioning  are  far  from  encouraging,  that, 
on  the  contrary,  they  bring  to  light  the  insufficiency  and  the 
errors  of  State  management,  the  excessive  expenses  which  it 
involves  for  a  feeble  return,  its  absence  of  elasticity,  and  its 
incapacity  to  adapt  itself  to  the  changing  exigencies  of  a 
troubled  period; 

Resolved,  that  it  protest  energetically  against  every  measure 
tending  to  give  as  its  basis,  for  the  economic  organization  after 
the  war,  an  industrial  "eorporalism,"  which  would  certainly 
be  a  costly  and  sterile  regime  of  incompetence  and  indolence.^^ 


IV 


After  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  reconstruction 
needs  added  another  aspect  to  the  commercial  policy 
of  the  Government.  Attention  now  became  centered 
upon  the  general  prohibition  of  importation  and  ex- 
portation, a  restriction  which  the  Government  was 
forced  by  public  opinion  to  raise  in  the  spring  and  sum- 
mer of  1919.  This  policy  was  followed  for  two  rea- 
sons: First,  a  flood  of  importations  would  completely 
unsettle  the  state  of  exchange,  already  so  unfavorable 
to  France;  second,  the  protectionist  argument  carried 
to  the  extreme, — namely,  French  industry  must  be  al- 
lowed to  reconstitute  itself,  unhindered  (as  well  as  un- 
aided) by  foreign  competitors.  The  unrestricted  en- 
trance of  foreign  products  into  France  would  over- 
whelm French  manufacturers.  The  solution  of  the  first 
of  these  arguments,  which  had  some  weight,  appeared 

** Quoted  in  L'Europe  Nouvelle,  May  4,  ]918. 

328 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

to  rest  in  the  arrangement  of  credit  in  foreign  coun- 
tries for  French  importers,  instead  of  in  the  total  ex- 
clusion of  foreign  products.  The  second  argument  had 
little  foundation.  France  needed  foreign  products  to 
rebuild  her  devastated  regions;  she  needed  foreign  ma- 
cliinery  if  she  was  to  manufacture  products  for  exporta- 
tion. To  create  the  tools  herself  for  her  rebuilding 
would  be  fatal  to  the  success  of  reconstruction  and  of 
foreign  trade.  A  few  examples  of  the  working  of  this 
protectionist  policy  will  demonstrate  its  weakness. 

Occasions  were  numerous  during  the  armistice  of 
French  manufacturers  whose  factories  had  been  ruined 
in  the  war,  who  wished  to  reestablish  their  industries 
immediately.  Machinery  formerly  purchased  in  Ger- 
many now  could  only  be  obtained  in  the  United  States 
where,  largely  in  sympathy  for  France,  the  orders  were 
filled.  But  to  import  it,  permission  from  the  French  Gov- 
ernment became  necessary.  At  the  manufacturers'  re- 
quest, the  Government  replied  that  such  an  importa- 
tion was  impossible  without  the  payment  of  a  seventy- 
five  per  cent  ad  valorem  tariff.  In  addition,  a  certain 
number  of  French  manufacturers  must  declare  to  the 
Government  that  this  machinery  was  not  to  be  found  in 
France  and  that  it  could  not  be  manufactured.  All 
this  to  encourage  French  production!  It  was  useless 
for  the  French  manufacturer  to  point  out  to  the  Govern- 
ment that  machinery  had  to  be  obtained  before  his 
factory  could  be  reopened;  and  that  if  he  could  not 
import  it  from  the  United  States,  it  would  take  five 
years  to  build  the  outlay  and  to  manufacture  the  ma- 
chinery in  France.  If  the  importation  were  allowed, 
the  machinery  could  immediately  produce  the  materials 
which  France  sorely  needed  and  which  could  not  else- 
where be  obtained.     Furthermore,  hundreds  of  work- 

329 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

men  would  be  given  inunediate  employment.  These 
arguments  were  vain,  because  the  consortiums  or  the 
inter-ministerial  committees  had  decided  that  French 
industry  must  be  "protected."  The  Government  was 
obdurate ;  for  the  sake  of  a  theory  French  industry  was 
forced  to  lose  invaluable  time  and  effort  in  manufactur- 
ing implements  which  foreign  merchants  already  had 
on  hand  and  at  a  cheaper  figure  than  the  French  could 
hope  to  produce  them.  There  was  one  other  alterna- 
tive— to  do  without;  and  in  most  cases,  this  was  what 
French  industry  was  obliged  to  do. 

What  appeared  to  be  an  inexcusable  application  of 
this  theory,  was  the  difficulty  which  the  Ford  Automo- 
bile Company  had  with  the  French  Government.  Dur- 
ing the  war  t-he  Government  had  purchased  4,500  com- 
mercial automobiles  from  this  company  which,  on  ac- 
count of  the  armistice,  were  never  used.  They  were 
stored  in  Bordeaux,  new,  and  ready  for  use.  Accord- 
ing to  the  terms  of  the  Ford  Company's  contract  with 
the  Government,  the  former  had  a  privilege  of  repur- 
chase, with  the  Government's  consent,  of  all  unused  cars 
at  half  the  original  price.  The  company  now  offered 
the  Government  the  full  price  for  the  cars,  plus  a  profit 
of  10  per  cent,  the  70  per  cent  ad  valorem  customs  duty, 
and  the  luxury  tax.  From  the  financial  standpoint  alone, 
the  revenue  resulting  to  the  Government  from  such  a 
transaction  would  have  been  nearly  9,000,000  francs 
($1,800,000).  The  Government  would  have  recuperated 
the  sum  of  8,437,000  francs  which  it  had  ])aid  for  the 
cars,  and  the  French  automobile  dealers,  who  held  the 
Ford  agency,  would  have  made  a  gross  ])rofit  of  8,000,- 
000  francs  by  the  sale  of  tlie  cars  to  Freiich  firms. 
The  sale  would  have  immodiatoly  resulted  in  the  termi- 
nation of  warehouse  and  upkeep  expense  of  the  ma- 

330 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

chines.  It  would  have  partially  alleviated  the  great 
transportation  crisis,  then  paralyzing  French  industry ; 
it  would  have  employed  thousands  of  dealers,  me- 
chanics and  repair-men,  and  in  a  number  of  other  ways 
it  would  have  contributed  to  the  stimulation  of  French 
industry.  But  the  Government  did  not  see  fit  to  accept 
the  proposition,  saying  that  French  automobile  manu- 
facturers  would  soon  fill  all  French  needs.  Incidentally, 
M,  Loucheur,  the  jMinister  of  Industrial  Reconstruc- 
tion, had  considerable  interests  in  the  Citroen  Company ; 
but  so  far  this  company  has  not  supplied  automobile 
needs,  although  it  enjoys  considerable  profits  on  those 
it  does  sell.  IMonopoly  privileges  apparently  are  en- 
joyed as  much  by  Government  officials  as  by  mere  busi- 
ness men.  In  any  case,  it  was  better  to  allow  several 
thousand  automobiles  to  continue  in  a  state  of  forced 
idleness  than  to  permit  an  American  firm  to  profit  by 
their  utilization ! 

Another  regrettable  incident  arising  from  this  policy 
followed  the  Lyons  Trade  Fair,  an  annual  event  of  na- 
tional importance.  Canada  had  had  an  important  sec- 
tion at  the  Fair,  and  her  merchants  took  a  large  num- 
ber of  orders  upon  samples  exhibited.  AYhen  they  at- 
tempted to  fill  them,  the  French  Government  refused 
the  permission  to  import  the  goods.  LTpon  the  inter- 
vention of  Sir  George  Foster,  the  Canadian  Minister 
of  Commerce,  the  Government  responded  that  the 
"Lyons  Fair,  being  purely  a  local  enterprise,  the  Gov- 
ernment could  not  grant  it  special  favors." 

Le  Temps,^^  always  a  vigorous  opponent  of  the  statist 
policies  of  the  Government,  commented  as  follows  upon 
this  instance: 

"Issue   of   May   15,   1919. 

331 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

As  a  result,  it  is  no  longer  necessary  for  individuals,  manu- 
facturers, agriculturists  or  merchants  to  be  aware  of  their 
needs  and  to  supply  them,  at  their  own  risk  and  perils,  by 
exercising  their  knowledge,  experience,  and  ambitions  for  the 
country;  but  following  such  and  such  resolutions,  taken  in 
such  and  such  administrative  bureaus,  these  needs  are  now 
catalogued,  estimated,  submitted  to  regulations;  always  chang- 
ing, however,  in  a  manner  to  dominate  individual  initiative 
which  is  too  much  given  to  boldness, — deemed  unreasonable. 

The  Mayor  of  Lyons,  M.  Herriot,  responded  to  the 
Temps'  comment,  in  part  as  follows : 

The  Canadian  incident  is  only  an  example.  Merchants  and 
manufacturers,  highly  qualified,  eagerly  attempt  to  obtain 
results;  but  a  small  anonymous  bureaucracy  completely  annuls 
their  efforts.  The  Minister  of  Commerce  makes  solemn  en- 
gagements ;  he  promises  some  liberties ;  but  no  engagement  is 
kept.  Clients  whom  we  have  gained  with  gi'eat  difficulty  are 
going  away  irritated  and  exasperated.  .  .  .  We  want  less  talk 
and  more  action.  We  do  not  ask  that  they  be  interested  in 
our  work.  That  would  be  an  indiscretion.  But  at  least,  they 
can  let  us  workP'^ 

Aside  from  the  evil  effect  upon  the  internal  welfare 
of  the  country  of  the  Government  control  of  importa- 
tions, it  was  creating  an  international  difficulty.  Al- 
lied merchants  were  very  glad  to  trade  with  France. 
They  were  not  prompted  solely  by  commercial  motives 
— though  the  French  Government  seemed  to  believe  this 
was  their  single  preoccupation — but  by  sympathy.  They 
desired  to  give  French  reconstruction  needs  every  pri- 
ority; but  when  the  French  Government,  indiscreetly, 
it  seemed  to  them,  refused  their  cooperation,  it  was 
only  natural  that  they  should  look  for  markets  else- 
where, Germany  included.     Not  only  was  France  los- 

^Le  Temps,  May  29,  1919. 

332 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

ing  Allied  trade,  but  slie  was  losing  markets  which  she 
could  have  had  in  Roumania,  Greece,  South  America 
and  the  Orient.  If  she  would  not  import  their  offerings, 
she  could  not  expect  to  export  to  them.  Consequently, 
France  was  beginning  to  face  an  economic  isolation. 


As  we  have  already  seen,  the  commercial  policy  of 
the  Government  was  by  no  means  acquiesced  in.  In- 
dustrial sentiment,  save  that  of  a  few  large  firms  profit- 
ing from  the  benefits  of  a  monopoly  market,  was  wholly 
against  it,  and  carried  on  a  vigorous  campaign  for  its 
repeal.  Among  political  parties,  only  a  few  Radicals 
and  Socialists  upheld  it.  Moderate  Republicans  to 
Royalists  were  its  strenuous  opponents — opponents  not 
only  of  this  restrictive  regulation  but  of  statism  in 
general. 

The  National  Association  of  Economic  Expansion, 
after  an  investigation  of  the  consortium, ^^  roundly  con- 
demned them  as  wastefuUy  exhausting  raw  materials 
necessary  to  national  industry.  In  regard  to  the  effect 
upon  reconstruction,  the  Federation  of  the  Architects . 
of  Northern  France,  upon  whom  such  a  task  would 
naturally  fall,  declared: 

Private  initiative  ...  is  the  only  means  for  the  rapid 
reconstruction  of  our  cities  and  villages.^s 

Similarly,  after  hearing  the  report  of  its  President, 
M.  Maurice  Charpentier,  the  Chartres  Chamber  of 
Commerce  resolved  that  "the  return  to  the  commercial 

-'Quoted  in  Le  Temps,  January  24,  1919. 
'■Ubid. 

333 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

and  industrial  life  of  before  the  war  be  effected  with 
the  briefest  possible  delay. ' '  ^^  The  French  Society  of 
Political  Economy,  an  organization  including  many 
eminent  economists,  likewise  accused  the  Government 
not  only  of  violating  the  most  fundamental  economic 
principles,  but  of  awkwardly  and  inefficiently  control- 
ling industry. 

At  a  meeting  of  the  Republican  Committee  of  Com- 
merce and  Industry,  attended  by  500  delegates  from  all 
over  France,  upon  May  14,  1919,  its  President,  Senator 
Mascuraud,  denounced  Government  Statism  in  these 
words : 

We  have  seen  how  the  State  buys,  manufactures,  and  sells. 
We  have  seen,  under  its  management,  a  deplorable  discrep- 
ancy produced  between  the  cost  of  production  and  that  of  the 
products,  so  much  so  that  the  cost  of  living  and  the  level  of 
salaries  always  increase  without  satisfying  any  one. 

The  experience  is  conclusive.  There  is  only  too  much  of  it. 
Enough  of  State  socialism  and  of  monopolies !  If  we  wish  to 
heal  our  wounds,  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  formidable  budget 
and  to  overcome  our  foreign  indebtedness,  we  must  have  lib- 
erty in  importations  and  in  exportations,  liberty  in  production 
and  in  circulation,  and  liberty  in  exchange. 

The  Union  of  Economic  Interests  also  declared  that 
"every  one  who  wants  to  work  for  the  resumption  of 
economic  life  conflicts  with  the  State.  In  place  of  en- 
couraging good  intentions  and  of  aiding  initiative,  it 
discourages  the  one  and  paralyzes  the  other.  The  State 
wishes  to  regulate  everything  and  to  control  everything: 
importations,  exportations,  production,  distribution, 
and  exchange."  ^° 

In  addition  to  these  business  elements,  Labor  entered 

"Meeting  held  on  Dec.  17,  1916,  Le  Temps,  Jan.  24,  1919. 
"°  Quoted  in  ibid. 

334 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

the  lists  against  one  feature,  at  least,  of  this  policy.  At 
a  meeting  of  the  Confederal  Committee  of  the  General 
Confederation  of  Labor,  held  on  July  22,  a  resohilion 
in  favor  of  Free  Trade,  the  suppression  of  custom  bar- 
riers, and  the  free  entry  of  raw  materials  and  manu- 
facturers, was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  ninety-one  to  six- 
teen. This  was  a  somewhat  radical  departure  for  this 
Labor  organization ;  but  it  was  strongly  supported  by 
the  Socialists — all  of  the  Socialist  papers  demanded 
the  suppression  of  the  exportation  ban — and  the  city 
dwellers  generally,  who  were  sorely  afflicted  by  high 
prices.  For  the  public,  L'Q^uvre  and  Le  Frogres 
Civique  denounced  the  theorj^  of  Protection  and  de- 
manded the  institution  of  Free  Trade.  It  seemed  that 
only  the  extremity  to  which  the  Government  had  car- 
ried the  theory  could  rouse  France  from  its  traditional 
belief  in  this  doctrine. 

Under  the  great  pressure  which  the  most  divergent 
interests  were  bringing  to  bear  upon  the  Government,  it 
gradually  removed  some  of  the  restrictions  upon  the 
liberty  of  commerce.  On  January  20,  1919,  a  decree 
was  issued  removing  the  bans  on  exportation  from  all 
but  140  articles  of  the  654  upon  the  tariff.  Another 
measure  placed  all  purchases  for  the  public  services 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Minister  of  Finances,  a 
move  of  economy.  A  further  decree,  announced  in  Le 
Temps,  on  May  14,  1919,  removed  the  ban  still  more  on 
exportations,  only  nineteen  articles  remaining  subject 
to  the  prohibition.  These  included  many  important 
items  such  as  live  animals,  chemicals,  metals,  and 
paper.  These  removals  did  not  ai)ply  to  importations 
and  consequently  did  not  allay  public  criticism.  But 
upon  the  17th  of  iMay,  a  letter  was  published  written 
by  M.  Loucheur,  IMlnister  of  Industrial  Reconstruction, 

335 


CONTEaiPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

to  M.  de  La  Tremoille,  who  had  laid  a  resolution  before 
the  Chamber  asking  for  freedom  of  importation  of  raw 
materials,  manufactured  articles  necessary  to  French 
export  trade,  and  agricultural  machinery.  In  this 
letter,  the  Minister  stated  that  the  ]\Iinisters  had  de- 
cided to  ask  the  President  of  the  Republic  to  sign  a 
decree  almost  completely  restoring  the  liberty  of  impor- 
tation so  far  as  raw  material  was  concerned ;  and  after 
adjustments  with  the  Allies,  another  decree  would  be 
issued,  more  nearly  suppressing  all  restrictions  on  im- 
'  portations.  The  ]\Iinister,  who  had  apparently  forsaken 
the  desire  to  fasten  this  policy  upon  peace-time  indus- 
try, closed  by  saying:  "We  are  thus  completely  in 
accord  with  you  .  .  .  upon  the  projected  resolution 
which  you  have  presented." 

Perhaps  to  the  surprise  of  the  French  public,  the 
Government  kept  its  word,  for  upon  May  20,  the 
Journal  Officiel  published  a  decree  allowing  the  impor- 
tation of  principal  raw  materials  necessary  to  the  re- 
sumption of  French  production.  Further  decrees  were 
announced  on  June  19,  July  7,  and  8,  which  suppressed 
nearly  all  prohibitions  on  importations,  about  a  dozen 
articles  remaining.  The  value  of  the  decrees,  however, 
was  largely  overcome  by  the  fact  that  they  increased 
certain  tariff  rates  on  needed  commodities  to  an  almost 
prohibitive  height.^^  Thus  it  was  about  eight  months 
after  the  close  of  hostilities  before  the  French  Govern- 
ment surrendered  its  control  over  private  enterprise. 
There  may  have  been  some  justification  to  its  policy ;  but 
the  dangers  in  which  it  resulted  appear  much  greater 
than  those  it  avoided. 


"See  L'Ecnnamiste  Francois,  July  19,   1920,   74,   " Le  ESgime 
commercial  frangais." 

336 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 


VI 


The  defects  in  functioning  and  the  defects  in  theory 
of  the  French  bureaucracy  have  been  vigorously  at- 
tacked. In  addition  to  those  opposed  to  the  war  poli- 
cies of  the  Government,  there  are  many  equally  opposed 
to  the  ordinary  extent  and  mode  of  operation  of  the 
Government  administration.  The  remedy  which  the 
business  interests,  including  the  upper  bourgeoisie, 
urge,  is  the  return  to  private  enterprise  of  activities 
now  directed  by  the  State.  As  it  is  extremely  improb- 
able that  the  State  will  ever  surrender  any  of  its  pres- 
ent industrial  prerogatives,  the  success  of  such  a  remedy 
seems  slight.  Realizing  this  unlikelihood,  the  anti- 
collectivist  movement  has  limited  its  demands  to  the 
prevention  of  future  State  extensions  into  industry. 
The  Union  of  Economic  Interests,  embracing  about  sev- 
enty-five commercial  organizations,  is  the  leader  in  this 
movement.  It  was  organized  in  1909  with  201  insur- 
ance syndicates  as  its  basis.  Its  purpose  is  to  combat 
State  Socialism  and  to  defeat  any  candidate  for  Par- 
liament who  does  not  promise  to  vote  against  measures 
increasing  it.  In  the  elections  of  1910,  the  activities  of 
the  Union  succeeded  in  pledging  366  Deputies  to  vote 
agaiust  the  creation  of  new  State  monopolies.  In  1910, 
Le  Reveil  Economique  was  founded ;  it  has  proved  an 
energetic  organ  in  carrying  on  the  Union's  campaigns. 
On  the  15th  of  December,  1913,  it  assembled  the  presi- 
dents or  delegates  of  forty  great  national  groupings  of 
commerce,  industry,  and  agriculture,  to  inaugurate  an 
anti-statism  program  for  the  1914  elections.  As  a  re- 
sult of  its  activities,  270  Deputies  declared  themselves 
against  the  extension  of  Government  activities  in  indus- 

337 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

try,  127  opposed  the  program  set  up  by  the  Union,  29 
were  for  it  with  reservations,  and  164  were  doubtful. 
At  a  meeting  held  at  Paris  upon  the  12th  of  INIay,  1919, 
the  Union  adopted  another  program  which  pledged  it- 
self to  ''formal  opposition  to  the  establishment  of  new 
monopolies,  to  any  attempt  at  colleetivist  socialization, 
to  any  encroachment  of  the  State  upon  services  of  a 
commercial  and  an  industrial  character,  to  the  opera- 
tion by  the  State  of  services  at  present  leased  to  indi- 
viduals, and,  generally,  to  any  interference  of  the  State 
in  the  management  of  private  enterprise. ' '  ^^ 

This  program  was  submitted  to  the  candidates  for 
election  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  last  November. 
Each  candidate  was  asked  to  subscribe  to  its  principles. 
As  a  result  of  this  canvass  and  of  the  election,  it  was 
found  that  377  of  the  elected  Deputies  approved  the 
program ;  35  made  reservations  to  it ;  96  were  doubtful, 
and  81  were  opposed  to  it. 

Despite  the  activities  of  the  business  interests,  the 
statist  movement  seems  to  be  growing  and  the  evils  of 
the  bureaucracy  remain  unchecked.  The  Government 
has  decided  to  convert  all  of  its  munition  plants  into 
industrial  factories,  operated  upon  a  peace-time  basis. 
It  is  not  apparent  why  these  plants  were  not  sold  to 
private  firms.  Bills  have  been  introduced  into  the 
Chamber  for  tlie  Government  monopoly  of  insurance  ^^ 
and  for  the  monopoly  of  petrol ;  the  Chamber  has  voted 
a  bill  providing  for  Government  participation  in  the 
profits  and  eventually  in  the  operation  of  mines;  like- 
wise,  a  bill  monopolizing  industrial  alcohol   has  been 


"  Article  II  of  the  program,  printed  in  brochure,  Union  des 
Intercts  Economiques. 

"Sec  article  on  "La  question  du  mnnopole  des  assurances"  in 
Le  Parlement  et  I'Opinion,  March,  1919. 

338 


BUREAUCRACY  AND  STATE  SOCIALISM 

passed.  Agitation  for  Government  ownersliip  of  hydrau- 
lic power  is  strong.  In  the  latter  part  of  June,  1919, 
M.  Albert  Thomas,  supported  by  the  railway  men's 
federations,  introduced  a  project  for  the  nationaliza- 
tion of  the  railways. 

Despite  the  distinction  which  some  Socialists  attempt 
to  create  between  Statism  and  Socialism,^*  the  French 
Socialists  with  the  left  wing  of  the  Radical-Socialists 
are  the  supporters  of  statist  policies  and  projects.  The 
statist  activities  of  Parliament  are  being  strenuously 
objected  to  by  moderate  elements  because  of  the  fact 
that  the  powers  of  Parliament  should  have  expired  in 
1918,  if  the  war  had  not  prevented  it.  It  has  no  right, 
according  to  them,  to  impose  its  will  upon  an  uncon- 
sulted  country. 

This  issue  doubtlessly  was  one  of  the  most  important 
in  the  elections  of  1919.  Anti-statism  is  always  certain 
to  be  the  rallying  cry  of  moderate  Republicans.  They 
will  be  supported  by  many  collectivists  because  of  the 
antipatriotism  and  Bolshevism  with  which  the  chief 
supporters  of  Statism,  the  Unified  Socialists,  are  asso- 
ciated.^^ 


"See  Emile  Vandervelde,  Le  Socialisme  contre  I'Etat. 

^°  Two  other  solutions  suggested  for  the  defects  of  the  French 
bureaucracy  will  be  considered  in  the  next  two  chapters:  (1) 
decentralization  by  service  and  professional  government,  and 
(2)  decentralization  by  regions,  or  the  extension  of  local  govern- 
ing powers. 


CHAPTER  XI 


GOVERNMENT   BY   INTERESTS   AND   EXPERTS 


Aux    lois    politiques    vont    de   plus    en    pliLS   succeder   des   lots 
economiqiies  au  administratives. — Pour  Gouverneb. 


The  increase  of  State  control  over  industry,  of  which 
the  period  of  the  war  has  given  an  illuminating  ex- 
ample, is  regarded  by  many  Frenchmen  as  an  inevitable 
if  not  a  welcome  evolution.  Unlike  the  interests  which 
desire  a  return  to  the  old  freedom  and  to  the  policy  of 
laissez  faire,  this  new  school  after  reorganizing  the 
basis  of  the  present  State,  wishes  to  extend  its  functions. 
It  offers  one  of  the  two  real  suggestions  for  remedying 
the  defects  of  French  administration — decentralization 
by  service  as  opposed  to  decentralization  by  geographic 
regions.^  Finally,  it  goes  much  farther  and  suggests 
an  entirely  new  political  framework  for  the  State. 

French  administration,  as  previously  noted,  owes 
many  of  its  faults  to  the  concentration  of  power  at  the 
head  of  its  various  departments.  Thus  the  Cabinet 
Ministers  are  not  only  part  of  the  political  government 
responsible  to  Parliament,  but  they  are  chiefs  of  all 
the  public  services  belonging  to  their  departments.  De- 
pendent upon  them,  a  great  number  of  directors,  under- 
directors,  chief  of  services  and  inspectors  exist,  whose 

*  See  Chapter  XII. 

340 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

powers  arc  more  or  less  extensive  aeeording  to  the  ]\Tin- 
istry ;  and  who,  under  the  authority  of  the  Ministers, 
act  as  agents  of  the  Government,  exercising,  as  a  French 
legal  authority-  has  stated,  the  tliree  powers  of  com- 
mand, surveillance  and  control. 

In  otlier  words,  these  ofificials  are  directly  controlled 
by,  and  at  the  absolute  mercy  of,  the  Government ;  they 
have  no  other  than  a  political  status.  The  Government 
exercises  complete  freedom  in  choosing  or  removing 
them.  Beneath  these  political  agents  are  several  hun- 
dred thousand  ordinary  employees  performing  the  most 
diverse  functions,  many  of  whom,  on  account  of  their 
organization,  already  enjoy  a  relative  permanency  of 
position. 

Decentralization  of  service  means  that  Government 
officials,  particularly  Government  agents,  will  no  longer 
be  placed  under  the  command  of  department  Ministers, 
but  only  under  their  control.  The  increase  of  public 
services  is  forcing  this  evolution,  for  it  has  become  an 
impossible  task  for  the  head  of  the  department  to  com- 
mand what  should  be  done  in  every  case  where  a  deci- 
sion is  necessary.  In  the  interest  of  the  good  manage- 
ment of  the  public  services,  initiative  in  decisions  must 
be  left  with  under-officials.  With  a  decentralized  ad- 
ministration,^ the  heads  of  departments  will  only  refuse 
to  approve  measures  taken  by  subordinates  when  they 
are  in  violation  of  law,  and  not  when  they  are  ill- 
judged.  The  power  of  surveillance  accompanied  by  a 
power  of  revocation  will  still  rest  with  the  central 
authority  but  it  will  be  strictly  limited  to  the  above  pur- 
poses.   Thus  the  decentralized  agent  will  have  an  initia- 

'  Leon  Duguit,  Traite  de  Droit  Constitutionnel,  i,  447-457. 
'  For    an    impartial    discussion    of    administrative    decentraliza- 
tion, sec  Ilauriou,  Precis  de  Droit  Administratif,  143-154. 

341 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tive,  as  well  as  a  comparative  freedom  from  officious 
interference  of  department  heads  now  frequently  exer- 
cised for  political  or  other  reasons.*  As  a  necessary 
complement  to  the  granting  of  initiative  must  go  the 
personal  responsibility  of  the  agent.  Otherwise  his 
freedom  would  be  unrestricted.  At  present  the  ]\Iinis- 
ter,  as  head  of  the  department,  is  alone  responsible 
to  Parliament,  a  responsibility  which  often  amounts  to 
nothing  at  all.  Under  a  thoroughly  decentralized  ad- 
ministration, every  negligent  or  careless  service  would 
imply  a  personal  responsibility  of  the  official  concerned 
for  which  he  could  be  held  pecuniarily  liable.  The 
creation  of  a  common  fund  by  the  organizations  of  the 
functionaries,  supplied  with  a  share  in  the  profits  which 
the  French  public  services  make,  would  furnish  a  source 

*  Professor  Jeze  classifies  public  services  into  two  categories: 
(1)  those  who  interest  the  inhabitants  in  general,  i.e.,  the  na- 
tional defense,  posts  and  telegraphs,  etc.;  and  (2)  those  who, 
while  interesting  the  nation  as  a  whole,  more  particularly  concern 
individuals  residing  in  each  locality,  i.e.,  tramways,  street  lighting, 
paving  etc.  The  second  class  of  public  services  may  become  de- 
centralized to  a  certain  point.  M.  Jeze  states  the  argument  as 
follows: 

"Centralization  seems  to  have  the  advantage  of  a  more  impar- 
tial administration  because  the  centralized  agents  arc  less  engaged 
in  local  quarrels;  but  this  is  not  ahvays  the  case.  On  the  contrary, 
a  centrahzed  administration  is  very  slow,  since  it  is  necessary, 
for  the  most  insignificant  things,  to  await  tlie  decision  of  distairt 
authorities.  Centralization  places  an  enormous  rcsiionsibiiity 
upon  the  Government,  since  it  not  only  must  take  account  of  na- 
tional considerations,  but  also  of  the  smallest  details  of  local 
administration.  Finally  centralization  does  not  interest  the  in- 
habitants in  the  management  of  public  affairs  and  does  not  accus- 
tom them  to  govern  themselves. 

"This,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  great  advantage  of  decentrali- 
zation. The  dominant  idea  of  modern  political  science  is  that 
individuals  rnust  (jovern  .  .  .  themselves.  The  time  seems  to  have 
passed  when  families  or  social  classes  were  charged  with  governing 
or  administering  others.  Tiulividuals  more  and  more  desire  them- 
selves to  direct  tlieir  affairs  and  to  escape  from  the  selfish  rule 
of  so-called  directing  families  and  classes  and  their  agents.  ..." 
Droit  Public  et  Administratif ,  132-33. 

342 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

from  which  their  joint  responsibility  could  be  met.  Ac- 
cording to  Professor  Duguit,  the  sujjporter  of  this  system, 
some  such  reorganization  must  be  effected  if  the  growth 
of  the  public  services  and  the  protection  of  the  individual 
against  the  omnipotence  of  Government  authorities  is 
to  be  reconciled. 

This  theory  further  implies  the  supplanting,  by  tech- 
nicians and  experts,  of  those  officials  in  the  Government 
service  who  are  incompetent  and  who  owe  their  appoint- 
ments solely  to  political  influence.  The  greater  number 
of  public  services  are  technical;  and,  to  be  efficiently 
operated,  they  require  skilled  direction.  If  initiative 
and  responsibility  are  to  be  placed  on  subordinate  offi- 
cials, they  must  be  granted  to  those  who,  by  training 
and  aptitude,  are  able  to  exercise  them  intelligently. 
This  applies  likewise  to  officials  at  the  head  of  adminis- 
trative departments.  Hence  this  is  a  movement  to  place 
the  expert  in  the  Government,  and  to  place  it  upon  a 
scientific  basis. 


II 


The  participation  of  subordinate  functionaries  and 
of  experts  in  the  control  of  the  public  services  already 
exists  to  a  very  limited  extent.  By  a  law  of  1896  the 
national  service  of  education,  through  councils  elected 
largely  by  teachers  themselves,  became  partially  decen- 
tralized. The  University  Councils  are  composed  of  the 
deans  and  two  delegates  elected  from  each  faculty  of 
the  same  university.  Although  the  deliberations  of  this 
Council  must  be  submitted  to  ministerial  approval, 
nevertheless  they  practically  control  the  direction  of 
the  university  concerned. 

By  decrees  issued  in  January,  1910,  M.  Millerand, 

343 


CONTEIVIPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

then  Minister  of  Public  Works,  provided  for  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  emploj'ees  of  the  Posts,  Telephones  and 
Telegraphs  in  the  regional  councils  of  discipline,  in  the 
central  council  of  discipline,  and  in  the  central  promo- 
tions council.  The  personnel  also  choose  delegates  to 
serve  with  the  IMinister,  the  department  directors,  and 
the  chief  of  the  service. 

As  members  of  M.  Clemenceau's  last  Cabinet,  M.  Cla- 
veille,  the  Minister  of  Transportation,  was  a  railroad 
man;  M.  Victor  Boret,  Minister  of  Agriculture,  was  a 
grain  merchant;  M.  Loucheur,  I\Iinister  of  Reconstruc- 
tion, was  a  financier  and  manufacturer;  M,  Vilgrain, 
Undersecretary  of  State  to  the  Food  Ministry,  was  a 
miller.  Thus  even  a  few  heads  of  departments  have 
been  selected  because  of  their  technical  knowledge  and 
experience. 

The  Chambers  of  Commerce  have  a  few  governmental 
powers  delegated  to  them.  According  to  a  law  of  April 
9,  1898,^  the  Government  is  obliged  to  consult  their 
national  assembly,  which  meets  every  two  months  in 
Paris,  upon  all  matters  or  changes  considered  in  com- 
mercial, tariff,  or  economic  legislation.  The  Govern- 
ment, however,  is  not  compelled  to  follow  its  advice. 
Of  more  importance,  the  Chambers  may  themselves 
operate  certain  public  works  and  services,  especially 
those  involving  ports  and  navigable  ways;  and  they 
may  conduct  technical  education.  They  may  also  issue 
certain  denominations  and  quantities  of  paper  money 
for  local  circulation.     A  special  Chamber  of  Commerce 

'^  Parlemcnt  et  I'Oinnion,  March,  1919,  Du  Role  des  Chambres  de 
Commerce.  Unlike  the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce,  the 
French  Chamber  is  a  public  institution;  it  is  established  by  a 
Government  decree.  There  is  one  for  every  department.  See 
Chamber  of  Commerce  organization  law,  April  9,  1898,  Codes  et 
Lois,  ii,   1441. 

344 


GOVItlRNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

tax,"  pjranted  tliein  by  the  Government,  insures  their 
financial  support.  Except  for  one  otlier,  the  President 
of  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Chambers,  was  the 
only  technician  appointed  on  the  Committee  of  Impor- 
tations, a  body  in  general  charge  of  war  importations. 
The  Chambers  are  also  represented  in  the  Regional 
Committees  of  Economic  Action  and  in  local  committees 
charged  with  adjusting  terms  for  sliips  requisitioned  by 
the  Government.  On  April  7,  1919,  Le  Journal  Officiel 
announced  that  136  of  the  Chambers  of  Commerce  were 
authorized  to  organize  themselves  into  seventeen  groups, 
according  to  economic  regions.  M.  Clementel,  the  Min- 
ister of  Commerce,  was  responsible  for  this  grouping. 
It  was  his  idea  '^  to  associate  these  Chambers  in  a  com- 
mon action,  giving  them  general  power  to  supervise  the 
economic  reconstruction  of  the  different  regions  of 
France.  A  regional  committee  was  to  be  formed  in 
which  the  Chambers  were  to  be  represented  according 
to  their  numbers.  This  committee  was  to  ' '  receive  from 
the  JMinistry  of  Commerce  a  letter  of  service  accrediting 
it  to  the  different  public  administrations,"  implying 
that  the  committees  would  be  given  a  part  in  the  admin- 
istration of  the  regions  and  departments  in  which  they 
were  located.  The  powers  which  were  to  be  accorded 
to  these  purely  professional  bodies  were  left  vague ;  and 
although  the  idea  is  received  with  favor  in  regionalist 
circles,  it  remains  a  question  whether  the  Government 
will  ever  willingly  give  these  bodies  any  amount  of  ef- 
fective authority. 

Aside  from  the  Chambers  of  Commerce,  other  profes- 


"M.   Lcroy,   " Lcs  Productcurs  au  pouvoir,"   La  Grande  Revue, 
March,  1919. 

''  "L 'Opinion  Begionaliste,"  L'Opinion,  April  26,   1919. 

345 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

sional  bodies  are  supposed  to  be  consulted  by  the  Gov- 
ernment. According  to  a  law  of  1852,^  Consultative 
Chambers  of  Agriculture  were  created  to  give  advice 
upon  subjects  of  agricultural  development  and  coordi- 
nation. This  functit)n,  when  now  carried  out,  is  left 
to  the  smaller  unions  of  agriculturists.  During  the 
war,  they  have  been  represented  upon  many  commit- 
tees such  as  those  of  Economic  Action  and  of  Agricul- 
tural Labor.  They  were  likewise  charged  with  distrib- 
uting fertilizer  to  wine  growers. 

An  old  law  further  created  the  Consultative  Cham- 
bers of  Arts  and  IManufactures,  but  it  is  lifeless.  Ac- 
cording to  a  decree  of  1894  a  Superior  Council  of  Com- 
merce and  Industry  comprised  of  appointed  members 
was  established,  which  the  Minister  of  Commerce  was 
obliged  to  consult  upon  tariff  laws  and  treaties  of  com- 
merce. A  similar  function  was  delegated  to  a  Superior 
Labor  Council,  composed  of  seventy-two  members, 
twenty-nine  of  whom  were  to  be  elected  by  labor  unions, 
twenty-nine  by  employers'  organization,  one  by  coopera- 
tive societies,  one  by  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Paris,  one  by  the  Bourse  du  Travail  of  Paris;  there 
were  also  to  be  three  Senators  and  five  Deputies  upon 
it.  This  Council  has  only  a  consultative  role,  but  it  has 
dor.e  a  great  service  in  supplying  the  IMinistries  of 
Labor  and  Commerce  with  invaluable  Labor  information, 
and  in  penetrating  them  with  a  new  social  spirit. 

A  Consultative  Committee  of  Railways  is  also  in 
existence,  which  now  has  seventeen  representatives  of 
the  Railway  Unions  upon  it.  During  the  war  the  Min- 
istry of  Armament  constituted  permanent   committees 

•  For  the  law  creating  the  Consultative  Chambers  of  Agricul- 
ture, March  25,  1852,  sec  Codes  ct  Lois,  ii,  477. 

346 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

of  conciliation  and  arbitration,  composed  equally  of 
employers  and  workers. 

In  the  Government  committee  of  Chemical  Products, 
there  were  four  specialists  who  were  chemical  manu- 
facturers, and  two  merchant  specialists  in  chemical 
products.  In  the  Central  Committee  on  steam  engines, 
there  were  five  business  men ;  on  the  Inter-ministerial 
Committee  charged  with  determining  the  national  ma- 
chinery needs,  there  were  five  representatives  of  em- 
ploj'^ers'  organizations  using  machinery,  three  machin- 
ery dealers  and  two  manufacturers,  as  well  as  other 
representatives  of  the  business  world.® 

Presumably  in  response  to  the  demand  for  compe- 
tence in  Government,  the  President  of  the  Council  an- 
nounced on  July  16,  1919,  the  formation  of  an  "Eco- 
nomic Council  charged  with  assuring  the  preparation 
and  the  execution  of  general  measures  concerning  the 
supply  and  distribution  of  products  and  supplies  of  any 
nature,  the  diminution  of  the  cost  of  living,  the  re- 
pression of  si)eculation,  the  development  of  economic 
life  and  the  reconstruction  of  the  liberated  regions." 
This  council  was  to  meet  at  least  once  a  week.  It  was 
presided  over  by  the  President  of  the  Council.  It  in- 
cluded the  Ministers  of  Public  Works,  Commerce,  In- 
dustrial Reconstruction,  Agriculture,  Colonies,  Labor 
of  the  Liberated  Regions.  Its  resolutions  are  submitted 
to  the  Council  of  IMinisters. 

To  this  Economic  Council  (which,  as  will  be  noted, 
is  nothing  but  a  division  of  the  Cabinet)  is  to  be  added 
a  commission  charged  with  framing  propositions  to  pre- 
sent to  it.     This  commission  is  partially  of  professional 

"  For  discussion  of  those  "War  Committeos  and  for  other  examples 
of  experts  in  French  administration,  see  M,  Leroy's  article  quoted 
above. 

347 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

composition,  for  it  contains:  (1)  the  Undersecretaries 
of  State  of  the  President  of  the  Council,  and  of  the 
Ministries  of  Public  Works,  Finance,  Interior,  Food 
Supply;  (2)  the  commissioner  of  maritime  transports; 
(3)  the  president  of  the  Section  of  Economic  Studies 
of  the  Presidency  of  the  Council;  (4)  the  president  of 
the  inter-ministerial  commission  in  the  Liberated  re- 
gions; (5)  three  representatives  of  employers'  organiza- 
tions;  (6)   three  representatives  of  labor  organizations. 

This  commission  will  receive  opinions  from  munici- 
palities, agricultural,  industrial  or  commercial  groups, 
workingmen  's  and  employers '  organizations,  and  co- 
operative societies. 

The  experts  thus  delegated  to  a  share  in  the  adminis- 
tration have  been  too  few,  according  to  the  reformists; 
their  powers,  when  exercised  at  all,  have  been  merely 
consultative  and  of  no  binding  force ;  and  they  have 
always  been  outweighed  by  non-expert  officials,  actu- 
ated largely  by  political  motives.  The  decentralization 
movement  must  permeate  the  regular  Government  ser- 
vices with  this  professional  element  which  the  Govern- 
ment has  been  in  a  partial  degree  forced  to  take  into 
its  war  administration.  It  must  increase  their  numbers 
and  their  power,  and  ultimately,  it  must  place  the  com- 
plete control  of  these  services  in  their  hands. 

In  the  spring  of  1919  the  Ligue  dcs  Gauverncs  was 
organized  by  ]\Iaxime  Leroy,  Henri  Dumay,  and  others 
to  agitate  this  development.  The  purpose  of  the  organ- 
ization is  declaredly  non-partisan,  and  is  solely  directed 
toward  the  improvement  of  the  administrative  system. 

One  of  its  brochures  says:  "We  (the  public)  are 
never  consulted  upon  the  organization  or  the  improve- 
ment of  services  wliich  at  every  instant  and  in  a  serious 
manner  affect  our  interests  and  our  welfare.    Arbitrary 

348 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

power,  negligence,  and  carelessness,  blind  and  injure 
us.  It  is  to  reform  this  state  of  things  that  the  Ligue 
des  Gouvernes  is  founded.  By  its  specialists  of  every 
order,  it  will  study  .  .  .  the  improvements  whose  need 
is  revealed  on  every  side,  and  will  pursue  their  im- 
mediate application  by  every  legal  means." 

The  League  announced  that  it  would  concern  itself 
with  all  of  the  public  services  which  the  State  now  exer- 
cises ;  and  its  definite  purpose  is  to  improve  the  service 
of  the  railways,  telegraphs,  post  offices,  telephones, 
omnibuses,  street  cars,  taxis,  water,  gas,  electricity, 
ports,  navigation,  State  and  other  monopolies,  bridges 
and  roads,  tariffs  and  octrois,  tax  collection,  munici- 
palities, burials,  ministerial  offices,  police,  insurance, 
recruiting,  public  assistance,  public  hygiene,  and  edu- 
cation. 

The  more  comprehensive  purpose  of  the  League  is  to 
work  out  a  plan  of  organized  cooperation  between  the 
Government  employees  and  the  general  public  through 
great  professional  groupings.  The  organisation  of 
public  employees  is  an  essential  element  in  the  decen- 
tralization of  administration  and  in  the  establishment  of 
their  responsibility.  Of  equal  importance  is  the  neces- 
sity for  developing  some  relationship  between  the  gen- 
eral public  and  the  functionaries  to  insure  the  proper 
use  of  their  decentralized  power.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
this  plan  of  administration  is  founded  on  syndicalism 
or  guildism,  that  is,  upon  numerous  autonomous  group- 
ings, cooperating  with  each  other,  independent  of  a 
continued  Government  intervention.  According  to  the 
proponents  of  this  theory,  this  is  really  taking  authority 
away  from  the  State  and  conferring  it  upon  experts, 
responsibly  and  efficiently  organized. 


349 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 


III 

The  organization  of  Government  functionaries  has 
met  the  same  resistance  in  France  which  it  has  ex- 
perienced in  other  countries,  France  has  two  laws  upon 
professional  organizations:  One,  the  law  of  1884,  which 
permitted  the  organization  of  professional  associations, 
such  as  labor  unions,  for  the  urging  of  professional 
demands  and  which  stated  "that  professional  syndi- 
cates have  as  an  exclusive  object  the  study  and  defense 
of  economic,  industrial,  commercial  and  agricultural 
interests";  the  other,  the  law  of  1901,  which  permitted 
the  general  organization  of  "associations"  among 
those  excluded  from  the  benefits  of  the  law  of  1884. 
These  associations  were  intended  to  be  of  a  social  and 
cultural  nature  rather  than  for  the  furtherance  of 
strictly  economic  improvement.^" 

The  Government  has  repeatedly  refused  to  interpret 
the  law  of  1884  to  include  Government  officials.  By 
circulars  issued  in  1892,  1895,  1897,  and  1904,  different 
ministries  denied  all  requests  of  their  functionaries  to 
organize  themselves  into  syndicates.  In  1910  the  tri- 
bunal of  the  Seine  declared  that  Government  officials 
could  not  form  professional  syndicates  such  as  were 
provided  for  in  the  law  of  1884.^^  The  case  was  upon 
the  legality  of  a  syndicate  formed  by  post  office  em- 
ployees.    But  the  Council  of  State  in  1909  had  ruled 


"The  Organization  law  of  March  21,  1884,  is  given  in  Codes  et 
Lois,  ii,  954.  The  Association  law  of  July  1,  1901,  is  found  in 
the   same   volume,   1483-84. 

"  The  Government  has  always  allowed  mere  workers  holding  no 
authority  to  organize  into  syndicates  of  the  1884  type.  Tlius 
the  arsenal  workers  and  those  engaged  in  labor  on  State  monopolies 
are  legally  syndicalized. 

350 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

that  functionaries  might  form  associations  under  the 
law  of  1901.  The  chief  practical  difference  between 
the  two  was  that  a  syndicate  formed  under  the  law  of 
1884  would  probably  adhere  to  the  General  Confedera- 
tion of  Labor,  in  order  to  increase  its  bargaining  power. 
The  Government  did  not  relish  demands  for  increased 
Avages  nor,  in  ease  of  their  refusal,  strikes  and  the  dis- 
ruption of  public  services  essential  to  the  nation.  A 
functionary,  in  accepting  public  employment,  entered 
into  a  special  status  carrying  with  it  the  obligation  to 
insure  the  continuance  of  governmental  activities.  The 
functionaries'  retort  has  always  been  that  if  theirs  is 
a  special  status,  which  limits  them  in  this  respect,  it 
should  offer  offsetting  compensations  in  permanency  of 
position  and  adequac}'  of  income.  Despite  the  illegality 
of  syndicates  among  the  postal  employees,  they  per- 
sisted in  maintaining  their  organizations  and  in  1009 
they  adhered  to  the  C.  G.  T. 

The  school-teachers  (instituteurs) ,  a  majority  of  whom 
it  is  said  are  Socialists,  were  pioneers  in  the  function- 
aries' struggle  for  the  privileges  of  the  law  of  1884. 
Their  campaign  was  begun  in  1887  when  they  first  con- 
ceived the  material  advantages  of  organization.  Upon 
Government  intervention,  organized  labor  in  France  was 
very  quick  in  coming  to  their  support.  As  a  result  of 
a  motion  voted  in  1902  at  a  Congress  of  the  Bourses  du 
Travail,  a  committee  on  Syndical  Education  was  ap- 
pointed, composed  of  six  teachers  and  five  workmen.  In 
1905,  upon  the  occasion  of  a  great  syndicalist  move- 
ment in  France,  an  open  struggle  began  between  the 
Government  and  the  school-teachers  for  the  possession 
and  exercise  of  this  right.  In  the  same  year,  the  leaders 
in  the  "Instituteurs'  "  organization  in  the  Seine  dis- 
trict were  arrested  by  the  Government  for  attempting 

351 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

to  enforce  its  recognition ;  a  year  later  a  project  of  am- 
nesty was  passed  and  the  proceedings  against  them  were 
dropped. 

In  the  meantime  a  Central  Committee  for  the  De- 
fense of  the  Syndical  Right  of  the  employees  of  the 
State,  the  Departments  and  the  Communes,  was  organ- 
ized; while  on  February  26,  1907,  the  National  Federa- 
tion of  Teachers'  Syndicates  was  created  and  its  statutes 
were  filed  with  the  Government.  A  year  later,  the  Cen- 
tral Committee  addressed  to  M.  Clemenceau,  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council,  an  open  letter  exposing  their  con- 
ception of  a  new  social  organization  and  asking  the 
benefit  of  the  law  of  188-1  upon  syndicates.  M.  Cle- 
menceau denied  this  request,  stating  that  the  law  was 
framed  only  for  industrial  workers,  and  that  the  Gov- 
ernment would  not  countenance  a  movement  antago- 
nistic to  it.  The  Government,  however,  was  asked  by 
Parliament  to  tolerate  the  syndicates  of  "instituteurs" 
already  existing,  while  forbidding  the  creation  of  any 
new  group.  This  modus  vivendi  existed  for  a  number 
of  years.  But  finally  after  the  Congress  of  Chambery 
in  1912,  M.  Briand  ordered  -the  syndicates  dissolved, 
accusing  them  of  being  centers  of  political  agitation  and 
national  disintegration.  Some  of  the  teachers  obeyed ; 
others  did  not,  and  the  members  of  the  Syndical  Coun- 
cil of  the  Syndicate  of  the  Seine  were  again  prosecuted. 
Proceedings  were  soon  dropped,  but  the  teachers' 
organizations  continued  to  develop.^^ 

At  present  the  functionaries,  300,000  of  them,  are 
grouped  into  a  National  Federation  of  Functionaries. 

"At  the  "  I  list  itui  curs'  "  Conyrcss  nt  Marseille,  June  8,  1919, 
thirty-threo  synilJeatcs,  eig^hteen  "amieal"  associations,  and  forty- 
two  frroups  of  nioliilizeil  teacluTs  (still  in  tlic  army)  were  repre- 
sented. 

352 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

They  are  divided  into  so-called  Amicales,  associations  of 
the  1901  type,  and  illegally  constituted  syndicates  of 
the  1884  type  which  the  Government  has  been  powerless 
to  suppress.  Their  organization  lias  been  accentuated 
by  the  almost  pitiful  salaries  which  French  function- 
aries receive.  By  all  odds  they  are  the  poorest  paid 
Government  officials  in  the  world.  An  English  official, 
corresponding  to  the  French  grade  of  redacteur,  re- 
ceives $1,000  a  year,  while  the  French  employee  receives 
$400.  When  he  becomes  chief  of  a  bureau  the  English 
official  receives  $5,000 ;  the  similar  position  in  France 
pays  $2,400.  The  French  Ministry  of  Marine  presented 
some  particular  abuses.  Candidates  for  positions  are  re- 
quired to  be  university  graduates,  but  such  low  salaries 
are  paid  (9,025  francs  for  the  chief  of  the  bureau  down 
to  a  third-class  redacteur,  who  receives  only  2,375  francs 
($■475),  that  it  is  impossible  to  fill  the  positions,  fifteen 
of  them  having  been  open  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war. 

On  the  22nd  of  June,  1917,  the  Senate  unanimously 
passed  a  law  extending  the  civil  capacity  of  professional 
sjnidicates  by  removing  some  of  the  restrictions  as  to 
property-holding,  placed  upon  them  by  the  law  of  1884. 
No  mention  was  made  of  extending  the  rights  of  the 
law  of  1884  to  functionaries.  The  bill  did  not  come 
up  for  discussion  in  the  Chamber  until  the  winter  of 
1918.  A  Socialist  prepared  the  report  upon  it,  and 
when  it  appeared  before  the  Deputies  it  contained  some 
interesting  additions,  the  chief  one  of  which  granted 
nearly  all  of  the  functionaries  the  right  to  organize. 
The  Socialists  had  wished  that  this  right  be  made  uni- 
versal in  its  extension  to  'all  employees  of  the  state, 
departments,  and  communes.  But  the  Chamber,  reticent 
to  extend  a  right  which  would  even  include  the  judges 

353 


CONTP]MPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

of  the  country  and  other  officials  upon  which  the  public 
welfare  vitally  depended,  passed  a  law  on  February  21, 
1919,  granting  the  right  to  organize  to  the  func- 
tionaries and  employees  of  state,  departments,  and  com- 
munes, except  members  of  the  military  forces,  the  po- 
lice, the  magistrates,  prefects  and  sub-prefects.  The 
Government  wished  a  provision  inserted  to  prohibit  defi- 
nitely the  right  to. strike  among  functionaries;  but  the 
Chamber,  under  Socialist  impulsion,  voted  it  down. 

On  the  19th  of  April,  the  Senate  voted  the  Chamber's 
law  with  two  definite  modifications.  Firstly,  it  granted 
the  right  to  organize  to  those  functionaries  holding  no 
part  of  the  "public  power."  This  was  an  attempt  to 
introduce  a  principle  into  the  question  which  the  Cham- 
ber had  attempted  to  settle  merely  by  a  list  of  exemp- 
tions. The  Senate  feared  that  the  Chamber's  precedent 
would  lead  to  the  easy  and  gradual  repeal  of  the  exemp- 
tions until  every  class  of  Government  official  could  le- 
gally organize.  The  Chamber,  on  the  other  hand,  argued 
that  it  was  impossible  to  draw  a  distinction  between 
employees  holding  and  those  not  holding  public  power. 
Secondly,  the  Senate  included  a  provision  to  the  effect 
that  any  Government  employee,  striking  in  a  concerted 
effort  to  stop  public  services,  by  that  act  would  become 
discharged.  On  the  return  of  the  bill  to  the  Chamber, 
both  of  these  jorovisions  w^ere  stricken  out ;  and  on  July 
18,  the  bill  was  again  voted  with  substantially  the^same 
exemptions. 

The  question  of  the  legality  of  functionary  syndi- 
cates, however,  is  largely  an  academic  one.  Not  only 
did  the  organizations  among  the  school-teachers  and 
postal  employees  persist  in  spite  of  their  formal  pro- 
hibition; but  other  groups  of  Government  officials  or- 
ganized  in  the  spring  of   1919,   and  became   affiliated 

354 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

with  the  General  Confederation  of  Labor.  Many  ac- 
cused the  Government  of  a  fatal  weakness  in  allowing 
these  wholesale  violations  of  the  law  of  1884.  The 
Government  itself  verbally  protested ;  but  by  refusing 
to  increase  the  unbelievably  low  salaries  of  its  officials 
it  allowed  the  greatest  reason  for  organization  to  re- 
main. 

On  the  8th  of  March  what  was  known  as  the  "Revolt 
of  the  Functionaries"  occurred.  Three  great  federa- 
tions of  tlie  public  services,  the  railway  men,  the  func- 
tionaries, and  workers  of  tlie  State,  took  part  at  a  meet- 
ing directed  by  the  secretary-general  of  the  C.  G.  T., 
and  adhered  to  the  Bourse  du  Travail  at  Paris.^^  On 
the  13th  they  voted  "that  all  the  administrative  em- 
ployees should  adhere  as  quickly  as  possible  to  the  C. 
G.  T.  so  they  might  participate  in  the  organization  of 
a  more  humane  and  just  society."  The  "revolt" 
aroused  the  fear  among  public  and  Government  circles 
that  these  organizations  would  now  resort  to  strikes  in 
order  to  force  their  demands.  This  insinuation  was 
vigorously  denied  by  functionary  leaders.^* 

This  example  was  followed  on  April  5  by  the  General 
Association  of  Under-Agents  of  the  Posts  which  changed 
itself  into  a  national  syndicate  affiliated  with  the  C.  G.  T. 
On  June  9,  1919,  the  National  Union  of  the  secretaries 
and  employees  of  the  French  IMayors^  in  its  twelfth 
national  congress,  voted  by  2,200  to  300  to  affiliate  with 
the  C.  G.  T,  At  the  same  time,  the  French  tax  col- 
lectore  at  their  tenth  congress  transformed  tlieir  asso- 
ciation into  a  syndicate ;  and  although  they  did  not  ad- 
here to  the  C.  G.  T.,  they  opened  negotiations  with 
the  Treasury  employees  to  effect  a  union.     On  May  3, 

"  The  Bourses  du  Travail  are  part  of  the  C.  G,  T. 
"See  Petit  Journal,  March  13,  1919. 

355 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  National  Federation  of  State,  Department,  and  Com- 
mune employees  expressed  a  desire  to  adhere  to  the 
C.  G.  T.  On  the  13th  of  May  at  their  annual  congress 
at  Strassburg,  the  General  Union  of  Customs  Agents, 
representing  twenty-seven  regional  groups,  decided  to 
change  their  association  into  a  sjmdicate  and  to  ask  to 
be  affiliated  in  the  C.  G.  T. 

On  the  24th  of  September,  the  Congress  of  the  School- 
teachers' "Amicales,"  or  associations  of  the  1901  type, 
voted  to  join  the  C.  G.  T.,  and  become  syndicates  by  a 
vote  of  170  against  43. 

These  examples  suffice  to  show  the  universal  organi- 
zation of  French  Government  employees.  "With  the  ex- 
ception, of  course,  of  soldiers  and  sailors,  it  seems  that 
every  class  of  functionary  is  compactly  grouped.  The 
professors  in  the  lycees'^^  are  even  associated  through 
the  Federation  of  Lycee  and  College  Professors.  The  em- 
ployees of  every  Government  service,  postal  clerks  to 
policemen,  are  organized,  most  of  them  in  syndicates 
of  the  1884  type.  If  the  present  evolution  continues, 
they  will  all  be  in  syndicates  and  members  of  the  Gen- 
eral Confederation  of  Labor. 

So  far,  purely  economic  demands  have  occasioned  this 
mania  for  organization.  This  the  National  Congress  of 
Functionaries,  meeting  on  July  6,  1919,  illustrated.  At 
that  time  the  immediate  realization  of  salary  increases 
by  July  20  and  the  recognition  of  the  syndical  right 
in  every  class  of  officials  were  demanded.  The  Congress 
also  invited  "all  the  federated  associations  to  transform 
themselves-  into  syndicates  affiliated  with  the  C.  G.  T. 
before  October  1.  .  .  ."  Due  to  their  insistent  agita- 
tion, the  Government,  upon  July  8,  asked  credits  for 
— — f 

^'^  Lycee,  a  school  corresponding  to  our  high  school  and  first 
two  years  of  college. 

356 


OOVP]RNi\IENT  ]iY  INTP]RESTS 

salary  increases.  Ui)()n  the  lOtli,  the  Cliainber  voted 
necessary  credits  so  as  to  advance  200  francs  to  all 
functionaries,  to  apply  on  future  salary  increases. 

To  the  Socialists  and  to  the  revolutionary  Syndical- 
ists, the  organization  of  Government  employees  means 
quite  another  thing  than  tlie  amelioration  of  living 
conditions.  To  them  it  is  an  essential  step  in  the  as- 
sumption of  power  by  the  proletariat.  To  the  advocates 
of  decentralization,  on  the  other  hand,  this  organization 
is  welcomed  as  the  basis  of  administrative  reform.  By 
no  means  going  to  the  length  of  the  Socialists,  they 
would  extend  the  powers  of  functionary  organizations 
to  a  direct  participation  in  the  management  of  public 
services.  For  example,  the  secondary  school-teachers, 
through  their  officials,  would  be  empowered  to  decide 
the  character  of  education,  rather  than  accept  policies 
dictated  by  the  IMinistry  of  Education.  The  Ministry 
might  lay  down  a  few  general  principles  to  be  fol- 
lowed, but  the  teachers  themselves  would  be  given  the 
initiative  and  independence  in  carrying  on  the  work. 
Doubtless,  such  a  system  of  decentralization  would  go 
to  the  extent  where  the  heads  of  the  IMinisterial  de- 
partments and  even  the  IMinister  would  be  chosen  from, 
if  not  elected  by,  the  educators  themselves.  Competence 
and  democracy,  it  is  urged,  would  then  be  instilled  into 
French  administration. 

The  organization  of  French  functionaries  is  an  as- 
sured fact ;  the  next  step,  and  one  of  equal  importance 
to  the  success  of  the  decentralization  movement,  is  to 
bring  them  into  relationship  with,  and  make  them  re- 
sponsible to,  the  public,  whose  interest  they  must  serve. 
So  far  no  one  has  offered  a  practical  way  of  bringing 
this  about.  If  it  is  not  solved,  any  amount  of  power 
granted  to  great  organized  bodies  of  public  employees 

357 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

risks  serious  abuse.  The  public  services  must  always 
be  administered  by  officials  directly  responsible  to  the 
electorate.  The  present  elective  method,  or  that  of 
ministerial  responsibility  to  Parliament,  to  a  certain 
theoretical  extent,  supplies  this  need.  Without  the 
establishment  of  responsibility,  it  will  be  impossible  to 
allow  organizations  of  employees  any  considerable  in- 
dependence in  the  management  of  the  public  services. 


IV 


There  are  those  who  do  not  stop  with  the  revision  of 
French  administration.  They  would  install  profes- 
sional competence  in  the  legislative  as  w^ell  as  in  the 
executive  branch  of  the  government.  In  other  words, 
they  advocate  professional  representation  in  Parlia- 
ment. Their  conception  of  the  State  is  that  of  a  mere 
"cooperation  of  public  services,  organized  and  con- 
trolled by"  ^^  the  governing  power.  With  the  evolution 
of  society  these  services  are  being  continually  diversi- 
fied. The  governing  power  which  administers  these 
services,  has  no  legitimate  basis  and  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  sovereignty.^'^  The  gouvernanfs  govern  because 
they  are  the  strongest,  and  tlie  gouvcrncs  are  governed 
because  they  are  weaker   tlian  the  goiivernants.     But 

"Leon   Duj^it,   Manuel   do  Droit   Constitutionnel,    72. 

Professor  Duguit's  doctrines  may  be  found  in  greater  detail  in 
his  L'Etat,  le  Droit  Objcctif  ct  la  Loi  Positive,  229  ff.  Lc  Droit 
Social,  le  Droit  Individuel  ct  Ics  Transformations  dc  VEtat,  25 
ff,  scq. 

"Professor  Esmein  is  the  most  vignrons  opponent  of  Professor 
Duguit,  in  France.  Ho  declarrs  tliat  it  is  anarcliy  to  deny  the 
existence  of  sovereignty.  See  Ksmein,  Droit  Constitutionnel  (4th 
ed.),  40.  Professor  Esmein  also  says  that  the  Duguit  theory 
of  group  control  is  a  return  to  feudalism.  See  the  6th  edition  of 
his  Droit  Constitutionnel,  45. 

358 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

the  governing  force  is  under  the  obligation  of  exercising 
itself  through  the  liens  of  social  solidarity  and  in  the 
interests  of  all.  Furthermore,  the  old  political  basis 
of  the  nation  is  passing  away;  social  units  such  as  the 
home  and  geographic  political  entities  are  being  sup- 
planted by  groupings  founded  upon  a  community  of 
professional  interest  and  the  promise  of  mutual  assist- 
ance. This  grouping  of  French  professional  interests 
is  defined  as  "the  movement  by  which  all  of  the  differ- 
ent social  classes  tend  to  organize  themselves  and  to 
give  themselves  a  definite  juridicial  structure  for  the 
defense  of  class  interests  and  for  the  conciliation,  by 
collective  contracts,  freely  consented  to,  of  divergent 
interests.  .  .  .  Thus  two  governing  forces  actually  ap- 
pear in  France:  the  numerical  majority  of  male  citi- 
zens, and  the  professional  syndicates. "  ^^  As  the  func- 
tion and  the  composition  of  the  State  have  changed, 
the  government  must  be  directed  by  professional  group- 
ings, fitted  for  tlie  task  by  strength  and  competence.  In 
other  words,  the  homme  de  'politique  must  give  way 
to  the  hamme  des  affaires — the  politician  to  the  busi- 
ness man. 

Maxime  Leroy  in  his  very  remarkable  book,  Pour 
Gouverner,  devoted  to  this  new  conception  of  govern- 
ment, says  that  the  old  State  is  based  upon  regalian 
conceptions;  it  is  monarchical.  Political  philosophers 
have  hitherto  addressed  their  observations  to  it.  Their 
arguments  against  State  Socialism  apply  only  to  this 
old  State  based  upon  privilege  and  authority.  Even 
our  idea  of  democracj^  has  been  false.  "The  wisdom  of 
number,"  he  says,  "the  equality  of  individuals,  the 
idea  of  the  'General  Will'  inspiring  the  role  of  citizens 

"  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  62. 

359 


CONTE]\IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

by  a  sort  of  quasi-divine  illumination,  the  infallibility  of 
the  peojjle  in  its  assemblies  and  of  the  Government  de- 
liberating in  its  councils  ,  .  .  who  still  dares  conscien- 
tiously to  defend  these  democratic  forms  -with  a  dis- 
interested voice  ? "  19  The  principles  of  the  Revolution 
are  unsound,  but  they  still  are  retained  in  government ; 
they  must  be  supplanted  by  doctrines  recognizing  the 
fundamental  factors  in  modern  life. 

"At  our  head,  we  ask  fewer  drivers  of  crowds,  fewer 
professional  leaders,  fewer  pontiffs ;  but  more  observers, 
endowed  with  an  experimental  sense ;  fewer  masters  of 
our  spirit,  but  more  stewards,  capable  of  assuring  the 
management  of  our  common  goods.  .  .  ."^o 

According  to  M.  Leroy,  we  must  be  skeptics  in  gov- 
ernment, we  must  be  penetrated  with  the  experimental 
method,  which  is  as  necessary  to  politics  as  to  science. 
Our  gouvernants  must  be  more  eager  to  learn  than  im- 
petuous to  command. 

What  the  State  needs  is  the  participation  of  pro- 
ductive forces  in  its  control ;  and  he  firmly  believes 
*'that  the  association  of  producers,  employers,  em- 
ployees, savants,  artists,  each  of  these  groupings  re- 
maining in  its  original  sphere,  without  a  false  con- 
fusion of  interests,  is  destined  to  regulate  the  tradi- 
tional antagonism  between  the  gouvernants  and  the 
gouvernes,  between  workers  and  employers,  between 
those  administrating  and  those  administered."  ^^ 

Professional  groupings  are  becoming  stronger  and  are 
demanding  an  effective  part  in  the  Government.  Both 
laborers   and  employers  are  insistent  on  the   destrue- 

"  Maxime  Leroy,  Pour  Gouverner,  342. 
'"Ibid.,   324. 
^Ibid.,  52. 

360 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

tion  of  the  old  centralizing  unity  which  excluded  them 
from  Government. 

The  most  scathing  as  well  as  the  most  unscientific  at- 
tack against  the  system  of  political  representation  in 
France,  has  been  made  by  Lysis,  the  head  of  the  party 
of  the  New  Democracy: 

Our  method  of  understanding'  universal  suffrage  is  an  insult 
to  good  sense.  We  invite  20,000  citizens  living-  in  a  certain 
area^^  to  designate  a  person  to  represent  their  interests  and 
their  conceptions  which  they  may  have  upon  every  economic, 
social  and  political  question.  It  is  easy  to  understand  that 
this  consultation  must  end  in  the  nomination  of  a  person  who 
represents  no  one  at  all. 

From  the  first,  he  does  not  represent  the  interests  of  his 
electoi-s  since  the  latter  exercise  the  most  diverse  and  often 
the  most  antagonistic  professions,  and  since  they  are  emjiloy- 
ers  and  woi'kers,  producers  and  consumers,  proprietors  and 
lodgers,  large  merchants  and  small  shopkeej^ers.  All  these 
interests  neutralize  and  annul  each  other.  There  is  no  means 
of  defending  them  all  at  the  same  time;  to  protect  one  is  to 
destroy  the  other.  .  .  .  Thus  a  deputy  inserts  in  his  profession 
of  faith  words  with  a  double  meaning,  able  to  make  the  most 
opposed  interests  believe  that  they  are  the  object  of  the  can- 
didate's particular  solicitude.  .  .  .  Our  electoral  system  ter- 
minates in  selecting  and  bnnging  into  power,  it  may  be  said, 
mechanically,  the  most  unfit  and  the  most  skeptical  men,  those 
the  most  destitute  of  beliefs  and  ideas;  in  a  word,  those  who 
are  morally  and  intellectually  the  least  meritorious.^^ 

As  a  solution  Lysis  advocates  professional  representa- 
tion, or  a  legislature  composed  of  delegates  elected  from 
and  by  economic  interests,  grouped  in  great  categories. 

The  Orleanist  party,  as  part  of  a  Royalist  regime, 
advocates  an  assembly  based  upon   professional  inter- 

**  Under  the  old  system,  an  arrondissement  was  the  electoral 
district. 

*^  Lysis,  Vers  la  Democratic  Nouvclle. 

361 


CONTEMPORAEY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ests,  entirely  supplanting  the  present  political  Parlia- 
ment. Its  powers  would  be  confined  to  purely  profes- 
sional subjects.  Although  it  does  not  go  to  this  ex- 
treme, the  Liberal  Action  party  includes  professional 
representation  in  its  platform.  At  its  Congress  in  1909 
it  expressed  the  belief  that  "the  epoch  of  purely  politi- 
cal Parliaments  is  closed, ' '  ^*  and  that  the  Senate  should 
be  formed  of  professional  elements.  The  party's  advo- 
cacy of  such  a  measure  is  suspected  of  being  based  upon 
a  desire  to  secure  recognition  of  Catholic  interests  in 
the  Government. 

Professor  Leon  Duguit  also  outlines  a  system  of  pro- 
fessional representation,  applying  it  to  the  Senate,  but 
leaving  the  composition  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  as 
it  now  is.^^  M.  Charles  Benoist,  as  far  back  as  1895, 
advocated  the  election  of  a  Chamber  of  Deputies  by 
voters  grouped  into  seven  classes  according  to  their  pro- 
fessions: (1)  agriculture,  (2)  industry,  (3)  transports, 
posts  and  telegraphs,  (4)  commerce,  (5)  public  ad- 
ministration, (6)  liberal  professions,  (7)  capitalists.^'' 

Thus,  according  to  ]\I.  Benoist,  instead  of  having 
300  lawyers,  professors  and  journalists  in  the  Chamber, 
under  a  system  of  professional  representation  their 
number  would  be  reduced  to  13,  while  the  number  of 
deputies  representing  agriculture,  industry,  commerce, 
transportation,  workers  and  employers,  would  rise  from 
120  to  450 ! 

A  carefully  worked-out  plan  of  professional  repre- 
sentation was  devised  by  the  League  of  Professional 
Representation  and  Regionalist  Action,  in  a  bill  pre- 
sented to  the  Chamber  upon  the  29th  of  April,  1915. 

"  Quoted  in  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  330. 

"Duguit,  op.  cit.,  167. 

**  Villcy,  Lcs  Vices  de  la  Constitution  Frangaise,  94. 

362 

; 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

Its  application  was  limited  to  tlie  Govcrtiment  of  the 
new  regions  wliieli  it  wished  to  create."'  Voters  of  each 
region  were  to  be  grouped  into  five  classes,  eaeli  of 
Avhich  would  elect  representatives  to  the  regional  as- 
sembly. I'rofessions  were  to  be  divided  into  (1)  agri- 
culturists, (2)  merchants,  (3)  manufacturers,  (4)  lib- 
eral professions,  (5)  Government  employees.  It  was  not 
comiiulsory  to  be  inscribed  upon  any  one  of  these  lists; 
those  not  wishing  to  inscribe  themselves  upon  a  pro- 
fessional list  and  tJiose  not  coming  within  the  classifica- 
tion would  be  placed  upon  a  general  list.  No  one  could 
be  inscribed  upon  two  lists  nor  could  one  be  elected  by 
electors  of  a  list  upon  which  he  was  not  enrolled.  For 
each  of  these  professional  electoral  lists,  whatever  the 
number  enrolled  on  each  might  be,  there  was  always 
to  be  one  representative.  Before  each  election  the  num- 
ber of  seats  in  the  Assembly  was  to  be  divided  among 
the  lists;  the  first  half  was  to  be  apportioned  equally; 
the  second  half  was  to  be  divided  among  the  lists  ac- 
cording to  their  numerical  importance.  To  insure  labor 
representation,  it  was  provided  that  upon  the  petition 
of  a  quarter  of  the  legally  constituted  labor  unions  in 
the  region,  half  of  the  seats  in  the  first  half  of  those 
equally  apportioned  to  each  professional  list  would  be 
reserved  for  employees,  the  other  half  for  employers. 
This  proposition  was  not  adopted  by  the  Chamber  in 
1915;  and  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  last  re- 
gionalist  bill  reported  to  Parliament  this  provision  was 
omitted.  The  reason  for  such  an  omission  was  given  by 
M.  Jean  Hennessy,  the  rapporteur  for  the  Administra-« 
tion  Commission,  himself  an  enthusiastic  advocate  of  the 
theory  of  professional  representation,  who  said : 

"See  p.  395. 

363 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

It  seemed  desirable  to  many  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  of 
regional  interests,  that  is,  economic  interests,  representing 
economic  groupings  of  the  region.  If  an  equitable  solution 
would  have  been  proposed,  it  would  have  been  accepted  by  a 
great  many  of  the  members  of  your  commission.  But  can 
one  be  found?  How  can  the  share  of  each  association  in 
the  deliberations  of  the  regional  council  be  determined?  The 
right  of  association  .  .  .  exists;  but  it  is  a  right,  not  an  obli- 
gation; in  each  profession  an  unlimited  number  of  groups 
can  be  constituted,  .  .  .  many  of  them  formed  only  of  one 
or  two  persons.  The  practical  difficulties  in  the  proper  rep- 
resentation of  these  interests  appeared  so  insurmountable  to 
the  Commission  that  it  was  unanimous  in  deciding  that  the 
members  of  the  Regional  Council  should  hold  their  powers 
from  the  whole  of  the  electoral  body.^^ 


Such  is  the  theory  of  professional  representation  and 
such  are  the  proposals  for  its  application.  The  basis  of 
the  plan  is  that  of  the  grouping  tendency  which  for  the 
past  thirty  years  has  swept  over  France.  Professional 
organization,  extending  to  every  class  of  French  trades- 
men, to  every  form  of  laborer,  even  to  the  choir  singers, 
who  are  organized  in  an  Amical  Association,  is  un- 
doubtedly the  most  marked  characteristic  in  modern 
French  political  life.  Cooperation  is  now  the  dominant 
form  of  industry.  On  January  1,  1914,  there  were  16,- 
713  syndicates  in  France,  containing: 

6,GG7   agricidtural   syndicat&s   with   1,029,727   members. 
4,9G7  industrial   and    commercial    employers'    syndicates   with 

403,143  members. 
4,846  labor  syndicates  with  1,020,302  members. 
233    mixed   syndicates    with   51,111    members. 

''Jean  Ilcnnessy,  Beorganisation  Administrative  dc  la  France, 
159. 

364 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

Tlio.se  s^'iulicatcs  are  in  turn  combined  into  485 
unions  of  syndicates : 

98  ayriculttiral    uuions*  of  syndioates. 
177  employers'  unions  of  syndicates. 
201   labor  unions  of  syndicates. 
!)  mixed  unions. 
The  employers'  unions  contained  4,092  syndicates. 
The  labor  comljinations  contained  4,380  syndicates. 

Tlie  organization  of  French  labor  has  been  discussed 
in  another  chapter.^"  The  General  Confederation  of 
Labor  (C.  G.  T.)  is  a  powerful  and  an  extensive  organi- 
zation ;  but  it  has  two  serious  problems  to  face.  The 
first  is  that  of  securing  the  organization  and  adhesion 
of  the  labor  elements  not  yet  included  in  it.  There  are 
5,64:2,000  laborers  in  France  (including  woman  and 
foreign  labor),  and  the  C.  G.  T.  contains  only  1,000,000 
of  them  at  the  most.  The  larger  part  of  this  out- 
side labor  is  doubtless  unorganized ;  but  a  good  share  of 
it  is  grouped  in  organizations,  such  as  the  National  Fed- 
eration of  Labor,  the  Christian  Syndicates,  containing 
about  55,000  laborers,  and  the  Union  of  Free  Workmen, 
— antagonistic  toward  the  C.  G.  T.  and  its  high-handed 
direction. 

The  C.  G.  T.  's  second  problem  is  that  of  securing  the 
adherence  of  other  than  strictly  proletariat  elements, 
but  which  are  necessary  to  the  strength  of  the  organiza- 
tion. AVe  have  already  seen  its  success  in  winning  over 
the  functionaries.  Going  even  farther,  it  has  welcomed 
purely  intellectual  and  bourgeois  groupings  to  its 
bosom,  surely  horrifying  to  the  shades  of  Karl  IMarx 
and  Georges  Sorel.    These  accessions  have  increased  its 

-"Cheron  report  on  syndical  bill  passed  by  Senate,  June  22, 
1917. 

^"See  pp.  237-239, 

365 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

membership  to  at  least  2,000,000.  It  was  announced  on 
April  26,  1919,  that  certain  university  professors,  be- 
cause of  discontent  with  salaries  and  the  powerlessness 
of  their  present  associations  to  bring  pressure  upon  the 
Government,  were  to  ask  the  National  Federation  of 
Professors  to  convert  itself  into  a  sj^ndicate  and  join  the 
C.  G.  T.  On  the  same  day  the  lyrical  and  dramatic 
artists,  at  a  meeting  at  the  Paris  Bourse  du  Travail, 
organized  a  syndicate  and  adhered  to  the  Labor  Con- 
federation; the  journalists  were  reported  to  be  consid- 
ering the  same  thing.  To  disseminate  "intellectual" 
propaganda,  Parisian  authors  of  radical  tendencies  or- 
ganized a  group  called  "Clarte";  its  members  included 
such  notables  as  Anatole  France,  Charles  Gide,  Henri 
Barbusse,  Remain  Rolland,  Victor  Margueritte,  Georges 
Duhamel,  and  Cyril  Berger.  This  movement  appeared 
to  be  spreading  so  rapidly  that  many  Paris  editors  be- 
gan to  wonder*  facetiously  if  the  French  Academy  was 
going  to  adhere  to  the  C.  G.  T. !  The  stumblingblock 
in  the  way  of  the  C.  G.  T.  is  the  adherence  of  the  peas- 
ant population.  In  imitation  of  the  Socialists'  effort, 
on  May  17,  it  addressed  a  circular  to  all  of  its  federa- 
tions and  departmental  organizations  asking  them  for 
opinions  upon  an  agrarian  program.  At  a  meeting  of 
the  Confederal  Committee  on  May  27,  it  was  decided  to 
create  a  union  federative  terrienne,  which  after  Jan- 
uary 1,  1920,  is  to  have  a  place  in  the  C.  G.  T.  If  the 
C.  G.  T.  is  successful  in  winning  the  adherence  of  these 
non-proletariat  groups  the  failure  of  revolutionary  syn- 
dicalism will  be  assured.  The  intellectual  and  the  peas- 
ant classes  of  France  are  very  jealous  of  their  individ- 
ualism ;  they  will  countenance  no  revolution ;  and  tlieir 
position  in  life  makes  the  doctrine  of  the  class  struggle 
repugnant  to  them. 

366 


GOVERNMENT  liY  INTERESTS 

The  Government  has  undertaken  to  organize  group- 
ings in  order  to  offset  the  predominance  of  the  C.  G.  T. 
In  Marcli,  1919,  M.  Clementel,  INIinister  of  Commerce, 
organized  a  Federation  of  the  Employers  of  Labor.  M. 
Victor  Boret,  ]\Iinister  of  Agriculture,  seemed  to  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  organization  of  a  General  Confedera- 
tion of  Agriculture,  to  include  the  peasant  workers  of 
France  and  to  be  independent  of  the  General  Confed- 
eration of  Labor.  'Anotlier  organization  among  the 
peasants  has  been  effected  in  the  Liguc  des  Paysans, 
whose  purpose  is  ''the  extension  of  individual  property 
and  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  all  the  producers 
of  the  soil." 

Among  the  employers  149  Chambers  of  Commerce 
provide  the  most  general  organization.  The  French 
Association  of  Industry  and  Agriculture ;  the  Society  of 
Agriculturers ;  the  Committee  of  Forges ;  the  Committee 
of  Forests ;  the  National  Confederation  of  Commerce  and 
Industry,  composed  of  150  employers'  syndicates;  the 
General  Association  of  Textile  Commerce  and  Industry; 
the  Syndical  Alliance  of  Commerce  and  Industry;  the 
Union  of  National  Industries ;  the  Union  of  Commerce 
and  Industry;  the  Federation  of  French  IManufacturers 
and  Merchants;  and  the  Central  Committee  of  Coal 
Mines  of  France,  are  other  examples  of  the  extended 
organization  among  French  business  men. 

•  The  Union  of  Economic  Interests,  not  solely  a  pro- 
fessional organization,  but  existing  for  propagandist 
purposes,  is  composed  of  the  largest  employers'  organi- 
zations in  France,  containing  about  seventy-five  Asso- 
ciations, Syndical  Chambers,  Federations,  Alliances,  and 
Committees,  from  the  greatest  diversity  of  industries. 
This  organization  represents  one  of  the  first  attempts 
toward  the  representation  of  interests  in  Parliament. 

367 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

In  July,  1912,  it  organized  the  "Republican  Group  of 
Economic  Interests,"  composed  of  over  100  members 
pledged  against  State  Socialism.  At  the  same  time 
"The  Republican  Group  of  Economic  and  Social  Stud- 
ies" was  formed  with  an  identical  program.  Both  of 
these  groups  later  united  in  the  French  "Parliamentary- 
Committee  of  Commerce." 

Other  groups  have  been  formed  in  both  the  Senate 
and  the  Chamber,  upon  purely  professional  bases.  In 
the  Senate  there  are  a  half  dozen  of  such  groupings, 
including  those  based  upon  agriculture,  insurance, 
commerce  and  industries.  In  the  Chamber  there  have 
been  thirty-six  economic  and  social  groups,  ranging 
from  the  defense  of  Breton  interests  to  those  of  phy- 
sicians. 


VI 


From  this  review  of  economic  organization  in  France 
it  will  be  seen  that  the  foundation  for  a  government 
based  on  professional  representation  is  now  partl.y  laid. 
Whether  these  organizations  will  ever  be  strong  enough 
to  bring  about  the  creation  of  such  a  government  is  an- 
other question.  The  advantage  of  their  existence  is  that 
they  make  collective  bargaining  l)etween  labor  and  capi- 
tal a  possibility.  Restricted  to  purely  economic  activi- 
ties, functioning  outside  the  realm  of  government,  the 
creation  of  great  economic  groupings  bargaining  with 
each  other,  offers  an  application  of  industrial  democracy 
which  may  go  far  in  curing  social  ills. 

It  is  ver}^  unlikely,  however,  that  the  movement  will 
go  farther  than  this  and  take  cliarge  of  the  legislative 
and  administi'ative  functions  of  government.  The  ex- 
pert has  his  place  in  government,  but  it  is  a  limited  one ; 

368 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

the  fact  that  he  is  an  expert  handicaps  him  in  the  direc- 
tion of  large  affairs  or  in  the  making  of  great  decisions 
stretching  beyond  the  field  in  which  he  is  skilled.  Men 
with  a  general  knowledge  of  a  great  number  of  things, 
men  with  tact  and  an  intimacy  with  human  nature,  men 
who  can  compromise  means  without  compromising  ends, 
must  always  be  the  gouvernants.  Technicians,  by  all 
means,  should  be  given  a  free  field  and  full  responsi- 
bility in  the  activity  in  which  they  are  expert ;  but  the 
coordination  of  politics  must  be  left  to  men  of  larger 
capacity  who  are  directly  responsible  to  political  bodies. 
As  Professor  Joseph  Barthelemy  has  pointed  out  in  his 
recent  book  on  Le  Problcnhe  de  la  competence  dans  la 
dcmocratie,  a  strong  democracy  should  be  conducted  by 
men  of  general  culture,  administered  by  specialists,  and 
controlled  by  public  opinion.  But  it  is  essential  for  a 
democracy,  as  for  any  regime,  to  possess  an  elite  well 
prepared  for  the  task  of  direction. 

The  professional  man  in  legislation  presents  even 
stronger  difficulties  than  in  administration.  However 
successful  a  porcelain  merchant  may  be,  he  is  probably 
ignorant  of  other  economic  affairs,  such,  for  example, 
as  the  tariff  on  steel.  A  Chamber  composed  of  pro- 
fessional men,  elected  purely  for  their  business  knowl- 
edge, would  individually  be  competent  in  regard  to 
everything;  but  collectively  it  would  be  competent  in 
nothing.^^ 

Furthermore,  despite  the  assertions  of  such  philoso- 
phers as  Professor  Uuguit  and  Maxime  Leroy,  govern- 
ment has  not  only  economic  problems  to  solve ;  legisla- 
tion is  not  wholly  a  matter  of  commerce,  markets  or 
stocks ;    representatives   are  not   intended    to   be   mere 

'^  For  an  aroriiment  against  professional  representations,  see 
Villey,  op.  cit.,  92-96. 

369 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

lobbyists,  securing  appropriations  or  protection  for  their 
constituents.  Especially  in  France,  legislative  prob- 
lems are  becoming  increasingly  economic ;  but  they  will 
never  become  entirely  so  and  they  must  be  approached 
from  other  than  economic  points  of  view.  Questions 
of  national  education  and  of  culture ;  questions  de- 
termined purely  by  political  philosophies,  i.e.,  federal- 
ism versus  centralization,  have  only  an  indirect  bearing 
on  economics.  In  regard  to  questions  of  foreign  policy, 
daily  becoming  more  important  and  requiring  a  general 
knowledge  of  history,  geography,  diplomacy  and  human 
nature,  a  glass-blower  or  even  an  iron  merchant  would 
doubtless  be  ignorant.  On  the  other  hand,  questions 
considered  from  mereh^  a  productive  standpoint  will 
receive  an  entirely  different  solution  when  coordinated 
with  other  considerations;  for  example,  the  extension 
of  the  government  into  private  enterprise,  from  the 
economic  standpoint  is  wasteful,  inefficient,  and  some- 
times even  corrupt.  •  From  the  standpoint  of  labor,  of 
industrial  democracy  and  of  the  prevention  of  profiteer- 
ing and  private  monopolies,  such  an  extension  may  be- 
come desirable.  What  is  necessary  is  a  balancing  of 
interests,  involving  a  broad  knowledge  of  them  all  and 
a  capacity  for  fair  judgment,  in  which  a  system  of  pro- 
fessional representation  would  fail. 

From  the  standpoint  of  national  unity  the  results  of 
professional  representation  would  again  be  highly  ques- 
tionable. The  excessive  number  of  French  political 
parties,  it  is  recognized,  causes  a  great  many  of  the 
defects  in  French  government ;  but  a  system  of  pro- 
fessional representation,  to  include  all  the  industrial 
categories  of  the  country,  would  undoubtedly  exag- 
gerate the  number  of  groupings  in  Parliament.  Each 
grouping,  having  the  material  interests  of  its  own  pro- 

:57() 


GOVERNMENT  BY  INTERESTS 

fession  at  heart,  would  onp:age  in  barters  and  conces- 
sions fatally  harmful  to  the  national  unity  and  wel- 
fare. There  would  not  be  the  Three  Estates  of  feudal 
assemblies  but  a  countless  number  of  equally  harmful 
antagonisms. 

As  M.  Jean  Hennessy  concluded,  the  practical  diffi- 
culties in  the  way  of  professional  representation  are  in- 
surmountable. Groupings  and  professions  are  changing 
in  composition  and  character.  The  proletariat  is  con- 
stantly merging  into  the  jyetit  hourgeais,  and  the  latter 
merges  into  the  rentier,  making  their  accurate  classifica- 
tion into  professional  categories  impossible. 

These  objections  many  upholders  of  competence  in 
government  realize.  The  Liberal  Action  party,  the 
Union  of  Economic  Interests,  the  National  Association 
for  the  Organization  of  Democracy  restrict  their  pro- 
fessional bodies  to  purely  consultative  duties.  Consulta- 
tive bodies,  composed  of  professional  representatives, 
would  doubtless  improve  legislation.  As  noted,  the 
French  Government  is  utilizing  their  services,  but  the 
very  fact  that  they  are  merely  consultative  prevents  the 
enforcement  of  their  advice  upon  Parliament.  That 
force  can  come  only  from  a  vigorous  and  an  enlightened 
public  opinion  guided,  as  Parliament  must  be,  by  other 
than  strictly  economic  motives. 

There  appears  to  be  only  one  cause  which  will  force, 
the  institution  of  professional  representation  upon 
France.  That  is  the  imminence  of  Socialist  and  Syn- 
dicalist success.  The  alarming  growth  of  the  C.  G.  T. 
has  already  caused  the  bourgeois  interests,  partly  in- 
stigated by  the  Government,  to  group  themselves  in  self- 
defense.  If  the  Socialists  and  the  C.  G.  T.  become  able 
seriously  to  threaten  the  overthrow  of  the  present  form 
of  government,  these  other  bourgeois  organizations  will 

371 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

be  willing  and  doubtless  strong  enough  to  substitute  a 
government  based  upon  all  economic  interests.  Such  a 
government  of  "guild"  syndicalism,  offered  as  a  com- 
promise, may  appease  the  advocates  of  revolutionary 
syndicalism. 

The  defects  in  theory  of  such  a  "professional"  gov- 
ernment appear  to  be  grave.  Yet  it  is  very  doubtful  if 
they  will  outweigh  the  defects  in  our  present  govern- 
mental systems.  Democracy  is  still  in  its  apprentice- 
ship, and  it  contains  many  defects  whose  real  cause  of 
existence  is  public  apathy.  In  France,  especially,  ma- 
terial considerations  rather  than  political  theories  in- 
fluence governments.  This  perhaps  is  due  to  the  French 
tendency  to  appeal  to  the  State  for  all  personal  as  well 
as  collective  needs.  This  tendency  itself  appears  to  be 
both  a  cause  and  a  result  of  French  statism.  At  any 
rate,  the  present  generation  has  no  Montesquieus  or 
Benjamin  Constants  to  expound  theories  to  it.  If  it 
had,  perhaps  the  governments  of  all  democracies  would 
be  improved.  But  it  is  more  reasonable  to  believe  that, 
however  logical  their  doctrines,  this  age  woiild  not 
listen  to  them.  Practical  considerations  and  an  eco- 
nomic opportunism  seem  to  rule  the  political  world. 


CHAPTER  XII 

regional.ism:^ 


II  y  a  en  France  trop  d' influence  centrale;  je  voudrais  rrwins  dc 
force  a  Paris  ct  2>lius  dans  cliaque  localitc. — Napoleon. 


A  product  of  long  centuries,  France  has  a  centralized 
or  "unitary"  government,  the  direction  of  which  is 
almost  entirely  vested  in  Paris.^  Although  the  French 
Parliament  now  exercises  immense  power,  this  authority 
has  often  varied  with  an  altered  constitutional  regime. 
But  in  matters  of  administration,  especially  of  local  af- 
fairs, there  has  been  slight  change  since  Napoleon  I  left 
France  its  present  form  of  administrative  organization. 
Powers  of  local  bodies  have  been  extended  or  con- 
tracted; but  the  fundamental  principles  of  French  de- 
partmental administration^  have  remained  aloof  from 
political  battles. 

^  This  chapter,  dealing  with  decentralization  by  the  creation  of 
regions,  outlines  the  third  remedy  proposed  for  the  defects  of  the 
French   bureaucracy. 

^ ' '  Paris  is  in  the  habit  of  governing  France.  For  two  centuries 
in  this  centralized  country,  the  word  of  commafid  has  come  from 
the  capital.  ..."     G.  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  i,  15. 

"France,  inhabited  by  a  population  of  different  origins,  subject 
on  her  frontiers  to  the  attraction  of  neighboring  Powers,  can  only 
preserve  her  power,  and  perliaps  her  existence,  by  making  constant 
sacrifices  to  the  cause  of  unity. ' '  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  i,  239. 

*For  a  discussion  of  French  administrative  law,  see  the  dif- 
ferent Traites  de  Droit  Administratif ,  by  Professors  Berthelemy, 
Hauriou,  Mor^au,  and  Jeze. 

373 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

France  is  divided  into  eighty-six  departments,*  each 
one  of  which  is  directed  by  a  Prefect  who  is  appointed 
and  removed  at  will  by  the  President  of  the  Republic 
through  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  The  office  is 
therefore  a  political  one  and  the  incumbent  is  usually 
displaced  with  a  change  in  ]\Iinistry.  Two  principal 
duties  fall  to  it — that  of  directing  matters  of  general 
administration,  applicable  to  the  whole  country,  and 
that  of  the  direction  of  the  local  department  affairs. 
The  Prefect  is  theoretically  an  immediate  agent  of  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior,  but  really  he  carries  out  or- 
ders from  all  the  IMinisters.  He  is  absolutely  subject  to 
them  in  the  execution  of  general  laws  and  decrees;  but 
in  such  matters  as  the  direction  of  the  police  and  the 
supervision  of  local  bodies,  he  has  more  freedom.  In 
the  greater  number  of  cases,  he  can  still  be  overruled 
by  the  Government  and  he  can  always  be  removed. 
^Vhatever  independence  he  may  have  is  largely  lost  by 
the  pressure  which  the  deputies  of  the  department  exert 
upon  him.  Consequently  questions  of  policy  usually 
are  referred  to  Paris  for  decision.  Thus  the  centralized 
control  over  department  administration  is  nearly  ab- 
solute, and- the  Government  at  Paris  concentrates  tre- 
mendous powers  in  its  hands.  In  theory  this  power  is 
not  exercised  irresponsibly,  for  the  parliamentary  re- 
sponsibility of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  prevents  too 
flagrant  abuses  of  administration.  But  at  the  same 
time,  the  vast  centralization  of  power  and  the  tremen- 
dous extent  of  governmental  activity  enables  an  enor- 
mous amount  of  patronage  to  be  disposed  of,  for  politi- 


*  Excluding  the  three  new  departments  (Moselle,  Haut-Ehin,  and 
Bas-Rhin)   formed  out  of  Alsaee-ljorrainc. 

374 


REGIONALISM 

cal  purposes;  and  the  actions  of  the  Prefect  are  largely 
controlled  by  such  considerations."' 

The  Prefect  is  assisted  in  matters  of  general  admin- 
istration by  a  Prefectoral  Council,  composed  of  three 
or  four  members  ajipointed  by  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public. But  with  tlie  exception  of  its  duties  as  an  ad- 
ministrative tribunal,  its  powers  are  purely  advisory. 

The  representative  body  of  the  Department  is  the 
General  Council.^  Each  canton  of  the  Department 
elects  one  member  to  this  Council  for  a  term  of  six 
years,  one  half  of  the  members  retiring  every  three 
years.  The  Council  holds  only  two  short  sessions  a 
year;  and,  as  may  be  imagined,  it  has  no  important 
powers.  It  may  adopt  resolutions  upon  purely  local 
matters  not  connected  with  general  politics.  It  appor- 
tions direct  taxes  among  the  arrondissements.  It  may 
participate  in  the  administration  of  highways  and  edu- 
cation, etc.  But  all  of  its  acts  are  subject  to  the  veto 
of  the  Government.  The  Prefect  carefully  guides  its 
deliberations.  He  prepares  the  budget  which  it  must 
vote.  When  the  Council  does  vote  a  measure  which  it 
regards  as  a  law,  its  execution  is  entirely  dependent 
upon  the  Prefect;  the  Council  cannot  enforce  it.  The 
Prefect,  on  the  other  hand,  can  enforce  his  own  decrees 
as  law.  The  very  existence  of  the  Council  is  dependent 
upon  the  Central  Government  for  the  latter  may  dis- 
solve it,  except  when  Parliament  is  in.session. 


°Sce  Jean  Hennessy,  Beorganisaiion  Administrative  de  la 
France,  12. 

•  For  a  detailed  study  of  the  powers  of  the  governing  bodies  in 
France,  particularly  tliose  of  administration,  see  Gaston  Jeze, 
Elements  (in  Droit  Public  ct  Adnii>tist)-atif.  The  powers  of  the 
department,  the  arrondissement,  and  the  commune  are  discussed, 
138-160.  See  also  Hauriou,  Precis  de  Droit  Administratif,  258- 
333. 

375 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Unfortunately,  the  powers  of  tlie  general  councils 
appear  to  be  in  the  process  of  curtailment.  Under  a 
law  passed  August  10,  1871,^  these  bodies  could  defi- 
nitely legislate  upon  the  construction  and  the  conces- 
sion (lease)  of  local  railways.  But  this  power  was 
taken  away  from  them  in  a  law  passed  July  31,  1913, 
which  provided  that  thereafter  departmental  assemblies 
could  not  even  enter  into  a  formal  inquiry  of  such  pro- 
jects without  first  securing  the  authorization  of  the 
Government.  The  State  justified  this  law  on  the  ground 
that  it  already  subventioned  local  railways,  and  that 
General  Councils  had  appeared  too  radical  and  too  ex- 
travagant in  the  granting  of  privileges.  But,  neverthe- 
less, another  step  was  taken  toward  the  decrease  in 
local  governing  power.* 

In  the  matter  of  public  works,  the  Central  Govern- 
ment has  also  intruded  upon  the  Council's  activity. 
Formerly,  the  highway  service  of  every  vicinity  was 
controlled  by  the  General  Council  of  each  department 
under  the  terms  of  the  Organization  law  of  1871,  a 
power  which  apparently  had  been  exercised  with  profit 
and  discretion.  But  the  Government,  wishing  to  unify 
the  road  services  under  the  Board  of  Bridge  and  Road 
Engineers  already  in  charge  of  national  roads,  recently 
deprived  the  General  Council  of  another  of  the  few  pre- 
rogatives left  it. 

Similarly,  the  Central  Government  has  taken  over  the 
service  of  social  assistance  and  of  public  hygiene,  an 
essentially  departmental  and  local  function.  By  a  law 
passed  on  March  15,  1893,  ui)on  gratuitous  medical  as- 

Tor  the  General  Council  law  of  August  10,  1871,  see  Codes  et 
Lois,  COG. 

"Sec  Boueheron,  "La  1\ (forme  Administrative  aprrs  la-  Guerre" 
in  the  June,  July,  August,  IIMS,  numbers  of  La  Revue  Politique 
ct  Varlcmcntaire. 

376 


REGIONALISM 

sistanc'o,  the  right  of  individuals  to  medical  aid  was 
substituted  for  former  optional  assistance,  limited  to 
public  resources.  This  law  was  of  unquestionable  social 
benefit ;  but  it  necessitated  additional  funds.  However, 
instead  of  levying  a  special  tax  upon  the  departments  or 
communes,  Parliament  preferred  to  subvention  groups 
of  departments  directly;  the  departments,  in  turn,  each 
receiving  their  share,  were  to  subvention  the  communes 
within  them.  With  the  establishment  of  State  financial 
aid,  the  Central  Government  in  Paris  laid  down  rigid 
rules,  making  for  complete  and  unintelligent  uniformity 
in  the  administration  of  medical  assistance.  The  law 
virtually  provided  for  the  detailed  operation  of  this 
charity,  and  .under  the  guise  of  financial  support,  it 
passed  wholly  out  of  the  competence  of  the  Depart- 
ments and  the  General  Councils. 

The  law  of  February  15,  1902,  on  the  Protection  of 
Public  Health  contained  the  same  financial  and  regula- 
tory provisions.  Likewise  the  law  of  1905  upon  Old 
Age  Assistance,  the  law  upon  Numerous  Families,  and 
the  law  on  Maternal  Assistance  provided  for  the  in- 
direct control  of  the  Central  Government  over  charities 
hitherto  and  more  intelligently  directed  by  local  bodies. 
Localities  no  longer  care  for  their  poor  as  under  the 
ecclesiastical  laws  and  the  laws  of  the  Revolution.  The 
result  of  the  change,  according  to  French  students,"  has 
been  to  create  an  undignified  scramble  among  com- 
munes ^for  department  subventions,  to  overlook  the 
needs  of  intelligently  administered  charities,  and  to  im- 
pose upon  the  dignity  of  the  poor.  From  the  financial 
standpoint,  extravagance  in  charity  administration  has 
greatly  increased. 

'  See  Louis  Boucheron  's  article  cited  above. 

377' 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

By  these  means,  the  powers  once  exercised  by  the 
General  Councils  have  gradually  been  taken  away  by 
the  Central  Government  until,  as  representative  bodies, 
they  are  inactive  and  uninfluential. 

When  the  General  Council  is  not  in  session,  a 
Departmental  Commission,  usually  composed  of  from 
four  to  seven  members,  sits  as  a  permanent  bodj^;  but 
like  the  Council,  it  has  no  power  of  control  over  the 
Prefect. 

The  arrondissement  is  an  administrative  subdivision 
of  the  department.  There  are  362  of  them  in  France. 
Each  is  directed  by  a  sub-prefect,  a  representative  of 
the'  prefect  and  the  Central  Government,  who  usually 
amounts  to  nothing  more  than  a  political  ^gent,  relying 
for  advancement  upon  winning  the  electoral  support  of 
the  arrondissement  for  the  Government.  The  people  are 
represented  in  an  Arrondissement  Council,  usually  com- 
posed of  nine  members  elected  by  manhood  suffrage  for 
a  term  of  six  years.  But  this  Council  has  little  power 
because  the  arrondissement  has  no  property  and  no 
budget.  Consequently,  its  activities  are  restrained  to 
apportioning  among  the  communes  the  quota  of  taxes 
allotted  to  the  arrondissement  by  the  General  Council. 
The  arrondissement  is  an  artifical  unit,  and  especially 
since  the  abolition  "of  the  scrutin  d' arrondissement  in  the 
elections  to  Parliament,^*^  there  are  few  reasons  for  its 
existence. 

The  arrondissoments,  in  turn,  are  divided  into  can- 
tons, of  which  there  are  now  about  3,000.  The  canton 
likewise  has  no  personality  although  it  is  used  as  an 
electoral  and  a  judicial  unit.  It  serves  as  a  district  for 
the  Justice  of  the  Peace  and  for  choosing  members  of 

"See  pp.  162  ff. 

378 


REGIONALISM 

the  General  and  tlio  Arrondissemcnt  Councils.     It  has 
few,  if  any,  adniinisti'ative  functions. 

The  commune,  of  Avhicli  tliere  are  more  than  36,000, 
is  the  hasis  of  local  govennnent  in  France. ^^  Its  size 
varies  from  the  smallest  village  to  the  largest  city.  With 
the  exception  of  Paris,  Lyons,  and  Marseille,  every 
commune  possesses  the  same  form  of  government.  The 
Mayor  of  the  commune  corresponds  to  the  Prefect  of  the 
department.  He  is  the  agent  of  the  Central  Government 
and  the  administrator  of  local  affairs.  Although  not 
directly  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Eepublic, 
he  is  not  directly  responsible  to  the  people,  for  he  is 
elected  by  the  communal  council  of  which  he  must  be 
a  member.  He  serves  for  a  term  of  four  years  and 
is  assisted  by  adjaints  whose  number  varies  with  the 
size  of  the  commune.  The  Mayor  has  considerable  ap- 
pointive power,  and,  with  the  exception  of  the  police,  he 
also  may  suspend  or  dismiss  any  municipal  officer.  The 
only  authority  able  to  review  his  acts  in  this  regard 
is  the  Council  of  State,  the  highest  administrative  court 
in  the  Republic.  He  also  has  general  charge  of  the 
financial  affairs  of  the  commune.  But  the  Mayor's  de- 
cisions upon  matters  such  as  communal  policy  and  pub- 
lic health  can  usually  be  annulled  by  the  Prefect,  who 
in  many  instances  can  order  him  to  carry  out  certain 
measures.  Financial  accounts  must  be  submitted  to 
the  Prefect  for  approval.  The  Prefect  may  suspend  the 
]\Iayor  from  office  for  a  month ;  the  Minister  of  Interior, 
for  three  months;  and  the  President  of  the  Republic 
may  remove  him  altogether.    Thus  the  Mayor  is  actually 

"  For  an  extended  account  of  the  powers  of  communes,  com- 
munal councils,  mayors  and  other  municipal  officials,  see  L.  Mor- 
gand,  La  Loi  Munidpale,  2  vols. 

379 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

subjected  to  the  ^*eatest  restraint,  and  conformity  -with 
the  desires  of  the  Central  Government  is  assured. 

The  Communal  Council,  the  representative  body  of 
this  unit,  varies  in  size,  according  to  the  population, 
from  ten  to  thirty-six  members.  It  is  elected  by  man- 
hood suffrage  for  a  term  of  four  years.  The  powers  of 
this  body  are  much  more  extended  than  those  of  the 
General  or  Arrondissement  Councils.  Many  of  these 
powers,  however,  are  subject  to  approval  by  higher 
officials,  such  as  measures  involving  the  disposal  of 
municipal  property,  the  control  of  streets,  and  the 
framing  of  the  communal  budget.  In  the  latter,  the 
Prefect  may  increase  or  diminish  receipts ;  but  with 
several  exceptions,  he  can  only  reduce  and  not  increase 
expenditures.  In  the  matters  of  fire  protection,  mu- 
nicipal cemeteries,  parks  and  other  local  services,  how- 
ever, the  Council  and  Mayor  exercise  an  independent 
control.  But  the  Prefect  can  always  suspend  the  Mu- 
nicipal Council  for  a  month ;  while  the  President  of  the 
Republic  may  entirely  dissolve  it  and  appoint  a  com- 
mission with  limited  powers  to  direct  the  commune  for 
a  period  not  longer  than  two  months,  when  a  new  coun- 
cil must  be  elected.  Here  again  the  Central  Government 
weighs  down  with  a  firm  hand.^^ 

The  extent  of  Government  intervention  in  strictly 
communal  affairs  is  shown  b}'  several  incidents  con- 
nected with  the  municipality  of  Lyons,  the  second 
largest  city  in  France.  During  the  war  when  the  Cen- 
tral Government  shoukl  have  been  completely  occupied 
with  problems  of  national  defense  and  when  the  cities 
would   naturally  have  been   allowed  to   exercise   their 

"  For  a  more  extended  description  of  the  local  system  of  govern- 
ment in  France,  see  Munro,  Tlw  Government  of  European  Cities, 
Chapter  I. 

380 


REGIONALISM 

greatest  initiative,  the  city  of  Lyons  could  not  even 
revise  a  street-cleaning  contract  without  securing  the 
approval  of  the  Government  in  the  form  of  a  regular 
decree.  This  case  was  in  regard  to  an  agreement  with 
a  IMadame  INFonin  relative  to  the  collection  of  dirt  upon 
the  city  streets;  tlie  decree  was  issued  September  24, 
1917.  Another  example  occurred  on  the  same  day  when 
the  Government  approved  an  agreement  entered  into  by 
the  Mayor  of  Lyons  and  a  Blast  Furnace  Company  at 
Pont-a-Mousson  for  the  delivery  of  some  water  pipes.^^ 
By  these  means  the  Central  Government  at  Paris  defi- 
nitely checks,  or  at  least  controls,  local  autonomy  and 
independence. 

Particularly  as  to  the  commune,  a  French  student 
writes : 

UnfortvTnately,  the  French  commune  does  not  yet  have  its 
liberties.  Placed  under  the  nominal  dependence  of  the  pre- 
fect and  his  ministers  ...  it  can  only  act,  develop  and  pros- 
per with  the  permission  of  irresponsible  bureaus;  it  can  only 
reform  with  the  consent  of  foreign  scribes  and  be  resigned  to 
interminable  delays.  In  order  to  make  a  local  affair  "emerge," 
as  it  is  said,  from  a  ministry  .  .  .  veritable  exorcisms  are 
necessary.^* 

Such  is  the  present  state  of  centralization  in  local 
government.  It  presents  two  vital  objections :  Firstly,  it 
deprives  the  people  of  a  direct  participation  in  what 
should  be  purely  communal  activities.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  a  very  few  local  officials,  the  only  elected  repre- 
sentatives are  deputies,  and  the  members  of  the  general 
arrondissement,  and  communal  councils.  Elections  do 
not  come  with  the  frequency  necessary  to  inspire  public 
interest  in  local  affairs.    In  addition  to  the  small  num- 

"  Quoted   in   E.   Hcrriot,   Crccr,   ii,    187,   note. 
'*Ibid.,  ii,  186. 

381 


conte:\iporaiiy  French  politics 

ber  of  officials  popularly  chosen,  interest  in  their  selec- 
tion is  further  diminished  by  the  complete  subordina- 
tion in  which  they  are  held.  AVhen  representative  bodies 
have  their  natural  powers  absorbed  by  a  distant  au- 
thority, the  training  of  citizens  in  the  responsibility  of 
government — a  training  which  they  must  have  if  a 
democratic  regime  is  to  be  a  success— is  prevented.  The 
success  of  American  Government  institutions  has  its 
roots  in  the  New  England  town  meetings,  and  in  local 
governments  everywhere  carried  on  by  citizens,  inde- 
pendent of  bureaucratic  interference.  In  France,  on 
the  other  hand,  and  for  historic  reasons  previously  dis- 
cussed, the  Republic  is  fed  from  above.  This  is  per- 
haps its  greatest  weakness. 

Secondly,  the  centralization  of  local  governing  powers 
in  Paris  makes  for  confusion  and  inefficiency.  The 
testimony  of  Frenchmen  offers  the  most  conclusive  evi- 
dence. M.  Barthe,  in  introducing  a  resolution  for  de- 
centralization, said  to  the  Chamber : 

Conceived  and  developed  by  the  adminLstrative  authority  it- 
self, our  administrative  system  is  too  visibly  inspired  by  the 
solicitude  of  hierarchical  control  and  not  enough  by  the  solici- 
tude of  sei-\'ice.  Fonnalistic  to  an  excess,  our  administrations 
are  increasingly  clogged  with  red  tape  and  routine.  They 
create  serious  obstacles  to  the  economic  activity  of  the  country 
by  their  systematic  ignorance  of  the  realities  ...  of  produc- 
tion and  exchange.^^ 

M.  Jean  Hennessy,  one  of  the  foremost  advocates  of 
decentralization  by  the  increase  of  self-governing  pow- 
ers, has  written: 

Before  1914  an  over-centralized  France  adapted  itself  with 
difficulty  to  the  great  economic  transformations  of  the  cen- 
tury; it  did  not  exploit  all  of  its  natural  resources;  it  did 
not    profit   from   its   incomparable    geographic    jiosition.      Its 

"  Quoted  in  Hennessy,  op.  cit.,  134. 

382 


REGIONALISM 

economic  wealth  was  developed  too  slowly;  the  convergence 
of  its  railway  system  tuwaid  Paris  did  not  sullieiently  place 
its  different  rejjions  in  relation  with  each  other  and  with  f(jr- 
ei.c:n  countries.  The  interior  of  the  country  was  not  connected 
by  means  of  communication  directed  toward  the  ports,  with 
foreitjn  countries;  liver  navigation  Avas  not  organized;  new 
Avaterways  had  not  been  develojjed;  heavy  merchandise  could 
not  reach  the  coast  without  being  overburdened  with  enormous 
freight;  lacking  return  freiglit  and  because  they  could  not 
find  well-equipped  ports,  the  great  ships  of  commerce  turned 
away  from  our  coasts;  and  our  merchant  marine,  notwith- 
standing large  subventions,  did  not,  so  to  speak,  exist.^^ 

Senator  Ilerriot  expressed  the  opinion  of  perhaps  the 
majority  of  Frenchmen  when  he  wrote  in  regard  to  the 
accnmnlating  ills  of  over-centralization,  as  follows: 

Our  administrative  regime  appears  to-day  as  a  mosaic.  It 
bon'ows  elements  from  all  the  former  regimes.  The  concep- 
tion of  authority  has  prevailed  over  the  tendency  to  liberty. 
The  French  communes  lack  liberties  granted  to  similar  units 
in  foreign  countries.  The  departments  are  administered  by 
prefects  whom  usage  has  made  sort  of  electoral  intendants, 
displaced  according  to  the  caprices  of  central  or  local  politics. 
The  communes  remain  in  wardship.  The  department  no  longer 
has  the  advantages  of  liberty  nor  the  benefits  of  national 
administration.  .  .  .  The  Kepublie  has  had  eminent  Prefects  in 
general,  entirely  due  to  their  own  personality.  But  to  what 
removals  have  they  not  been  coudenmed?  Hazard  reduced 
them;  hazard  raised  them.  The  political  shoal  has  little  by 
little  corrupted  the  institution.  Gari"otted  mayors,  imcertain 
prefects;  this  is  what  our  democracy  retains  to  assure  our 
future.  It  deserves  better.  A  victorious  France  cannot,  with- 
out essential  injuiy,  be  content  with  such  a  regime — which  is 
neither  that  of  authority  or  that  of  liberty.^" 

The  celebrated  words  of  Lamonnais  epitomize  these 
defects  as  follows:  "AVith  centralization,  yon  have  apo- 
plexy at  the  center  and  paralysis  in  the  extremities." 

"Ibid.,   114. 
"  Creer,  ii,  179. 

383 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

To  understand  the  movement,  present  and  historical, 
for  the  restoration  of  local  governing  powers  in  France, 
a  brief  history  of  their  development  will  first  be  given. 


II 


French  centralization  is  a  result  of  long  centuries 
which  worked  for  the  creation  of  French  unity  and  the 
French  nation.  From  a  country  originally  composed 
of  feudal  holdings,  independent  and  antagonistic,  in 
which  the  king  was  merely  a  baron  upon  his  limited 
estates  along  the  Seine  and  the  Loire,  a  nation  has 
emerged.  The  feudal  domain  was  gradually  absorbed 
into  the  royal  domain;  seigneuries  were  united  and 
feudal  power  was  transferred  to  the  king.  A  continual 
series  of  foreign  wars,  of  attacks  by  or  upon  enemies 
on  every  side — Spain,  England,  Austria,  Prussia,  Swe- 
den, and  the  Netherlands — stimulated  this  process  and 
brought  the  royalty  greater  power.  AVar  was  always 
imminent  and  a  strong  central  authority  became  a  con- 
tinuous necessity. 

It  was  Louis  XIV  who  crowned  the  work  of  French 
unity.  At  his  accession  France  divided  its  legal  juris- 
diction between  a  written  law  and  local  custom.  A 
majority  of  Frenchmen  w'ere  ignorant  of  the  national 
language.  France  was  simply  a  federation  of  provinces, 
each  of  which  used  its  own  laws.  The  Chancellor  used 
two  seals,  one  for  Dauphine,  the  other  for  the  rest  of 
the  kingdom.  Cities  were  independent  citadels.  Re- 
gional States-Generals,  established  by  financial  neces- 
sity, cried  for  independence.  But  through  the  inten- 
dants,  the  predecessors  of  the  modern  prefects,  the  king 
overcame  local  independence  and  centralized  adminis- 

384 


REGIONALISM 

tration ;  armies,  cities,  provinces,  judges,  came  under 
his  direct  control.  Louis  XIV  traced  the  outlines  which 
Napoleon  was  to  fill. 

The  weakness  of  succeeding  sovereigns  postponed  the 
completion  of  the  work  Louis  had  started.  The  Revolu- 
tion found  France  still  a  divided  and  morcellated  coun- 
try. Lorraine  was  regarded  as  a  foreign  province ; 
Beam  demanded  a  distinct  sovereignty;  Dauphine  pre- 
tended to  be  at  the  same  time  in  and  out  of  the  king- 
dom; Boulogne  and  Navarre  started  separatist  move- 
ments, declaring  null  the  royal  edicts  joining  them  to 
France.  The  situation  confronting  the  Revolution  was 
a  serious  one  and  led  to  the  appeal  for  unity  without 
which  the  Revolution  could  not  succeed.  The  Con- 
stituent Assembly  of  1789  ^^  relied  upon  a  common  devo- 
tion of  the  communes  of  France  to  the  fatherland  to  en- 
force this  unity.  The  institutions  of  local  government 
which  it  established  were  marked,  consequently,  by  local 
independence.  The  Assembly  divided  France  into  about 
eighty-five  departments,  which  in  turn  were  formed 
into  districts.  The  intendant,  a  regalian  office,  was  sup- 
pressed and  elective  officials  held  the  executive  control 
of  the  departments.  The  central  power  had  no  repre- 
sentatives in  local  assemblies.  The  communes  or  parois- 
ses,  of  which  there  w^re  about  44,000,  were  uniformly 
organized  as  self-governing  units  with  a  mayor  and 
council  elected  by  nearly  universal  suffrage.  They  also 
were  practically  independent  of  the  central  authority. 
The  Revolution  thus  achieved  a  democratic  and  a  de- 
centralized system  of  self-government ;  but  French  unity 
had  not  become  firmly  enough  established  to  prevent  the 

"  A  brief  history  of  French  administrative  organization  and 
decentralization  since  1789  will  be  found  in  G.  Jeze,  Elements  du 
Droit  Public  et  Administratif,  134-137, 

385 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

abuses  of  such  extensive  liberty.  Consequently  in 
1795,  because  of  the  excesses  of  the  Reign  of  Terror 
which  arose  under  local  governing  bodies  uncontrolled 
by  the  central  authorities,  a  reorganization  became  nec- 
essary. The  Directory  immediately  upon  coming  into 
power  suppressed  the  communes  as  a  self-governing 
unit  and  substituted  for  them  the  canton,  whose  ad- 
ministration was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  directory  of 
five  to  nine  members  popularly  elected.  As  many  small 
communes  were  grouped  into  a  single  canton,  much  of 
the  local  and  unrestrained  independence  was  destroyed. 
Although  this  cantonal  system  led  to  a  more  effective 
control  of  the  country,  it  could  not  become  the  satis- 
factory basis  of  local  government  because  the  canton 
was  an  artificial  division.  The  commune,  by  tradition 
and  by  natural  boundaries,  has  been  and  always  will 
be  the  natural  unit  of  local  administration. 

Napoleon  may  have  recognized  this  fact,  for  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1800  (twenty-eight  pluviSse,  Year  VIII),  upon 
his  advent  to  power,  he  reestablished  the  commune  as 
the  governmental  unit.  Completely  out  of  sympathy 
with  popular  demands  for  freedom  in  government,  he 
did  away  with  the  election  of  officials.  Henceforth 
mayors,  adjoints  and  couneilmen  were  to  be  appointed 
by  the  central  regime.  The  department  was  retained, 
but  at  its  head  was  placed  an  appointive  prefect;  the 
arrondissoments  appeared  in  place  of  the  old  districts, 
and  were  presided  over  by  the  sub-prefect,  also  ap- 
pointed. These  features  the  Third  Republic  still  main- 
tains. With  the  growth  of  the  Empire,  France  little  by 
little  lost  its  local  and  regional  liberties. 

To  these  centralizing  tendencies,  men  like  Villele  and 
Corbiere  were  not  slow  in  ol)jecting.  But  no  funda- 
mental change  in   the  Napoleonic   administration  was 

386 


REGIONALISM 

made  even  after  the  Restoration  in  1815.  Numerous 
projects  appeared  urging  the  extension  of  local  self- 
government.  In  1829  the  Martignac  project  was  intro- 
duced, substituting  the  election  of  the  general  and 
arrondissement  councilors  for  their  appointment  by  the 
central  power;  but  it  failed  of  passage  and  caused  the 
fall  of  the  cabinet.  It  was  only  after  the  Revolution  of 
1830,  bringing  Louis  Philippe  into  power,  that  this 
movement  bore  fruit.  By  the  laws  of  1831  and  1837 
municipal  governments  were  reorganized  so  that  coun- 
cilors could  be  elected  indirectly  by  a  suffrage  based 
on  property  and  educational  qualifications.  The  mayors 
and  adjoints  still  were  appointed,  but  were  now  to  be 
taken  from  members  of  the  council ;  the  municipal  coun- 
cils were  granted  limited  power  in  certain  matters  of 
local  administration.  In  1833  slight  changes  were  also 
made  in  departmental  organization. 

The  Revolution  of  1848  gave  a  new  impulse  to  the 
movement  for  decentralization.  A  project  with  that 
purpose  was  submitted  to  the  Council  of  State,  which 
provided  for  the  substitution  of  commissions  of  the 
arrondissements,  formed  of  the  general  councilors  of 
each  arrondissement,  for  the  old  arrondissement  and 
canton  councils.  But  the  National  Assembly  did  not 
approve  the  measure.  How^ever,  municipal  councils  in 
communes  of  not  more  than  6,000  inhabitants  were  per- 
mitted to  select  their  own  mayors.  But  the  larger  cities 
continued  under  the  old  jurisdiction.  The  Second  Em- 
pire in  1852  took  away  this  privilege  from  the  com- 
munes, and  the  Government  also  abolished  the  practice 
of  choosing  mayors  from  members  of  the  municipal 
council.  The  entire  spirit  prevalent  in  the  Government 
of  Napoleon  III  was  in  complete  agreement  with  that  of 

387 


CONTE]\IPORAItY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Napoleon  Bonaparte.^^  The  prefects  exercised  complete 
power  not  only  over  the  departments  but  over  com- 
munes. In  1866  and  1867  laws  were  passed  somewhat 
enlarging  the  attributes  of  the  general  and  municipal 
councils,  but  they  were  already  so  effectively  controlled 
by  the  central  authority  that  municipal  life  remained 
practically  extinct. 

This  repressive  policy  naturally  met  with  opposition. 
Demands  for  reform  culminated  in  the  program  of 
Nancy  in  1865,  to  which  representatives  of  nearly  every 
political  faith  adhered — Berryer,  de  Broglie,  Casimir- 
Perier,  d  'Haussonville,  J.  Simon  and  Jules  Favre.^"  This 
conference  proved  a  landmark  in  the  movement  for 
self-government.  It  officially  gave  birth  to  the  regional 
idea — the  creation  of  a  region  of  considerable  powers, 
supplanting  and  greater  than  the  department — 
although  several  writers  had  previously  made  the  sug- 
gestion. Auguste  Comte  in  185-4  urged  the  grouping  of 
departments  into  seventeen  regions;  while  Le  Play,  in 
his  Reforme  Sociale  en  France  in  1864,  urged  the  group- 
ing of  the  departments  into  thirteen  "provinces." 

The  Assembly  of  1871,  after  bringing  the  war  to  a 
close,  partly  occupied  itself  Avith  the  administrative  re- 
organization of  France,  As  a  temporary  measure  it  de- 
cided, except  for  a  few  alterations,  to  return  to  the  sys- 
tem used  in  1848.  One  of  these  changes  was  that  in  all 
cities,  except  those  having  over  20,000  inhabitants,  the 
mayors  might  be  chosen  by  the  municipal  councils.  The 
Assembly  having  retained  the  general  features  of  the 
centralized  government  laid  down  by  Napoleon  I,  op- 


"Sec  De  la  Gorcc,  Histoire  du  Second  Empire,  ii,  48  et  seq. 
for  Napoleon  III  and  decentralization. 

^''  For  the  Nancy  projjram,  as  advocated  before  the  National 
Assembly,  see  G.  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  i,  234,  235. 

388 


REGIONALISM 

I)()siti()n  in  favor  of  incroasocl  local  freedom  arose  in  the 
Third  Republic.  In  an  effort  to  silence  it  by  oppres- 
sion, and  to  make  its  own  position  permanent,  the  ]\Iac- 
Mahon  Government  secured  the  passage  of  a  law  in  1874 
which  suppressed  the  right  of  communes  to  choose  their 
own  mayors.  This  law  was  repealed  upon  the  accession 
of  a  new  government  in  1876;  and  in  1882  every  com- 
mune, regardless  of  its  size,  was  allowed  to  choose  its 
own  administrative  officials.  On  April  5,  1884,  a  munic- 
ipal code  ^^  was  promulgated  combining  and  organizing 
the  many  different  laws  upon  municipal  government 
which  previous  regimes  had  framed.  "With  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  amendments,  it  provides  the  present  basis 
of  municipal  organization  in  France,  which  has  been 
outlined  at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter. 


Ill 


Throughout  the  history  of  this  development  two  cur- 
rents of  reform  may  be  discerned.  The  first  limited 
itself  to  the  extension  of  the  powers  of  local  assemblies 
and  units  at  present  in  existence.  Such  a  movement 
was  successful  enough  to  extend  the  financial  powers 
of  the  general  councils  by  a  law  passed  in  July,  1898, 
and  also  those  of  the  municipal  councils,  in  a  law  passed 
on  April  7,  1902.  ]\rore  recent  attempts  for  increasing 
the  powers  of  local  assemblies  are  too  numerous  to  re- 
count. Three  propositions  upon  communal  organiza- 
tion were  introduced  in  Parliament  about  1900;  since 
then,  at  least  thirteen  propositions  upon  cantonal  or- 
ganization and  eleven  bills,  upon  departmental  organiza- 

"For  the  Law  of  Municipal  Organization  of  April  5,  1884,  sec 
Codes  et  Lois,  ii,  9.55-967. 

389 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tion,  including  the  suppression  or  the  reduction  of  the 
uiidcr-prefect,  have  also  been  introduced.  The  re- 
forms advocated  place  much  of  the  present  initiative 
of  the  prefect  upon  the  general  council,  and  free  hira 
from  the  constant  interference  of  Paris  authorities.  A 
few  even  advocate  the  election  of  the  prefect  or  of  the 
under-pref ect ;  many  advocate  the  total  suppression  of 
the  arrondissement.  The  extension  of  the  powers  of 
the  commune  receives  the  strongest  supporters  because 
it  is  the  natural  and  traditional  unit  of  government  in 
France.^^     The  increasing  responsibilities  of  niunicipal- 

"  The  most  extensive  effort  toward  decentralization  in  France 
was  that  attempted  by  the  Paris  Commune  of  1871.  According  to 
the  Official  Journal  of  the  Commune  (April  20,  1871),"  it  de- 
manded: 

"The  absolute  independence  of  the  Commune  and  its  extension 
to  every  locality  in  France;  the  assurance  by  this  means  to  each 
person  of  his  rights  in  their  integrity.  .  .  .  The  independence  of 
the  Commune  will  have  but  one  limit — the  equal  right  of  indepen- 
dence to  be  en.ioyed  by  the  other  Communes  who  shall  adhere  to 
the  contract.  It  is  the  association  of  these  Communes  that  must 
secure  the  unity  of  France. 

* '  The  inherent  rights  of  the  Commune  are  these :  the  right  of 
voting  the  Communal  budget  of  receipts  and  expenditure,  of 
regulating  and  reforming  the  system  of  taxation,  and  of  directing 
local  services;  the  right  to  organize  its  own  magistracy,  the  inter- 
nal police  and  public  education ;  to  administer  the  property  be- 
longing to  the  Commune ;  the  right  of  choosing  by  election  or  com- 
petition, with  responsibility  and  a  permanent  right  of  control 
and  revocation,  tlie  communal  magistrates  and  officials  of  all 
sorts.  .  .  . 

' '  Paris  desires  no  more  than  this,  with  the  condition,  of  course, 
that  she  shall  find  in  the  Grand  Central  Administration,  com- 
posed of  delegates  from  the  Federal  Communes,  the  practical 
recognition  and  realization  of  the  same  principles.  .  .  .  The  unity 
which  has  hitlierto  been  imposed  u])on  us  by  the  Empire,  the 
Monarchy,  and  the  Parliamentary  Government  is  nothing  but  a 
centralization,  despotic,  unintelligent,  arbitrary,  and  burdensome. 
Political  unity  as  <lesired  by  Paris  is  a  voluntary  association  of 
each  local  initiative,  a  free  and  sjxintaneous  coiijieration  oi  ail 
individual  energies  with  one  common  object — the  well-being,  liberty 
and  security  of  all.  ..."  Quoted  by  II.  M.  Hyndman  in 
Clcmcnc('<iu,  the  Man  and  IJis  Time,  40. 

(See  also  G.  llanotaux,  op.  cit.,  i,  1G8,  169. 

390 


REGIONALISM 

ities  makes  an  increased  freedom  imperative.  As  Sen- 
ator Ilerriot  says,  "the  cities  of  France  are  not  only 
inert  statues  upon  the  Place  de  la  Concorde.  They  are 
acting,  living,  growing  beings,  obliged  to  prosper  under 
penalty  of  succumbing.  Thej'  must,  in  spite  of  con- 
straint and  stupidity,  defend  their  interests,  create 
wealth,  and  improve  by  their  efforts,  the  welfare  of  their 
citizens.  ...  It  is  by  the  reorganization  of  the  com- 
mune .  .  .  that  administrative  reform  can  be  suitably 
commenced."  ^^ 

However,  the  efforts  to  increase  the  independence  of 
bodies  at  present  existing,  as  noted,  have  largely  failed, 
and  the  tendency  in  France  is  toward  a  greater  con- 
centration of  power  in  the  State  authority.  In  the  be- 
lief that  the  present  units  of  government,  especially  the 
departments,  because  of  the  strictures  in  which  history 
and  their  composition  hold  them,  will  never  be  given 
any  amount  of  autonomy,  the  movement  of  Regionalism 
has  developed.  This  movement  aims  at  the  total  sup- 
pression of  the  departments  w'hich  it  considers  as  arti- 
ficial and  over-numerous  units  of  government.  In  their 
place  it  would  erect  a  great  region  based  upon  natural 
economic  and  historic  boundaries.  ^*  These  regions 
would  be  much  larger  than  the  present  departments  and 
consequently  there  would  be  a  smaller  number  of  them. 
They  would  be  governed  by  a  regional  assembly,  en- 
dowed with  autonomous  poAvers  which  would  extend  to 
the  development  of  regional  interests,  economic  and  po- 


^^Creer,  ii,  189. 

'"  For  example,  the  region  of  Lille  is  characterized  by  its  tex- 
tile industries;  the  region  of  Dijon  by  its  unique  system  of  inland 
wnter  transportation;  the  region  of  (Jrenolile  by  its  electric  power 
and  manufacturing;  the  region  of  Marseille  by  its  port  facilities 
and  by  its  Oriental  and  African  trade.  The  regionalists  wish  to 
impose  upon  these  economic  delimitations  a  political  delimitation. 

391 


CONTEI^IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

litieal.    As  a  result  trade  would  be  stimulated  and  gov- 
ernment administration  be  intelligently  carried  on. 

The  first  argument,  then,  for  the  creation  of  such  a 
unit  of  administration  is  that  if  new  powers  are  to  be 
actually  exercised,  it  is  necessary  to  wipe  out  old  local 
organs  of  government  and  start  with  a  clean  slate.  The 
second  argument  is  that  the  department  is  artificial  in 
its  composition  and  that  consequently  it  cannot  intel- 
ligently direct  the  economic  interests  of  the  locality. 
Because  of  its  small  size  and  its  lack  of  dignity,  it 
does  not  attract  men  of  ability  to  its  public  offices.  The 
third  argument  is  one  of  economy.  A  larger  adminis- 
trative unit  will  decrease  the  number  of  Government  em- 
ployees, reducing  financial  expenditures  and  political 
profiteering.  According  to  the  report  upouvthe  regional 
proposition,  introduced  by  M.  Rognon  in  1916,  the 
adoption  of  the  region  would  result  in  suppressing : 

53  prefects 
275  sub-prefects 

20  secretary-generals 
159  councilors  of  the  prefecture 

53  general  treasurers 
362  financial  receivers 

53  registry  directors 

53  indirect  tax  directors 
302  road  overseers 

and  a  great  number  of  tax  collectors 
and  justices  of  the  peace.-'' 

The  fourth  argument  for  the  creation  of  a  region, 
supplanting  the  department,  has  arisen  out  of  the  prob- 
lem of  reconstruction :  First,  in  regard  to  the  govern- 
ment of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Although  the  people  of  these 
provinces  have  welcomed  their  return  to  Franco,  they 

-°  Quoted  in  Ilenncssy,  op.  cit.,  133. 

392 


RKGIONALISM 

do  not  relish  the  re.slrictivo,  bureaucratic  and  inefficient 
control  of  the  French  IMinistry  of  the  Interior.  Under 
German  rule,  and  because  of  a  desire  to  conciliate  the 
Alsatians,  they  were  given,  at  least  so  French  regional- 
ists  assert,  more  administrative  autonomy  than  that 
"vvhich  the  French  department  is  accorded.  Conse- 
quently only  a  regional  organization,  embracing  these 
provinces  in  their  entirety,  with  local  administrative 
liberties,  will  assure  the  happy  reabsorption  of  the  lost 
provinces  in  La  Patrie.  Secondly,  the  devastated  re- 
gions have  asked  for  liberation  from  the  binding  re- 
straints in  which  the  Paris  Government  was  holding 
them  in  their  efforts  at  rehabilitation.  The  cities  and 
the  Chambers  of  Commerce  of  Lille,  Roubaix,  and  Tour- 
coing  requested  the  Government  to  organize  the  devas- 
tated regions  upon  the  regional  principle.  Through 
this  type  of  organization,  they  believed  the  liberated 
area  of  France  could  best  utilize  its  own  energies  in  the 
tremendous  task  of  reconstruction. 

Sympathy  with  this  argument  was  expressed  by  the 
Congress  of  the  League  of  Professional  Representation 
and  Regionalist  Action,  held  at  Lyons,  April  20  and  21, 
1919,  which  adopted  the  following  resolution : 

Whereas  it  is  happily  impossible  to  frustrate  the  people  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  from  the  benefits  of  their  regional  or- 
ganization or  to  submit  them  to  the  naiTOW  and  tyi'annical 
regime  of  our  old,  imperial  administration; 

Whereas  the  populations  of  the  liberated  regions  find  them- 
selves in  many  respects  in  the  same  situation  as  the  peojile  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  \\Tth  this  single  difference,  perhaps,  that 
they  have  suifered  more  hann  from  the  war  and  that  they  have 
fewer  means  of  bringing  a  remedy  to  it; 

Whereas,  they  have  therefore  every  reason  to  have  their 
right  realized  to  be  admitted  to  all  the  benefits  of  regional, 
autonomous   organization,    alone  capable   of  hastening,   in   a 

393 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

larger  and  more  flexible  framework,  their  economic  recon- 
struction ; 

Resolved,  that  the  League  of  Regionalist  Action  would 
neglect  its  very  principles  if  it  did  not  express  the  wish  that 
prompt  satisfaction  be  given  them  and  to  the  other  regions 
of  France  at  the  same  time; 

And  that  for  these  reasons,  the  Regionalist  Congress  of 
Lyons  ask  Parliament  to  vote  without  delay  the  law  upon 
regional  organization.^^ 


IV 


Since  the  congress  of  Nancy  in  1865,  the  regionalist 
movement  has  been  effectively  carried  on  by  many  differ- 
ent organizations.  In  1895,  the  National  League  of  De- 
centralization was  formed,  only  to  succumb  shortly 
afterward.  In  the  same  year,  jMM.  Paul  Deschanel,  the 
present  President  of  the  Republic,  de  Lucay,  and  de 
Marcere,  produced  books  urging  the  reform.  About 
this  time,  La  Nmwelle  Revue  published  a  series  of  arti- 
cles urging  decentralization,  to  which  the  great  Pro- 
vencal poet,  Frederic  IMistral,  contributed.  In  1898,  a 
Breton  Regionalist  Union  was  organized,  to  be  followed 
in  the  next  twenty  years  by  some  ten  other  provincial 
organizations. 

The  French  Regionalist  Federation  arose  from  the 
combination  and  the  federation  of  smaller  organiza- 
tions. Founded  in  1900  and  constituted  "outside  and 
above  all  political  parties,"  it  proposed  to  coordinate 
the  efforts  of  every  society  and  individual  interested  in 


"CEuvre,  April  23,  1919. 

Another  unique  argument  for  regionalism  was  advanced  at 
this  Congress  by  a  Walloon  from  Liege ;  ho  urged  the  creation  of 
regional  autonomy  to  overcome  the  only  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
Belgian  union  with  France!  That  such  a  thing  is  contemplated 
is  interesting,  to  say  the  least. 

394 


REGIONALISM 

regional  reform.  It  did  not  supplant  existing  organi- 
zations, it  merely  federated  them.  By  means  of  press 
campaigns  and  conferences,  it  was  able  to  arouse  con- 
siderable interest  in  this  new  idea  of  government. 
Among  its  members  were  such  prominent  statesmen  and 
politicians  as  Alexandre  Ribot,  Paul  Deschanel,  Jean 
Hennessy,  and  Louis  IMarin,  and  such  literary  men  as 
Mistral,  Barres,  apd  Ducroeq.  In  fact,  the  regional 
movement  was  as  much  directed  toward  the  revival  of 
regional  art  and  literature  as  toward  the  institution  of 
a  purely  political  reform. 

The  League  of  Professional  Representation  and  Re- 
gionalist  Action  was  founded  in  April,  1913,  by  M.  Jean 
Hennessy,  who  became  and  still  is  its  President.  Dif- 
fering from  previous  organizations,  it  asked  for  the 
election  of  a  Regional  Assembly  composed  of  representa- 
tives of  economic  and  professional  interests  in  addition 
to  the  mere  creation  of  the  regional  unit.^^  A  month 
after  the  organization  of  the  League,  in  ^May,  1913,  a 
bill  upon  regional  reform,  creating  professional  regional 
assemblies,  was  introduced  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.^^ 
After  its  introduction,  the  League  organized  confer- 
ences in  the  principal  cities  of  France  to  arouse  popular 
interest  in  the  reform.  On  February  1,  1914,  a  Con- 
gress was  held  in  Toulouse  to  which  the  Federation  of 
Agriculture,  Commerce  and  Industry,  and  the  Cham- 
bers of  Commerce  sent  delegates.  But  despite  the 
propagandist  efforts  of  the  League,  all  attempts  at  re- 
gional reform  have  so  far  failed  to  pass  Parliament. 


"See  pp.  362-364. 

^Before  this  date,  seven  similar  projects  had  been  unsuccess- 
fully urged  before  the  Chamber.  In  1910,  M.  Briand,  then 
Premier,  advocated  the  region  as  a  necessity  for  electoral  reform. 
He  was  unable  to  convince  Parliament  of  his  point  of  view. 

395 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

During  the  folloAving  four  years,  four  bills  upon  re- 
gionalism and  decentralization  were  introduced. 

The  Administrative  Commission  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  of  which  M.  Hennessy  was  the  rapporteur, 
took  these  various  measures  and  combined  them  into  a 
compromised  proposition  which  was  a  very  poor  sub- 
stitute for  the  regionalist  idea. 

The  first  step  in  administrative  reform,  according  to 
the  report  of  this  Commission,  should  be  the  creation  of 
a  region  and  the  fixing  of  the  powers  of  its  representa- 
tive assembly,  its  method  of  selection,  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  budget.  "With  this  step  achieved,  the  re- 
form of  other  local  institutions  may  be  brought  about, 
as  well  as  that  of  the  public  services. 

The  delimitation  of  the  region  was  recognized  by  the 
Commission  to  be  a  difficult  task.  It  finally  decided  to 
pass  this  responsibility  on  to  the  Council  of  IMinisters 
who  by  decree  should  fix  the  limits  and  the  capital  of 
each  region  after  having  received  the  advice  of  the 
Council  of  State.  This  latter  body,  before  emitting  its 
advice,  should  consult  the  wishes  of  the  local  bodies, 
such  as  Chambers  of  Commerce,  general,  municipal,  and 
arrondissement  councils,  and  professional  organizations. 
On  the  petition  of  at  least  one  fourth  of  its  voters  each 
arrondissement  might  protest  against  the  incorporation 
of  the  arrondissement  in  one  region,  in  favor  of  another. 

The  administration  of  the  region  was  to  be  vested  in 
a  representative  of  the  central  power.  In  theory  the 
Commission  believed  it  better  for  each  region  to  elect 
such  an  official ;  but  because  of  the  presence  of  war  con- 
ditions, it  did  not  believe  the  State  could  safely  relin- 
quish its  control.  In  addition  to  this  prefect,  a  re- 
gional commission  was  to  be  erected.  Its  method  of 
election,  its  powers  and  those  of  its  president,  were  to 

396 


REGIONALISM 

be  the  same  as  those  of  the  present  departmental  or- 
ganizations. Many  members  of  the  Commission  believed 
that  the  region  should  be  directed  by  a  sur-prefect,  un- 
derneath whom  would  be  the  department  prefects.  But 
this  idea  was  also  abandoned,  and  the  direction  of  the 
region  was  confided  in  the  Prefect  of  the  department  in 
which  the  capital  (chef-lieu)  of  the  region  was  to  be 
located.  The  representative  body  of  the  region,  known 
as  the  Regional  Council,  was  to  be  elected  by  the  de- 
partment general  councils.  Each  arrondissement  was 
to  have  at  least  one  representative  in  a  Regional  Coun- 
cil. The  number  of  the  regional  councilors  was  to  equal 
one  fifth  of  the  general  councilors.  The  powers  of  this 
Council,  naturally  difficult  to  define,  were  left  rather 
vague.  The  principle  was  laid  down  that  the  Council 
should  control  the  administration  of  all  public  services 
extending  beyond  the  department  and  not  essentially  of 
a  national  character,  and  those  of  a  local  nature  which 
at  present  congest  State  administration.  The  three  mat- 
ters specifically  intrusted  to  this  Regional  Council  were 
education,  to  the  extent  of  its  adaptation  to  local  needs; 
social  assistance,  such  as  aid  to  the  blind,  deaf  and  dumb 
and  to  tubercular  patients,  which  extends  bej-ond  the 
needs  of  single  departments ;  and  public  works,  such  as 
regional  water  transportation  and  local  railways.  In 
general,  even  if  the  regional  councils  were  granted  no 
more  power  than  the  present  departmental  councils,  they 
could  do  immensely  more  in  the  development  of  indus- 
try because  of  the  natural,  economic  delimitation  of  the 
region.  The  departments  are  organized  so  that  they 
have  competitive  and  conflicting  economic  interests 
which  their  general  councils  cannot  effectively  develop. 
The  region,  in  combining  departrpents  of  similar  compo- 
sition and  interests,  will  immeasurably  improve  their 

397 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

productiveness.  In  place  of  the  conflicts  and  the  antag- 
onism which  the  present  departments  engender,  the 
region,  it  is  urged,  will  coordinate  and  confederate  mu- 
tual interests. 

The  financial  resources  of  the  region,  the  Commission 
left  to  the  determination  of  the  Fiscal  Legislation  Com- 
mission, except  to  suggest  that  the  regional  budget  be 
composed  of  additional  centimes,  levied  upon  the  nat- 
ional taxes,  and  voted  by  the  regional  council.  Further- 
more, the  region  should  be  given  the  right  to  create  new 
taxes,  a  right  which  the  local  assemblies  of  France  do  not 
now  have.  In  this  respect,  they  are  denied  a  preroga- 
tive which  nearly  every  local  assembly  in  the  world  en- 
joys. The  problem  of  a  regional  budget  is  of  the  most 
extreme  importance,  because  without  financial  indepen- 
dence from  the  central  power,  local  self-government  will 
be  almost  impossible. 

This,  the  last  proposition  upon  regionalism,  presents 
many  serious  defects.  First,  it  does  not  suppress  the 
department;  maintaining  it  with  its  present  powers,  it 
merely  superimposes  another  unit  of  government — that 
of  the  region.  The  executive  power  of  this  region  is 
vested  in  an  appointee  of  the  State.  So  far  the  bill  ap- 
pears only  to  add  an  additional  complication,  through 
which  the  ^Ministry  of  the  Interior  will  be  able  to  in- 
crease its  interferences.  Secondly,  the  composition  of 
the  Regional  Council  is  disappointing;  the  councilors 
are  not  elected,  as  are  the  members  of  the  general,  ar- 
rondissement,  and  communal  councils ;  but  they  are 
chosen  by  the  general  councils  themselves.  A  very  valu- 
able oi)portunity  has  here  been  lost  to  increase  popular 
participation  in  government.  The  powers  of  this  Coun- 
cil are  also  open  to  criticism.  Education  has  become  a 
national  function ;  and  unity  of  language  has  with  too 

398 


REGIONALISM 

much  diHiculty  been  imi)osed  to  renounce  this  natiojial 
charge.  Social  assistance  is  an  affair  of  the  commune ; 
while  j)ul)li('  works,  as  local  (juarrels  over  roads  and  the 
needs  of  national  railways,  have  shown,  is  also  largely  a 
national  affair.-'^  Finalh',  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
bill,  the  Council  is  given  no  authority  to  impose  its  de- 
cisions upon  the  departments  and  the  communes  within 
it.  Its  powers  would  therefore  be  advisory.  In  sura, 
this  bill  does  not  introduce  any  effective  innovation  in 
decentralization  and  in  self-government.  Because  of  its 
compromises,  it  does  not  receive  the  support  of  the 
regionalists,^"  and  naturally  it  is  opposed  by  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  theory. 


V 


The  principal  objection  to  the  adoption  of  regionalism 
is  the  same  hcte  noire  which  haunts  French  politics  gen- 
erally— the  fear  of  the  destruction  of  national  unity.  As 
noted,  this  fear  arises  from  profound  historical  causes. 
To  empower  regional  assemblies  with  any  amount  of 
independence  would  open  the  temptation  to  destroy  this 
unitJ^  Such  an  argument  is  disapproved,  however,  by 
the  fact  that  the  strongest  nationalist  elements  in  France, 
the  Orleanists  and  the  Ligue  des  Patriotes,  through 
Maurice  Barres,  are  ardent  advocates  of  regionalism. 

The  strongest  opponent  of  any  measure  of  decentrali- 
zation and  especially  of  regionalism,  is  the  French  Gov- 
ernment.    Despite  its  changing  composition,  succeeding 

^'  This  statement  does  not  apply  to  purely  local  nndertakings 
such  as  tramway  lines,  power  plants,  etc.,  which  there  is  every 
reason  to  believe  a  regional  assembly  could  efficiently  adminis- 
ter. 

™  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  Regionalist  Plan,  see  Jean 
Hennessy,  Eegions  de  France  (1911-1916). 

399 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Governments  jealously  guard  and  attempt,  openly  or  by 
stealth,  to  extend  their  absorbing  and  penetrating  arms. 
Any  attempt  to  deprive  the  central  power  of  its  strength, 
therefore,  is  bound  to  be  unwelcome  and  to  be  bitterly 
and  effectively  opposed  by  the  wnde  organization  which 
the  Government  can  muster  against  it.^^  Finally,  inno- 
vation, involving  .the  complete  change  of  one  institution 
of  government  for  another,  is  much  more  difficult  to 
accomplish  than  the  reform  of  existing  institutions.  For 
these  reasons,  it  may  be  that  the  movement  for  self- 
government  in  France  will  be  satisfied  with  the  exten- 
sion of  the  powers  of  existing  bodies.    From  the  politi- 

''  The  most  recent  defense,  written  in  the  light  of  the  lessons 
of  the  past  war,  of  the  French  administrative  system  as  it  now 
exists,  is  that  given  in  the  preface  to  the  ninth  edition  of 
Maurice  Hauriou's  Precis  de  Droit  Administratif  (Librairie  de  la 
Societe    du    Recueil   Sirey,    1919). 

M.  Hauriou  maintains  that  the  existence  of  a  highly  centralized 
and  bureaucratic  Germany  demands  that  France  support  a  system 
equally  strong.  He  believes  that  it  was  the  system  of  cen- 
tralization in  France,  Russia,  and  Italy,  which  succeeded  in  rapidly 
mobilizing  military  preparations  and  therefore  preventing  Germany 
from  winning  the  war.  It  was  the  French  system  of  centraliza- 
tion, he  says,  which  enabled  the  French  army  to  stand  the  first 
shocks  of  the  war  until  the  slower  processes  of  English  decen- 
tralization came  to  her  aid.  ' '  If  civilization  was  saved,  it  was  by 
centralization. ' ' 

He  believes  that  it  is  impossible  to  maintain  a  permanent  and 
mobile  army  along  with  a  decentralized  political  and  administrative " 
system. 

From  the  standpoint  of  interior  problems,  Professor  Hauriou 
says  tliat  a  strong  centralized  government  is  needed  to  cope  with 
the  forces  now  endeavoring  to  overthrow  it.  To  prevent  the  control 
of  the  State  by  labor  syndicates  or  by  capitalistic  trusts,  * '  a 
strong  centralized  executive  is  necessary  which  will  exercise  a 
preventive  action,  thanks  to  the  omnipotence  of  its  police,  and  if 
necessary,  by  the  direct  participation  in  the  enterprises  which  may 
be  of  public  interest." 

The  teaching  of  the  war  has  shown  that  there  has  been  too 
much  lack  of  coiirdination  between  the  different  ministries,  and 
that  what  is  really  necessary  is  a  new  centralization  which  will 
unite  tho  different  heads  of  the  public  services  into  one  coordinat- 
ing body. 

400 


REGIONALISM 

cal  standpoint  such  a  reform  would  be  satisfactory ;  from 
the  economic  point  of  view,  because  of  the  artificial 
structure  of  the  departments  retained,  it  would  be  val- 
ueless. 

Whatever  direction  this  movement  may  take  in 
France,  whether  it  be  in  the  adoption  of  regionalism  or 
in  the  mere  enlargement  of  departmental  or  communal 
powers,  it  is  very  likely  that  France  will  soon  a(;hieve 
some  sort  of  administrative  reform.  The  present  sys- 
tem is  a  remnant  of  the  Empire,  based  upon  authorit}'-, 
clothed  with  stupid  inefficiency,  and  inconsistent  with 
a  Republican  regime.  It  is  only  through  vigorous,  local 
institutions  of  government  that  citizens  can  be  rigidly 
trained  in  civic  responsibilities.  It  is  such  an  education 
which  French  democracy  appears  to  need.  Now  accus- 
tomed to  regard  the  Government  as  something  foreign 
to  them,  many  Frenchmen  have  lost  interest  in  the  main- 
tenance of  its  spiritual  integrity.  Dependent  upon  it, 
on  the  other  hand,  for  almost  all  of  their  economic  needs, 
they  regard  every  means  of  influencing  it  as  legitimate. 
The  extension  of  local,  decentralized  power  and  responsi- 
bility will  do  much  toward  overcoming  this  attitude. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


WHAT   THE  FRENCH    PEACE   TERMS   MIGHT   HAVE  BEEN 


Chaque  puissance  chcrche  a  regagner  au  mains  quelque  chose 
de  ce  qu'eUe  a  perdu  en  empechant  une  troisieme  de  s'agrandir: 
tons  les  elements  poUtiques  sont  en  combustion;  et  le  denouement 
final  n'est  attendu  par  personne. — Metternich. 


The  one  enduring  thought  in  the  French  mind 
throughout  hostilities  and  one  which  remained  dominant 
through  every  phase  of  the  peace  negotiations,  was  that 
terms  should  be  imposed  at  the  end  of  the  war  which 
would  forever  wipe  out  the  menace  of  another  German 
attack.  A  fear  of  Germany  was  the  controlling  impulse 
in  the  French  heart.  When  the  armistice  was  signed 
(the  11th  of  November,  1918)  French  opinion  was  def- 
initely obliged  to  formulate  the  terms  or  "guarantees" 
embodying  this  security.  It  was  quite  natural  that 
strategic  considerations  should  suggest  themselves  as 
alone  capable  of  supplying  these  guarantees.  The  prece- 
dents of  history  and  the  past  policies  of  the  enemies  of 
France,  motived  more  by  a  desire  for  aggrandizement 
than  French  impotence,  were  certain  to  affect  her  pres- 
ent statesmanship. 

France  remembers  her  history.  She  remembers  those 
years  of  the  Napoleonic  tribulation  which  flanked  her  on 
all  sides  with  hostile  powers — the  Low  Countries,  the 
German    Confederation,    a   neutralized    Switzerland,    a 

402 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

legitimist  Spain.  She  remembers  how  the  Count  of 
Artois  was  forced  to  evacuate  fifty-three  -of  her  for- 
tresses, leaving  France  to  treat  with  her  enemies 
at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  wholly  disarmed ;  and 
after  Waterloo,  those  three  long  years  of  foreign 
occupation  in  which  the  Austrians,  the  Prus- 
sians, the  Spaniards,  came  i)()nring  into  her  depart- 
ments across  the  Alps,  the  Rhine  and  the  Pyrenees — a 
million  and  a  half  soldiers  swarming  over  an  already 
war-ridden  country.  Pillaged  villages,  prefects  replaced 
by  Allied  governors,  savings  banks  confiscated,  arbitrary 
requisitions  appropriating  not  only  communal  but  indi- 
vidual wealth — these  things,  generations  do  not  forget. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington,  writing  to  Lord  Castle- 
reagh,  expounded  these  principles  of  diplomacy  as  fol- 
lows: 

The  coalition  has  no  reason  to  favor  the  French  people;  its 
sensibility  is  only  a  wounded  vanity.  It  is  more  desirable, 
from  a  number  of  points  of  view,  that  the  people  of  France, 
if  they  do  not  yet  know  that  Europe  is  too  strong  for  them, 
may  be  warned  of  the  fact  and  that  the  dwj  of  retribution 
must  come.  Thus,  aeeordinf?  to  me,  it  would  not  only  be 
unjust  for  the  sovereigns  to  favor  the  people  of  France  on  this 
subject  at  the  expense  of  their  own  people,  but  the  sacrifice 
Avould  be  impolitic,  seeing  that  it  would  deprive  them  of  the 
occasion  of  giving  to  the  peoi)le  of  France  a  grand  lesson  in 
morality/ 

France  remembers  1870  even  more  vividly — not  only 
the  brutal  origin  of  the  war,  not  only  Alsace-Lorraine, 
but  the  four  months'  siege  of  Paris,  the  occupation,  and 
the  indemnity.  The  exactions  of  the  victor  first  exhib- 
ited themselves  in  the  feverish  haste  in  which  France 

*  Quoted  from  Debidour,  Histoire  DiplonKitique  de  I  'Europe, 
i,  79. 

403 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

was  compelled  to  sign  a  peace.  The  peace  preliminaries 
which  France  was  compelled  to  sign  upon  the  26th  of 
February  included  one  of  the  largest  indemnities  in 
history  (5,000,000,000  francs)  and  the  cession  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine — about  5,600  square  miles  of  territory  and  1,- 
600,000  inhabitants.  She  had  already  been  the  victim  of 
the  dispatch  at  Ems,  of  ravaged  departments,  and  of  a 
besieged  Paris.  The  people  of  her  countr^^  were  starving, 
and  among  nations  she  had  no  friends — Switzerland 
alone  brought  aid  to  her.^ 

Smarting  under  past  oppression,  especially  from  that 
heaped  on  her  by  German}^  it  was  but  natural  that  the 
people  of  France  should  now  demand  retaliation  in  the 
spirit  of  revenge.  To  their  credit,  it  must  be  said  that 
such  a  spirit  was  considerably  repressed,  and  that  their 
demands  were  limited  to  reparation  and  to  security. 
President  Poincare,  at  the  first  plenary  session  of  the 
Peace  Conference,  upon  January  18,  1919,  ably  ex- 
pressed the  nation 's  desires  in  these  words : 

You  search  only  justice  and  a  justice  which  has  no  favorites. 
Justice  in  territorial  problems,  justice  in  financial  problems, 
justice  in  economic  problems.  But  justice  is  not  inert,  it  does 
not  take  the  part  of  injustice.  It  demands  from  the  first, 
when   it   has   been   violated,   restitutions   and   reparations   for 

^  M.  Thiers  vividly  described  the  effects  of  the  War  of  1870 
on  France  in  a  speech  on  the  19th  of  February,  1871 : 

"France,  hurled  into  a  war  without  a  serious  motive,  without 
sufScient  preparation,  has  seen  lialf  her  territory  invaded,  her 
army  destroyed,  her  fine  organization  shattered,  her  ancient  and 
powerful  unity  compronused,  her  finances  shaken,  the  greater  part 
of  her  children  torn  from  their  labors  to  go  and  die  on  the 
battlefield ;  public  order  profoundly  disturbed  by  a  sudden  appari- 
tion of  anarchy,  and  after  the  forced  surrender  of  Paris,  the  war 
suspended  for  a  few  days  only,  ready  to  break  out  again,  if  a 
(Jovornment  enjoying  tlie  ostoeni  of  Europe,  courageously  accept- 
ing power,  assuming  responsibility  for  painful  negotiations,  does 
not  arise  to  put  an  end  to  terrible  calamities!"  llanotaux,  op. 
cit.,  i,   70,     . 

404 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

the  peoples  and  the  iii<livi(hials  who  have  hecn  despoiled  or 
maltreated,  lii  foriiiulaliiii;-  tliis  le.nitimate  claim,  it  is  obedient, 
neither  to  hatred  nor  to  an  instinctive  and  a  thou^'htless  desire 
for  reprisals;  it  pursues  a  double  object:  to  render  to  each 
his  due  and  to  discourage  the  recurrence  of  crime,  by  punish- 
ment. 

Justice  still  demands  under  the  influence  of  the  same  senti- 
ment, sanctions  ai^ainst  culprits  and  efficacious  jjuarantees 
against  an  offensive  return  of  the  spirit  which  perverted  them, 
and  it  is  logical  in  demanding  that  these  g^uarantees  be  given, 
first  of  all,  to  the  nation  which  has  been  and  who  still  may  be 
the  most  exposed  to  aggression  or  menace,  who  has  many 
times  risked  submersion  under  the  periodic  wave  of  the  same 
invasion.  Justice  excludes  dreams  of  conquest  and  of  im- 
perialism, the  disdain  of  national  desires,  the  arbitrary  ex- 
change of  provinces  between  States,  as  if  their  peoples  were 
only  property  or  pawns  in  the  game. 

Forty-eight  years  ago,  day  for  day,  the  18th  of  January, 
1871,  the  German  Emjiire  was  proclaimed  by  an  army  of  in- 
vasion in  the  chiiteau  of  Versailles.  It  demanded  the  rape  of 
two  French  provinces  as  its  first  consecration.  It  was  thus 
vitiated  in  its  very  origin  and  carried  in  itself  the  germ  of 
death ;  born  in  injustice,  it  has  ended  in  opprobrium.  You 
are  assembled  to  repair  the  wrong  w^hich  it  has  done  and  to 
prevent  its  return. 

It  was  also  to  be  expected  that  France  would  prevent, 
so  far  as  possible,  the  "return"  by  the  methods  which 
Germany  and  other  enemies  of  France  had  always  used 
to  render  her  powerless — by  the  measures  which  the 
"old  diplomacy"  invariably  took  to  insure  the  gains  of 
victory.  So  far  as  they  were  limited  to  guarantees  there 
was  nothing  directly  immoral  about  these  means  com- 
pared with  the  ends  they  attempted  to  serve ;  but  their 
defect  lay,  as  the  world  was  gradually  coming  to  see,  in 
their  impotency  to  bring  about  and  to  insure  their  orig- 
inal intention. 

Despite  the  burdensome  cost  of  the  "old  diplomacy," 
405 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

and  tlie  smoldering  flames  which  it  failed  eventually  to 
extinguish,  no  considerable  element  in  France,  at  least 
until  the  entrance  of  America  into  the  war,  thought  of 
any  other  means  of  inaugurating  a  peace,  provided,  of 
course,  that  the  w^ar  ended  in  an  Allied  victory.  Through- 
out the  peace  negotiations,  French  public  opinion,  in 
regarding  territorial  "guarantees"  as  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  national  existence,  looked  askance  upon  substitu- 
tions based  on  future  uncertainty  and  untried  by  ex- 
perience. Despite  the  defects  of  the  old  methods,  there 
was  some  assurance  at  least  of  their  temporary  success; 
realism  was  preferable  to  ideology. 


II 

The  guarantees  which  French  public  opinion  desired, 
as  reflected  by  several  war  ministries  and  by  the  press, 
were  of  a  strategic  and  territorial  character.  The  most 
advanced  of  these  demands  was  that  which  called  for 
the  total  dismemberment  of  the  German  Empire  and 
its  disintegration  into  the  States  from  which  it  was 
originally  constituted  in  1866.  The  most  insistent  sup- 
porters of  this  drastic  exaction,  mildly  corresponding  to 
the  Roman  treatment  of  Carthage,  were  the  royalist 
journal,  L' Action  Frangaise,  through  the  pen  of  Charles 
Maurras,  and  Le  Temps,  a  representative  of  the  grand 
bourgeoisie  of  France. 

L^ Action  Frangaise  proclaimed  this  doctrine  in  these 
words : 

We  have  often  declared  ourselves  as  moderate  annexation- 
ists. Above  all  we  are  hostile  to  the  unity  of  the  German 
Empire.  .  .  .  Our  g'uarantee  is  the  Rhine.  But  the  Rhine  in 
its  turn  must  be  j^uarantced  by  the  partition  of  Germany. 
We  have  never  concealed  the  apprehension  which  the  pure  and 

406 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

simple  annexation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  woukl  leave  in 
us,  if  upon  tlie  rif;ht  flank  of  our  conquests  the  great  Gennany 
of  Bismarck  and  of  William  is  allowed  to  exist.  It  is  too 
clear  that  the  immense  magnet  of  a  unified  Germany,  agitated 
by  a  spirit  of  revenge,  will  exercise  an  influence  and  an  attrac- 
tion upon  the  Rhenish  provinces  which  will  profoundly  impede 
the  action  of  the  French  spirit.^ 

There  is  no  equitable  basis  for  the  German  Empire, 
the  argument  proceeds;  it  was  founded  upon  force  and 
through  the  means  of  three  wars  of  aggression.  To  dis- 
solve it  now  would  not  institute  a  new  wrong  but  repair 
an  old  one.  As  a  practical  step  to  enforce  this  disso- 
lution, M.  Maurras  writes: 

The  Allies  must  in  every  ease  refuse  to  treat  with  the 
Empire, — with  a  unified  Germany,  They  must  only  invite  or 
admit  to  their  audiences  the  states  which  composed  the  former 
Empire  or  which  were  framed  from  its  debris.* 

And  this  idea  he  developed  to  the  extent  of  levying  the 
indemnity,  not  upon  the  Empire,  but  upon  its  several 
States — such  as  Saxony  and  Bavaria. 

The  attitude  of  Charles  Maurras  and  Le  Temps  to- 
ward the  destruction  of  the  German  Empire  finds  a 
curious  precedent  in  1815 — the  only  difference  being  that 
the  object  of  destruction  was  France  and  not  Germany. 
After  the  return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba,  the  governor- 
general  of  the  Prussian  provinces  of  the  Rhine  issued  a 
proclamation  on  the  15th  of  April,  1815,  part  of  which 
read  as  follows: 

A  country  (France)  so  delivered  up  to  anarchy  and  dis- 
order would  menace  Europe  with  complete  dissolution  if 
every  brave  Teuton  did  not  ami  himself  against  it.  .  .  .  We 
must  arm  ourselves  to-day  to  divide  this  unholy  ground  and 
indemnify  ourselves  by  a  fair  partition  of  its  provinces  for 

'Issue  of  April  3,  1919. 
*Ibid.,  April   5,   1919. 

407 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

all  of  the  sacrifices  which  we  have  made  for  twenty-five  years 
in  resisting  its  disorders. 

At  the  same  time  the  Rhenish  Mercury  wrote : 

"War  must  be  declared  on  the  whole  nation  and  this  depraved 
people  must  be  outlawed.  .  .  .  The  world  cannot  remain  in 
peace  so  long  as  a  French  people  exists ;  therefore  they  must 
be  changed  into  peoples  of  Burgundy,  Neustria,  Aquitania, 
etc.;  they  will  tear  each  other  up  among  themselves;  but  the 
world  will  remain  tranquil  for  centuries.^ 

Another  advocate  of  the  dismemberment  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  is  M.  Yves  Guyot.  In  his  book,  The 
Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  War,  M.  Guyot,  advo- 
cated the  total  dismemberment  of  Prussia,  the  German 
Empire,  and  Austria-Hungary.  He  insists  that  Prussia 
must  be  reduced  to  the  old  frontiers  which  she  had  before 
the  partitions  of  Poland  in  1772,  1793,  and  1795.  The 
Rhine  province  and  Westphalia  must  be  declared  auton- 
omous. Saxony  must  recover  the  two  fifths  of  her 
kingdom  lost  in  1815.  Frankfort  must  return  to  the 
status  of  a  free  city.  The  annexation  of  Hanover, 
Brunswick,  Hesse  and  Nassau  must  be  declared  null  and 
void,  since  from  the  point  of  view  of  law,  the  Prussian 
Diet  had  no  right  to  sanction  it.  With  the  kingdom  of 
Saxony  as  a  nucleus,  M.  Guyot  would  form  a  Central 
German  confederation.  He  would  form  a  second  union 
of  the  Southern  Stales,  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg,  Baden, 
and  Hesse,  with  the  severed  Prussian  provinces  of  the 
Rhineland  and  Westphalia.  i\I.  Guyot 's  suggestions  sur- 
pass for  severity  any  of  the  Prussian  proposals  in  regard 
to  the  dismemberment  of  France,  made  in  1814  and 
1815.  Other  writers  such  as  Maurice  Barres,  G.  Hano- 
taux,  and  M,   Etienne,  have  considerable  difficulty  in 

"(Quoted  from  Debidour,  llistoirc  Diplomatique  dc  I' Europe,  i, 
52,  footnote. 

408 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

disguising  the  sentiment  which  M.  Guyot  so  bohlly  ex- 
presses. 

The  reasons  for  tlie  demand  of  the  dismemberment  of 
the  German  Empire  are  not  altogether  political.  Per- 
haps the  greatest  one  of  them  is  found  in  the  increasing 
numerical  inferiority  of  France  compared  with  Germany 
• — or  in  other  words,  the  depopulation  question. 

The  followin  gtable  will  show  the  birth  rate,  death 
rate,  and  rate  of  natural  increase  of  France  and  Ger- 
many from  1901  to  1912: 


France 

Germany 

Year 

Birth 

Death 

Natural 

Birth 

Death 

Nat. 

^ 

llatc 

Rate 

Increase 

Rate 

Rate 

Increase 

1901 

22.0 

20.1 

1.9 

35.7 

20.6 

15.1 

1902 

21.6 

19.5 

2.1 

35.1 

19.5 

15.6 

1903 

21.1 

19.3 

1.8 

33.9 

19.9 

14.0 

1904 

20.9 

19.4 

1.5 

34.1 

19.5 

14.6 

1905 

20.6 

19.6 

1.0 

33.0 

19.8 

13.2 

1906 

20.5 

19.9 

0,6 

33.1 

IS.  2 

14.8 

1907 

19.7 

20.2 

-0.5 

33.2 

18.0 

15.2 

1908 

20.1 

18.9 

1.2 

32.0 

18,0 

14.0 

1909 

19.5 

19.1 

0.4 

31.0 

17.1 

13.9 

1910 

19.6 

17.8 

1.8 

29.8 

16.2 

13.6 

1911 

18.7 

19.6 

-0.9 

28.6 

17.3 

11.3 

1912 

19.0 

17.5 

1.5 

28.3 

15.6 

12.7 

Mean  rates 

20.3 

19.3 

1.0 

32.3 

18.3 

14.0 

The  marriage  rate  between  the  two  nations  was  almost 
identical — 8  per  cent.  Just  before  the  war  with  Prussia 
in  1870  the  French  birth  rate  was  26  per  cent;  in  the 
five  years  between  1911  and  1915  it  averaged  only  18.2 
per  cent.    After  the  war  it  dropped  still  further.® 


See  p.  150. 


409 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

If  French  population  remains  stationary  or  even  de- 
creases annually,  and  if  German  population  increases 
11  per  cent  or  12  per  cent  a  year,  France  soon  will  be 
hopelessly  outdistanced.  Just  before  the  war  Germany 
had  nearly  70,000,000  inhabitants  to  about  40,000,000  of 
Frenchmen.  Hence  the  fear  of  a  still  greater  increase 
on  the  part  of  Germany  has  led  to  the  demand  for  the 
break-up  of  the  Empire. 

A  second  demand  of  the  old  diplomacy  was  for  the 
annexation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  To  a  nation 
whose  safety  reposes  solely  upon  military  prowess,  un- 
assisted by  the  procedure  and  the  sanction  which  a 
League  of  Nations  would  supposedly  provide,  the  ques- 
tion of  strategic  security,  of  frontiers  guarding  certain 
gateways  of  invasion,  assumes  a  preeminent  position. 
Such  a  consideration  was  one  of  the  German  excuses, 
indeed  a  veiled  one,  for  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  in  1871.  It  has  been  urged  with  more  justice 
lately  by  Belgium  in  Limburg,  by  Poland  in  Danzig, 
and  by  Italy  in  the  German  Tyrol.  To  France  the  Rhine 
is  a  natural  frontier  the  possession  of  which  is  the  only 
certain  guarantee  against  a  German  attack  which  she 
believes  will  come  again  if  effective  measures  are  not 
taken  to  prevent  it.  For  this  reason  the  annexation  of 
the  Rhenish  provinces  was  urged  by  Generals  Foch  and 
Gouraud,  the  Royalists,  such  Conservatives  as  Charles 
Benoist,  and  perhaps  the  majority  of  the  so-called  Radi- 
cal elements.  Maurice  Barres,  writing  in  L'Echo  de 
Paris,  attempted  to  soften  the  annexationist  feature  by 
arguing  that  the  Germans  inhabiting  the  left  bank  were 
not  of  German  ilk,  that  originally  they  were  nurtured  by 
French  culture,  and  that  now  they  were  eager  to  return 
under  its  intluence.  In  his  literary  style  of  argument, 
M.  Barres  quoted  Victor  Hugo  as  the  original  advocate 

410 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

of  the  "return"  of  these  provinces  to  France.  At  the 
end  of  the  War  of  1870  Hugo  announced  that  France 
would  achieve  la  revanche  only  when  she  had  re- 
taken, not  only  Lorraine  and  Alsace,  but  Treves,  IMainz, 
Coblenz,  and  "all  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  which  the 
German  States  took  from  France  in  1815."  As  far  back 
as  1838  Hugo  wrote  in  the  "Rhine":  "France  will  only 
return  to  its  normal  form  and  to  its  necessary  propor- 
tions .  .  .  [when]  it  will  have  its  portion  of  the  Rhine 
and  its  natural  frontiers."  ^ 

In  a  brochure  distributed  by  the  Nantes  Committee 
for  the  Left  Bank  of  the  Rhine,  some  interesting  de- 
mands are  found.  This  pamphlet,  scarcely  daring  to 
ask  for  complete  annexation,  which  it  admits  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  ideals  for  which  the  war  was  pre- 
sumably  fought,   asks: 

1.  That  all  the  cis-Rhenish  country,  as  far  as  the  Hol- 
land frontier  be  taken  from  Germany  for  political,  mili- 
tary and  economic  reasons ; 

2.  That  the  military  hegemony  of  France  be  exercised, 
either  by  its  or  Belgian  garrisons,  upon  the  principal 
fortresses  on  the  Rhine,  extending  as  far  as  its  entry 
into  Holland; 

3.  That  the  economic  zone  of  France  and  of  Belgium 
be  extended  to  all  of  the  cis-Rhenish  country  where  it 
will  be  substituted  for  the  German  Zollverein. 

How  such  a  system,  involving  the  alienation  of  the 
territory  fron-j^ermany  and  the  surrender  of  its  mili- 
tary and  economic  control  to  France,  differs  from  out- 
right annexation,  it  is  difficult  to  see. 

Other  Frenchmen  who  realized  the  boldness  of  such 
projects  and  the  difficulty  in  carrjnng  them  out,  advo- 

^Echo  dc  Paris,  March  5,  1919. 

411 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

cated  the  formation  of  a  Rhenish  republic,  under 
French  hegemony,  to  serve  as  a  buffer  state  on  which 
a  German  attack  would  first  have  to  spend  itself.  The 
French  Catholics  were  supposed  to  be  advocates  of  such 
a  republic  which  was  to  include  the  German  territory 
occupied  by  the  Allied  troops,  extending  from  Cleves 
on  the  north  to  Saarbriick  and  Landau  on  the  south. 
This  territory,  including  Westphalia,  has  a  population 
of  about  15,000,000  people,  of  whom  about  8,000,000 
are  Catholics.  The  ecclesiastical  element  in  these  prov- 
inces supported  by  Catholic  opinion  in  France,  believed 
that  its  influence  would  be  more  effectively  exercised 
in  an  independent  republic  where  it.  would  be  nu- 
merically strongest,  than  under  the  German  Govern- 
ment, where  its  influence  was  now  neutralized.  This- 
combination  of  the  religious  and  the  military  motives 
brought  the  demand  for  a  Rhenish  republic  into  con- 
siderable prominence  in  France.  The  separatist  move- 
ments throughout  Germany  were  given  an  exaggerated 
publicit}^  bj^  the  French  press;  attempts  to  form  repub- 
lics in  Bavaria  and  in  the  Palatinate  were  portrayed  as 
completely  successful  when  in  reality  they  were  purely 
local  manifestations.  In  fact,  there  seemed  to  be  cause 
for  suspicion  that  many  of  these  attempts  were  insti- 
gated by  the  French  military  authorities  themselves. 

History,  however,  lent  some  support  to  the  French 
suggestion  of  a  Rhenish  Republic.  Although  these  dis- 
puted provinces  are  now  German  in  rac  And  in  culture, 
in  times  past  they  have  been  French  i^  feeling.  The 
Armies  of  the  Revolution  in  September,  1792,  pene- 
trated these  provinces  under  the  leadership  of  Custine, 
who  inspired  them  with  the  followii^g  principles: 

The  weight  of  our  arms  in  the  future  must  only  strike 
those  who   abuse   a  confided   power — desitots  and  their  satel- 

412 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

lites.  When  we  will  carry  the  firebrands  of  war  into  a  coun- 
try, we  will  respect  the  liberty  of  the  peaceful  inhabitant: 
let  none  of  our  arms  be  dishonored  in  shedding  the  blood  of  an 
innocent  citizen.^ 

Under  the  infection  of  the  principles  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, the  armies  of  Ciistine  rapidly  conquered  the  coun- 
try, winning  over  Speyer,  llainz  and  Strassburg  by  the 
last  of  October.  At  Mairiz,  Custine  again  announced 
with  fervent  sincerity,  the  principles  which  led  to  the 
conquest : 

The  war  which  we  wage  to-day,  so  different  from  those  which 
have  preceded  it,  is  directed  against  all  those  who  have  be- 
trayed the  usage  of  conferred  powers,  and  not  against  peoples. 
Your  magistrates  alone  must  support  the  ransom  which  is 
imposed  •upon  your  city;  such  is  the  will  of  the  French  na- 
tion.3 

Shortly  after  the  French  occupation  of  IMainz  the 
liberal  element,  following  the  example  of  the  French 
clubs,  organized  a  "Society  of  German  Friends  of  Lib- 
erty and  Equality."  With  the  impetus  which  such  an 
organization  gave  to  the  insurgent  peoples  of  the  Rhen- 
ish territory,  and  with  the  stimulus  of  the  French  revolu- 
tionaries in  their  midst,  a  wave  of  liberalism  swept  over 
the  country,  carrying  with  it  not  only  the  demand  for 
separation  from  German  suzerainty,  but,  as  in  the  case 
of  Mainz,  for  incorporation  with  the  French  Republic. 
Custine,  accepting  this  invitation,  established  a  pro- 
visional government  upon  the  19th  of  November,  which 
consisted  of  ten  members  and  which  sat  at  Mainz.^"    In 

"Quoted  in  L'Europe  Nauvelle,  February  8,  1919. 

Ubid. 

"See  Albert  Sorel,  L'Europe  et  la  SevoJution  Franqaise,  Part 
III.,  "La  Guerre  avx  Fois,"  97-114;  also  Part  IV.,  " Lcs  Limites 
NaturcUcs,"  159,  270,  301. 

413 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  winter  of  1793  a  Rhenish  convention  was  held  which, 
on  the  18th  of  March,  declared  the  forfeiture  of  its 
former  sovereigns  and  the  erection  of  all  the  territory 
between  Landau  and  Bingen  into  a  free  and  indepen- 
dent state,  "which  will  obey  common  laws  and  which 
is  founded  upon  liberty  and  equality."  Three  days 
later,  however,  because  of  the  fear  that  Prussia  and 
Austria  were  determined  to  prevent  their  withdrawal 
from  the  German  Federation,  the  Assembly  decreed  the 
incorporation  of  the  Rhenish-Germanic  peoples  in  the 
French  Republic.  In  the  summer  of  1793  Germany  re- 
took Mainz  and  the  outlying  provinces,  insufficiently 
protected  by  the  Republic,  and  (although  the  French  do 
not  urge  the  point)  inadequately  convinced  of  French 
superiority.  A  year  later,  however,  the  armies  of  Hoche 
and  Championnet  retook  the  territory  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Mainz.  Thenceforth  the  Republic  worked  to  es- 
tablish order,  commerce,  and  industry  in  the  provinces. 
The  peace  signed  at  Basel,  April  5,  1795,  with  Prussia, 
virtually  recognized  the  conquests  of  the  Revolution  by 
stating  that  the  troops  of  the  French  Republic  would 
continue  to  occupy  the  part  of  the  states  of  the  King 
of  Prussia  situated  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 
The  task  before  the  Convention  was  the  disposition  of 
this  country,  either  by  the  erection  of  a  cis-Rhenish  re- 
public or  by  its  incorporation  with  France.  The  latter 
seemed  to  have  prevailed,  except  for  the  intrigues  of  the 
King  of  Prussia  who  forestalled  actual  annexation. 
However,  in  August,  1796,  he  signed  a  secret  convention 
by  which  he  consented  to  the  cession  of  these  provinces 
in  compensation  for  the  incorporation  of  certain  eccle- 
siastical principalities  in  his  kingdom.  The  Directory, 
now  at  the  head  of  the  French  Republic,  inaugurated  an 
autonomous  government  and  divided  the  provinces  into 

414 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

six  districts,  each  locally  administered.  Liberty  of  the 
press  was  reestablished  and  the  University  of  Bonn  was 
reopened.  Fear  of  losing  the  provinces  altogether  be- 
cause of  the  increasing  strength  of  Prussia  caused  Gen- 
eral Iloche  to  create  a  cis-Rlienish  republic,  a  move 
which  aroused  considerable  opposition.  After  the  coup 
d'etat  of  the  4th  of  September,  1797,  the  Directory  in- 
structed the  General  not  to  form  a  Rhenish  republic 
unable  to  sustain  itself,  but  rather  to  secure  its  prompt 
reunion  with  the  Republic.  This  task  was  accomplished 
by  General  Augereau,  General  Iloche 's  successor;  and 
in  the  last  of  December,  IMainz  was  taken  from  the  Ger- 
mans, their  last  hold  across  the  Rhine.  The  entire 
Rhenish  country  was  again  in  the  bosom  of  France. 
From  1802  to  1814  France  slowly  overcame  whatever  op- 
position its  inhabitants  had  to  its  new  guardian;  and 
thus  for  a  period  of  eighteen  years  (1796-1814)  the 
Rhenish  provinces  were  virtually  under  French  tutelage, 
either  as  a  Republic  or  as  a  part  of  the  Revolutionary 
conquests  of  France.  When  Napoleon  was  finally  de- 
feated and  peace  made,  the  Rhinelands  were  divided 
among  Prussia,  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  Bavaria,  Despite 
the  burdens  which  the  Empire  had  imposed  upon  them, 
their  separation  from  France,  according  to  such  men 
as  Maurice  Barres,  was  accompanied  with  a  lasting  at- 
tachment to  French  institutions  and  culture  which  they 
still  secretly  cherish. 

Whether  or  not  this  Gallophile  sentiment  in  the  Rhen- 
ish provinces  can  be  revived  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
lead  to  the  erection  of  a  Rhenish  republic  or  to  the  union 
of  the  provinces  with  France  is  a  question.  Its  de- 
cision, however,  involves  a  great  deal  more  than  the 
mere  redrawing  of  maps  by  the  Peace  Conference.  The 
people  of  the  provinces  themselves  should  be  the  judge 

415 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

of  their  destinies,  unaffected  by  Freneli  armies  or  propo- 
ganda. 

The  fourth  strategic  guarantee  which  the  old  diplo- 
macy desired  Avas  the  annexation  of  the  valley  of  the 
Saar.  This  valley,  lying  north  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
contains  about  seven  hundred  square  miles  of  territory; 
two  thirds  of  it  lies  in  Rhenish  Prussia,  one  third  in 
German  Lorraine,  and  a  very  small  portion  in  the 
Palatinate.  Saarlouis,  on  its  eastern  edge,  and  Saar- 
briick,  on  its  western  edge,  delimit  its  extension  along  the 
Lorraine  frontier. 

The  historical  claim  to  this  territory  on  the  part  of 
France  goes  back  to  1552  when  Henry  II  united  the 
three  bishoprics  of  the  region  to  his  crown,  the  posses- 
sion of  which  was  confirmed  in  the  treaty  of  Miinster. 
In  the  treaty  of  Ryswick,  Louis  XIV  surrendered  a 
good  portion  of  this  territory  to  the  German  count  of 
Nassau-Saarbriiek ;  but  in  reality,  the  French  assert, 
the  entire  territory  was  under  French  culture  and  was 
virtually  a  French  fief  until  the  Congress  of  Vienna. 
After  1789,  the  feudal  attachments  of  the  Saar  district 
to  Germany  were  broken,  and  it  became  a  part  of  the  Re- 
public. Although  agriculture  was  the  chief  occupa- 
tion of  the  Saariens,  the  exploitation  of  its  coal  fields 
rapidly  developed  under  the  Republic.  In  1796,  456 
quintaux  "  were  extracted ;  twelve  years  later,  this  pro- 
duction had  tripled.  Napoleon,  realizing  the  vital  im- 
portance of  such  an  industry,  distributed  coal  conces- 
sions in  1808  to  sixty  arrondissemcnts,  created  a  school 
of  mines  at  GeislautA-n,  and  caused  the  compilation  of 
a  magnificent  atlas  o^  sixty-six  maps,  containing  well- 
ordered  plans  of  exploitation.    The  first  treaty  of  Paris 

"  Quintal,   a  hundredweight. 

416 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

of  May  31,  1814,  still  included  the  cantons  of  Saarlouis 
and  Saarbriick,  until  the  Nied,  within  the  frontiers  of 
France.  But  after  the  Hundred  Days  and  Napoleon's 
defeat  at  Waterloo,  Prussia,  with  the  determination  to 
ruin  France,  demanded  that  it  be  deprived  of  one  sixth 
of  its  territory  and  be  forced  to  pay  an  indemnity  of 
600,000,000.  Only  a  portion  of  its  desires  were  carried 
out,  and  in  the  treaties  of  November  20,  1815,  Saarlouis 
was  given  to  Prussia  while  Landau  and  the  former  de- 
partment of  the  Saar  fell  to  the  lot  of  Austria.  The 
historic  claim  to  this  area,  therefore,  is  largely  based  on 
a  Revolutionary  conquest,  a  claim  which,  if  pressed, 
would  extend  to  the  Netherlands,  Spain  and  Italy. 

The  economic  arguments  in  favor  of  the  annexation 
of  the  Saar  were  the  most  tenable  of  those  advanced. 
The  first  of  these  arguments  was  the  increased  military 
and  industrial  strength  the  coal  fields  of  the  Saar  would 
give  to  France.  The  second  was  that  the  Saar  coal  was 
necessary  for  the  profitable  exploitation  of  Alsatian  in- 
dustry and  its  iron  mines.  The  third  "v^as  that  the  in- 
demnity could  partly  be  paid  by  the  cession  of  the  dis- 
trict to  France  at  its  capitalized  value. 

One  of  the  strongest  elements  in  German  military 
strength  was  its  self-sufficiency  in  raw  materials,  es- 
pecially in  coal.  Comparatively,  its  strength  in  terms 
of  resources,  was  as  follows: 

Tons 

Germanv    433,000,000,000 

Great  Britain 189,000,000,000 

Russia    60,000,000,000 

Austria-Huii^arv     59,000,000.000 

France    ' 18,000,000,000 

Belgium    11,000,000,000 

From  the  military  standpoint,  then,  any  measure  de- 
priving Germany  of  a  portion  of  this  immense  supply  of 

417 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

coal,  over  twice  that  of  Great  Britain,  was  looked  ■apon 
as  legitimate  by  the  old  diplomacy.  The  weakening  of 
German  resources  meant  the  weakening  of  her  power 
to  carry  on  a  prolonged  conflict. 

Before  the  war  France  produced  40,800,000  tons  and 
consumed  64,800,000  tons  of  coal,  necessitating  the  an- 
nual importation  of  24,000,000  tons.  In  1915  this  latter 
figure  increased  to  40,000,000;  in  191G,  to  42,000,000; 
and  in  1917  to  47,000,000.  On  account  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  mines  in  the  North  of  France  and  because  of 
the  demands  of  the  industry  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  it 
is  estimated  that  the  annual  coal  deficit  in  the  future 
will  be  about  40,000,000  tons.  At  a  price  of  ten  dollars 
a  ton  this  will  burden  the  French  balance  of  trade,  to  the 
extent  of  $400,000,000  a  year.  Soaked  as  it  is  with  the 
protectionist  idea,  the  French  bureaucracy  is  alarmed 
at  such  a  prospect. 

As  to  the  second  point,  Alsace  and  Lorraine  had 
again  become  French  provinces,  dependent  industrially 
and  politically  upon  France.  Their  steel  manufactures 
and  their  industries  generally,  which  were  of  the  great- 
est strength,  had  formerly  been  supplied  with  German 
coal,^^  coming  largely  from  the  basin  of  the  Saar.  Coal 
was  necessary  to  the  industrial  life  of  these  provinces; 
but  if  it  now  had  to  come  from  French  mines,  the  in- 
dustries of  these  provinces  would  become  a  drain  upon 
the  French  coal  supply  and  industry  generally.  If 
France  did  not  get  the  source  of  the  former  Alsatian 
coal  supply  along  with  the  provinces,  the  value  of  their 
return  to  the  mother  country  would  be  frittered  away. 
The  sentimental  feature  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  ques- 

"Sce  articles  by  Louis  do  Launay  in  La  Sevue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
July  15,  1919,  and  Nov.  1,  1919,  on  "La  valcur  viinicre  ct  indiis- 
triclle  de  V Alsace-Lorraine." 

418 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

tion  was  of  course  predominant ;  but  perhaps  the  eco- 
nomic factor  was  of  as  much  elementary  importance. 
To  tlie  Frencli  business  man,  Alsace-Lorraine  was  a 
poor  investment  without  the  Saar  to  make  it  profitable. 

Finally,  the  annexation  of  this  basin  was  urged  as  a 
restitution  in  kind,  of  material  which  Germany  had  des- 
troyed. Annex  the  territory,  capitalize  its  value,  and 
deduct  it  from  the  sum  total  of  the  indemnity  charge — 
such  was  the  most  reasonable  argument  urged  for  the 
annexation.  Germany  was  a  debtor,  unable  to  meet 
her  obligations.  Like  an  individual  in  similar  circum- 
stances, why  could  not  her  property  be  attached  to 
meet  these  obligations?  National  bankruptcy  followed 
by  national  liquidation  was  the  remedy  proposed.  The 
fact  that  the  Prussian  Government  itself  was  the  owner 
of  most  of  the  mines  of  the  Saar  lent  color  to  the  ar- 
gument. 

As  to  the  resources  of  the  Saar  basin,  estimates  vary 
from  45,500,000,000  to  53,515,000,000  tons.^^ 

In  1913  there  were  80  shafts  in  operation  in  the  basin 
from  which  the  following  amounts  were  produced: 

Tons. 

In  the  Prussian  part  of  the  tlistriet 12,406,523 

In  the  Lorraine  part  of  the  district 3,795,9.*}2 

Bavarian    (Palatinate)    810,546 

Total  production  of  district  in  1913 17,013,001 

Of  the  17,000,000  tons  of  coal  which  the  Saar  valley 
annually   i)r()du('es,   it  itself   consumes  7,850,000   tons 
leaving    about    9,000,000    tons    for    disposal    elsewhere 


"  Authorities   differ  on   the  amount  of   coal   in   the  Saar.     Al 
thoufjh   Deschcn  estimates  the   reserves  as   amounting   to   45,500, 
000,000  tons   (see  the  Am-crican  Heview  of  L'eviews,  March,  1919, 
313),   tlie    German    Peace   Delegation    in    their   comments   on    the 
Peace   Treaty   placed   the   amount  at   only   11,000,000,000   tons. 

419 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Considering  solely  these  tonnage  figures,  this  snrplns 
would  supply  the  7,200,000  tons  of  coal  which  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  need  in  addition  to  what  they  themselves 
produce.  It  would  constitute  about  a  fifth  of  the 
amount  which  France  would  otherwise  have  to  import. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  quality  of  the  Saar  coal  is 
mediocre.  It  contains  a  great  deal  of  volatile  matter, 
it  is  lower  in  heating  value  than  the  coal  in  northern 
France,  and  it  is  not  particularly  adapted  for  use  in 
the  iron  industry  where  its  employment  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine is  especially  needed.^*  The  Prussian  Government 
operates  twenty-seven  mines  in  this  district  and  it  is 
barely  able  to  make  operating  expenses.  In  the  fiscal 
year  of  1913-1914  its  expenditures  upon  the  mines 
amounted  to  93,899,200  marks  and  its  receipts  104,110,- 
438.  Under  these  conditions,  whether  or  not  these  mines 
would  be  of  distinct  profit  to  French  industry,  is  ques- 
tionable ;  while  the  disjuncture  of  50,000,000,000  tons  of 
coal  resources  from  the  military  standpoint  would  not 
affect  materially  the  433,000,000,000  tons  which  Germany 
possesses.  However,  the  addition  of  such  a  resource  to 
the  18,000,000,000  which  France  now  has  would  bring 
its  coal  supply  up  to  that  of  Russia  and  what  was 
formerly  Austria-Hungary.  In  other  words,  the  coal 
basin  of  the  Saar  would  increase  by  three  times  the 
present  coal  resources  of  France,  The  possibility  of 
such  an  increase  was  naturally  looked  upon  with  cove- 
tous eyes,  although  the  quality  of  the  coal  itself  was  of 
an  inferior  character,  the  mining  of  which,  under  the 

"  It  is  very  significant  that  the  French  censor  refused  to  allow 
the  Frencli  editor  of  the  Now  York  Herald,  Pierre  Veber,  or 
L'Europe  Nouvclle,  to  itrint  these  facts  ahout  the  inferiority  of 
the  Saar  coal.  It  was  only  after  their  revelation  in  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  near  the  close  of  the  Peace  Conference,  that  they 
became  generally  known. 

420 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

French  bureaucracy,  would  undoubtedly  be  a  profitless 
enterprise. 

The  one  outstanding:  arp^ument  against  the  annexation 
of  the  Saar,  was  that  it  would  to  a  smaller  extent 
repeat  the  German  seizure  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The 
Saar  basin  is  an  integral  i)art  of  the  German  Eini)ire. 
The  elections  of  the  German  Republic  were  held  in  this 
region  in  January,  1919,  and  such  a  large  vote  was 
cast  for  the  Centrist,  the  Social  Democratic,  and  Demo- 
cratic parties,  that  there  is  no  reason  whatever  to  believe 
that  the  Saar  wishes  to  be  detached  from  Germany. 
Ordinarily,  the  old  diplomacy  would  not  attempt  to  pro- 
tect the  right  of  self-determination,  if  the  higher  prin- 
ciple of  strategic  or  economic  security  stood  in  the  way. 
But  because  of  the  nominal  acceptance  of  this  principle, 
French  opinion  tried  to  square  it  with  their  desires  by 
alleging  that  the  population,  of  the  Treves  region  at  least, 
which  contained  only  about  650,000  people  in  1913,  was 
too  small  to  make  the  principle  applicable.  Of  these, 
they  said,  only  about  200,000  or  300,000  were  German 
miners,  while  the  greater  part  of  the  population  was 
of  a  cosmopolitan  character — Poles,  Lorrainers  and 
colonials.  The  directors  and  the  engineers  of  the  mines, 
being  employed  by  the  Prussian  Government,  would 
naturally  withdraw  upon  French  occupation ;  and 
within  twenty  years,  so  the  argument  goes,  France 
would  have  the  valley  cleared  of  German  sympathizers, 
and  merged  morally  and  economically  into  French  Lor- 
raine.^^     Although  there  is  little  question  that  France, 

"The  German  answer  to  this  French  argument  is  given  in  the 
"Comments  by  the  German  Delegation  on  the  Conditions  of 
l^eace, "   under   "Territorial   Questions": 

There  is  no  industrial  district  in  Germany  whose  population 
is  as  homogeneous,  as  i)urely  German,  and  as  little  "complex"  as 
that  of  the  Saar  district.     Among  the  050,000  inhabitants  there 

421 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

if  given  the  opportunity,  will  soon  rid  this  basin  of  its 
German  tinge,  the  argument  is  certainly  not  to  the  point, 
so  far  as  Germany's  desire  to  win  back  the  province  is 
concerned.^® 


Ill 


As  to  the  immediate  question  of  the  disarmament  of 
Germany,  the  old  did  not  differ  materially  from  the 

•were  in  1918  not  even  100  French.  For  more  than  1,000  years 
(since  the  treaty  of  Meersen,  in  the  year  870)  the  Saar  district 
has  been  German.  Temporary  occupations,  brought  about  by 
enterprises  of  v,rt  on  the  part  of  France,  always  terminated  at 
the  conclusion  of  peace,  after  a  short  lapse  of  time,  in  the 
restitution  of  the  country.  In  a  period  stretching  over  1,048  years 
France  has  possessed  the  country  no  longer  than  sixty-eight  years. 
When,  in  fixing  the  frontier  in  the  first  Peace  of  Paris,  1814,  a 
small  part  of  the  territory  now  claimed  was  retained  by  France, 
the  people  rose  in  protest  and  demanded  ' '  reunion  with  their 
German  Fatherland,"  with  which  they  were  "related"  by  bonds 
of  ' '  language,  customs  and  religion. ' '  After  an  occupation  of  one 
and  one-quarter  years'  duration,  this  demand  was  satisfied  in  the 
second  Peace  of  Paris,  1815.  Since  then  the  country  has  been 
attached  to  Germany  uninterruptedly  and  owes  to  this  connection 
its  economic  prosperity. 

'®  That  the  Allies  had  actually  agreed  upon  the  major  features 
of  the  demands  of  the  Old  Diplomacy,  above  outlined,  is  shown 
by  the  following  secret  telegram  from  tlie  Russian  Foreign  Min- 
ister to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  from  the  30th  of  Janu- 
ary to  the  12th  of  February,  1917: 

"At  an  Imperial  audience  M.  Doumergue  (French  Ambassador 
in  Petrograd)  informed  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  France's 
wish  to  assure  herself  of  the  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  war,  and  also  of  a  special  position  in  the 
Saar  valley,  and  to  bring  about  the  detachment  from  Germany  of 
the  territories  west  of  the  Rhine  and  their  reorganization  in  such 
a  way  that  in  future  the  Rhine  may  form  a  permanent  strategic 
obstacle  to  any  German  atlvance.  ..." 

In  a  secret  telegram  of  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  to  the 
Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  the  9th  of  March,  1916,  Russia 
"agreed  to  leave  to  France  and  Fnglaml  full  free<lom  to  fix  the 
western  frontiers  of  Germany.  ..." 

From  the  correspondence  published  by  the  Bolshevist  Govern- 
ment, in  November,  1917;  rejirinted  by  the  New  Europe,  Novem- 
ber 29,  1917,  supplement. 

422 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

new  diplomacy.  The  disarmament  of  nations  is  an  ideal 
to  be  striven  for  and  is  the  essential  element  of  peace. 
But  the  old  idea  was  not  universal  disarmament ;  it  was 
the  complete  reduction  of  German  armament  and  the 
maintenance,  if  not  the  increase,  of  Allied  armament; 
or,  in  other  words,  the  permanent  maintenance  of  Ger- 
man inferiority  by  Allied  superiority.  The  French 
feeling  upon  this  subject  expressed  itself  in  a  resolution 
which  was  signed  by  223  French  Deputies.  It  was 
unanimously  approved  by  the  Chamber  Committees  on 
the  Army  and  on  Foreign  Affairs,  and  presented  by  M. 
Raynaud  after  the  Conference  decision  as  to  German 
disarmament,  to  the  President  of  the  Chamber  upon 
the  4th  of  April.  The  resolution,  expressing  great  dis- 
content with  the  Conference  decision,  invited  the  Gov- 
ernment to  insist  at  the  Peace  Conference  "that  Ger- 
many must  conserve  neither  army  nor  military  organiza- 
tion, nor  armaments  of  any  sort,  and  that  there  ought 
only  to  be  maintained  in  each  of  the  German  states, 
foTces  of  police  necessary  to  maintain  internal  order." 
This  resolution  was  not  voted  upon,  because  M. 
Deschancl,  the  President  of  the  Chamber,  ruled  it  un- 
constitutional on  the  grounds  that  the  President  of  the 
Republic  alone  carried  on  treaty  negotiations.  But  it 
represented,  except  perhaps  for  the  Socialists,  the  unani- 
mous opinion  of  the  Chamber.^^ 

The  French  apprehension  as  to  the  spirit  and  intent 
of  the  new  German  Republic  was  aroused  by  the  voting,' 

"  During  the  ratification  debate  on  the  Treaty  in  the  French 
Chamber,  in  September,  1919,  An<lr6  Lefevre  introduced  a  motion, 
to  be  attached  as  a  rider  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  calling  for 
the  coniplete  disarmament  of  Germany,  in  view  of  its  present 
intentions  to  evade  Allied-  orders  and  to  rebuild  her  military  sys- 
tem. The  day  after  the  Treaty  was  ratified,  his  motion  was 
withdrawn    (October   3d)    for   one   "inviting   the   Government   to 

423 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

in  the  latter  part  of  April,  1919,  of  a  law  by  the  Weimar 
Assembly,  reorganizing  the  German  army.  The  pre- 
amble of  this  law  read  as  follows :  * '  The  organization  of 
the  future  army  in  time  of  peace  depends  upon  the  con- 
ditions of  peace  and  the  Constitution  of  the  German 
State.  Because  of  technical  difficulties,  the  incorpora- 
tion of  conscripts  cannot  be  constituted  with  certainty. 
This  is  why  it  is  necessary  to  recur  to  volunteers  in  a 
period  of  transition."  This  preamble  apparently  in- 
dicated the  German  desire  to  restore  its  army  eventu- 
ally, and  it  gave  French  opinion  greater  cause  than  ever 
to  demand  the  complete  destruction  of  the  German  mili- 
tary system. 

Finally,  the  Older  Diplomats  demanded  an  alliance 
between  the  present  Allies  to  enforce  these  and  other 
terms  imposed  upon  Germany  with  the  simple  intent  of 
keeping  it  in  a  state  of  subjection.  Through  this  alli- 
ance Germany  would  be  kept  perpetually  impotent,  for- 
ever unable  to  threaten  the  peace  and  liberties  of  the 
world.  If  it  should  be  bold  enough  to  cross  the  Rhine 
again,  even  to  win  back  the  cis-Rhenish  provinces,  this 
alliance  would  immediately,  through  armaments  in- 
creased by  the  past  war  and  maintained  since  it,  force  it 
back  to  the  confines  which  the  Peace  Treaty  had  de- 
limited. To  insure  the  economic,  subjection  of  Germany, 
this  alliance  would  do  everything  possible,  by  discrimin- 
ating tariffs  and  boycotts,  to  keep  it  out  of  the  markets  of 

reach  an  understanding  with  the  Allied  and  Associated  powers 
with  a  view  of  the  execution  of  the  measures  rendering  the  dis- 
armament of  Germany  and  her  Allies  effective  by  tlie  interdic- 
tion of  certain  manufactures  of  war  and  other  necessary  meas- 
ures." Nominal  reconciliation  of  this  motion  with  the  plan  for 
universal  disarmament  was  secured  by  the  adoption  of  an  amend- 
ment, inserted  after  the  word  "powers,"  "in  agreement  with 
I'rcsident  Wilson  who  should  convoke  a  conference  under  the 
provisions  of  the  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. ' ' 

424 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

the  world.  This  determination,  the  Inter-Allied  Eco- 
nomic Conference  in  Paris,  1916,  very  forcibly  exposed. 

These  conceptions  of  a  peace  M'ere  part  of  what  the 
French  called  the  Victoire  Intcgrale.  To  sum  them  up, 
they  included,  on  the  part  of  the  extremists,  the  disin- 
tegration of  the  German  Empire;  on  the  part  of  the 
more  moderate,  the  annexation  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  or  the  creation  of  a  cis-Rhenish  republic,  and  if 
both  of  these  did  not  materialize,  at  least,  the  annexation 
of  the  valley  of  the  Saar ;  the  total  reduction  of  German 
armament ;  and  finally,  the  erection  of  a  permanent  al- 
liance among  the  present  Allies. 

There  was  very  little  of  imperialism  or  aggression 
about  such  a  peace.  France  is  not  imperialistic;  she 
desires  no  conquests  for  the  sake  of  conquest.  But  the 
principle  of  reparation  and  of  security  is  superior,  in 
her  mind,  to  that  of  self-determination.  Even  the  mat- 
ter of  the  Saar  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  a  mere  desire 
to  increase  resources  at  the  ruthless  expense  of  the  de- 
feated. When  considered  in  the  light  of  the  terrible  suf- 
fering and  material  ruin  which  France  was  compelled 
by  Germany  to  undergo,  the  mines  of  this  basin,  from 
the  standpoint  of  reparation,  belong  to  France.  In  jus- 
tice to  her,  it  must  be  said  that  she  does  not  dream  of 
"Mitteleuropa." 

A  peace  of  the  Old  Diplomacy  might  not  have  been 
reprehensible.  In  fact,  its  purpose  was  commendable, 
the  difficulty  being  that  the  means  did  not  always  bring 
the  desired  result.  Such  a  peace,  embodying  strategic 
and  economic  superiority  of  the  Allies  over  Germany, 
was  the  only  one  to  expect  from  European  powers. 
Backed  by  generations  of  the  bitterest  rivalry  and 
schooled  in  realist  pliilosophies,  they  still  cherish  its 
thought   even   after    their   nominal   acceptance    of    the 

425 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

League  of  Nations  idea,  occasioned  by  America's  entry 
into  the  war.  The  European  code  was  of  distant  origin, 
and  tradition  was  with  it.  Europe  was  not  convinced, 
and  it  is  still  unconvinced  many  months  after  the  28th 
of  June,  1919,  that  an  American  settlement  is  superior. 
Time  may  prove  that  Europe  is  right.  But  at  any  rate 
the  Old  Diplomacy  had  centuries  of  failures  behind  it ; 
and  the  League  of  Nations  idea  remained  the  only  un- 
tried surcease  of  international   conflict. 

IV 

Generally  speaking,  the  Old  Diplomacy  is  based  on 
the  assumption  of  national  antagonism — the  antithesis 
of  national  interests.  To  guard  against  the  effects  of 
this  conflict  of  desires,  national  security  has  become  the 
principal  object  of  diplomacy.  To  insure  it,  the  prin- 
ciples of  protected  markets,  strategic  frontiers,  njilitary 
power  and  alliances — all  swallowed  up  in  that  obscu- 
rism  of  the  Balance  of  Power,  have  been  assiduously 
practiced. 

Unfortunately,  national  antagonisms  are  always 
bound  to  exist.  However,  to  irritate  them,  to  assume 
their  continual  predominance,  to  fan  them  into  war 
whenever  one  nation  feels  strong  enough  to  wage  it,  was 
the  result,  if  not  the  intent,  of  the  Old  Diplomacy. 

Furthermore,  the  means  whicli  it  employed  of  pro- 
tecting national  security  not  only  proved  ineffective  but 
violated  certain  definite  principles.  The  attempt  to  se- 
cure economic  superiority  through  protected  markets, 
when  carried  to  the  point  of  discriminating  against  one 
nation  in  favor  of  another,  led  to  the  worst  form  of 
economic  exploitation  of  subject  peoples  and  to  the  exag- 
geration of  national  rivalries.     Although  it  resulted  in 

426 


FRENCH  PEACE  TERMS 

quasi-complete  economic  independence,  so  dear  to  the 
Elder  Statesmen  in  time  of  war,  the  theory  was  false  so 
far  as  commercial  advantage  was  concerned  and  its  prac- 
tice led  to  the  grossest  form  of  economic  imperialism. 
Strategic  frontiers  justified  the  annexation  of  any  ter- 
ritory, especially  if  supported  by  historic  and  economic 
arguments.  Historic  arguments,  particularly  their  pres- 
ent abuses,  have  been  used  to  justify  the  worst  rob- 
beries. Most  of  them  have  their  source  in  epochs  where 
possession  was  to  the  strongest  and  people  were  pawns, 
moved  upon  a  board  of  forced  treaties  and  balanced 
armaments.  Economic  demands  were  absolutely  un- 
justifiable when  they  violated  the  will  of  peoples  and 
when  they  could  only  be  executed  by  forced  appropria- 
tion. Furthermore,  and  of  more  practical  importance, 
strategic  frontiers  were  ineffective  and  relative.  Their 
acquisition  by  the  nation  against  whom  they  were  di- 
rected was  a  natural  desire.  Their  maintenance,  as  well 
as  that  of  national  superiority,  involved  armaments,  con- 
scription and  fortifications,  the  weight  of  which  was 
overwhelming. 

Military  power  was  also  a  comparative  power,  subject 
to  international  competition,  and  thus  bound  to  become 
increasingly  burdensome.  Alliances  and  the  Balance  of 
Power  idea  arose  from  the  combined  advantages  which 
a  number  of  friendly  nations  gave  against  a  common 
enemy.  Alliances  arose  for  a  definite  protection  or  a 
definite  aggression.  But  when  one  alliance  became  strong 
enough  to  subjugate  another,  the  misuse  or  the  fear  of 
the  misuse  of  its  power,  subsequent  to  disagreement 
among  its  members,  led  to  its  regrouping,  and  the  com- 
position of  an  opposing  alliance  able,  either  potentially 
or  directly,  to  control  the  first.     Every  alliance  in  the 

427 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

world's  history  lias  been  marked  by  this  changing,  shift- 
ing process.  Its  formation  was  to  guarantee  static 
things ;  but  the  forces  of  the  world  and  the  interests  of 
nations  were,  and  are,  dynamic.  They  changed ;  interests 
which  were  mutual  became  conflicting ;  and  an  alliance 
offered  no  means  of  adjusting  the  evolution.  When  this 
disintegration,  these  "diplomatic  revolutions,"  occurred, 
they  were  usually  followed,  sometimes  very  distantly, 
by  war.  If  the  change  itself  did  not  thus  result,  the 
new  organisms — two  sets  of  comparative  strengths — 
inevitably  clashed.  Their  reason  for  existence  was  not 
only  the  opposition  but  the  superiority  of  the  one  over 
the  other.  In  the  feverish  race  for  supremacy  all  of 
their  members  were  engulfed  in  this  hopeless  circle. 
The  security  resulting  from  it  was  at  the  most  relative ; 
its  uncertainty  and  its  temporariness  made  it  no  secur- 
ity at  all.  And  despite  this  offsetting  of  national 
strengths  in  which  the  Balance  of  Power  resulted,  some- 
body was  sure  sooner  or  later  to  tip  the  scales  and  to 
throw  the  world  into  another  melee  of  disaster. 

The  German  Empire  was  the  supreme  embodiment  of 
these  principles.  But  in  addition  to  the  mere  desire  for 
security,  it  had  designs  of  aggression  for  its  own  sake. 
The  Old  Diplomacy  could  be  exercised  for  the  one  pur- 
pose as  well  as  for  the  other.  But  at  the  same  time,  it 
so  hopelessly  interwove  the  maintenance  of  security  with 
measures  of  aggression  that  the  two  motives  were 
scarcely  distinguishable.  In  the  great  number  of  cases, 
under  the  Balance  of  Power  regime,  security  meant  ag- 
gression. As  such  it  not  only  was  morally  objectionable 
but  physically  unable  to  endure. 

In  the  particular  case  of  the  French  demands  for  the 
disintegration  of  the  German  Empire,  and  the  annexa- 

428 


FRENCH  PEACP]  TERMS 

tion  of  the  loft  bank  of  the  Rhine,  including  the  Saar, 
morally  they  would  have  violated  the  clearly  recognized 
right  of  peoples  to  govern  themselves.  With  the  French 
installed  on  the  Rhine,  Germany  would  have  exactly  the 
same  motive  of  antagonism  against  France  as  France 
has  had  against  Germany  since  1870.  To  overcome  the 
fear  of  a  German  attack,  would  have  involved  the  main- 
tenance of  armies  which  no  people  was  in  the  mood  of 
sustaining  and  which  France,  unsupported,  was  in- 
capable of  sustaining.  The  same  competitive  basis — that 
of  keeping  Germany  in  a  state  of  inferiority  and  France 
in  a  state  of  superiority — would  have  been  reverted  to. 
Perhaps  it  could  be  done ;  but  without  the  help  of  the 
Allies,  it  was  impossible.  This  made  'an  alliance  a  neces- 
sity. But  to  an  alliance  framed  especially  in  the  face 
of  the  legitimate  desire  of  Germany  to  unite  to  herself 
purely  Germanic  peoples,  the  United  States  certainly 
would  not  have  been  a  party.  Such  an  alliance  would 
have  been  a  Holy  Alliance  to  maintain  an  unholy  status 
quo.  Although  the  French  Peace  Delegation  came  to 
see  that  the  help  of  England  and  the  United  States  was 
more  to  be  desired  than  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  it  is 
very  strange  that  French  opinion  should  still  prefer 
the  latter  to  the  former. 

In  regard  to  German  disarmament,  it  may  be  said 
that  history  teaches  a  sad  lesson  as  to  the  attempts  of 
one  nation  to  enforce  disarmament  upon  another.  On 
the  8th  of  September,  1808,  Prince  William  of  Prussia 
signed  at  Paris  the  famous  "Articles  Separes,"  the  first 
of  which  read  as  follows:  "His  Majesty  the  King  of 
Prussia,  wishing  to  avoid  everything  that  may  give 
umbrage  to  France,  undertakes  the  engagement  of  main- 
taining for  ten  years,  beginning  January  1,  1809,  only 

429 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  number  of  troops  specified  below.  "^^  This  specifi- 
cation comprised  22,000  infantrymen,  8,000  cavalry, 
6,000  artillerymen,  sappers,  etc.,  6,000  of  the  King's 
guardsmen — a  total  of  42,000  men.  This  provision  was 
overcome  by  Prussia  through  the  creation,  under  the 
clever  supervision  of  Scharnhorst,  of  a  militia  deprived 
of  all  visible  connection  with  the  permanent  army,  and 
maintained  supposedly  for  interior  order,  but  which,  by 
repeated  military  exercise,  was  capable  of  serving  as  a 
reserve  army  in  case  of  the  outbreak  of  war.^^  Although 
Napoleon  interfered  with  the  training  of  such  a  militia, 
Prussia  again  evaded  the  law  by  instructing  soldiers 
for  a  few  months,  then  returning  them  to  their  homes, 
after  which  others 'came  to  take  their  places  in  the  ranks 
of  the  permanent  army.  Thus  a  large  body  of  reserves 
was  built  up.  To  deceive  French  inspectors,  regiments 
would  leave  part  of  their  men  in  the  barracks  when  the 
inspectors  went  on  the  drill  field.  As  a  result  of  this 
deception,  instead  of  the  42,000  men  Prussia  was  sup- 
posed to  have,  she  had  a  trained  body  of  150,000,  the 
worth  of  which  the  armies  of  Bliicher  upon  the  fields 
of  Waterloo  ably  demonstrated. 

Although  armaments  in  modern  warfare  are  singu- 
larly more  difficult  to  conceal  than  those  of  the  Napo-' 
leonic  epoch,  what  is  gained  in  national  superiority 
from  this  fact  is  more  than  overcome  by  the  rapidity 
with  which  armies  at  present  act,  and  with  which  muni- 
tions can  be  produced.  The  disarmament  of  Germany 
presents  the  same  problem  to-day  as  it  did  in  the  Napo- 

"  Quoted  in  Le  Temps,  March  2,  1919. 

"  For  tlie  evasions  of  this  agrcfmont  by  Scharnhorst  and 
Gneisenau,  see  Treitschke  's  History  of  Germany  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century    ( Knglish  translation),  i,  336-347. 

430 


FKENCII  PEACE  TERMS 

Iconic  era.  It  means  the  establishment  of  an  Allied  es- 
pionage in  Germany  which  she  Avill  bitterly  resent  and 
assiduously  deceive,  especially  when  she  knows  that  the 
Allies  are  increasing  their  own  armaments. 

The  difficulty  of  enforcement  of  disarmament  was  ap- 
pari'nt  within  six  months  after  the  signature  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles,-''  and  it  constituted  the  fir.st,  i)rac- 
tical  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  Old  Diplomacy's  solu- 
tion. A  second  objection  against  the  continued  main- 
tenance of  French  and-  Allied  armaments  in  the  face  of 
a  supposedly  prostrate  Germany,  was  a  moral  one.  For 
the  maintenance  of  such  a  force  is  quite  likely  to  arouse 
a  desire  of  conquest  on  the  part  of  the  occupying  troops, 
even  though  masked  under  another  name.  As  a  prac- 
tical example,  French  opinion  ardently  desires  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine.  If  the  Old  Diplomacy  has  its  Avay, 
inspired  as  it  is  by  the  example  of  the  Roumanians  in 
Budapest  and  the  Italians  in  Fiume,  it  is  very  probable 
that  France  will  annex  the  Rhenish  provinces  which  her 
troops  already  hold,  and  even  take  over  other  parts  of 
Germany.  The  probability  of  such  a  move  is  increased 
by  the  helplessness  which  the  Allies  have  attempted  to 
enforce  upon  Germany.  It  is  also  increased  by  Amer- 
ica's reaction  against  participation  in  European  affairs. 
France,  no  doubt,  is  not  consciously  plotting  this  annex- 
ation ;  she  has  no  official  desires  of  imperialism ;  but  the 
arousal  of  such  a  spirit  is  always  to  be  feared  when  one 
nation  becomes  predominantly  powerful  and  especially 
when  hitherto  Avhat  it  regards  as  "legitimate"  desires 
have  been  thwarted. 


-"8oe  an  article,  entitled  "  Lc  Dcsarmcmcnt  dc  I'AUemngne,"  by 
Andre  Tardieu,  in  L'lUuslratinn,  for  February  28,  1920,  for  the 
extent  to  which  the  Allies  have  thus  far  succeeded  in  disarming 
Germany. 

431 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 


IV 


Such  were  the  dangers  which  the  devices  of  the  Old 
Diplomacy  involved.  They  not  only  were  morally  ques- 
tionable but,  and  because  of  it,  they  were  eventually  in- 
effective. The  League  of  Nations  idea  theoretically  in- 
duced the  European  powers  to  consider  the  guarantees 
which  it  substituted.  It  promised  France  reparation 
and  security ;  it,  however,  rejected  in  theory  the  annexa- 
tion of  territory  in  distinct  violation  of  the  will  of  the 
people  inhabiting  it.  It  desired  partial  German  dis- 
armament ;  but  after  the  Treaty  had  been  complied  with, 
it  demanded  the  disarmament  of  all  nations  as  the  only 
sure  means  of  removing  the  pretense  for  any  one  nation 
to  arm.  In  place  of  war  as  a  settlement  of  international 
disputes,  it  substituted  compulsory  arbitration.  To 
compel  the  enforcement  of  the  decision  of  such  an  ar- 
bitration and  to  prevent  attacks  of  one  nation  upon 
another,  it  offered  an  international  military  force. 

To  what  extent  the  League  of  Nations  idea  was  incor- 
porated in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  how  far  it  was  suc- 
cessful in  defeating  the  demands  of  the  Old  Diplomacy, 
and  why  French  opinion  was  dissatisfied  with  the  char- 
acter of  the  League  as  established,  will  be  discussed  in 
the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  FRENCH   CONCEPTION  OP  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


Pendant  longtemps  encore,  I'idcal  aura  besoin  de  gros  canons. — ■ 
Joseph  Barth^lemy. 


French  opinion  upon  the  League  of  Nations — official 
as  well  as  popular — underwent  a  remarkable  evolution 
during  the  war.  M.  Clemenceau's  blunt  characteriza- 
tion of  the  idea  as  "a  myth"  was  later  repudiated  by 
his  open  support  of  a  commission  of  French  publicists, 
charged  with  designing  a  draft  of  League  organization.^ 
Political  parties,  notably  the  Unified  Radicals  and  the 

^  Senator  Leon  Bourgeois,  tlie  French  representative  at  The 
Hague  Conferences,  and  a  former  Prime  Minister,  was  chairman 
of  this  commission. 

The  sinL-crity  of  M.  Clemeneeau  's  change  of  heart  may  be 
judged  from  the  following  extract  of  one  of  his  early  speeches  as 
Prime  Minister: 

' '  I  have  been  asked  to  explain  myself  in  regard  to  war  aims, 
and  as  to  the  idea  of  a  League  of  Nations.  I  have  replied  in  my 
declaration,  'We  must  conquer  for  the  sake  of  justice.'  That 
is  clear.  We  live  in  a  time  when  words  have  great  power,  but 
they  have  not  the  power  to  set  free.  The  word  'justice'  is  as 
old  as  mankind.  Do  you  imagine  that  the  formula  of  a  League  of 
Nations  is  going  to  solve  everything? 

"There  is  a  committee  at  the  Alinistry  of  Foreign  Affairs  even 
now  preparing  a  scheme  for  a  League  of  Nations.  Among  its 
members  are  the  most  authoritative  exponents  of  international 
law.  I  undertake  that  immediately  their  labors  are  finished  T  will 
table  the  outcome  of  it  in  this  Chamber,  if  I  am  still  Prime  Min- 
ister— which  does  not  seem  likely."  Quoted  in  Ilyndman,  Clcmen- 
£eau,  the  Man  and  his  Time,  32.5. 

433 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

Unified  Socialists,  urged  the  League's  creation;  entirely 
unofficial  societies  sprang  up  to  propagate  the  idea; 
finally  the  press,  although  without  any  great  enthu- 
siasm, it  is  true,  came  to  acknowledge  its  inevitability. 
The  great  force  behind  these  outward  manifestations 
was  Jhe  inchoate  belief  of  the  French  common  people 
that  the  old  policy  of  Balance  of  Power  had  egregiously 
failed  and  that  in  a  League  of  Nations  lay  the  only  hope 
for  future  peace. 

The  extent  to  which  public  opinion  had  forced  M. 
Clemenceau  from  his  original  position  was  illustrated  by 
his  remarks  at  the  second  plenary  session  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  on  January  25th,  1919.  At  that  time,  he 
said: 

At  the  time  of  the  annistice  the  five  powers  had  altogether 
12,000,000  men  under  arms  on  the  battlefield.  Their  dead  can 
be  counted  by  millions.  If  the  idea,  that  great  notion  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  was  not  above  the  whole  of  our  work 
here,  it  would  have  been  possible  for  us,  the  five  great  powers, 
to  consult  only  ourselves  in  the  settlement.  That  would  have 
been,  after  all,  our  right.  Well,  that  has  never  been  our 
thought.  We  have  asked  the  nations  interested  in  the  settle- 
ment to  meet  us.  We  have  asked  them  to  give  us  their  co- 
operation and  their  help. 

As  for  myself,  I  have  come  here  ready  to  sacrifice  many  of 
my  o|)inions  in  order  to  conciliate,  in  order  to  reach  the  con- 
clusions we  all  wish  for,  and  I  have  already  made  sacrifices, 
and  I  have  done  it  with  joy,  for  the  great  common  cause  which 
unites  us  here.  I  hope  we  will  all  be  inspired  by  the  same 
spirit. 

It  was  in  accordance  indeed  with  this  spirit  that  the 
Conference  adopted  a  resolution  setting  forth  the  prin- 
ciples which  were  to  govern  its  debates:  (1)  It  is  es- 
sential to  the  maintenance  of  the  world  settlement,  which 
the  Associated  Nations  are  now  met  to  establish,  that 

434 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

a  League  of  Nations  be  created  to  promote  international 
cooperation,  to  insure  the  fulfillment  of  accepted  inter- 
national obligations,  and  to  provide  safeguards  against 
war.  (2)  The  League  should  be  treated  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  general  Treaty  and  should  be  open  to  every 
civilized  nation  which  can  be  relied  upon  to  promote  its 
•  objects.  (3)  The  members  of  the  League  should  meet 
periodically  and  they  should  have  a  permanent  organ- 
ization and  secretariat  to  carry  on  the  business  of  the 
League. 

Thus,  at  the  outset,  the  Conference  pledged  itself  to 
the  creation  of  a  treaty  based  upon  principle.  It  de- 
cided, further,  that  the  League  and  such  a  treaty  were 
absolutely  inseparable;  without  the  one  the  other  could 
not  exist.  If  peace  alone  were  made — omitting  the  guar- 
antee of  the  League — it  would  necessarily  assume  the 
forms  of  the  Old  Diplomacy.  There  were  only  two 
choices :  Security  by  means  of  the  League,  or  security 
through  the  discredited  policy  of  Balance  of  Power.  To 
postpone  the  creation  of  the  first  would  have  been  to 
institute  a  peace  dependent  on  the  latter. 

As  in  the  United  States,  a  strong  element  in  France 
clamored  for  an  immediate  treaty  with  Germany,  leaving 
the  formation  of  the  League  of  Nations  until  later.  But 
most  of  those  who  took  this  stand  appeared  to  be  enemies 
of  the  principle  of  the  League,  either  because  of  their 
imperialism,  their  avowed  hatred  for  Germany,  or  a 
natural  lack  of  confidence  in  the  League  guarantees. 
They  did  not  dare  to  demand  openly  the  rejection  of 
the  League ;  so  they  argued  for  its  postponement.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  those  who  believed  whole-heartedly  in 
the  League,  were  in  favor  of  its  integral  inclusion  in 
the  Treaty. 

435 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 


II 


The  French  conception  of  the  League  of  Nations,  as 
revealed  by  the  press  and  public  utterances  during  the 
peace  negotiations,  yvas  on  the  whole  a  very  practical 
one.  It  was  not  so  much  concerned  with  the  methods* 
of  organization  of  the  League  as  with  what  it  desired 
to  see  it  accomplish.  The  first  test  of  the  League's 
reality  was  a  financial  one.  Originally,  in  the  hot  en- 
thusiasm of  victory,  French  opinion  demanded  the  ex- 
action of  an  indemnity  from  Germany  which  should 
compensate  not  only  for  the  damage  done  to  civilian  life 
and  property,  but  also  for  the  entire  expense  to  which 
France  had  been  put  in  waging  the  war.  In  some  in- 
stances, demands  were  heard  for  the  return  of  the  in- 
demnity of  1871.  But  gradually  it  dawned  upon  French 
economists  that  these  sums  represented  a  figure  so  enor- 
mous that,  even  if  Germany  could  conceivably  pay,  a 
century  or  more  of  annuities  would  be  required.  To 
place  such  a  burden  upon  the  old  Empire  would  prob- 
ably force  her  into  total  insolvency.  Moreover,  to  main- 
tain a  threatening  trusteeship  over  the  German  people 
for  an  indefinite  period,  from  the  standpoint  of  a  return 
to  normal  international  relations,  threatened  a  further 
political  disaster.^ 

In  addition  to  Germany's  inability  to  pay,  the  indem- 
nity was  limited  for  a  theoretical  reason — a  principle 


^  The  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Part  VITT,  Art.  232,  recognized  Ger- 
many's  inability  to  pay,  as  follows:  "The  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  recognize  tliat  the  resources  of  (iermany  are  not 
adequate,  after  taking  into  account  ])ermanent  diminutions  of 
such  resources  which  will  result  from  other  provisions  of  the  pres- 
ent treaty,  to  make  complete  reparation  for  all  such  loss  and 
damage. ' ' 

436 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OP  A  LEAGUE 

which  favored  remitting  the  direct  cost  of  carrying;  on 
a  war,  because  such  exactions,  if  fastened  on  a  defeated 
power,  would  but  encourage  nations  to  aggression,  tlieir 
people  being  given  the  hope  that  victory  would  compen- 
sate for  every  sacrifice.  In  other  words,  it  was  felt  that 
the  formula  must  be  laid  down  that  war  profits  no 
nation.  In  the  case  of  France,  the  demand  for  the  pay- 
ment of  war  charges  was  thoroughly  legitimate  because 
she  had  not  been  the  aggressor.  But  the  Conference  ob- 
viously feared  to  establish  a  precedent  which  might  en- 
courage future  aggressions.^ 

Princii)le,  and  Germany's  ability  to  pay,  therefore, 
limited  the  amount  of  the  French  indemnity  to  the  repa- 
ration of  civilian  damage.  With  the  recognition  of  this 
fact,  only  one  conclusion  could  be  reached — Germany 
could  be  counted  on  to  pay  France  only  a  fraction  of 
the  damages  she  had  inflicted.  In  plain  figures,  this 
meant  that  France  had  to  face  with  her  own  resources, 
a  national  debt  of  $30,000,000,000,  and  a  budgetary  de- 
ficit for  1919  of  at  least  $4,000,000,000.'^  During  the 
four  years  of  the  war  the  French  Government  had  ex- 
pended $34,000,000,000  in  military  expense  alone,  i.  e., 
munitions  and  army  supplies.     The  damage  to  the  dev- 

'  The  exclusion  of  an  indemnity  covering  direct  war  charges  was 
implied  in  the  note  of  Secretary  of  State  Lansing  to  the  Gorman 
Government,  of  November  4,  1918:  "In  the  conditions  of  peace 
laid  down  in  his  address  to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  the 
I'resident  declared  that  invaded  territories  must  be  restored  as 
well  as  evacuated  and  freed.  The  Allied  Governments  feel  that 
no  doubt  ought  to  bo  allowed  to  exist  as  to  what  this  provision 
imjdies.  By  it  they  understand  that  compensation  will  be  made 
by  Germany  for  all  damage  done  to  the  civilian  populations  of  the 
Allies  and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of  Germany  by  land, 
by  sea,  and  from  the  air." 

*  The  precarious  financial  situation  in  France  was  partly  occa- 
sioned by  the  questionable  policy  followed  of  raising  funds  by 
loans  instead  of  by  taxation.  See  Appendix  B,  "French  Taxation 
During  the  War." 

437 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

astated  regions  amomited  to  $15,000,000,000  at  least. 
For  the  latter  sum,  France  could  expect  indemnification ; 
for  the  former,  more  than  twice  as  large,  she  must  re- 
nounce all  hopes  of  compensation. 

The  realization  of  this  precarious  situation  came  not 
without  a  natural  bitterness.  INIust  this  great  burden 
whose  payment  it  is  impossible  to  exact  from  Germany 
be  borne  by  France  alone?  Or  will  the  Allies  jointly 
assume  it  ?  Will  the  League  of  Nations  prove  its  worth 
by  taking  the  debt  over?  To  the  practical-minded 
Frenchmen,  this  question  was  the  first  test  of  the  genu- 
ineness and  the  efficacy  of  the  new  Society  of  States. 
It  was  also  a  test  of  the  sincerity  of  the  assertion  re- 
peatedly made  by  her  Allies  that  France  had  ' '  saved  the 
world." 

This  point  of  view  was  expressed  in  an  editorial  in 
Le  Petit  Parisien: 

The  world  has  placed  its  hope,  it  may  be  said,  its  faith,  in 
the  League  of  Nations.  .  .  .  But  it  does  not  suffice  that  a 
League  of  Nations  shall  superimpose  upon  its  component 
States  a  permanent  Arbitral  Court,  that  it  control  their  arma- 
ments and  even  certain  of  their  productions.  The  war  has 
set  forth  problems  Avhich  each  country,  taken  alone,  will  be 
practically  powerless  to  solve  but  which  the  world  collectively 
may  settle  with  relative  ease.  .  .  .  One  of  the  grave  questions 
of  the  present  and  the  future  is  the  financial  question.  It  rose 
suddenly  before  us  and  our  Allies  on  the  morning  of  the 
armistice.  Eveiy  one  foresaw  its  difficulties,  and  realized  that 
the  liquidation  of  the  charges  contracted  during  the  years  of 
struggle  could  not  be  dealt  with  by  transitory  expedients.  .  .  . 
No  one  seriously  contests  that  Germany  and  her  allies  must 
pay  the  most  possible  .  .  .  but  it  is  recognized  that  Germany 
and  her  allies,  whatever  measures  they  may  take,  will  be 
unable  to  bear  the  whole  burden.  It  is  for  the  liquidation  of 
the  balance  that  the  Tjeague  of  Nations  must  intervene. 

What   will    this   balance  be?     We  do   not   know.     But   the 

438 


FRENCH  concp:ption  op  a  league 

principle  which  must  inevitably  be  followed  is  clear:  The  na- 
tions which  have  united  around  Bclj,''ium,  Serbia,  and  France, 
have  contracted  themselves  in  a  lifo-lonji'  pact.  If  one  of  them 
had  defaulted  durinjif  the  first  or  in  the  last  six  months  of  the 
war,  the  Central  Powers  would  have  attained  their  ends.  If 
in  the  future,  one  of  them  (the  Allies)  should  be  financially 
or  economically  wiped  out,  the  League  of  Nations  must  lose  in 
prestige  as  a  protecting  remedy.  Men,  ships,  food,  and  rail- 
ways have  been  put  in  common  usage.  It  is  essential  that  the 
charges  shall  also  be  placed  in  a  joint  account ;  otherwise  the 
people  who  have  consented  to  the  greatest  sacrifice  in  the 
common  cause  will  be  the  ones  most  surely  destined  in 
the  future  to  a  definite  collapse.  By  economic  disaster  they 
would  atone  for  the  heroism  which  they  have  displayed  in  the 
service  of  universal  liberty.^ 

Similarly,  M.  Antonin  Dubost,  President  of  the  Sen- 
ate, said: 

The  League  of  Nations  can  alone  become  the  basis  of  an 
international  financial  organization  capable  of  meeting  the 
burdensome  charges  (of  the  war).  By  any  other  means,  the 
task  appears  hardly  surmountable.^ 

In  the  course  of  a  remarkable  speech  before  the 
Senate,  M.  Ribot,  former  President  of  the  Council,  de- 
clared : 

We  have  suffered  more  than  any  one  else.  .  .  .  But  because 
our  country  has  been  the  theater  of  the  war,  because  this  strug- 
gle has  been  fought  upon  our  soil,  must  they  (the  Allies)  leave 
us  alone  to  support  all  the  consequences  of  the  war,  and  to 
face  the  uncertainty  of  German  payment?  No,  I  say  that 
this  is  an  injustice!  My  conclusion  is  that  the  expenses  of 
reparations  and  the  expenses  of  pensions  as  well  must  be 
placed  in  common.  .  .  .  The  debt  must  be  supported  not  by 
ourselves  alone,  nor  yet  in  proportion  to  our  sufferings  and 

"Issue  of   March   7,   1919. 

'  At  a  meeting  of  tlie  General  Council  of  the  Is5ro,  held  at 
Grenoble,  April  28,  1919. 

439 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

our   sacrifices,   but   in    proportion   to   the   resources   of   each. 
That  is  what  justice  demands^ 

An  interesting  plan  for  a  financial  section  of  the 
League  of  Nations  was  laid  before  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  in  February.  This  called  for  the  creation 
among  the  Allied  powers  of  a  Financial  League  of  Na- 
tions which  would  divide  among  them,  proportionately 
to  their  populations  and  to  their  respective  contributing 
power,  the  fiscal  charges  necessary  to  cover  the  expenses 
caused  by  the  war.  These  charges,  which  amounted, 
according  to  the  Deputy,  M.  Jacques  Stern,  who  intro- 
duced the  measure,  to  over  $100,000,000,000  would  be 
cared  for  by  a  common  fund,  underwritten  by  the 
members  of  the  League.  To  assume  this  debt,  inter- 
national bonds  would  be  issued,  upon  which  each  mem- 
ber of  the  League  would  be  obliged  to  pay  his  share  of 
interest  and  amortization  charges.  Subscribers  to  na- 
tional war  loans,  etc.,  would  exchange  their  bonds  for 
this  new,  international  security,  collectively  guaran- 
teed. The  share  of  each  nation  would  have  to  be  deter- 
mined by  its  ability  to  pay  and  not  by  its  share  in  the 
debt.  If  a  nation  should  fail  to  meet  its  payments  upon 
this  international  debt,  it  would  have  to  surrender  to  the 
League  of  Nations  a  pledge — such  as  its  tariff  receipts 
or  railways — to  be  internationally  operated  until  the 
debt  be  paid. 

The  Stern  project  was  not  received  with  a  great  deal 
of  favor  in  France,  first,  because  it  did  not  provide  for 
the  exaction  of  an  indemnity  from  Germany ;  second, 
because  it  made  no  provision  for  the  division  of  debts 
according  to  war  losses. 

A  more  detailed  project  was   carefully  worked   out 

'  Upon  May  30,  1919,  several  -weeks  after  the  Treaty  had  been 
presented  to  Germany. 

440 


FRENCH  CONCKI'TION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

in  a  brochure  by  M.  Marcel  Bouilloux-Lafont,  entitled: 
"An  Essay  upon  the  Economic  and  Financial  Role  of 
the  Society  of  Nations."  The  settlement  of  the  indem- 
nity, according  to  him,  should  follow  these  principles: 

1.  Distribute  the  payment  over  a  period  long  enough  so 
that  the  operation  may  be  materially  possible. 

2.  In  addition  to  payments  in  gold  and  restitutions  in  kind, 
place  an  indemnity,  of  say  300,000,000,000,  upon  the  enemy 
nations,  for  the  payment  of  damages  caused  to  civilians. 

3.  Place  the  sui-plus  of  the  war  expenses  upon  the  League 
of  Nations,  to  be  paid  in  the  form  of  annuities. 

4.  Create  an  international  bank  of  issue  which  should  be 
created  to  issue  the  financial  instruments  necessary  to  the  work 
of  liquidation,  to  make  the  necessary  advances  to  participant 
countries,  and  to  be  supplied  with  resources  allowmg  it  to 
pay  off  the  debt  in  from  fifty  to  seventy  years. 

5.  Create  a  tariff  union  among  nations,  which,  by  the  appli- 
cation of  a  minimum,  an  ordinary,  and  a  "penalty"  tariff  upon 
goods  of  a  defaulting  nation,  may  enforce  international  obliga- 
tions. 

As  an  example  of  the  method  of  operation  of  such  a 
system,  France,  whose  war  expenses  the  writer  esti- 
mated at  $30,000,000,000,  would  receive : 

1.  Nine  billion  dollars  in  international  bills  from  the  inter- 
national bank,  six  billion  of  which  would  be  paid  to  the  Bank 
of  France,  as  security  for  French  paper  issues. 

2.  Nine  billions  in  international  bonds,  seven  billions  of 
which  would  offset  the  bonds  of  the  "National  Defense"  and 
consequently  lighten  the  annual  interest  charge. 

3.  Twelve  billions  would  be  paid  by  the  international  bank 
in  the  fonii  of  annuities,  with  4^/^  per  cent  interest,  plus  the 
amortization  rate,  to  run  for  a  maximum  period  of  seventy 
years. 

In  this  way,  the  $30,000,000,000  which  France  could 
not  exact  from  Germany,  would  be  paid  in  seventy  yeare 
through  her  own  and  international  aid. 

441 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

To  supply  the  resources  for  this  novel  bank,  the  writer 
would  institute  a  series  of  international  taxes:  (1)  a  tax 
on  land,  sea  or  air  transportation  of  .01  franc  or  its 
equivalent,  upon  each  kilometric  ton  of  merchandise 
transported  upon  any  railway  among  the  associated  na- 
tions; (2)  a  tax  on  passenger  travel  of  1  per  cent;  (3) 
a  tax  of  half  a  franc  (10  cents)  upon  each  ton  of  ship- 
ping entering  a  port  of  one  of  the  associated  nations; 
(4)  a  special  surtax  on  importation  or  exportation  of 
1  per  cent  ad  valorem;  (5)  a  special  tax  on  the  produc- 
tion of  alcohol,  sugar,  opium,  iron,  wheat,  cotton,  petro- 
leum, rice,  coffee,  copper,  wines,  wool,  coal,  tobacco, 
tea,  beer,  and  silk ;  (6)  a  special  surtax  upon  telegraphic, 
telephone,  and  radio  communications  of  1  per  cent;  (7) 
a  tax  of  .001  franc  per  kilowatt  hour  produced  in  every 
electrical  establishment. 

The  intended  effect  of  the  assumption  of  the  war  debt 
by  the  League  of  Nations  would  be  to  relieve  France  of 
a  burden  which  she  felt  was  disproportionately  large 
and  to  place  a  share  of  this  load  upon  nations  who  had 
not  suffered  to  the  same  extent  but  who  had  profited 
as  greatly  from  her  sacrifice.  This  meant  that  the  share 
of  the  United  States  would  be  greatly  increased.  Such 
a  result  and  that  of  the  general  apportionment  of  war 
debts  was  worked  out  by  Professor  Charles  Gide,  the 
eminent  economist.  According  to  the  table  given  such 
a  division  would  relieve  France  of  a  yearly  charge  of 
over  4,000,000  francs  or  63  per  cent  of  her  present  bur- 
den ;  it  would  relieve  Italy  of  over  half,  or  57  per  cent, 
and  Great  Britain  of  21  per  cent.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  would  increase  the  United  States'  annual  charges 
from  7,500,000,000  to  16,000,000,000  francs  ($3,000,000,- 
000 ) ,  an  increase  of  over  100  per  cent.^ 

"Revue  d'Econoime  Politique,  January-February,  1918. 

442 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

GiDE's  Al'P;)ItTIONMENT   OF   WaR   DeBTS 


War 

Expenses 


Annual 
Interest 
Charges 


Yearly 
Income 


Proportional 
iShare  of  In- 
terest Charge 


France 

British  Empire 

Italy 

United  States . . 


milliards  frs 

130 

180 

50 

150 

510 


milliards  frs. 
7.8 
9 
3 
7.5 

27.3 


milliards  frs. 

33 

80 

15 

180 

308 


milliards  frs. 

2.9 

7.1 

1.3 

16 

27.3 


Although  it  is  certain  that  the  French  Peace  Delega- 
tion urged  some  such  plan  of  division  of  war  indebted- 
ness, the  Peace  Treaty  omitted  all  reference  to  it.  Con- 
sequently, the  general  financial  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
were  disappointing  to  the  French. 

Although  the  principle  Avas  laid  down  that  compensa- 
tion might  be  exacted  from  Germany  for  damage  to 
persons  injured  from  acts  of  war,  cruelty,  and  violence; 
for  the  capitalized  cost  of  pensions,  for  allowances  paid 
by  the  Allied  Governments  to  families  of  soldiers  during 
the  war,  and  for  damage  to  property,  excepting  naval 
and  military  works  and  materials,  it  did  not  definitely 
state  what  the  amount  of  the  indemnity  would  be  or 
when  it  would  be  paid.  The  Treaty  merely  said  that  the 
amount  of  this  damage  for  which  compensation  was  to 
be  paid  by  Germany  should  be  determined  by  an  Inter- 
Allied  commission,  to  be  called  the  Reparation  Com- 
mission.^ This  Commission  on  or  before  May  1,  1921, 
should  notify  the  German  Government  of  the  extent 
of  its  obligations ;  and  payments  were  to  be  made  in  the 
form  of  annuities  for  a  period  of  thirty  years,  beginning 

•Treaty  of  Versailles,  Article  233. 

443 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

with  the  1st  of  May,  1921.  In  other  words,  France  was 
obliged  to  wait  until  1921  before  receiving  anything 
definite  in  the  way  of  reparation,  while  her  territories 
must,  necessarily  to  her  very  existence,  be  immediately 
restored.  It  is  true  that  the  Treaty  provided  for  a 
payment  of  20,000,000,000  marks  during  1919,  1920, 
and  the  first  four  months  of  1921.  But  out  of  this  sum 
the  expenses  of  the  armies  of  occupation  subsequent  to 
the  armistice  of  the  11th  of  November,  1918,  must  first 
be  met,^"  in  addition  to  that  of  the  supplies  of  food  and 
raw  materials  advanced  by  the  Allies  to  Germany. 
It  was  quite  apparent  that  this  deduction  would  largely 
consume  the  20,000,000,000  marks.  To  the  French 
public,  this  priority  even  appeared  to  be  little  more  than 
a  guarantee  that  the  British  and  American  merchants, 
indirectly  supplying  the  armies  of  occupation  and  the 
material  advanced  to  Germany,  would  receive  first  pay- 
ment. They  could  not  understand  why  their  own  de- 
vastated regions  had  not  been  given  first  consideration. 

Another  inconsistency  concerned  the  German  annui- 
ties. Starting  in  1921,  they  were  to  run  for  thirty 
years;  but  the  Allied  Army  of  Occupation,  the  only 
guarantee  of  payment,  was  to  be  withdrawn  in  fifteen 
years  (except  upon  the  express  decision  of  the  League 
of  Nations  to  the  contrary)  when  probably  not  more 
than  half  of  the  indemnity  would  have  been  paid. 

These  financial  defects  might  have  been  pardoned  if 


^'' Ibid,  Article  235.  Twenty  billion  marks  gold  bearer  bonds, 
payable  not  later  than  May  1,  1921,  without  interest,  were  also 
to  be  issued,  toward  the  amortization  of  which  the  above  sum  of 
20,000,000,000  marks  was  to  be  applied  after  deduction  had  been 
made  for  the  reimbursement  of  the  expenses  of  the  armies  of 
occupation  and  fo^f  payment  of  foodstuffs,  etc.,  advanced  by  the 
Allies  to  Germany.  See  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Article  244,  Annex 
II,  12,  c  (1). 

444 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

the  Conference  had  granted  what  the  French  considered 
the  most  imi3ortant  of  all  their  financial  requests :  the 
assumption  of  the  actual  war  expenses  of  the  Allies  by 
the  League  of  Nations.  Of  these  charges, — the  most  for- 
midable item  in  the  French  debt, — the  Treaty  made  no 
mention  whatsoever;  while  absolving  Germany  from  its 
j)ayment,  it  substituted  no  other  policy  of  liquidation 
in  its  place.  The  brunt  of  this  overwhelming  debt  now 
lay  upon  France  alone.  The  world  had  praised  her  for 
the  heroic  sacrifices  she  had  made,  yet  now  refused  to 
help  heal  her  wounds.  Qui  pay  era?  La  France!  This 
was  the  mournfully  reiterated  commentary  upon  the 
whole   Treaty  document.^ ^ 

The  request  of  France  for  financial  help — according 
to  newspaper  announcements  made  during  the  first  week 
of  ]\Iareh,  1919 — was  definitely  refused  by  the  American 
Peace  Delegation.  It  is  not  yet  publicly  known  why 
and  in  what  form  this  refusal  was  made.  To  acquiesce 
in  this  burden,  which  assuredly  would  fall  the  heaviest 
on  the  United  States,  w^as  a  grave  measure  of  policy. 
The  American  delegates  took  their  stand  probably  be- 
cause the  proposed  measure  would  increase  hostility  to 


^^  L' Europe  Nouvelle,  May  17,  1919,  thus  protested  against  the 
financial  provisions  of  the  Treaty:  "The  financial  stipulations  of 
the  Treaty  will  cause  ...  an  immense  deception  throughout  the 
whole  of  France.  They  place  the  entire  country  before  a  formi- 
dable uncertainty.  They  constitute,  in  our  opinion,  the  most 
flagrant  injustice.  .  .  .  The  stupid  error,  the  unpardonable  error, 
of  our  negotiators  has  been  not  to  lay  down  as  the  basis  of 
all  negotiations,  the  financial  settlement  of  the  war,  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  expenses  of  the  war  by  a  pro  rata  of  efforts,  of  human 
capital  sacrificed  and  of  effective  capacities  of  production.  .  .  . 
The  adoption  of  this  equitable  and  fair  principle  alone  .  .  .  can 
permit  the  establishment  of  a  just  and  durable  peace.  .  .  .  Vic- 
torious by  its  arms,  radiant  in  glory  and  set  in  the  purest  halo 
made  from  sacrifice  and  from  the  obscure  devotion  of  millions  of 
heroes,  Franco  will  be  controlled  in  the  future  by  the  markets 
of  London  and  New  York,    Is  it  for  this  that  we  have  fought?" 

445 


i 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  League  in  the  United  States  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  whole  idea  would  be  defeated.  Whatever  the  reason, 
the  refusal  to  reimburse  France  for  what  she  considered 
a  common  sacrifice  aroused  the  first  suspicion  among 
League  supporters  of  the  impotency  of  the  League  as 
created  and  of  the  insincerity  of  the  Allies.  It  was  this 
suspicion,  growing  into  a  firm  conviction,  which  caused 
the  obstinate  esaggeration  of  other  demands  by  France. 


Ill 


In  addition  to  the  financial  test,  the  French  public 
weighed  the  value  of  the  League  of  Nations  by  the  guar- 
antees it  offered  for  future  peace  as  compared  with  those 
furnished  by  the  policies  of  the  so-called  "Old  Diplo* 
macy. ' '  French  hatred  of  Germany  naturally  affected  its 
conception  of  a  League  of  Nations.  France  believes  that 
Germany  will  always  be  her  enemy  and  that  she  will 
always  meditate  a  fresh  attack.  Even  M.  Clemenceau 
was  indiscreet  enough  to  declare  publicly  last  February 
that  the  armistice  was  * '  only  a  lull  in  the  storm. ' '  The 
French  attitude,  the  intensity  of  which  cannot  be  over- 
emphasized, was  completely  justified  by  the  past  conduct 
of  its  adversary,  by  the  hideous  conduct  of  the  war  and 
by  German  breaches  of  faith  during  the  armistice.  The 
establishment  of  a  republic-  did  not  appear  to  alter  Ger- 
man character.  The  sinking  of  the  German  fleet  at 
Scapa  Flow,  the  destruction  of  the  French  flags  taken 
in  1870,  and  the  brutal  attacks  upon  Poland  at  the  very 
time  of  the  signing  of  the  peace,  all  reenforced  the 
French  belief  that  something  more  than  a  treaty  must  be 
drawn  up.  Sure  and  positive  means  of  enforcing  its  pro- 
visions must  be  provided. 

446 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

It  was  this  instinctive  fear  of  Germany  and  the  open 
distrust  of  its  word  wliieh  led  France  to  insist  upon  its 
exclusion  from  the  League,  at  least  until  such  a  time 
(as  Article  VII  of  the  Covenant  draft  expressed  it) 
when  Germany  "is  able  to  give  effective  guarantees  of 
its  sincere  intention  to  observe  its  international  obliga- 
tions." From  the  French  standpoint,  this  policy  of  ex- 
clusion, and  the  belief  that  Germany  must  be  kept  in 
a  state  of  constant  surveillance,  was  perhaps  justified. 
From  the  standpoint  of  the  success  of  a  League  of 
Nations,  it  is  more  difficult  to  defend.  Several  times 
during  the  course  of  the  war,  the  creation  of  a  League 
among  the  Allied  belligerents  had  been  urged.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  demonstrated  the  error  of  this  argument 
Avhen  he  said:  "The  League  of  Nations  .  .  .  cannot  be 
formed  now  [during  the  progress  of  the  war].  If 
formed  now,  it  would  be  merely  a  new  alliance  confined 
to  the  nations  associated  against  a  common  enemy.  "^^ 
To  succeed,  a  League  must  be  composed  of  the  entire 
world  and  be  designed  as  an  instrument  of  peace. 

But  although  the  formation  of  the  League  was  de- 
ferred for  this  very  reason  until  after  the  war,  the  logic 
of  the  argument  was  not  carried  out.  Germany  and 
the  other  enemy  powers  were  excluded — only  tempo- 
rarily, it  is  true. 

But  when  they  are  eventually  taken  in.  they  will  al- 
ways resent  the  League  and  suspect  it  of  being  a  com- 
bination of  the  present  Allies  to  keep  them  in  permanent 
subjection.  In  short,  the  League  as  established,  was  little 
more  than  an  alliance — which  if  stronger  than  any  pre- 
decessor, possessed  little  more  than  the  essential  ele- 
ments of  an  alliance,  i.e.,  one  group  of  nations  joined 


'Speech  at  New  York,  September  27,  1918. 

447 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

together  against  another/^  With  this  entering  wedge, 
the  way  was  opened  for  the  perpetuation  of  the  old 
system  of  partial  alliances  and  the  Balance  of  Power. 
These  principles  were  implicitly  recognized  in  the  Treaty, 
although  subject  to  certain  limitations.^*  The  alliance 
between  England,  America;  and  France  was  an  example 
of  this  inconsistency.^^  The  League  may  work  without 
Germany,  but  it  cannot  hope  to  be  successful  so  long  as 
it  maintains  an  unofficially  hostile  attitude  toward  a 
considerable  portion  of  Europe. 

In  addition  to  excluding  Germany  from  the  League, 
the  French  attitude  insisted  upon  her  disamiament  and 
military  subjection.  In  general  terms,  the  French  de- 
manded that  a  compulsory  sanction  reenforce  the  desire 
of  the  League  to  maintain  the  peace  of  the  world.  Al- 
though the  Treaty  provided  for  the  disarmament  of  all 
nations,  no  certain  assurance  was  given  of  this  policy 
being  carried  out.  Article  VIII  of  the  Treaty  spoke  only 
of  "the  full  and  frank  exchange  of  information"  as  to 
military  and  naval  programs.  Article  IX  specified  that 
a  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  advise 
the  Council  upon  the  execution  of  the  provision  of  Article 
VIII  and  on  military  and  naval  questions  generally. 
This  commission  was  given  no  adequate  powers  of  in- 
vestigation or  of  enforcement.  Although  for  a  period 
of  fifteen  years  the  Allies  are  to  maintain  an  army  in 
Germany  enforcing  disarmament,  thereafter  no  means 


"  In  the  same  speech  tho  President  said,  ' '  Tliere  can  be  no 
leagues  or  alliances  or  special  covenants  and  understandings  within 
the  general  and  common  family  of  the  League  of  Nations.  .  .  . 
Special  alliances  and  economic  rivalries  and  hostilities  have  been 
the  prolific  source  in  the  modern  world  of  the  ])lans  and  passions 
that  produce  war. ' ' 

"See  Articles  18,  19,  and  20,  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

"iSee  discussion  of  this  alliance,  pp.  462,  463. 

448 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

of  knowing  whether  or  not  Germany  is  re-arming  or 
not,  is  provided.  A  nation's  word,  especially  Germany's 
word,  France  did  not  regard  as  sufficient.  Upon  the 
matter  of  disarmament,  she  urged  the  creation  of  a  com- 
mission vested  with  inquisitorial  powers  to  determine 
whether  tlie  leagued  nations  were  keeping  their  promises. 
An  amendment  to  this  effect  was  unsuccessfully  urged 
before  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  by  the 
French  delegation.  At  the  second  plenary  session  of  the 
Conference,  at  which  the  draft  was  presented,  M.  Bour- 
geois, the  French  member  of  the  commission,  said : 

In  order  to  assure  the  execution  of  international  sen- 
tences, there  must  be  a  limitation  of  armaments.  .  .  .  The 
nations  who  are  the  contracting  parties  of  the  covenant  pledge 
themselves  mutually  to  communicate  to  each  other  full  infor- 
mation about  their  armaments  and  their  means  of  production. 
This  is  a  very  good  plan,  with  which  I  am  particularly  satis- 
fied. At  the  same  time^  I  proposed  an  amendment  which  I 
think  I  ought  to  mention ;  I  thought  that  it  would  be  necessary 
to  institute  a  permanent  organization  for  purposes  of  in- 
spection, but  this  amendment  was  not  embodied  in  the  text. 
We  have  accepted  the  text,  as  it  is  before  you,  and  if  we  now 
mention  the  amendment,  it  is  because,  as  the  whole  scheme  is 
going  to  be  discussed  by  the  world,  it  is  better  that  all  the 
])oints  that  have  given  occasion  to  important  observations 
should  be  mentioned. 

The  rejection  of  this  amendment  was  another  indica- 
tion to  the  French  of  the  weakness  of  the  League  as 
created.  A  more  vital  weakness  was  the  total  absence 
from  the  Covenant  of  provisions  for  a  military  force  of 
international  composition  to  give  a  sanction  to  the 
League's  decision  or  in  plain  terms,  capable  of  prevent- 
ing immediately  or  even  anticipating  tlic  attack  of  one 
nation  ui)on  another.  Article  XII  of  the  Treaty  provided 
that  disputes  between  members  of  the  League  should  be 

449 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

submitted  to  arbitration  before  resorting  to  war,  or  to 
inquiry  by  the  Executive  Council;  and  that  any  dis- 
putant should  not  go  to  war  until  three  months  after 
the  award  of  the  arbitrator  or  until  a  recommendation 
by  the  Council  had  been  made;  and  (Article  XIII)  that 
not  even  then  would  the  disputants  resort  to  war  against 
a  member  of  the  League  which  complied  with  the  de- 
cision. Article  XVI  provided  that  violation  of  these  pro- 
visions would  be  considered  as  an  act  of  war  against  all 
other  members  of  the  League,  who  would  immediately 
sever  all  trade  and  financial  relations  with  the  offending 
State,  thus  placing  it  in  a  state  of  economic  isolation. 
The  article  further  said: 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  council  in  such  a  case  to  recom- 
mend to  the  several  Governments  what  effective  military,  naval 
or  air  force  the  members  of  the  League  shall  severally  eon- 
tribute  to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the  covenants 
of  the  League. 

This  word  "recommend" — in  the  light  of  French  ex- 
perience— was  not  very  reassuring.  Moreover,  the  arti- 
cle did  not  even  state  whether  or  not  the  member-States 
were  obliged  to  accept  the  Council's  recommendation. 
It  even  implied  that  they  were  not.  There  was  nothing 
certain  laid  down  concerning  contributions.  In  fact, 
this  article,  the  most  important  in  the  whole  covenant, 
from  the  French  stand.point — one  which  was  supposed 
to  substitute  the  securities  of  the  League  for  those  of  the 
Old  Diplomacy — was  quite  unsatisfactory.  French  se- 
curity from  the  German  menace  was  an  affair  of  vital 
importance,  yet  what  did  the  proposed  League  put  for- 
ward to  meet  this  concrete  situation?  Even  if  the 
nations  were  obliged  to  make  contributions  to  an  armed 
force,  who  would  enforce  this  obligation?    It  obviously 

450 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

reposed  on  international  good  faith.  But  nations  have 
broken  faith ;  not  only  Germany,  but  others.  If  it 
were  not  a  matter  of  abiding  faith,  it  might  become  one 
of  "interpretation."  And  while  nations  were  deciding 
whether  or  not  to  send  quotas,  or  even  while  they  were 
engaged  in  raising  and  sending  them,  the  damage  would 
be  done.  France  did  not  wish  again  to  stand  waiting 
through  two  desperate  years  until  England  made  ready, 
or  three  years  until  America  joined  the  lists.  To  relieve 
this  uncertainty  the  French  delegation  wanted  to  endow 
the  League  with  an  international  military  force,  directed 
independently  of  national  quotas  and  policies,  suppress- 
ing aggression  as  quickly  as  a  fire  department  extin- 
guishes a  local  blaze.  ]\Ioreover,  it  was  only  the  assur- 
ance of  such  a  force  which  would  convince  France  of  the 
League's  reality. 

Senator  Bourgeois  stated  the  French  view  on  this  sub- 
ject at  the  session  of  the  Conference,  on  February  14th, 
in  these  words: 

Here  is  a  i)oint.  Take  a  State  which  violates  the  Interna- 
tional Covenant.  That  State  is  supposed  to  be  in  a  state  of 
war  aeainst  all  the  members  of  the  Leag'ue,  and  all  are  pre- 
pared to  execute  its  obligations.  But  war  is  not  something 
that  can  proceed  at  once,  especially  when  the  question  is  how 
to  bring  together  forces  belonging  to  States  which  are  very 
different  from  each  other  and  may  be  at  the  four  corners  of  the 
world.  Each  people  will  have  to  wait  in  order  to  act,  in  order 
that  the  proeedui^e  has  been  gone  through,  in  order  that  for 
each  particular  nation  a  vote  may  be  taken  by  its  parliament, 
and  so  on.    This  means  time  and  delay. 

And  supposing  that  there  is  on  the  part  of  the  aggressor  a 
will  of  precipitating  a  situation,  then  we  must  provide  for  the 
possibility.  For  this  purpose  it  would  be  desirable  to  have 
all  the  means  of  resistance  studied,  and  concerted  action  pre- 
pared before  the  occasion  aii-ses.  This  would  be  the  best  check 
against  all  ill  designs.     If  the  would-be  aggressor  knows  that 

451 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

the  resistance  is  fully  prepared  against  any  action  like  the 
one  he  anticipates,  then  he  will  be  constrained. 

On  the  contrary,  if  he  knows  that  no  such  prepara- 
tion exists  and  that  a  sudden  action  on  his  part  would  en- 
counter no  prepared  and  well-thought-out  resistance,  perhaps 
he  would  not  be  restrained  and  it  would  be  extremely  danger- 
ous. If  we  do  not  wish  to  see  the  ten-ible  ordeal  that  the 
world  has  passed  through  renewed  in  the  future,  we  ought  to 
have  a  permanent  organization  to  pi'epare  the  military  and 
naval  means  of  execution,  and  make  them  ready  in  case  of 
emergency. 

This  has  been  objected  to  by  some  members  of  the  Commit- 
tee because  it  involved  some  difficult  constitutional  problems. 
This  is  why  we  agreed  to  the  text  without  that  amendment,  but 
we  think  the  principle  of  that  proposed  amendment  ought 
to  be  put  before  public  opinion  at  the  same  time  as  the 
scheme  that  we  have  agreed  to. 

The  rejection  of  this  amendment  was  the  greatest 
blow  of  all  to  the  French  confidence  in  the  guarantees  of 
the  League.^''  It  gave  the  conservatives  fresh  ammuni- 
tion for  their  attack  on  its  principle  and  on  the  Four- 
teen Points ;  while  those  who  believed  in  the  ideal  had 
their  faith  in  the  form  of  its  application  considerably 
weakened. 

Thus  Jacques  Bainville,  after  the  publication  of  the 
draft,  wrote: 

There  can  be  no  real  League  of  Nations  without  a  firm 
engagement  to  come  to  the  help  of  an  attacked  adherent. 
There  can  be  no  engagement  of  this  kind  without  the  prin- 
ciple of  obligatory  intervention  being  solemnly  established. 
There  can  be  no  possible  intei"vention  without  armies  ready  to 
make  it  effective.  But  under  the  proposed  plan,  each  in  case 
of  appeal  will  remain  free  to  discuss  its  militaiy  participa- 
tion.    Thus  through  concessions  made  in  order  to  assure  its 

"  See  an  article  on  ' '  French  Ideals  and  the  Covenant, ' '  by  Leon 
Bourgeois,  London  Times  (French  number)  of  September  6, 
]91<J. 

452 


FRENCH  CONCP]PTTON  OF  A  LEAGUE 

existence,  the  Leay-ue  of  Nations  has  to  deprive  itself  of  its 
most  essential  element. 

L'Echo  dc  Paris,  cumnK'ntiiij^  in  a  similar  maiinei', 
wrote  as  follows: 

We  are  thus  forced  to  conclude  that  the  twenty-six  articles 
do  not  briuf;:  us  real  security.  As  lon<;-  a.s  tliey  are  not  chan^'-ed, 
we  can  by  no  means  sacriOce  to  them  our  means  of  defense. 

Upon  another  occasion  this  same  paper  wrote : 

All  the  amendments  cai)able  of  giving  to  the  League  bone, 
muscles,  and  nerves,  especially  the  French  amendments,  have 
found  little  mercy  in  the  eyes  of  those  two  great  doctrinaires, 
Wilson  and  Robert  Cecil.  The  control  of  armaments?  Use- 
less. An  Inter-Allied  Staff?  Superfluous.  .  .  .  Truly,  the 
constitution  of  the  League  is  in  harmony  with  its  program,  the 
spectacle  of  which  we  have  admired  for  three  months.  The 
theory  is  worth  the  practice. 

La  France  Lihre,  a  Socialist  paper,  also  said : 

To  constitute  the  Society  or  League  of  Nations — the  word 
matters  little  provided  we  have  the  thing — to  impose  com- 
pulsory arbitration  and  to  create  an  international  police  force 
strong  enough  to  make  Law  and  Justice  prevail, — such  ought 
to  be  the  i)rogram  of  reason  and  of  humanity  inspiiing  the 
peace  jilenipotentiaries. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  there  was  some  merit  in  the. 
French  conception.  If  the  League  of  Nations  was  to 
be  anything  more  than  another  Hague  Tribunal,  it  must 
necessarily  contain  some  elements  of  force.  If  its  pur- 
pose is  to  establish  compulsory  arbitration,  it  is  obliged 
to  include  the  means  of  making  arbitral  decisions  com- 
pulsory. The  French  amendments  gave  life  and  blood 
to  the  League ;  they  aimed  at  establishing  definite  sanc- 
tions and  ones  to  be  respected. 

453 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

It  is  generally  believed  that  the  American  Peace  Del- 
egation was  responsible  for  the  defeat  of  all  the  French 
suggestions,  financial  as  well  as  military.  Although  the 
members  of  the  delegation  itself  w^re  doubtless  in  favor 
of  them  with  certain  modifications,  it  appeared  that  thd 
Republican  opposition  in  America  would  completely  kill 
the  entire  League  if  it  embodied  such  definite  and  pre- 
cise responsibilities.  This  seems  to  be  one  of  the  ex- 
planations for  the  creation  of  a  vague  and  unorganized 
Covenant. 

This  Republican  opposition  to  the  League  of  Nations 
was  the  final  factor  in  the  French  suspicion  of  its 
value.  The  results  of  the  November  elections,  returning 
Republican  majorities,  naturally  led  many  Frenchmen 
to  believe  that  a  treaty  of  peace  embodying  a  League 
would  be  rejected  by  the  American  Senate.  Conse- 
quently a  reliance  upon  the  guarantees  of  a  League, 
whose  very  existence  was  in  question,  as  a  substitute  for 
the  security  which  the  territorial  exactions  of  the  Old 
Diplomacy  offered  was  something  which  no  Frenchman 
could  countenance. 


IV 


Reverting  now  to  the  effect  the  principles  of  the 
League  of  Nations  had  on  the  French  peace  demands,  it 
may  be  said  that  they  resulted  in  the  rejection  of  the 
Rhenish  frontier;  they  compromised  the  Saar  question 
and  German  disarmament;  but  they  met  defeat  almost 
completely  in  the  matter  of  the  Anglo-French-American 
Alliance. 

As  a  temporary  substitute  for  the  Rhine  frontier,  the 
Treaty  provided  that  Germany  Avould  not  "maintain  or 
construct  any  fortifications  either  on  the  left  bank  of 

454 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

the  Rhine  or  on  the  right  bank  to  the  west  of  a  line 
drawn  fifty  kilometers  to  the  east  of  the  Rhine. ' '  "  This 
provision  the  League  Council  was  to  enforce.  The  exe- 
cution of  the  Treaty  was  further  assured  by  the  Allied 
occupation  of  the  German  territory  west  of  the  Rhine, 
together  with  its  bridge-heads,  for  a  period  of  fifteen 
years. 

The  temporary  occupation  of  the  Rhine  has  been  vig- 
orously attacked  by  so-callod  "liberals"  as  being  as 
inconsistent  with  the  Fourteen  Points  and  the  League 
of  Nations  idea  as  the  annexation  of  the  Rhenish  prov- 
inces to  France  would  be.  It  is  said  that  this  policy 
means  the  physical  subjection  of  Germany  to  the  Allies, 
resulting  not  in  the  restoration  of  international  friend- 
ship but  in  the  continuance  of  a  hostility  which  sooner 
or  later  must  again  violently  express  itself.  Although 
this  may  be  the  result,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  could 
be  otherwise,  even  under  the  asgis  of  a  vigorously  consti- 
tuted League  of  Nations.  Germany  has  been  the  imme- 
diate cause  of  an  international  conflagration,  the  dam- 
age of  which  she  was  under  the  deepest  retributive  obli- 
gation to  repair.  Like  any  other  culprit,  there  was  no 
reason  to  believe  that  she  would  voluntarily,  or  without 
the  fear  of  compulsion,  submit  to  her  sentence.  The 
maintenance  of  a  police  force  upon  the  Rhine,  under  the 
direction  of  a  League  of  Nations  or  of  a  given  number 
of  Allied  powers,  until  the  obligations  of  Germany  had 
been  complied  with,,  was  a  practical  necessity,  despite 
its  moral  objections.  It  has  been  urged  that  the  dura- 
tion of  this  occupation  and  the  charges  placed  upon 
Germany  which  the  occupation  w^as  to  enforce,  were 
both  onerous  and  impossible.     But  this  can  hardly  be 

"  Treaty  of  Versailles,   Article   42. 

455 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

said  of  the  indemnity  feature,  the  amount  of  which  was 
left  to  the  determination  of  the  Reparations  Commis- 
sion, and  whose  provisions  in  fact  completely  relieved 
Germany  of  the  Allied  war  expense.  Although  the  eco- 
nomic clauses  of  the  Treaty  seemed  to  impose  great  hard- 
ships, it  must  be  remembered  that  France,  especially, 
has  suffered  hardships  which  Germany  can  never  repair. 
To  pervert  the  Fourteen  Points  so  as  to  absolve  Ger- 
many completely  from  the  criminal  responsibility  of 
starting  and  of  continuing  the  war,  and  even  to  prevent 
all  retribution  for  such  a  responsibility  is  an  error  which 
can  only  encourage  future  aggressions.  The  punishing 
of  wrong-doing  is  no  injustice ;  in  fact,  the  absolution 
of  impenitent  wrong-doers  is  a  perversion  of  justice. 
The  League  of  Nations  indeed  aims  at  the  prevention 
of  international  crime,  but  it  would  fall  short  of  this 
purpose  if  it  neglected  to  punisli  severely  its  commission. 
Although  the  occupation  of  the  Rhenish  provinces 
does  not  necessarily  conflict  with  the  principles  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  the  solution  of  the  Saar  controversy 
is  more  difficult  to  defend.  According  to  the  Treaty, 
and  "as  compensation  for  the  destruction  of  the  coal 
mines  in  the  north  of  France  and  as  part  payment  to- 
ward the  total  reparation."  ^^  Germany  ceded  to  France 
the  full  ownership  of  the  coal  mines  of  the  Saar  basin. 
To  avoid  the  appearance  of  violating  the  will  of  the 
population  of  the  district,  it  is  to  be  governed  by  a 
Commission  of  the  League  of  Nations,  consisting  of  five 
members,  one  French,  one  a  native  of  the  Saar,  and 
three  others  representing  different  countries  other  than 
France  and  Germany.  After  fifteen  years  a  plebiscite 
will  be  held  by  communes  to   determine  whether   the 

■"  Treaty   of   Versailles,   Article  45. 

456 


FRENCH  (CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

population  wislics  lo  conlimie  under  tlie  regime  of  tlie 
League  of  Nations,  or  to  unite  with  either  France  or 
Germany.  In  any  portion  of  the  district  which  may  be 
restored  to  Germany,  the  latter  Government  must  buy 
out  the  French  mines  at  an  appraised  valuation.  And 
if  Germany  does  buy  back  the  mines,  the  League  will 
decide  how  much  of  the  coal  shall  be  annually  sold  to 
France, 

Although  the  French  demand  for  annexation  of  the 
Saar  was  rejected — as  a  violation  of  the  principle  of 
self-determination — the  compromise  appeared  so  ficti- 
tiously veiled  to  L'TIumanite,  the  Socialist  organ,  that  it 
was  moved  to  write : 

The  pai'tisans  of  a  peace  of  violence  and  of  rape  must  be 
satisfied  by  the  pi'oceedings  of  the  last  session  of  the  Council 
of  Four.  Only  economic  advantages  are  to  be  conceded  to  the 
French  capitalists  for  the  exploitation  of  the  basin  of  the 
Saar.  Some  "administrative  rights"  will  permit  the  French 
Government  to  exercise  a  "control"  over  the  basin  which  is  to 
become  a  "State  analogous  to  Luxemburg."  And  it  is  already 
announced  that  the  French  military  authorities  have  arrested 
in  this  region,  Germans  accused  of  being  at  the  same  time 
Nationals  and  Bolsheviki.  The  French  anny  takes  up  the  role 
played  by  the  Prussian  soldiery  in  their  treatment  of  the  people 
of  Alsace-Lorraine,  this  time  against  a  German  population. 
What  an  infamy!  The  bourgeois  press  pretends  that  M. 
Clemenceau  has  French  opinion  behind  him.  We  are  certain 
that  (censored )^^  will  not  be  deceived  by  this  impudent  false- 
hood. They  know,  on  the  contraiy,  that  the  real  French  peo- 
ple, those  who  woi'k  and  those  who  have  fought,  protest  with 
indignation  against  a  policy  unworthy  of  our  great  country. 
The  "khaki"  deputies  of  Lloyd  George  are  exerting  pressure 
on  the  English  Government  to  obtain  a  peace  entirely  opposed 
to  Wilsonian  principles.  The  Franklin  Bouillons  of  our 
Palais  Bourbon  lead  the  same  campaign  in  France  and 
Clemenceau  serves  them  at  his  best. 

"  Probably  the  Americans. 

457 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

These  gentlemen  may  triumph  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  But 
we  will  again  tell  them  that  their  peace  will  not  be  ratified  by 
the  people, — that  the  reoresentatives  of  the  working  class 
will  not  vote  for  it.-*' 

A  friendly  neutral,  whose  opinion  carries  more  weight 
than  that  of  L'llumanite,  likewise  wrote: 

France  at  present  offers  the  si^ectacle  of  a  man  who  loses  his 
prey  for  its  shadow.  In  order  to  have  the  Saar,  it  has  given 
up  the  help  of  President  Wilson  and  its  intimacy  with  Eng- 
land; it  follows  a  policy  whose  ultimate  consequences  will  be 
to  throw  Austria  and  Italy  back  into  the  arms  of  Germany  and 
at  the  same  time  it  prepares  for  itself  a  splendid  isolation 
in  Europe.  It  is  again  committing,  in  another  manner,  the 
disastrous  fault  of  the  Napoleons.-^ 

The  possession  of  the  Saar,  from  the  standpoint  of 
security,  did  not  appear  necessary.  The  seizure  of  its 
coal,  from  the  standpoint  of  reparation,  was  perhaps 
justified ;  but  there  seemed  to  be  scant  reason  why  the 
Treaty  did  not  stipulate  that  Germany  annually  de- 
liver to  France  the  amount  and  the  quality  of  coal 
which  the  latter  herself  wanted  to  take  from  the  Saar.^^ 

="  Issue   of  April    11,   1919. 

"  William  Martin,  in  Le  Journal  ds  Geneve,  Switzerland, 
March  19,  1919. 

"  The  principle  of  restitution  of  coal,  directly  by  Germany  and 
irrespective  of  French  ownership  of  the  mines  frorii  which  it  is 
to  come,  is  recognized  in  two  places  of  the  Treaty.  Chapter  III, 
section  37,  of  the  Annex  of  Part  III,  of  the  Treaty  (the  provisions 
governing  the  Saar),  states  that  if  the  inhabitants  of  the  Saar 
at  the  end  of  fifteen  years  vote  to  return  to  Germany,  and  after 
Germany  buys  back  the  mines  from  France,  ' '  the  French  State 
and  French  nationals  shall  have  the  right  to  purchase  such  amount 
of  coal  of  the  Saar  Basin  as  their  industrial  and  domestic  needs 
are  found  at  that  time  to  require." 

The  principle  is  more  directly  admitted  in  Article  II,  Annex 
V  of  Part  VIIT,  on  Reparation  which  states  that  "Germany 
undertakes  to  deliver  to  France  7,000,000  tons  of  coal  per  year 
for  ten  years.  In  addition,  Germany  undertakes  to  deliver  to 
Franco  annually  for  a  period  not  exceeding  ten  years  an  amount 

458 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

Such  a  solution  would  satisfy  the  French  claim  for  in- 
demnity, but  leave  inviolate  the  principle  involved.  An 
Inter-Allied  Commission  to  govern  the  district  is  cer- 
tainly a  poor  sop  to  the  self-determination  theory.  It 
will  be  noted  that  a  German  representative  upon  the 
Commission  is  carefully  exchidedj  except  the  one  "native 
of  the  Saar"  whose  vote  is  hopelessly  outweighed  by 
four  foreign  delegates.  There  is  little  assurance  that 
the  district  will  be  governed  any  differently  than  if  it 
had  been  annexed  outright  by  France.  Germany,  at 
least  for  fifteen  years,  will  be  inspired  by  the  same  de- 
sire, although  perhaps  of  less  intensity,  to  win  back 
this  district,  which  so  strongly  animated  France  from 
1871  to  1918  with  respect  to  Alsace-Lorraine.  The 
irritation  remains,  and  with  it  an  always  threatened 
peace. ^^ 

The  compromises  upon  the  question  of  German  dis- 
armament, as  affected  by  the  League  theory,  followed 
two  lines:  First,  the  treaty  did  not  provide  for  the  com- 
plete disarmament  of  Germany;  and  second,  it  pro- 
of coal  equal  to  the  difference  between  the  annual  production 
before  the  war  of  the  coal  mines  of  the  Nord  and  Pas  fl,e  Calais, 
destroyed  as  a  result  of  the  war,  and  the  production  of  the  mines 
of  the  samejirea  durinfj  the  years  in  question."  If  Germany  is  to 
make  such  a  restitution,  it  is  not  ajiparcnt  why  the  amount  of 
coal  which  Franco  is  to  derive  from  the  Saar  by  way  of  repara- 
tion could  not  be  delivered  to  her  in  a  similar  manner,  freed 
from  the  questionable  foreign  ownership  of  the  Saar  mines  which 
the  Treaty  imposes. 

"The  justification  of  the  Saar  settlement,  considered  in  the 
light  of  other  Treaty  provisions,  was  that  other  nations  were 
urging  and  virtually  obtaining  territory  to  which  they  did  not 
have  as  much  claim  as  France.  France  felt  that  her  interests 
alone,  among  the  Allies,  were  being  sacrificed  to  the  principle  of 
self-determination.  Although  one  wrong  does  not  justify  another, 
there  was  much  to  be  said  on  this  point.  The  chief  thing  against 
it,  made  while  France  was  urging  the  point,  particularly  before  the 
settlement  of  other  territorial  questions,  was  that  the  establish- 
ment of  such  a  precedent  would  lead  other  nations  to  increase 
unjustified  demands. 

459 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

vided  for  the  disarmament  of  all  nations  after  Germany- 
had  been  partially  disarmed.  But  even  so,  the  pro- 
visions as  to  disarmament  went  farther  than  the  French 
General  Staff  estimate  of  an  army  of  200,000  or  the 
American  estimate  of  an  army  of  400,000,  advised.  The 
Treaty  provided  for:  (1)  the  reduction  of  the  German 
army  to  100,000  men;  (2)  the  dispersal  of  the  German 
General  Staff,  the  number  of  its  officers  being  limited 
to  4,000;  (3)  the  recruiting  of  the  German  army  (con- 
scription being  abolished)  in  terms  of  twelve  consecu- 
tive years,  the  number  of  discharges  before  the  expira- 
tion of  that  term  not  to  exceed  in  any  year  five  per  cent 
of  the  total  effectives,  an  arrangement  designed  to  pre- 
vent the  accumulation  of  reserves;  (4)  the  dismantling 
of  all  of  German}^  's  fortifications  within  a  fifty-kilometer 
zone  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rhine,  as  well  as  on  the 
west,  within  three  months;  (5)  the  closing  of  its  muni- 
tions factories,  with  some  specific  exceptions,  and  the 
dismissal  of  their  personnel,^* 

The  purpose  of  the  policy  of  limited  disarmament  was 
to  make  possible  its  more  rigid  enforcement,  for  as  the 
experience  of  history  had  taught,  this  could  not  be  ac- 
complished if  the  complete  elimination  of  armed  forces 
was  attempted.  It  was  believed  that  Germany  would 
have  less  incentive  to  avoid  the  stipulation  of  the  Treaty 
if  she  was  allowed  an  army  large  enough  for  police  pur- 
poses. 

The  second  principle  foreshadowed  by  the  Treaty  and 
the  League  theory  was  the  eventual  disarmament  of  all 
nations.  But  this  could  not  be  contemplated  until 
Germany  had  made  amends  and  indicated  an  earnest 
intention  never  again  to  upset  the  world's  peace.    But 

"Treaty  of  Versailles,  Section  I,  Part  V,  Articles   159-213. 

460 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

at  the  same  time,  the  theory  implied  that  the  world 
never  could  return  to  a  normal  basis  so  long  as  the 
Allies  kept  Germany  in  a  state  of  disarmament  while 
they  themselves  kept  up  great  establishments  purposely 
to  subdue  Germany.  Such  was  the  policy  of  Pertinax 
and  L' Act  ion  Frangnise.  The  disarmament  of  all  na- 
tions was  not  only  essential  to  the  peace  of  the  world, 
but  it  was  the  only  thing  which  would  lead  Germany 
to  disarm  willingly.  The  immediate  fear  of  Germany, 
however,  predominated  in  the  Treaty  over  the  desire 
for  eventual  peace.  Instead  of  working  out  a  definite 
scheme  for  universal  disarmament,  the  Treaty  aims  were 
again  compromised  by  the  old  idea  of  a  necessary  Ger- 
man inferiority.     Thus  the  following  article  reads: 

The  Members  of  the  Leajjue  reeog-nize  that  the  maintenance 
of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the 
lowest  i^oint  consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforce- 
ment by  common  action  of  international  obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical  situations 
and  circumstances  of  each  State,  shall  formulate  plans  for 
effecting  such  a  reduction  for  the  consideration  and  action  of 
the  several  Governments.  .  .  .  After  these  plans  shall  have 
been  adopted  by  the  several  Governments,  the  limit  of  arma- 
ments then  fixed  shall  not  be  exceeded  without  the  occurrence 
of  the  council.-^ 

Disarmament  therefore  became  a  matter  for  each 
Government  to  decide ;  and  no  obligation  was  imposed 
on  the  respective  members.  It  is  certain  that  if  one  pow- 
er refuses,  other  powers,  however  fervently  they  may 
desire  and  believe  in  universal  disarmament,  will  hardly 
dare  to  subject  themselves  to  the  military  predominance 
of  the  objecting  power. ^^ 

"Treaty  of  Versailles,  Article  8. 

-' Althougli  France  particularly  has  eause  to  object  to  disarma- 
ment Iicfore  Germany  lias  fiilfilleil  her  Treaty  obligations,  there  are 

461 


CONTEMPORARY   FRENCH   POLITICS 

The  final  compromise  of  the  difficult  questions  arising 
at  the  Peace  Conference  was  found  in  an  alliance  be- 
tween England,  France,  and  the  United  States,  the  pur- 
pose of  which  was  the  immediate  support  of  France  in 
case  of  an  unprovoked  German  attack.  From  the  stand- 
point of  the  League  theory,  as  President  Wilson  pointed 
out  in  his  speech  at  the  Metropolitan  Opera  House,  such 
an  alliance  could  not  be  justified.  The  alliance  was  based 
on  perpetuated  international  suspicion.  In  fact,  its  pre- 
amble stated:  "The  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government  of  the  French  Republic  apprehend  that  the 
stipulations  concerning  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  cannot 
assure  immediately  to  France,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to 
the  United  States,  on  the  other,  as  signatory  powers  to 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  appropriate  security  and  pro- 
tection." 

This  certainly  implied  the  probability  of  attack,  if 
the  alliance  were  not  created  to  deter  it.  From  one 
standpoint,  this  alliance  might  be  placed  in  the  same 
category  of  necessity  as  the  military  occupation  of  the 
Rhine ;  that  is,  if  it  were  temporary  and  if  it  were  termi- 
nated with  the  fulfillment  of  the  Treaty  obligations.  But 
on  consideration  it  becomes  evident  that  this  alliance 
vitally  differed  from  the  military  occupation.  First,  its 
existence  was  not  limited — as  was  the  occupation — to 
fifteen  j'cars;  and  secondly,  it  definitely  reestablished 

at  least  two  indications  that  certain  elements  demand  relief  from 
the  burdens  of  militarism.  Thus  the  Radical  Congress,  July  26, 
1919,  voted  for  the  abolition  of  the  three-year  military  service  law 
and  the  gradual  reduction  of  disarmament  in  view  of  the  securi- 
ties offered  by  the  League  of  Nations.  But  the  Radical  party 
before  the  war  opi)Osed  the  three-year  law,  and  this  decision  may 
not  indicate  any  changed  opinion.  But  the  military  bill  intro- 
duced in  the  Senate,  and  discussed  in  September,  1919,  called 
for  the  substitution  of  a  one-year  period  in  place  of  the  present 
three-year  period,  in  view  of  the  League  securities. 

462 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  01^ A  LEAGUE 

the  old  idea  of  a  Concert  of  Nations  and  the  lialanee 
of  Power.  As  noted  previously,  the  l^'rencli  iiisistenee 
npon  Germany's  exclusion  from  the  Leajjue  provided  a 
precedent  ■which  was  log^ically  followed  by  an  alliance, 
though  a  dei'ensive  one,  against  Germany.  There  secnncd 
to  be  no  reason  why  the  protection  offered  by  tlie  alli- 
ance did  not  extend  to  Belgium ;  or  why  Italy  and  Japan 
were  excluded  from  its  membership,  that  is,  if  it  was  to 
exist  at  all.  But  why  indeed  did  it  not  become  a  uni- 
versal alliance  against  universal  offenders?  Why  should 
it  not  include  every  member  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
each  bound  to  move  against  every  member  or  non-mem- 
ber of  the  League  who  insisted  upon  upsetting  the  peace 
of  the  world? 

The  answer  to  all  of  these  inconsistencies  within  the 
League  of  Nations  Covenant  and  the  Treaty  is  quite  evi- 
dent.^^  It  lay  in  the  French  skepticism  wdth  respect  to 
the  guarantees  offered  by  the  Leaguel  In  other  words, 
France  might  have  been  willing  to  surrender  the  guar- 
antees, economic  and  military,  which  the  Saar  settle- 
ment and  the  Alliance  gave  her,  if  a  League  of  Nations 
had  been  constituted  with  real  force  and  sanction,  com- 
pelling the  arbitration  of  disputes,  and  preventing  un- 

"  The  real  inconsistencies  of  the  Peace  Treaty  and  the  Fourteen 
Points  (lid  not  so  much  come  with  the  terms  arising  from  the 
French  demands  for  territory  and  the  Alliance.  They  came  in  the 
Central  and  Eastern  European  settlement,  where  the  self-deter- 
mination principle  was  frequently  violated,  to  prevent  the  future 
growth  of  a  strong  Germany.  These  latter  terms,  as  seen  in  the 
prevention  of  German  Austria's  union  with  Germany,  were  inspired 
by  the  French  peace  delegation,  to  enact  a  strategic  substitute  for 
that  which  the  League  failed  to  provide.  Incidentally,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  Gonferoncc,  by  pitifully  re<lucing  Austria  to 
nearly  an  economic  and  political  nonentity,  gave  it  the  strongest 
possible  incentive  for  union  with  Germany,  an  event  which  though 
it  temporarily  may  have  thwarted,  will  eventually  and  inevitably 
assert  itself.  At  least,  that  is  the  teaching  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
and  of  Poland, 

463 


CONTEMPOJIARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

warranted  attacks  by  means  of  an  international  police 
force.  If  a  League  policy  had  been  adopted  which  would 
have  assumed,  to  a  partial  extent,  France's  war  in- 
debtedness, slie  doubtless  would  have  easily  relented  in 
the  matter  of  the  Saar.  This  is  not  to  absolve  France 
from  a  hopeless  attachment  to  a  "European"  settle- 
ment, but  it  is  merely  to  point  out  that  the  construc- 
tion of  a  vigorous  League  of  Nations,  invested  with  a 
sanction  to  enforce  its  will,  would  have  gone  a  long  way 
toward  loosing  that  attachment.  The  failure  to  estab- 
lish such  a  League  led  to  the  insistence  upon  the  old  de- 
vices of  frontiers  and  alliances.^* 

The  success  of  the  League  idea  in  securing  the  repu- 
diation of  the  Rhine  frontier  and  the  outright  annexa- 
tion of  the  Saar  was  bitterly  resented  by  the  French 
public.  The  Alliance  might  be  an  equivalent  security, 
it  was  argued ;  but  there  was  no  assurance  that  England 
or  America,  through  their  legislative  bodies,  would  sup- 
port such  an  arrangement.  Frenchmen  had  no  reason  to 
believe  that  the  United  States  Senate  would  ratify  the 
Alliance,  which  imposes  so  many  more  definite  obliga- 
tions than  the  League  upon  America,  any  more  than  it 
would  ratify  a  League  of  Nations.-^  Furthermore,  if  the 
Alliance  did  become  effective,  what  would  insure  British 
or  American  adherence  to  it  fifty  years  hence?  Good 
faith,  they  argued,  was  not  as  satisfying  a  security  as  the 
incorporation  and  garrisoning  of  the  Rhinelands  by 
France.  This  idea  was  repeatedly  expressed  during  the 
debate  on  ratification,  not  only  by  the  Royalists,  but  by 

"On  January  19,  1919,  L'Echo  dc  Paris  wrote:  "For  us 
French,  there  is  only  one  means  of  appreciating  the  worth  of  the 
Leagues  of  Nations  wliich  are  proposed  to  us.  In  what  ways 
do  they  assure  our  security  on  the  Rhine,  the  most  exjposed  region 
in  the  world?" 

'*See  pp.  173,  174. 

464 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

such  conservatives  as  Charles  Benoist.  Even  after  the 
ratification  of  the  Treaty  by  the  French  Chamber  on 
October  2,  Maurice  Barres  explained,  to  a  carefully  at- 
tentive audience  (October  3),  a  plan  for  the  French 
colonization  of  the  Rhinelands,  virtually  amounting  to 
annexation.^" 

It  is  easy  to  maintain  that  even  if  the  French  idea 
of  a  League  of  Nations  had  been  incorporated  in  the 
Covenant,  there  would  have  been  a  demand  for  the  guar- 
antees of  the  Old  Diplomacy.  But  it  is  equally  reason- 
able, however,  to  believe  that  they  would  neither  have 
been  so  insistent  nor  so  universal.  The  League  of  Na- 
tions, as  finally  constituted,  was  considered  by  French 
opinion  as  lacking  the  most  essential  elements  of 
strength.  It  came  not  as  a  substitution  for,  but  in  addi- 
tion to,  the  old  principles  of  the  Balance  of  Power.  The 
important  thing  to  be  noted,  however,  is  that  the  theory 
of  the  League  was  finally  accepted — along  with  the  prin- 
ciples embodied  in  the  Fourteen  Points.  The  League 
was  born.  If  it  is  properly  protected  during  its  infancy, 
the  jealous  guardians  of  the  Balance  of  Power  may  not 
be  successful  in  killing  it  off,  as  they  are  now  bent  on 
doing.    The  critical  stage  is  already  at  hand. 

The  responsibility  for  the  failure  to  provide  the 
League  of  Nations  with  the  security  upon  which  France 
justly  insisted  was  largely  due  to  the  American  Peace 
Delegation.  Although  doubtless  favorable  to  a  struc- 
ture of  the  French  design  (as  pointed  out),  fear  of  op- 

""  In  the  course  of  his  address  he  said :  ' '  We  ask  that  every 
measure  be  taken  to  associate  more  intimately  the  Rhinelands 
with  France  through  commerce,  through  ways  of  communication, 
through  coordination  of  railway  taritl's,  through  a  program  of 
public  works,  through  banking  and  cooperative  institutions,  and 
through  the  coordination  of  labor  and  social  laws.  To  this  end 
there  shouhl  be  created  without  delay,  mixed  commissions  com- 
posed of  Rhinelanders  and  Frenelimen. " 

465 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

position  at  home  compelled  the  vetoing  of  any  project 
placing  definite  burdens  upon  the  United  States.  Con- 
sequently, every  Frenchman  conscious  of  the  German 
menace,  every  one  upon  whom  fell  the  responsibility 
of  the  national  defense,  would  have  been  recreant  to  his 
country's  cause  if  he  did  not  urge,  at  least,  the  Alliance 
to  supplement  the  hazy  guarantees  of  a  League,  whose 
whole  principle  the  American  Senate  might  reject. 
Looking  at  it  in  this  light,  M.  Clemenceau  pursued  as  a 
patriot  the  only  policy  possible,  and  Mr.  Wilson,  in  the 
face  of  a  fast-developing  home  opposition  to  a  "gen- 
uine" league,  found  himself  obliged  to  acquiesce. 

Mr.  Wilson  has  been  bitterly  attacked  for  acceding 
to  many  compromises  respecting  his  avowed  principles. 
He  has  been  accused  of  frivolously  and  recklessly  con- 
doning the  violation  of  all  of  his  Fourteen  Points,  ex- 
cept the  fourteenth,  which  called  for  the  creation  of  the 
League.  But  had  it  not  been  for  the  idea  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  overshadowing  the  proceedings  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  one  shudders  to  consider  what  the  settlement 
might  have  resulted  in.  It  seems  certain  that  the 
"secret  treaties"  would  not  only  have  been  enforced, 
but  they  would  also  have  been  exaggerated.  When 
viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  "how  much  worse  the 
Treaty  might  have  been,"  it  may  be  considered  remark- 
able that  Mr.  Wilson  achieved  so  much. 

France,  perhaps,  has  been  too  insistent  upon  her  own 
security,  for  it  appears  unlikely  that  Germany  will  soon 
be  in  a  position  again  to  attempt  to  conquer  the  world. 
But  there  has  been  something  very  much  larger  involved 
in  the  Peace  Settlement  than  the  mere  "fixing"  of  Ger- 
many. A  "peace"  erected  on  such  a  basis  cannot,  by 
its  very  nature,  endure.  Europe  is  large  enough  for 
a  strong  Germany  and  a  strong  France.     In  fact,  the 

466 


FRENCH  CONCEPTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

happy  future  of  Europe  depends  upon  the  existence  of 
tliese  two  nations — not  antagonistic  toward  each  other, 
but  cooperating  with  each  other.  It  was  the  Marquis  de 
Gabriac,  the  first  (;harge  d'affaires  that  France  sent  to 
Berlin  after  the  War  of  1870,  who  said:  "The  two  na- 
tions (France  and  Germany)  are  not  predestined  to 
mutual  extermination.  They  are  two  strong  races,  of 
dill'erent  aptitudes,  but  they  ought  to  live  side  by  side 
in  good  understanding  united  by  the  ties  of  a  common 
civilization.  ..."  It  is  the  hope  of  such  an  under- 
standing, and  this  hope  alone,  which  makes  the  success 
of  a  true  League  of  Nations  an  enduring  possibility. 


CHAPTER  XV 


WHAT  PRANCE  THOUGHT  OF  AMERICAN       IDEALISM 


Intellectuel:  individu  qui  ne  persvxide  que  la  societe  doit  se 
fonder  sur  la  logique  et  qui  meconnait  qu'elle  repose  en  fait  sur 
drs  vecessites  anterieures  et  peut-etre  etrangeres  a  la  raison  in- 
dividuelle. — Maurice  BaerIis. 


One  of  the  greatest  tributes  that  Paris  ever  paid  to 
a  visiting  statesman  was  its  reception  of  President  Wil- 
son in  December,  1918.  The  Etoile  has  presided  over 
many  such  triumphal  entries ;  it  has  seen  the  royalty  of 
Europe  greeted  with  enthusiasm ;  it  has  seen  its  own 
men  of  valor  welcomed  with  pride.  But  that  beautiful 
arch,  now  looming  more  proudly  than  ever  at  the  far 
end  of  the  Champs  Elysees,  never  witnessed  an  ovation 
of  more  cordiality  than  that  which  the  President  re- 
ceived. In  him  the  people  of  Paris  and  the  people  of 
France  at  last  beheld  the  true  symbol  of  peace.  The 
embodiment  of  the  spirit  of  America,  he  stood  forth 
as  the  spokesman  of  a  new  international  order,  destined 
definitely  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  the  miseries  and 
privations  which  Europe  had  suffered  during  five  apoc- 
alyptic years. 

Not  only  did  the  unorganized  masses  show  the  most 
spontaneous  enthusiasm,  but  every  organized  political 
element  in  France  was  more  than  generous  in  its  recep- 

468 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

tion  and  in  its  acclamation.  L'llumanitc,  the  official  jour- 
nal of  the  Socialist  party,  issued  a  special  edition  in  the 
President's  honor  on  the  day  of  his  arrival;  in  its  col- 
iims  such  writers  as  Anatole  France  and  Romain  Rol- 
land  praised  him  in  the  highest  panegyrics.  Many  of 
the  newspapers  printed  the  President's  biography.  They 
recalled  with  what  "skill"  the  President  led  America 
into  the  war.  They  characterized  and  praised  him  both 
as  an  idealist  and  a  realist;  and  they  pointed  to  his 
share  in  the  raising  of  an  army  of  3,000,000  men 
from  among  an  "inherently  pacifist  people"  as  a  re- 
markable achievement.  Journals  of  the  Right  as  well 
as  of  the  Left  united  in  this  common  admiration ;  each 
found  in  the  President  an  interpreter  of  their  own 
philosophies.  L' Action  Frangaise,  the  monarchist  mouth- 
piece, saw  in  Mr.  Wilson  "one  of  the  three  political 
directors,  who,  with  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau, 
was  able  to  crown  the  glorious  decision  of  the  war." 
La  Croix,  a  clerical  paper,  called  him  I'amii  de  la  jus- 
tice, who  at  the  same  time  would  surely  recognize  the 
necessity  of  an  American  alliance  with  France  to  insure 
the  freedom  of  democracy.  Auguste  Gauvain  in  Le 
Journal  dcs  Dcbats  assured  his  readers  that  the  legiti- 
mate interests  of  France  would  not  encounter  any  re- 
sistance from  the  President;  while  Le  Temps  asserted 
that  the  President  would  surely  sympathize  with  French 
insistence  upon  real  guarantees  of  future  peace. 

The  Socialist  press,  represented  by  the  L'Heure,  ex- 
pressed Labor  sentiment  in  an  article  by  Marcel  Sembat, 
entitled,  "From  What  He  Saves  Us;  Whither  He  Leads 
Us": 

He  has  saved  us  from  a  German  peace  which,  as  we  know 
from  the  text  furnished  by  Count  Bernstorff,  would  have  been 

469 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

enforced  upon  us.  He  leads  us  to  ends  opposite  from  those 
which  our  diplomats  have  in  view.  For  these,  as  well  as  for  a 
great  number  of  other  Frenchmen,  Bismarck  remains  the 
model  and  the  guide.  They  would  prepare  for  us  a  Bis- 
marckian  peace,  a  peace  of  oppression,  an  anned-to-the-teeth 
peace.  .  .  .  Upon  this  ideal  Wilson  turns  his  back.  He  has 
another  plan.  .  .  .  His  ideal  is  the  disanuament  of  the  world 
within  the  Society  of  Nations. 


Upon  the  day  of  the  President's  arrival  in  Paris,  the 
General  Confederation  of  Labor  and  the  Unified  So- 
cialist party  joined  in  a  declaration  which  they  pre- 
sented to  Mr.  Wilson.  In  this  document  they  asserted 
Labor's  sympathy  with  the  President's  idealism;  they 
warned  him  of  the  overwhelming  forces  arrayed  against 
him,  and  of  the  designs  he  would  have  to  thwart.  They 
had  planned  an  immense  manifestation  of  working  men 
in  his  honor,  apart  from  the  general  welcome  which  Paris 
had  prepared.  But  the  Government  refused  its  authori- 
zation to  this  ceremony  as  the  only  effect  of  it  would 
have  been  to  antagonize  public  opinion  and  to  inject 
into  the  President 's  reception  a  spirit  of  class  conscious- 
ness. 

L' Europe  No'uvelle,  liberal  in  opinion,  said  in  its  num- 
ber of  December  14,  1918 : 

At  the  very  hour  when  these  lines  appear,  President  Wilson 
will  have  made  his  solemn  entry  into  the  capital  of  the 
Entente. 

All  the  people  of  Paris,  all  the  true  sons  of  French  democ- 
racy will  be  there,  present  in  body,  their  hands  stretched 
forth  to  their  Apostle.  With  enthusiasm  and  also  with  re- 
spect, they  will  greet  this  Messiah  of  Peace,  of  the  Just 
Peace. 

No  king,  no  emperor,  ever  received  a  similar  welcome. 

He  is  not  yet  here,  but  we  already  seem  to  breathe  a  purer 
air. 

470 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

With  his  presence,  a  new  era  of  justice,  of  reason  and  of 
understanding  will  open.  .  .  . 

The  democracies  of  the  Entente  have  the  insecure  feeling 
that  certain  diplomatic  circles  have  not  completely  renounced 
the  spirit  which  guided  the  negotiations  of  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna  in  their  selfish  work. 

And  it  is  because  they  have  learned  the  rude  lesson  of 
actual  conflict,  because  they  well  know  that  the  words  "social 
reconstruction,"  "political  regeneration,"  or  "durable  peace," 
are  not  vain  words  to-day — dust  thrown  in  their  faces  by  the 
diplomats  of  the  Paris  Conference,  that  they  look  with  con- 
fidence, that  they  greet  with  an  intense  and  a  profound  joy, 
this  new  man  in  whom  they  have  placed  all  their  hopes  in  a 
better  future  for  mankind.  .  .  . 

The  hounds  bay;  the  caravan  passes.  Mr.  Wilson  is  a 
man  of  wisdom.  And  we  who  have  never  ceased  in  these 
columns  to  besj^eak  the  confidence  with  which  this  just  and 
righteous  man  inspires  us,  we,  convinced  democrats,  who  have 
alwaj's  regarded  him  as  the  leader  of  modern  democracies, 
greet  his  coming  to-day  as  the  dawn  of  a  new  era  toward  which, 
though  displeasing  to  the  timid,  to  the  greedy  or  to  the  slug- 
gard, an  irresistible  force  impels  the  peoples  of  the  world. 


II 

Underlying  all  the  cordiality  expressed  toward  the 
President,  there  was,  however,  from  the  outset,  a  certain 
distrust — even  fear.  To  certain  circles  this  amounted 
to  open  suspicion ;  to  others  it  bordered  upon  bitter  dis- 
like. The  imperialists, — and  to  the  credit  of  France, 
they  were  few, — saw  in  the  Fourteen  Points  a  definite 
impasse  checking  their  ambitions.  They  felt  that  they 
were  to  be  unjustly  robbed  of  spoils  which  Germany 
would  have  taken  had  she  won  the  war.  The  conserva- 
tives (including  many  of  the  so-called  Radicals)  felt 
that  the  security  of  France  was  to  be  sacrificed  for  some 
vague   ideal — perhaps  sound   in   theory,  but  certainly 

471 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

incapable  of  execution.  As  for  the  liberals — but  there 
are  no  liberals  in  France  as  far  as  the  new  internation- 
alism is  concerned !  To  all  Frenchmen  alike  the  Ger- 
man menace  is  too  real.  Four  times  it  has  crossed  the 
Rhine ;  four  times  it  has  been  driven  back  again.  With 
the  exception  of  the  last,  its  coming  has  been  followed 
by  the  loss  of  French  territory — living  parts  of  France. 
The  unspeakable  miseries  of  the  last  four  years  of  fight- 
ing— though  the  end  was  won — can  never  be  forgotten. 
The  terrible  foreboding  of  a  future  German  victory  was 
never  more  firmly  imbedded  in  the  French  mind.  Secur- 
ity against  future  attacks  and  guarantees  against  a  Ger- 
man revanche,  are  the  principles  which  must  dominate 
French  foreign  policy.  The  means  by  which  this  se- 
curity is  obtained  is  immaterial — it  may  or  may  not  sac- 
rifice "principles."  Certainty  is  the  thing.  To  the 
French  nation  liberal  principles  applied  internationally, 
meant  uncertainty!  Hence  they  questioned  them.  Apart 
from  the  Socialist  press,  wiiieh  made  of  internationalism 
a  purely  class  issue,  no  newspaper  in  Paris  sincerely  and 
whole-heartedly  supported  the  full  application  of  the 
principles  of  which  the  President  had  become  the  cham- 
pion. 

Open  opposition  to  the  things  for  which  the  American 
Peace  Delegation  stood  was  preceded  by  a  readjustment 
of  personal  estimates.  The. American  army  had  come  to 
France  filled  with  enthusiasm  and  with  somewhat  of  an 
appreciation  of  the  French.  Yet,  because  of  difference 
in  language,  the  disparity  of  social  customs,  and  count- 
less "little  things"  there  were  many  misunderstandings. 
French  shopkeepers  were  repeatedly  accused  of  over- 
charging Americans.  It  was  alleged  that  there  was  one 
price  for  them  and  one  for  the  French.  Generosity  and 
considerateness  were  not  to  be  found  among  French  com- 

472 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

incrc'ial  virtues.  As  a  mattor  of  fact,  as  Americans 
found  on  returning  to  the  United  States,  overcharging 
was  no  more  prevalent  in  France  than  in  America.  In 
both  countries,  profiteers  appeared  anxious  to  drain  the 
soldiery.  Morality  is  not  delimitated  by  lines  of  nation- 
ality ;  but  the  average  doughboy  in  France  made  of  it 
a  diplomatic  issue.  A  still  greater  prejudice  was 
aroused  by  the  thousands  of  prostitutes  who  thronged 
the  streets  of  practically  every  town  where  soldiers 
were  stationed.  Perhaps  this  was  an  inevitable 
accompaniment  of  war,  but  the  French  authorities 
appeared  to  be  clearly  negligent  in  controlling  the 
situation.  As  a  result,  too  many  Americans  drew 
their  opinions  of  French  women  from  those  they 
saw  on  the  streets;  consequently,  to  most  of  them, 
France  was  the  most  immoral  nation  in  the  world.  They 
failed,  through  no  fault  of  their  own,  to  meet  the  real 
France,  to  know  the  essential  piety  of  the  French  family, 
to  understand,  in  short,  the  French  point  of  view. 
The  French,  on  the  other  hand,  gained  a  similar  opin- 
ion of  the  Americans.  The  conduct  of  many  members 
of  the  A.  E.  F.  was  discreditable.  From  the  irrepressi- 
ble action  of  many  permissionaires,  coming  to  leave 
areas  for  a  week,  with  no  expenses  to  meet  and  per- 
haps several  months'  pay  to  spend,  many  Frenchmen 
came  to  believe  seriously  that  the  chief  social  interests 
of  Americans  were  limited  to  the  demi-monde  and  cog- 
nac. Le  Matin,  upon  January  27,  1919,  printed  the 
following  significant  statement: 

Official  statistics  give  for  the  month  of  December  just  past, 
a  total  of  34  murders,  220  clay  or  night  attacks,  and 
nearly  500  bloody  encounters,  caused  by  American  soldiers  in 
the  single  department  of  the  Seine. 

473 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  these  figures  were  carelessly 
and  tactlessly  exaggerated.  The  bases  of  these  mutual 
prejudices  were  completely  and  equally  unsound.  But 
their  existence  could  not  help  but  prejudice  America's 
position  at  the  Peace  Table. 


Ill 


America's  entrance  into  the  war  had  been  accom- 
panied, in  France,  by  a  sort  of  halo.  Her  assistance  had 
been  invaluable ;  yet  both  Americans  and  Frenchmen 
had  perhaps  overprized  it.  When  the  war  ended  a  re- 
action naturally  set  in.  The  average  Frenchman  could 
not  fail  to  compare  the  casualty  lists  of  the  two  nations. 
It  was  only  natural  for  him  then  to  believe  that  Amer- 
ica had  been  given  too  much  credit.  America  had  de- 
rived great  profits  from  the  war,  America  had  been  in 
the  war  a  year — France,  five.  Yet  now  it  came  before 
the  Peace  Conference  to  dictate  peace.  Indeed  the  sur- 
prising thing  about  this  changing  attitude  lay  in  the 
fact  that  it  was  not  expressed  more  forcibly.  French- 
men were  very  courteous  in  repressing  what  they  surely 
must  have  thought,  and  they  were  equally  tolerant  in 
listening  to  repeated  boastings  of  American  superiority. 
Those  who  did  give  vent  to  their  feeling  appeared  to  be 
dominated  more  by  desires  which  the  presence  of  Amer- 
ica thwarted  than  by  a  wish  to  secure  France  a  just  part 
in  the  peace  deliberations. 

An  interesting  article  appeared  in  Le  Eire  de  Paris,  a 
popular  weekly,  shortly  after  the  armistice  had  been 
signed,  upon  the  value  of  American  participation  in  the 
war.  It  stated  that  up  to  April  6,  1918,  the  United 
States  only  manufactured  880,000  .75  shells,  a  number 

474 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

which  at  the  time  of  the  sig^iiature  of  the  armistice  had 
increased  to  2,400,000.  In  August,  the  daily  production 
did  not  reach  50,000.  The  production  of  shells  of  a 
larger  caliber  was  even  less.  France,  on  the  other  hand, 
turned  out  300,000  shells  a  day.  In  ten  days  it  pro- 
duced all  the  shells  which  the  United  States  manufac- 
tured in  twenty  months.  Of  course,  American  produc- 
tion would  have  increased  had  the  war  lasted,  but  it  is 
upon  actualities,  not  surmises,  that  judgment  should  be 
passed.  The  United  States  sent  109  cannon  to  France 
up  to  September,  1918.  But  no  American  .75 's  came 
from  American  factories  up  to  the  time  of  the  armistice, 
and  the  first  tubes  for  the  155  mm.  guns  were  not  ex- 
pected until  ]\Iarch,  1919.  As  a  result,  France  furnished 
the  United  States  armies  with  its  field  artillery,  amount- 
ing to  22,000  .75 's — enough  to  equip  eighty  divisions. 
Out  of  the  4,000  aeroplanes  used  by  the  Americans, 
2,700  were  furnished  by  the  French. 

La  Vieille-France,  perhaps  the  most  anti-American 
paper  in  France,  likewise  said  that  America  and  Presi- 
dent Wilson  aspired  to  regulate  the  affairs,  the  con- 
stitution, and  the  frontiers  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  all 
for  having  brought  over  109  cannon  and  lost  36,154  men 
in  the  war !  ^ 

IV 

The  next  line  of  attack  had  as  its  result  the  attempt 
to  discredit  the  President  as  misrepresenting  the  will 
of  the  American  people.  As  far  back  as  October,  1918, 
L'Echo  de  Paris,  through  its  American  correspondent, 
Welliver,  gave  great  prominence  to  the  Republican  op- 
position to  the  President.  There  was  scarcely  a  criticism 
'  Issue  of  February  13,  1919. 

475 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

which  this  journal  did  not  repeat.  Such  papers  as  Le 
Matin  and  Le  Petit  Parisien,  on  the  other  hand,  at- 
tempted to  interpret  American  opinion  more  sympa- 
thetically. Instead  of  quoting  entirely  from  the  anti- 
AVilson  press  in  America,  especially  with  respect  to  the 
significance  of  the  November  elections,  they  quoted 
organs  like  the  New  York  Times,  which  did  not  con- 
sider their  results  so  much  a  criticism  of  the  Presi- 
dent's foreign  policy,  as  determined  by  purely  domestic 
issues.  This  attitude  L' Europe  Nouvelle  also  main- 
tained. In  regard  to  the  opposition  of  such  men  as 
Roosevelt,  Lodge,  and  Penrose,  this  journal  very  boldly 
said  that  "they  support  as  a  domestic  policy,  the  main- 
tenance of  the  trust  regime  and  an  impassable  tariff 
wall ;  as  a  foreign  policy  they  desire  the  creation  of  a 
permanent  army  and  a  powerful  navy,  the  one  and  the 
other  for  the  service  of  imperialist  aims"! 

La  Vieille-Fratnce,  with  its  customary  exaggeration, 
was  still  more  naively  critical : 

It  has  been  observed  that  Mr.  "Wilson  is  surrounded  nearly 
exclusively  by  politicians  from  the  southern  states.  This  is 
natural  since  Mr.  "Wilson  was  elected  by  the  Democratic  party 
and  since  the  southern  states  are  Democratic  against  the 
Republican  North,  slave  holders  against  abolitionists.  Thus 
we  understand  why  our  Bolshe\'iki,  our  Thomas-Renaudels 
.  .  .  who  lead  their  following  of  stupefied  proletariats  around 
as  slaves,  acclaim  the  American  slave-owning  party! 

This  was  certainly  a  remarkable  explanation  of  the 
Socialist  support  of  the  President ! 

Andre  Cheradame,  in  numerous,  outspoken  articles 
in  La  Democruiie  XouvcUe,  continued  an  attempt  to 
show  the  existence  of  a  breach  between  ]\lr.  "Wilson  and 
the  American  people.  He  endeavored  to  prove  that  the 
President  directly  contradicted  his  mandates  and  ex- 

476 


I 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

peeded  his  powers  by  not  consulting  the  Senate  during 
the  peace  negotiations.  According  to  him,  for  more  than 
six  months,  the  most  important  Senators  at  Washing- 
ton, Senator  Lodge  at  their  head,  declared,  with  in- 
creasing insistence,  "We  wish  a  complete  victory  over 
Germany — that  is,  a  dictated  peace.  Consequently  we 
are  opposed  to  any  negotiated  peace  which  the  Hun  crim- 
inals would  be  permitted  to  discuss.  We  entered  the 
war  with  two  well-determined  and  definite  ends :  to  save 
France  and  to  put  an  end  to  the  Pan-German  peril  by 
imposing  on  Germany  conditions  of  peace  so  radical  that 
she  can  never  commence  again.  But  now,  before  realiz- 
ing these  objects,  it  is  said  to  us:  'First  form  a  League 
of  Nations,  then  we  will  settle  the  war.'  But  such  a 
general  League  of  Nations  constitutes  an  entirely  differ- 
ent aim  from  that  which  determined  our  exceptional  in- 
tervention in  Europe.  A  League  of  Nations  would  en- 
gulf us  in  obligations  much  heavier  than  those  which 
we  wish  to  assume.  We  cannot  with  any  exactitude  de- 
termine what  would  be  its  consequences.  We  Ameri- 
cans desire  then  first  to  settle  the  war  in  conformity 
with  the  principles  which  determined  our  intervention." 
According  to  M,  Cheradame,  this  was  the  opinion  which 
the  American  electorate  emitted  during  the  election  of 
November  6.  Consequently,  the  President,  in  pursuing 
his  intention  to  incorporate  the  League  in  the  Treaty, 
was  violating  the  expressed  wish  of  the  American  peo- 
ple. In  another  editorial,  he  spoke  of  Senator  Lodge  as 
the  most  representative  man  in  the  United  States  Sen- 
ate charged  with  ratifying  the  Treaty,  and  that  "the 
Senate  at  Washington  reflects  American  opinion,"  and 
that,  "it  will  not  consent  to  ratify  a  Treaty  resulting  in 
the  assassination  of  tlie  France  of  Lafayette  and  of 
Rochambeau."     The  author  of  the  above  now  is  prob- 

477 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

ably  aware  that  he  somewhat  misinterpreted  American 
opinion ;  but  such  editorials  had  an  unsettling  effect 
upon  French  political  thought.^ 

Personal  attacks  against  the  President  went  to  even 
greater  lengths.  Thus  the  irrepressible  Urbain  Gohier, 
returning  to  the  charge,  spread  across  the  entire  cover 
of  La  Vieille-France  the  following : 

RESTITUTIONS DROIT    DES    PEUPLES 

Hurrah 

pour  le  President  Wilson 

qui  va  rendre 

a  la  France 

(coupe — [censored] ) 

Encore  un  lapin! 

m         *         *         *         *         m         * 

Nous  supplions  M.  Wilson 

d'arreter  les  inondations 
m         *****         m 

Nous  supplions  M.  Wilson 

de  nous  donner 

notre  charbon  quotidien. 

In  the  same  issue  M.  Gohier  assailed  Mr.  Henry 
White,  one  of  the  members  of  the  American  Peace  Dele- 
gation, He  charged  him  with  the  grievous  crime  of 
having  married  his  daughter  to  Count  Von  Scherr-Thoss, 
a  German  officer,  of  visiting  the  Kaiser  upon  numerous 
occasions,  and  a  month  after  the  declaration  of  war, 
of  writing  the  following  to  the  Kreuzzeitung  of  Berlin : 

Every  American  who  knows  Gennany  will  be  a  friend  of 
the  Germans.     Everybody  wlio  has  seen  the  holy  earnestness 

'  In  ono  issue,  M.  Ch^radame  expressed  the  belief  that  the 
American  censor  was  keeping  from  the  French  public  the  division 
of  opinion  in  the   United  States  as  to  the  Treaty,  etc. 

478 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

and  (he  iron-like  \vill-])()wer  wliicli  every  German  sliows  in  ful- 
filliiifi:  his  duty  toward  the  Fatherland  .  .  .  cannot  believe  that 
Genuaiiy's  defeat  is  possible. 

M.  Goliier  then  inquires,  "Just  how  well  docs  Mr. 
Henry  White  fit  in  as  an  American  delegate?" 

La  Vieille-France  certainly  possesses,  with  all  of  its 
defects,  what  the  French  term  the  "virtue  of  indiscre- 
tion." 

Charles  Maurras  was  also  critical : 

A  magistrate  foreii^a  to  France  and  even  to  our  continent, 
escapes  all  responsibility.  .  .  .  We  are  not  a  herd  of  sheep 
with  whose  pasturage  and  protection  he  is  charged.^ 

After  the  President's  New  York  March  address  in 
which  he  charged  European  statesmen  with  having 
neither  valor,  foresight,  nor  prudence,  M.  Maurras 
wrote : 

If  the  sentence  is  not  explained  or  denied,  what  will  prevent 
the  statesmen  of  the  old  Europe  from  calling  the  President's 
attention  to  the  example  afforded  by  the  Italian  Cabinet, 
which  from  the  tenth  month  of  the  war,  entered  it  for  prin- 
ciples of  morality  and  the  welfare  of  man;  the  English  Cab- 
inet, who  joined  this  holy  cause  fully  armed  from  the  second 
day;  and  the  Belgian  Cabinet,  which  was  ready  under  arms 
from  the  first? 

Valor,  Prudence,  Foresight ;  0  cardinal  virtues  of  the  Amer- 
ican moralist,  where  were  you  then?  In  the  cabinets  of  Albert 
I,  George  V,  and  Victor  Emmanuel  III,  hereditary  sovereigns 
of  the  old  continent,  or  in  the  cabinet  of  the  autocrat  of  the 
new  world,  to  whom  more  than  two  yeai-s  an3  a  half  of  hesita- 
tion were  necessary  to  make  up  his  mind  to  take  the  terrible 
step?  O  Valor,  0  Prudence,  O  Foresight,  remove  our  doubts. 
Foresight,  Prudence,  Valor,  respond  !* 

M.  Maurras  wields  at  least  a  trenchant  pen. 


*  L' Action  Fran^aise,  February  11,  1919. 
*Ibid.,  March  8,  1919. 

479 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 


Yet  another  charge — more  sincere  and  reasonable — 
brought  agamst  American  idealism,  was  its  impractica- 
bility. "It  is  very  well  for  you  Americans  to  have  such 
lofty  principles,"  these  critics  would  say,  "but  you  live 
far  from  the  neighborhood  of  a  traditional  enemy  whose 
temper  is  eternally  hostile,  one  who  will  seize  every  op- 
portunity to  attack.  You  have  no  frontiers  to  guard 
or  to  dispute.  Finally,  the  full  application  of  your 
ideals  will  only  result  in  the  liberation  of  dozens  of 
minor  nationalities,  totally  unable  to  defend  them- 
selves! Europe  will  become  Balkanized  and  if  any  one 
profits  by  the  situation  it  will  be  Germany." 

In  such  a  tone,  L' Act  ion  Frangaise  wrote: 

Too  often  and  over-ambitiously  it  has  been  declared  that 
a  new  Europe  is  about  to  be  constructed.  What  sort  of 
Europe  are  they  going  to  build  for  us?  A  simple  heap  of 
rubbish,  from  which  a  Germany  has  already  emerged,  the 
only  state  in  this  chaos  to  possess  a  form.  .  .  . 

The  policy  founded  on  the  principle  of  nationalities  and 
the  right  of  peoples  has  failed  before  even  receiving  its  in- 
tegral application  or  the  consecration  of  treaties.  The  other 
policy — that  of  the  balance  of  power,  has  been  held  up  to 
contempt.  It  is  always  easy  to  make  light  of  physical  laws — 
or  those  of  expeiience.  This  conceit  never  fails  to  bring  its 
own  punishment.    But  the  pity  of  it  all  is  that  France  will  be 

the  first  to  feel  the  revenge  of  realities.  .  .  .^ 

• 

It  was  the  American  doctrine  of  the  rights  of  na- 
tionalities which  led  to  the  destruction  of  the  Austro- 
Ilungarian  Empire,  many  Frenchmen  said.  This  dis- 
solution led  to  the  Italian-Jugo-Slav  conflict  over  Fiume, 
to  the  Roumanian-Serbian  conflict  over  the  Banat,  and 

"Issue  of  February  14,  1919. 

480 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

to  the  Czecho-Polish  imbroglio  over  Toschen.  This  same 
doctrine  threatened  the  dissolution  of  Russia,  and  led  to 
disputes  in  Turkey,  in  Asia  ]\Iinor,  and  in  the  Dode- 
canese. Finally,  it  was  quoted  in  support  of  disturb- 
ing revolts  in  the  British  protectorate  of  Egypt  and  in 
the  Empire  of  India.  It  lent  fire  to  the  Irish  move- 
ment. In  sum,  American  principles,  the  President's 
principles,  shook  the  old  fabric  of  Europe  to  its  founda- 
tion ;  they  were  destructive,  for  they  were  not  strong 
enough  to  be  constructive.  In  the  opinion  of  many 
Frenchmen  they  wreaked  a  damage  which  will  keep 
Europe  in  constant  turmoil  for  years,  a  turmoil  from 
which  will  arise  a  new,  a  more  powerful  Germany.  Such 
was  the  belief  of  those  Frenchmen  to  whom  order 
seemed  more  important  than  national  ideals.  They 
failed  to  realize  that  the  absence  of  the  second  would 
eventually  upset  the  first. 

L'Echo  de  Paris,  through  the  violent  pen  of  Pertinax, 
voiced  its  exasperation  at  such  a  state  of  affairs  in  these 
words :  "  Is  it  possible  that  mere  idealism  should  longer 
obstruct  the  achievement  of  a  victory  so  dearly  won  ? "  ^ 

Le  Figaro  said,  "His  (the  President's)  philosophy 
to-day  causes  our  vanquished  enemies  to  rely  upon  his 
ideas  to  contest  the  reality  of  our  victory ;  and  they 
will  invoke  his  name  to-morrow  in  refusing  us  its 
fruits."^  Jacques  Bainville,  likewise  said  that  these 
principles,  "put  into  articles  of  a  treaty,  will  engender 
catastrophes." 

But  while  the  conservative  element  in  France  was 
thus  loudly  insistent  upon  the  uselessness  of  American 
idealism,  the  Socialist  press,  of  course,  resented  such  a 
contention.     It  maintained  that  only  the  application  of 

"March    ll,   1919. 
'March  11,  1919. 

481 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

a  wholly  new  set  of  principles  would  restore  Europe  to 
a  stable  basis.  They  also  believed  that  no  bourgeois  so- 
ciety would  carry  these  principles  into  effect.  Thus  the 
belief  was  strengthened  that  French  Labor  must  fall  in 
behind  the  President's  attempts.  This  was  the  opinion 
of  L.  Jouhaux,  who  wrote  in  La  Bataille,  a  syndicalist 
journal : 

While  "Wilson  has  opposing  him  a  handful  of  intriguers  or 
of  simpletons  who  in  good  faith  believe  that  folly  is  the 
supreme  retrenchment  of  wisdom,  he  also  has  behind  him  the 
profound  masses  of  the  people  who  march  beneath  his  ban- 
ner crying,  Vive  la  franchise  et  vive  la  liberie! 

The  radical  and  democratic  journals,  such  as  L'CEuvre, 
Le  Pays,  La  Vicioire,  and  La  Lanteme,  although  not  so 
eloquently,  showed  open  sympathy  for  the  Fourteen 
Points.    Thus  Gustave  Herve  wrote : 

Our  acclamations  of  the  speeches  made  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States  are  only  disgusting  hypocrisies  if  we 
do  not  decide  to  demand  that  our  representatives  resolutely 
exert  themselves  toward  the  realization  of  a  "Wilsonian  Peace." 

Le  Temps  and  Le  Journal  des  Dehais,  conservative 
and  critical,  yet  scholarly  and  fair,  realized  that  the 
basis  of  the  organization  of  Europe  must  be  changed. 
The  American  suggestions,  they  were  ready  to  believe, 
offered  the  solution. 


VI 


Another  charge  soon  became  current,  directly  reflect- 
ing upon  American  sincerity.  This  was  to  the  effect 
that  her  ideals  directly  affected  none  of  the  vital  inter- 
ests of  America — that,  in  fact,  they  benefited  them.  As 
M.  Bainville  wrote,  these  "Fourteen  Points,  a  hundred 

482 


FRANCE  AND  AI\rERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

less  than  Mohamet's  Koran,  have  in  no  manner  the  ap- 
pearance of  contradicting  the  interests  of  America.  They 
may  even  coincide  with  some  of  lier  immediate  interests, 
above  all.  with  the  commercial  interests  of  an  Anglo- 
Saxon  association.  ..."  The  conservatives  seemed 
thoroughly  to  believe  that  the  United  States  has  im- 
perialist designs  npon  the  western  hemisphere.  One 
would  not  see  it  so  much  in  print  as  he  would  hear  it  in 
conversation.  "Oli/'  they  would  declare,  "you  Ameri- 
cans are  inevitably  going  to  annex  IMexico  and  Canada; 
look  how  even  now  you  are  holding  on  to  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico!  And  have  you  not  your  own  designs  on  our  pos- 
sessions in  the  Indies,  or  upon  Guiana?  You  wish  to 
monopolize  the  trade  of  South  America.  Why  else  did 
you  start  the  Spanish  War?  And  you  are  really  going 
to  give  the  Philippines  their  independence?  If  you 
really  believe  in  self-determination,  why  did  you  fight 
the  Civil  War?  And,  you  lovers  of  democracy,  you  be- 
lievers in  the  equalities  of  men,  why  do  you  lynch 
negroes  and  deny  them  their  civil  rights?  Or  why  do 
you  discriminate  against  the  Japanese  ? "  These  opinions, 
frequently  heard  in  Royalist  circles,  emanated  from 
those  who  believed  that  nations  can  only  be  inspired  by 
self-interest  and  the  desire  of  aggrandizement.  They 
did  not  represent^  it  is  true,  any  considerable  portion 
of  French  thought;  but  they  paved  the  way  to  a  much 
more  serious  line  of  criticism :  American  insistence  upon 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  its  inconsistency  with  the 
principles  governing  the  proposed  League  of  Nations. 

President  Wilson 's  classic  position  was  that  the  League 
should  extend  the  application  of  the  I\Ionroe  Doctrine  to 
the  world.  This  was  entirely  acceptable  to  the  French. 
But,  as  is  so  well  known,  it  did  not  satisfy  a  very  con- 
siderable element  in  America  who  insisted  upon  the  spe- 

483 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITIGg 

cific  incorporation  of  this  historic  principle  in  the  Cove- 
nant. This  attitude  was  interpreted  by  many  members 
of  the  French  press  to  mean  that  the  Americans  would 
tolerate  no  intervention  of  European  States  in  western 
disputes,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine would  permit  the  eventual  political  or  commercial 
absorption  of  other  American  nations  by  the  United 
States.  That  the  doctrine  had  never  given  rise  to  the 
latter  interpretation  made  no  difference  to  the  French 
critics  who  rested  their  theories  upon  future  possibilities 
rather  than  on  precedents. 

Professor  Scelle,  of  the  University  of  Dijon,  moder- 
ately expressed  this  view  as  follows: 

What  is  the  principal  cause  of  the  opposition  which  has 
arisen  in  the  American  Senate  to  the  text  of  the  League 
Covenant?  It  is  the  fear  of  seeing  the  United  States  pledge 
itself  to  intervene  in  all  the  quarrels  of  Europe  and  of  the 
world,  and  the  rehictance  to  guarantee  the  status  of  nations 
outlined  by  the  Conference ;  the  fear  also  of  seeing  the  Society 
of  Nations  control  American  policy  on  the  American  con- 
tinent, contrary  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  Republican 
party  wishes  to  retain  for  the  United  States  the  right  of  being 
neutral  in  certain  cases,  in  others  of  playing  the  role  of 
arbiter.  .  .  . 

We  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  if  these  reservations  are 
admitted  they  will  become  generalized ;  and  such  a  course  will 
bring  to  an  end  the  League  of  Nations  as  a  guarantee  of 
the  permanence  of  peace.  They  are  incompatible  with  the 
high  duties  of  membership  in  the  League  of  Nations.  If  they 
earnestly  desire  the  advantages  of  this  membership,  if  they 
wish  to  enjoy  its  security,  they  must  be  ready  to  accept  its 
eventual  obligations,  and  in  particular,  to  fulfill  the  duties  it 
involves.  Surely  the  most  onerous  but  the  most  essential,  is 
of  concentrating,  if  necessary,  all  of  the  national  energies, 
against  the  enteqirLses  or  the  menaces  of  any  disturber  of 
public  ordcr.^ 

' L'Europe  Nouvclle,  Ajjril  5,  1919. 

484 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

The  Italian  trouble  over  Fiume,  aroused  Jacques 
Bainville  to  criticize  America  on  this  score,  though  from 
a  different  angle.    He  wrote : 

In  these  latter  days  America  has  again  proclaimed  her 
attachment  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  She  is  rif;ht  and  we  are 
not  desirous  of  seeing  France  meddle  in  America,  sending, 
it  may  be,  at  the  account  of  tlie  Society  of  NationSj  another 
expedition  to  Mexico.  But  if  America  is  to  be  closed  to  Euro- 
peans, why  should  Europe,  at  this  time  which  is  to  deter- 
mine, it  may  be,  its  future  for  centuries,  submit  to  the  arbitrari- 
ness of  a  single  American?  What  titles  can  Mr.  Wilson  invoke 
to  overthrow,  even  in  the  name  of  Right,  the  maxim :  "Do  not 
do  unto  othere  that  which  you  do  not  wish  them  to  do  unto 
you?"  He  speaks  of  "the  services  which  the  United  States 
rendered  the  Allies."  We  do  not  forget  these  services  and 
we  value  them.  But  has  France  ever  protested  against  the 
Monroe  Doctrine?  Has  she  ever  pretended  to  control  Amer- 
ican policies  in  the  name  of  the  aid  she  once  brought  (and 
before  the  eleventh  hour)  to  the  Americans  in  their  struggle 
for  independence?^ 

France  saw  England  insisting  upon  her  supremacy 
on  the  high  seas,  a  supremacy  tacitly  admitted  by  the 
Conference.  She  allowed  England  to  enforce  a  pro- 
tectorate upon  Egypt,  struggling  for  independence.  She 
saw  her  traditional  guardianship  in  the  Near  East 
threatened  by  the  British  armies  in  Constantinople,  She 
saw  Shantung  succumb  to  Japanese  control.  She  ad- 
mitted the  full  validity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Help- 
less to  prevent  the  huge  trade  interests  Anglo-Saxon 
business  men  were  building  up  on  the  wreckage  of  Ger- 
many's commercial  empire,  she  knew  that  the  control 
of  the  trade  and  money  markets  had  definitely  passed  to 
London  and  New  York.  The  United  States  had  talked 
a  great  deal  about  disarmament,  of  reducing  armies  to 

'L' Action  Fran<:aise,  April  24,  1919. 

485 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

a  ''police  force"  intended  to  guard  domestic  order  or  to 
furnish  a  quota  to  the  new  international  army.  Yet 
during  the  peace  negotiations,  congressmen,  the  General 
Staff,  even  military  authorities  directing  the  A.  E.  F. 
University  at  Beaune,  were  urging  universal  service. 
At  the  very  time  Lloyd  George  was  talking  about  the 
abolition  of  conscription  and  the  French  Senate  was 
considering  a  bill  reducing  the  period  of  military  service 
in  France,  the  United  States  War  Department  an- 
nounced a  plan  of  universal  military  training !  A  French 
paper,  printing  the  requests  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
Daniels  before  the  House  Naval  Committee  for  extraor- 
dinary appropriations  of  three  and  a  half  billion  francs 
and  for  the  increase  of  the  fleet  personnel  from  1-43,335 
to  260,000  men,  very  dryly  asks,  "Is  this  the  disarma- 
ment which  America  is  commencing?" 

These  were  the  glaring  and  apparent  inconsistencies 
which  French  opinion  found  difficulty  in  understanding. 
Little  wonder  that  France  felt  her  own  vital  interests 
sacrificed  for  ideals  which  the  Allies  were  hypocritically 
violating ! 

Even  the  Socialists,  usually  eager  in  their  defense  of 
American  principles,  were  quick  to  point  out  what  they 
considered  defects.  Thus  La  Vague,  in  a  paragraph 
entitled  "800  Years  in  Prison,"  pointed  out  tliat  the 
total  convictions  in  the  trial  at  Chicago  of  ninety-three 
members  of  the  I.  W.  W.  were  as  follows:  Fifteen  of  the 
accused,  each  twenty  years  in  prison  and  $20,000  fine; 
thirty-three  of  the  accused,  ten  years  and  $30,000 ;  seven 
of  the  accused,  five  years  and  $20,000 ;  twenty-six  of  the 
accused,  seven  years  and  $30,000 ;  twelve  of  the  accused, 
one  year  and  $30,000.  Total:  859  years  in  prison  and 
some  millions  indemnity.     It  dryly  adds  that  this  is  an 

486 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

indemnity  for  a  class  war.     "All  this  in  Wilson's  coun- 
try!" 

At  tl^c  Easter  Congress  of  the  Socialist  party  at  Paris, 
an  order  of  the  day  was  adopted  which  expressed  sym- 
pathy with  all  laborers  who  have  been  "victims"  in 
every  country  of  capitalist  repression.  It  energetically 
protested  against  the  imprisonment  of  Eugene  Debs  and 
all  other  Syndicalists  and  Socialists  in  America,  as  perse- 
cutions ' '  which  can  only  enfeeble  the  fight  of  the  Amer- 
ican delegates  against  the  imperialists  and  the  reaction 
of  the  Peace  Conference." 

One  of  the  most  spectacular  criticisms  directed  against 
the  consistency  of  American  principles,  charging  us 
with  what  virtually  amounted  to  economic  imperialism, 
came  from  the  pen  of  Andre  Cheradame  in  an  article 
entitled  "Ne  Cherchons  Plus  Midi  a  Quatorze  Heures. " 
He  charged  American  financiers  with  receiving  conces- 
sions from  the  Bolshevist  government  in  Russia  in  order 
to  develop  Russian  railways,  forests  and  mines.  M. 
Cheradame  charged  that  as  passports  were  necessary  to 
have  effected  such  a  negotiation,  the  American  Govern- 
ment must  have  been  fully  aware  of  its  responsibility 
and  given  its  tacit  consent.  IMatters  had  gone  to  the 
extent,  he  claimed,  where  the  French  Legation  at  Stock- 
holm was  obliged  to  declare  that  the  concessions  ac- 
corded by  the  Soviet  government  in  Russia  to  foreign 
financiers  for  the  construction  and  exploitation  of  rail- 
ways in  Russia  were  not  recognized  by  the  French  Gov- 
ernment in  whose  opinion  the  Bolshevist  government 
was  only  a  de  facto  government,  maintained  by  the  aid 
of  terror;  as  such  it  had  no  right  to  grant  concessions 
and  dispose  of  national  property. 

M.  Cheradame  then  indignantly  comments: 
487 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

TVe  must  reach  this  formidable  conch;sion.  The  Wilsonian 
principles  are  applicable  to  the  West  of  Europe,  but  not  to 
the  East.  For  three  months,  in  the  name  of  his  princi]3les,  Mr. 
"Wilson  has  sharply  questioned  France,  whose  sacrifices  have 
saved  the  world,  respecting  her  rights  to  reparations  and  to 
guarantees.  Mr.  Wilson  is  very  much  preoccupied  by  French 
imperialism  in  the  matter  of  the  mines  of  the  Saar.  But  this 
same  Mr.  Wilson  sees  no  inconsistency  in  coming  to  an  under- 
standing with  the  Russian  Bolsheviki,  whose  atrocities  sur- 
pass all  those  recorded  in  histoiy. 

He  then  cites  the  instance,  reported  in  Le  Matin  of 
April  14,  of  "two  strange  decisions,"  secretly  arrived 
at  in  the  conference,  under  the  Presidency  of  Mr.  "Wil- 
son. One  vote  designated  Geneva — in  preference  to 
Brussels — as  the  seat  of  the  League  of  Nations.  This 
vote  conformed  to  the  wishes  of  Mr.  Wilson,  who  de- 
clared, "The  majority  has  passed  judgment.  Geneva 
is  adopted."  Then  came  the  vote  on  the  Japanese 
amendment  proclaiming  the  equality  of  nations.  This 
time  the  majority  voted  for  Japan  against  the  United 
States.  "A  majority  is  not  enough,"  Mr.  Wilson  then 
declared.  "A  unanimous  vote  is  necessary;  therefore 
the  Japanese  amendment  is  not  adopted." 

Thus  Le  Matin  concludes,  "In  the  sessions  of  the 
League  of  Nations  commission,  there  are  majorities 
which  count  and  majorities  which  do  not  count.  They 
count  when  they  are  for  us.  They  do  not  count  when 
they  are  against  us ! " 

M.  Cheradame  asks:  What  sort  of  peace  can  be  es- 
tablished under  such  auspices?  Can  we  accept  such  a 
method  of  "making  the  world  safe  for  democracy"? 

The  wind  was  taken  out  of  the  sails  of  Mr.  Chera- 
dame's  article,  the  next  day,  when  the  American  State 
Department  issued  a  statement  denying  that  any  Rus- 
sian concessions  had  been  granted.    But  even  this  did  not 

488 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

alter  the  opinion  of  many  Frenchmen — that  Americans 
were  liberal  only  when  they  profited  thereby. 

During  certain  periods  of  the  negotiations,  the  French 
press,  despite  the  rigorous  restraint  imposed  by  the  cen- 
sorship, made  it  very  uncomfortable  for  the  Ameri- 
can delegates.  Many  Parisian  journalists  appeared  to 
think  that  articles  in  the  French  language  remained  a 
sealed  book  to  the  Americans  in  France.  The  humorous 
weeklies,  such  as  Le  Sourire  and  others  of  similar  bac- 
chanalian propensities,  ridiculed  Americans  and  their 
idealism  in  rather  indecent  cartoons.  The  Socialist 
Humanite  seemed  to  be  the  only  organ  which  con- 
sistently resented  this  storm  of  criticism.  Toward  the 
end  of  the  conference  it  wrote,  in  an  article  entitled 
"Ingratitude": 

In  imitation  of  the  conservative  and  jingoist  journals  from 
across  the  Channel,  our  French  press  with  shocking  unanim- 
ity— indirectly  or  directly — leads  the  campaign  against  Presi- 
dent Wilson. 

Stupid  ironies,  and  sarcasms,  wounding  and  injurious  at- 
tacks, what  a  spectacle  of  ignoniiny ! 

A  year  ago,  when  the  German  armies  directly  menaced 
Paris  and  when  the  hearts  of  all  were  moved  with  somber 
anxiety,  this  same  press  implored  the  Americans  to  hasten 
to  our  aid.  With  what  disinterestedness  and  how  completely 
they  obeyed  these  agonized  appeals !  We  ought  never  to  lose 
the  thought  of  it.  They  sent  us  3,000,000  soldiers  and  con- 
solation; to  the  enemy,  terror.  What  thanks  our  journalists 
then  offered  them  and  what  panegyrics  in  honor  of  the  noble 
nation  which  tui'ned  the  balance  of  destiny  in  our  favor! 

At  this  hour  what  a  difference  in  tone!  We  will  not  take 
up  all  the  insinuations:  the  insolence  of  Pertinax  and  of  Le 
Temqis,  of  the  great  organs  of  Paris  or  their  provincial  under- 
studies.   In  plain  terms,  this  is  disgraceful.  .  .  . 

And  all  this  because  the  President  has  wished  to  remain 
faithful  to  his  ideas  of  universal  peace,  of  moderation  in  vic- 
tory, of  solicitude  for  international  justice.     Mr.  Wilson  en- 

489 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

deavors  to  foresee  the  future  and  to  conclude  a  clean  and 
just  peace  so  that  it  may  be  durable.  He  resists — as  much 
as  lies  within  his  power — the  imperialistic  conceptions  and 
the  designs  of  territorial  conquests  advanced  by  his  Allies. 
He  appeals  to  reason,  and  the  necessity  of  calming  inex- 
piable hatreds, — the  psychosis  of  collective  follies  to  which 
humanity  at  this  time  is  a  prey.  These  are  the  reasons  for 
the  blind  wrath  of  a  press  which,  with  an  indelicacy  wholly 
unworthy  of  our  traditions,  has  so  quickly  forgotten  the  ser- 
vice rendered  us. 

Because  he  stands  alone  in  resisting  certain  sinister  forces, 
the  President  must  be  outflanked.  And  what  will  be  the 
result  gained  by  the  nationalistic  bourgeoisie  of  all  the  bel- 
ligerent countries?  It  is  not  difficult  to  perceive.  A  peace 
based  on  the  Fourteen  Points,  a  League  of  Nations  involving 
universal  disarmament,  would  be  admittedly  able  to  bring  to 
exhausted  men  a  relative  consolation  and  to  leave  them  some 
hope  for  the  future.  Now  that  these  "illusions"  are  thrust 
aside  and  that  the  "chimeras"  and  other  Wilsonian  ideologies 
have  been  exorcised,  peoples  no  longer  have  confidence  in 
themselves.  The  last  great  bourgeois  will  be  unable  to  prevent 
the  inevitable. 

L'Hiimanite  was  in  part  right.  IMuch  of  the  criticism 
directed  against  America  and  the  President  came  from 
those  who  found  in  onr  representatives  the  chief  ob- 
stacle to  their  own  illegitimate  ambitions.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  must  be  admitted  that  many  of  the  ch^ges 
which  France  brought  against  us  were  true.  America 
is  not  perfect ;  her  nature  is  essentially  human.  But 
the  ideals  which  she  has  asked  Europe  to  adopt  are  not 
wholly  new,  they  have  not  arisen  from  her  inherent 
moral  superiority.  Their  origin  may  be  traced  to  Eu- 
rope and  their  most  fertile  growth  was  fostered  by  the 
minds  of  French  philosophers:  Abbe  Saint-Pierre,  Rous- 
seau, Bergasse — even  that  pseudo-idealist  Napoleon  III. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  peculiar  set  of  circumstances  has 
made  America  their  appropriate  mouthpiece.  Her  optim- 

490 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

ism,  the  optimism  of  youth,  born  of  the  serenity  which 
national  isolation  has  given  iis,  carried  these  ideals,  re- 
newed and  reenforced,  to  a  p]urope  in  turmoil.  It  was 
the  moral  force  of  America  arising  from  this  hope,  which 
to  a  limited  extent  fastened  these  principles  upon  Eu- 
ropean politics.  The  misunderstandings  were  mutual ; 
the  best  way  to  smooth  them  out  was  by  a  frank  inter- 
change of  ideas,  even  of  mutual  criticism. 


VII 


The  rejection  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  by  the  United 
States  Senate  in  November,  1919,  was  viewed  with  nat- 
ural alarm  in  France.  The  first  expressions  of  opinion 
were  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States  wished  to 
repudiate  the  obligations  to  which  it  had  pledged  itself. 
The  French  press  reiterated  its  former  position  that  the 
assurance  of  American  participation  in  the  League  of 
Nations  had  led  France  to  give  up  her  demands  for  a 
strategic  frontier.  Now  if  American  cooperation  was 
not  forthcoming,  France,  deprived  of  the  guarantees  it 
had  demanded,  would  find  itself  defenseless  whenever 
Germany  wished  to  renew  hostilities.  Under  these  con- 
ditions, it  was  natural  that  France  should  charge  Amer- 
ica with  bad  faith.  The  French  press,  notably  Le  Matin 
and  L' Action  Fran^aise,  was  full  of  such  recrimina- 
tions. Those  w'ho  did  realize  that  the  Treaty  debate  w'as 
a  struggle  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
powers,  believed  that  even  that  could  not  excuse  the 
endangering  of  the  peace  of  the  world.  Those  who  be- 
lieved that  the  President  was  supported  by  American 
opinion,  charged  the  Senate  with  playing  politics.  Those, 
like  L'Echo  de  Paris  and  Andre  Cheradame,  who  be- 

491 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

lieved  that  the  President  had  acted  in  contradiction  to 
the  will  of  tlie  American  people,  continued  their  at- 
tacks on  ]\Ir.  Wilson, 

The  real  cause  of  the  Treaty  delay,  however,  the 
French  press  did  not  realize:  American  opinion,  keyed 
to  the  highest  pitch  of  idealism  during  the  war,  had 
suffered  a  reaction.  The  American  Senate  perhaps  never 
had  been  imbued  with  that  idealism;  but  there  is  little 
question  but  that  in  his  original  appeals  to  interna- 
tional morality,  the  President  had  been  followed  by  the 
people,  heart  and  soul.  At  the  close  of  the  war,  how- 
ever, with  the  succeeding  months  of  a  monotonous  armi- 
stice, with  the  return  of  American  troops  from  France, 
and  with  the  growing  evidence  of  Allied  imperialism, 
American  idealism  commenced  to  wane.  Public  opinion 
did  not  repudiate  the  President's  ideals — it  simply  for- 
got about  them.  Its  enthusiasm  had  been  burnt  out  by 
the  war,  and  it  was  natural  that  upon  the  return  to 
peace,  a  shortsighted  and  a  languid  opinion  should  oc- 
cupy itself  with  domestic  pursuits  and  internal  prob- 
lems. During  the  war,  importunate  realities  had  stimu- 
lated an  interest  in  European  affairs;  the  dangers  of 
German  imperialism  public  opinion  had  been  forced  to 
realize.  With  Germany's  defeat,  however,  probably  the 
majority  of  the  American  people  felt  that  the  menace 
was  over.  They  speedily  forgot  about  the  causes  of 
the  menace.  And  their  powers  of  thought  were  too  ex- 
hausted to  think  of  means  of  preventing  its  recurrence. 
Furthermore,  the  agencies  of  public  opinion  which  the 
Government  had  created  during  the  war,  now  passed  out 
of  existence.  A  propagandized  opinion  which  had  had 
facts  and  ideas  literall}^  jammed  down  its  throat,  heaved 
a  sigh  of  relief  when  the  supply  of  medicine  was  ex- 
hausted.   Public  opinion  demanded  a  vacation ;  most  of 

492 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM" 

the  people  who  really  thought,  realized  that  America 
had  certain  definite  and  immediate  obligations  to  Eu- 
rope. But  numbers  of  people,  perhaps,  cared  little  more 
about  the  Treaty  debate  in  the  Senate  than  they  did 
about  the  Einstein  theory.  And  although  the  Senate 
was  accused  for  its  ineptitude  and  although  it  doubt- 
lessly misrepresented  public  opinion,  there  is  every  rea- 
son to  believe  that,  had  the  public  been  inspired  with 
the  same  interest  and  feeling  which  dominated  it  during 
the  war,  the  Senate  would  have  been  literally  forced 
into  a  decision  against  its  own  will. 

Although  America  had  an  innocent  conscience,  in 
lapsing  back  into  an  isolation  made  easy  as  well  as 
comfortable  because  it  required  no  thought — and  think- 
ing was  a  hard  task  for  most  people — France  was  wide 
awake  to  the  seriousness  of  the  prospect  of  America's 
withdrawal  from  Europe.  If  the  Senate  had  ratified 
the  Peace  Treaty  immediately,  not  only  would  France's 
fear  have  been  allayed,  but  her  subsequent  efforts  to 
revive  the  system  of  alliances  which  has  caused  so  much 
harm  in  Europe,  would  have  never  been  made  necessary. 
The  Senate's  reticence  and  the  bitter  hostility  which  a 
minority  within  it  showed  toward  Europe,  increased 
French  insistence,  however,  upon  the  guarantees  of  the 
Old  Diplomacy.^"    Although  America  had  condemned  the 

"  The  notification  by  Premier  Millerand,  on  February  10,  1920, 
to  Germany  that  the  time  of  occupation  of  the  Eheuish  provinces 
would  be  extended  indefinitely  because  of  the  failure  of  Germany 
to  comply  with  some  parts  of  the  Treaty,  may  be  looked  upon  as  a 
disguiseci  annexation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Khine  by  France.  It 
marks  the  first  step  in  the  erection  of  the  guarantees  which  France 
unsuccessfully  urged  at  the  Conference.  Now  that  American  par- 
ticipation is  uncertain,  France  is  bending  every  effort  to  restore 
the  peace  which  would  have  been  negotiated  originally,  if  America 
had  not  participated  in  the  Conference.  Millerand  's  announcement 
and  the  efforts  being  made  to  negotiate  alliances  indicate  the  re- 
sults of  American  hesitation.    If  America  had  acted  promptly,  the 

493 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

tactics  of  the  Elder  Statesmen,  she  was  now  driving 
Europe  again  to  resort  to  them.  In  fact,  to  many  French- 
men, America  presented  the  piteous  spectacle  of  a  na- 
tion which  had  given  birth  to  a  new  idea  and  now  re- 
fused to  make  the  sacrifices  necessary  to  keep  it  alive. 
During  the  drearisome  months  which  the  Senate  list- 
lessly consumed,  France  and  the  whole  of  Europe  came 
to  believe  that  although  the  foremost  republic  in  the 
world  has  its  virtues,  it  is  perhaps  controlled  as  much 
by  self-interest  and  as  little  by  altruism  as  any  other 
nation  in  the  world. 

But  even  so,  France  realized  that  a  system  of  Euro- 
pean alliances,  necessarily  unstable  because  of  chang- 
ing and  conflicting  national  interests,  would  not  supply 
her  with  the  protection  against  a  German  attack  which 
a  League  of  Nations,  even  with  limited  American  help, 
would  do.  Consequently,  France  was  willing  to  have 
America  enter  the  League  with  reservations.  France 
was  not  satisfied  with  these  reservations.  But  it  finally 
came  to  believe  that  they  were  better  than  nothing  at 
all.  This  led  to  a  direct  volte-face.  Le  Temps,  which 
had  originally  attacked  the  reservations  as  destructive 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  now  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  they  did  not  vitiate  it  in  any  respect.  This  diplo- 
matic attitude  was  held  by  France  generally.  It  was 
disappointed  in  American  hesitation ;  yet  it  accepted  the 
inevitable  and  tried  to  make  the  best  of  a  bad  situation. 

However,  a  radical  revision  of  the  system  upon  which 
the  world  for  a  century  had  operated,  was  too  much  to 
expect.  Reaction  was  sure  to  set  in ;  the  pendulum  was 
bound  to  swing  back.    But  at  least  one  step  in  advance 

old  regime  perhaps  would  have  been  fjiven  a  death  blow.  Now  it 
is  speedily  revivinjj,  and  it  is  forcing  the  League  of  Nations  into 
a  state  of  innocuous  obscurity. 

49-4 


FRANCE  AND  AMERICAN  "IDEALISM'* 

has  been  made.  There  will  be  more  wars  and  there 
will  be  more  peaee  conferences.  AVitli  each  succeeding 
one,  however,  the  world  may  hope  for  some  betterment 
and  for  some  progress.  Just  as  the  Treaty  of  Vereailles 
is  a  vast  moral  improvement  over  the  Treaty  of  Vienna, 
each  succeeding  treaty  may  bring  to  the  world  hopes 
for  a  brighter  future.  Real  peaee,  however,  is  not  an 
inert  thing.  It  does  not  consist  in  the  adjustment  of 
boundary  lines  nor  in  the  disposition  of  groups  of  peo- 
ples. It  lies  in  the  hearts  of  men  and  it  will  be  realized 
only  when  the  character  of  humankind  has  been 
changed. 


1 


APPENDIX  A 


GEORGES    CLEMENC?EAU 


M.  Clemenceau  was  born  in  La  Vendee,  September  28,  1841. 
At  the  age  of  nineteen  he  went  to  Paris  to  study  medicine, 
where  three  years  later  he  received  his  degree.  In  18GG  he 
went  to  the  United  States,  and  for  a  time  taught  French 
at  a  girls'  school  at  Stamford,  Connecticut.  He  fell  in  love 
and  later  married  one  of  his  students.  Miss  Mary  Plummer. 
M.  Clemenceau  then  returned  to  Paris  and  devoted  himself 
to  the  practice  of  medicine,  chiefly  among  the  poor  of  the 
Montmartre  district. 

After  the  proclamation  of  the  French  Kepublie  on  Septem- 
ber 4,  1870,  Clemenceau  was  elected  mayor  of  the  Mont- 
martre district.  It  was  this  district  which  sent  him  to  the 
National  Assembly  at  Bordeaux  as  its  representative.  Clemen- 
ceau voted  vnth  Louis  Blanc  and  the  other  "irreeoncilables," 
against  the  peace  preliminaries  with  Germany,  because  of 
the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 

The  urgency  of  his  mayoral  duties  called  M.  Clemenceau 
back  to  Paris  on  the  5th  of  March,  1871.  On  the  18th,  the 
ill-fated  Commune  was  established.  Because  he  struggled  to 
pi-event  the  murder  of  Generals  Lecomte  and  Thomas,  Clemen- 
ceau became  a  "suspect"  of  the  Central  Committee  which  re- 
moved him  from  his  position.  Shortly  aftenvard,  M.  Pyat 
ordered  his  arrest.  Fortunately  for  M.  Clemenceau,  a  Brazil- 
ian who  resembled  him  was  seized  instead;  and  as  he  was 
about  to  be  shot,  the  mistake  was  discovered. 

After  the  fall  of  the  Commune,  Clemenceau  withdrew  from 
active  polities.  For  five  years  he  engaged  in  the  practice  of 
medicine.  During  this  period  he  also  served  as  a  municipal 
councilor,  finally  becoming  President  of  the  Paris  municipal 
council. 

In  1876  he  was  again  elected  to  the  Assembly,  where  he 

497 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

made  himself  both  impopular  and  prominent  by  advocating 
the  passage  of  an  amnesty  bill  freeing  the  participants  in 
the  Commnne,  notably  A.  Blanqni.  Although  he  was  but 
thirty-five  years  of  age  at  this  time,  he  was  already  advocating 
the  program  wljieh  later  carried  him  into  national  pvom- 
inenee:  freedom  of  speech,  of  belief,  and  of  the  press;  the 
separation  of  church  and  state;  the  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits. 
He  urged  the  inauguration  of  social  reforms  of  a  collective 
nature.  He  was  bitterly  opposed  to  colonization  because  he 
believed  it  would  dissipate  the  strength  of  the  nation  which 
should  be  continually  prepared  to  avenge  the  cruel  losses  of 
1871,  Consequently  he  opposed  the  penetration  of  Tunis, 
Tonkin,  Annam  and  Madagascar  by  France.  It  was  be  who 
was  largely  responsible  for  the  Fi'ench  withdrawal  from  Egypt 
in  1882.  M.  Clemenceau  deserves  some  of  the  credit  for  un- 
earthing the  decoration  scandal  in  which  Daniel  Wilson,  the 
son-in-law  of  President  Grevy,  was  involved. 

Perhaps  the  greatest  service  of  M.  Clemenceau  to  the 
Republic  is  that  between  1876  and  1893  be  kept  alive  the 
spirit  of  the  French  Revolution  within  Parliament — during  a 
period  in  which  the  Government  was  almost  daily  on  the 
verge  of  succumbing  to  the  Royalists. 

M.  Clemenceau  was  Boulanger's  cousin ;  this  doubtless  was 
one  reason  why  the  Old  Tiger  at  first  supported  this  militant 
troubadour  in  his  escapades  of  1887-1889.  But  he  soon  saw 
bis  mistake   and   later  repudiated   his   connections   with   him. 

Clemenceau's  enemies  attemi)ted  to  entangle  him  in  the 
Panama  Canal  affair  (1892-1893)  in  which  wholesale  embezzle- 
ments consumed  great  sums  originally  intended  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal.  At  this  time  Clemenceau  was  editor 
of  La  Justice.  One  of  the  ringleaders  in  the  Panama  scandal 
had  subscribed  $5,000  to  this  newspaper  in  its  early  days. 
With  this  evidence,  M.  Clemenceau's  opponents,  of  whom  he 
had  many,  urged  that  his  paper  had  been  deliberately  "bought" 
over  by  the  Panama  crowd.  The  charges  were  never  proved; 
and  Clemenceau  ably  defended  himself  against  them  in  the 
Chamber. 

In  1893,  however,  his  opi)oiients  had  become  too  strong  for 
him.  He  was  bitterly  accused  of  atheism,  of  opposing  the  al- 
liance with  Russia,  even  of  being  pro- English;  and  as  a 
result,   he  was  defeated  for  election  to  the  Assembly  from 

498 


GEORGES  CLEMENCEAU 

the  district  df  Dra<,nusnan.  Thus  after  seventeen  years  of 
active  parliainentai-y  life,  he  returned  to  journalism,  at  the 
age  of  fifty-two. 

But  he  did  not  lose  interest  in  i)ublic  affairs,  for  through 
the  columns  of  L'Aurore  he  preached  the  doctrines  of  social 
refonn  and  hatred  for  Germany.  He  led  the  struggle  for  the 
defense  of  Dreyfus;  in  fact,  it  was  he  who  suggested  that 
Zola  write  that  terrible  indictment  of  the  army,  J'Accuse, 
which  appeared  in  Clemenceau's  own  paper. 

In  1902,  Clemenceau  again  entered  active  political  life,  for 
he  was  elected  to  the  Senate  from  the  Var.  For  the  first 
time  in  his  career  he  accepted  a  Government  position  in 
March,  1906,  when  he  was  appointed  Minister  of  the  Interior  in 
the  SaiTien  Cabinet.  He  was  immediately  called  upon  to 
solve  the  terrible  colliery  disaster  in  Courrieres,  the  wine 
growers'  revolt  in  Southern  France,  and  the  electrician  and 
other  strikes  in  Paris.  In  October,  1906,  Clemenceau  himself 
became  head  of  the  cabinet. 

Despite  the  fact  that  his  uncle  is  a  priest,  Clemenceau  is  a 
bitter  anti-Catholic ;  and  the  first  task  confronting  his  ministry 
was  the  enforcement  of  the  anticlerical  legislation  of  1905.  At 
this  he  was  unsuccessful,  as  the  supplementary  law  of  1907 
amply  demonstrated.  The  Clemenceau  Ministry  was  respon- 
sible for  the  first  step  in  the  nationalization  of  the  French 
railways,  the  Government  taking  over  the  Western  road.  Al- 
though the  Prime  Minister  was  an  ardent  believer  in  the 
right  of  labor  to  organize  and  to  strike,  he  was  opposed  to 
the  unionization  of  Government  employees  because  of  the 
unique  status  which  they  occupied.  Clemenceau  was  finally 
driven  out  of  office  in  July,  1909,  by  Deleasse,  whom  Clemen- 
ceau had  bitterly  attacked  for  his  Moroccan  policy.  Now 
it  was  Deleasse  who  accused  the  Prime  Minister  first  for 
failing  to  overcome  Aveaknesses  in  the  na\^'^  which  Clemenceau 
himself  had  criticized,  and  finally  for  pursuing  a  contradic- 
tory policy  in  Morocco.  M.  Clemenceau  was  at  that  time 
even  more  impatient  than  he  proved  to  be  in  later  years;  for 
in  the  debate  he  deliberately  flaunted  the  Chamber.  As  a  re- 
sult he  failed  to  win  a  vote  of  confidence;  and  retired  from 
the  ministry  at  the  age  of  sixty-eight. 

In  1913  and  1914  he  continually  preached  the  danger  of  a 
German  invasion   through   the   columns   of  L'lLomme   Libre. 

499 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

When  war  came,  he  gave  it  his  sti;rdiest  support.  At  the  same 
time  he  was  courageous  enough  to  point  out  in  no  delicate 
terms  the  defects  in  the  administration  of  the  French  army. 
So  strongly  did  he  condemn  the  defeatist  movement  which 
was  rapidly  undermining  the  morale  of  France,  that  in  Novem- 
ber, 1917,  the  country  turned  to  him  as  the  one  man  who  could 
rally  every  Frenchman  to  the  support  of  La  Patrie.  At  the 
age  of  seventy-six,  this  "grand  old  man  of  France"  assumed 
the  direction  of  the  French  Government,  himself  taking  the 
arduous  position  of  Minister  of  War.  He  made  quick  work 
of  the  traitors,  as  Le  Bonnet  Rouge  and  other  trials  proved; 
— he  reorganized  and  reinvigorated  the  whole  war  machine. 
To  him,  more  than  to  any  other  statesman,  France  owes  her 
victory. 

M.  Clemenceau  is  a  teetotaller;  he  does  not  smoke.  He 
rises  every  morning  at  three  o'clock.  His  chief  hobby  is 
animals,  and  of  these,  dogs  hold  the  first  place  in  his  heart.  He 
is  the  most  dangerous  duelist  in  France— the  President  of  the 
Republic,  Paul  Deschanel  and  the  former  Nationalist,  M. 
Deroulede,  can  attest  to  that  from  experience.  M.  Clemenceau 
is  an  enraptured  collector  of  Japanese  art;  and  he  is  a  de- 
voted student  of  John  Stuart  Mill.  He  is  an  orator  who 
despises  the  conventions  of  oratory.  He  sjaeaks  evenly,  and 
his  one  gesture  is  that  of  a  weighty  index  tinger  with  which 
he  drives  home  point  after  point  upon  unwilling  and  willing 
audiences  alike. 

The  strength  of  M.  Clemenceau  rests  in  his  courage — in  his 
fearless  denunciation  of  injustice  and  of  inefficiency.  His 
weakness  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  too  often  is  destructive  with- 
out being  constructive,  that  he  is  intransigent  to  the  point  of 
stubbornness,  and  that  he  is  cynically  unimaginative  so  far  as 
a  conception  of  amicable  relations  between  European  nations 
is  concerned.  Time  only  will  judge  him  ai'ight.  But  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  despite  his  faults  he  is  one  of  the  great 
men  of  the  Third  Republic,  and  that  his  name  may  properly 
be  enshrined  among  those  of  the  Immortals. 


APPENDIX  B 

FRENCH    TAXATION    DURING    THE    WAR 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  appendix  to  give  a  com- 
plete aceount  of  the  French  system  of  taxation  or  even  to 
mention  all  of  the  taxes  employed  durine:  the  war,  but  merely 
to  point  out  the  change  in  the  basis  of  the  system  from  "real" 
to  "personal"  taxes  and  the  fact  that  the  change  has  not  been 
successful. 

The  former  system  of  taxation  was  based  on  what  were  called 
the  "four  direct  contributions."  These  taxes  were:  (1)  A  tax 
on  land.  As  no  change  in  the  assessment  of  property  values 
had  been  made  since  1850,  this  tax  was  naturally  subject  to 
the  grossest  discriminations.  Lands  which  at  the  time  of  their 
evaluation  in  1S50  were  productive,  might  have  become  unpro- 
ductive since  then ;  but  they  were  subject  to  the  same  tax  as 
before.  There  was  also  a  tax  on  landed  property.  This  tax 
•was  somewhat  fairer  for  it  was  based  on  the  annual  rent  of 
houses  and  factories, — estimated  every  ten  years.  (2)  The 
so-called  patents  tax — nominally  a  tax  on  incomes  and  profes- 
sional earnings.  This  tax  was  also  based  on  the  rental  value 
of  the  premises  upon  which  the  business  of  the  taxpayer  was 
being  conducted.  Consequently  it  was  upon  apparent  rather 
than  actual  earnings,  and  open  to  the  greatest  discrimina- 
tions. (3)  The  tax  on  doors  and  windows.  This  tax,  long 
recognized  as  utterly  unsocial  because  it  really  imposed  a  tax 
on  light  and  air,  w'as  in  theory  repealed  by  a  law  passed 
July  18,  1892;  but  successive  financial  bills  postponed  its  actual 
demise  until  the  financial  law  of  July  31,  1917  finally  provided 
that  it  should  not  be  levied  after  January  1,  1918.  (4)  Taxes 
on  personal  property.  This  tax  was  also  levied  on  the  signs  of 
wealth  rather  than  on  the  wealth  itself;  instead  of  attempting 
to  assess  the  amount  of  personal  property  actually  held,  it 
was  levied  on  ostensible  tokens,  such  as  the  amount  of  rent 
paid,  etc. 

501 


CONTE]\IPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

The  objections  to  these  "real"  as  opposed  to  "personal" 
taxes — the  fact  that  they  were  not  in  any  true  sense  based 
on  the  faculty  theory  of  taxation — led  to  insistent  demands 
for  reform.  For  the  last  twenty  j^ears  the  advanced  parties 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  have  demanded  the  enactment  of 
an  income  tax,  but  it  was  not  until  191-i  that  the  Senate  finally 
gave  its  consent.  The  law  passed  July  15,  1914,  levied  a  tax 
upon  incomes  greater  than  5,000  francs,  an  amount  which  by 
the  law  of  December  30,  1916,  was  lowered  to  3,000  francs 
($600,  normal  rate  of  exchange).  Those  having  an  income 
less  than  3,000  francs  are  exempt  from  the  tax,  a  sum  which 
is  increased  2,000  francs  in  the  case  of  a  man'ied  man  having 
one  or  more  children.  Taxpaj'ers  having  dependents  more 
than  seventy  years  old  or  who  are  infirm,  and  children  of  less 
than  twenty-one,  receive  a  further  exemption  of  1,000  francs 
for  each  in  case  the  total  number  of  dependents  does  not 
exceed  five;  if  it  does,  the  exemption  increases  for  each  per- 
son bej'ond  the  fifth,  to  1,500  francs. 

The  rate  of  this  tax  is  (law  of  June  30,  1918)  : 

1.  Taxable  incomes  up  to  5,000  francs  —  IVg  per  cent. 

2.  Taxable  incomes  between  5,000  and  150,000  francs  —  IV2 
per  cent  to  16  per  cent,  with  a  progression  of  one  centime  per 
hundred  francs. 

3.  Taxable  incomes  between  150,000  and  550,000  francs  — 
16  per  cent  to  20  per  cent,  with  a  progi-ession  of  one  centime 
per  thousand  francs  or  fraction  thereof. 

4.  Taxable  incomes  gTeater  than  550,000  francs  —  20  per 
cent. 

Of  the  several  other  direct  pei-sonal  taxes  levied  during 
the  war  the  most  important  was  the  "extraordinary  or  sup- 
plementary war-profits"  tax,  or  in  other  words,  an  excess 
profits  tax.  This  tax,  which  was  first  passed  July  1,  1916, 
was  supposed  to  be  le^^ed  on  all  business  and  commercial  enter- 
prises, including  mining  operations,  whose  profits  came  within 
the  tenns  of  the  law.  The  profit  to  be  taxed  is  determined  by 
subtracting  from  the  total  net  profit  of  the  current  year,  the 
normal  profit.  The  latter  is  based  on  an  average  of  the  profits 
of  the  three  years  preceding  August  1,  1914.  The  normal 
profit  in  no  case  can  be  estimated  at  a  sum  lower  than  5,000 
francs  or  less  than  6  per  cent  of  the  invested  capital.  The 
rate  of  this  tax   (by  the  law  of  December  31,  1917)   is  50 

502 


FRENCH  TAXATION  DURING  THE  WAR 

per  cent  of  tlie  excess  profits  less  than  100,000  francs;  00  per 
cent  of  the  excess  profits  between  100,000  and  2rj0,000  francs; 
70  per  cent  of  the  excess  profits  between  250,000  and  500,000 
francs;  80  per  cent  of  the  excess  profits  greater  than  500,000 
francs. 

The  point  whicli  sliould  be  noted  is  that,  nnlike  the  experi- 
ence of  other  conntries,  tlie  inauguration  of  income  taxes 
in  France  has  succeeded  neitlier  in  efiualizing  the  burden  of 
taxation  nor  in  securing  the  necessary  revenue.  When  the 
income  tax  law  of  July  15,  1914,  was  passed,  it  was  estimated 
that  the  tax  would  return  about  80,000,000  francs  an- 
nually. For  the  year  1910,  however,  it  only  produced 
40.000,000.  As  a  result  of  a  reduced  exenijition,  etc.,  the  tax 
in  1918  produced  about  200,000,000;  in  England,  having  a 
population  but  sliglitly  larger  than  France's,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  same  kind  of  a  tax  produced  over  five  times  as  much.  Sim- 
ilarly the  Excess  Profits  Tax  in  France  annually  realized  but 
80X),000,000  francs,  while  in  England  the  same  tax  produced  be- 
tween 7,000,000,000  and  8,000,000,000— ten  times  as  much.  In 
comparing  these  two  conntries,  it  must  be  remembered  that  be- 
fore the  war  per  capita  taxation  in  both  were  about  the  same. 
Taking  into  consideration  all  the  different  taxes,  it  has  been 
estimated  that  taxes  incieased  in  England  2.77  times  during 
the  war,  but  in  France  only  1.14  times,  and  that  England 
raised  about  six  times  the  amount  of  money  during  the  war 
by  means  of  taxation  that  France  raised.  For  the  financial 
year  ending  t)ecember  31,  1919,  the  direct  taxes  in  France 
yielded  733,970,000  francs;  claims,  however,  had  been  issued 
for  1,135,578,400  francs.  Thus  the  Government  failed  to  col- 
lect nearly  400,000,000  francs. 

The  reason  for  the  failure  of  personal  as  opposed  to  real 
taxation  in  France  is  found  partly  in  the  character  of  the 
French  business  man.  He  resents  bitterly  any  interference 
with  his  accounts,  especially  by  the  Government.  Few  French- 
men, it  must  be  admitted,  were  scrupulously  honest  in  com- 
piling their  returns.  Many  laborers  refused  outright  to  pay 
tlie  tax,  saying  it  was  an  outrage  to  tax  men  wth  an  income 
as  low  as  $000  when  the  wealthy  were  getting  off  almost  for 
nothing. 

The  evasions  of  the  excess-profits  tax  were  as  numerous  as 
those  of  the  income  tax, — perhaps  more  so,  because  evasion 

503 


CONTEMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

was  easier.  Companies  might  invest  their  profits  in  lands 
and  other  property,  thus  escaping  the  tax.  This  caused  con- 
siderable speculation  and  several  subsequent  failures.  It  was 
notorious  that  many  large  munition  firms,  notably  the  Hotch- 
kiss  company,  escaped  their  share  of  the  burden. 

Furthermore,  the  income  tax  had  been  enacted  just  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.  There  was  no  organized  administration 
for  its  collection.  Mobilization  and  concentration  on  war 
activities  prevented  the  Govennnent  from  establishing  such  a 
system.  The  war  also  upset  the  incomes  of  perhaps  the 
majority  of  the  people  so  that  it  was  an  impossibility  accur- 
ately to  estimate  what  these  incomes  would  be. 

The  failure  of  these  taxes  led  the  Government  to  resort  to 
credits,  bond  issues  and  indirect  taxes  for  the  greater  part  of 
its  revenue.  Only  about  one  fifth  of  the  financial  resources  of 
the  French  Government  were  raised  by  taxation.  As  a  result 
of  this  loan  and  credit  policy,  the  note  issues  of  the  Bank  of 
France  increased  from  6,000^000,000  in  1914  to  33,000,000,000 
in  1918;  and  the  amount  was  increasing  even  in  1919. 
This  naturally  inflated  values  and  was  the  main  cause  of  the 
high  cost  of  living.  It  should  be  added  in  defense  of  the 
French  policy  that  the  war  was  being  fought  on  French 
soil.  England  was  not  being  invaded  and  its  industries  were 
not  being  destroyed :  it  could  resort  to  direct  taxes.  But  in 
France  one  tenth  of  the  country  was  actually  being  devastated 
and  the  whole  nation  was  living  in  momentary  fear  of  attack. 
Consequently,  the  Government  felt  justified  in  alleviating  the 
immediate  financial  burdens  which  burdensome  direct  taxes 
would  impose. 

The  failure  of  the  personal  taxes  led  many  elements  in 
France,  among  them  Le  Temps,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  to 
demand  the  abolition  of  the  income  tax  and  the  return  to  the 
Four  Direct  Contributions.  Francois  Marsal,  in  numerous 
articles  (see  Revue  Politique  et  Tarlementaire,  January  10, 
1920),  advocated  a  similar  program.  Ujion  his  appointment 
as  Minister  of  Finance  in  the  Millerand  Cabinet,  it  is  inter- 
esting to  note  that  he  at  once  became  indefinite  in  his  plans 
to  return  to  the  old  system  whose  injustice  had  been  recog- 
nized in  every  country  which  had  tried  it.  In  one  of  his 
first  speeches  to  the  Chamber,  M.  Marsal  said  that  for  the 
present  he  would  continue  the  financial  policy  of  M.   Klotz, 

504 


FRENCH  TAXATION  DURING  THE  WAR 

M.    Clemenceau's    Finance    Miniator.      Although     Klolz    had 
planned  to  retain  the  old  taxes  as  well  as  to  institute  some 
new  ones,  such  as  a  tax  on  business  fij^ures,  he  relied  for  the 
greater  part  of  the  1920  budt^et  upon  loans. 
His  estimate,  made  in  January,  1920,  follows: 

Francs 

Ordinary  expenditures   17,801,140,000 

Kxi)enditures  arisiiij;  from  hostilities,  etc...,       7,508,083,055 
Expenses    for    reconstruction,    pensions,    etc., 

but  which  are  recoverable  from  Germany..     22,089,597,500 


Total  in   round  numbei-s 47,500,000,000 

M.  Klotz  planned  to  meet  only  the  ordinaiy  expenditures  of 
17,801,140,000,  by  taxation.  M."  Marsal  indeed  will  do  well  if 
he  can  come  up  to  his  standard,  for  the  ordinary  revenue 
assured  for  1920  amounts  but  to  9,308,000,000  francs,  leaving 
a  deficit  of  8,493,000,000  francs  which  must  be  met  by  taxa- 
tion. It  was  M.  Klotz's  idea  to  raise  the.  amounts  necessary 
for  the  extraordinary  expenditures  from  loans,  in  the  hope 
of  eventually  recouping  the  sums  from  Germany  by  the  pay- 
ment of  the  indemnity.  Even  if  this  hope  is  realized  even- 
tually, France  still  has  a  tremendous  problem  on  its  hands  in 
meeting  the  deficit  in  the  ordinary  expenditures,  amounting, 
as  we^  have  seen,  to  over  8,000,000,000  francs.  The  1914 
budget  was  only  5,000,000,000;  the  1920  ordinary  budget  is 
17,000,000,000;  and  although  the  depreciation  of  values 
will  account  for  part  of  this  diffei-ence,  the  conclusion  seems 
inevitable  that  the  French  Govennnent,  accustomed  to  the 
huge  expenditures  of  war,  has  become  extravagant  in  financing 
its  ordinary  activities. 

The  reticence — it  may  be  the  impossibility — of  France  to 
adopt  a  plan  of  taxation  which  would  place  a  greater  burden 
upon  its  taxpayers,  was  one  of  the  reasons  that  the  Allied 
Governments  would  not  consider  the  proportional  division  of 
war  indebtedness  among  thetnselvos.  They  believed  it  would 
be  grossly  unfair  to  level  additional  taxes  npon  their  own 
citizens  who  ah-eady  were  being  taxed  more  heavily  than 
Frenchmen, — to  relieve  the  latter  of  their  burdens.  Although 
this  argument  was  of  weight  as  far  as  the  ordinary  govem- 

505 


CONTEIMPORARY  FRENCH  POLITICS 

mental  expenditures  were  concerned,  it  bad  less  bearing  wben 
tbe  matter  of  strictly  war  expenses  was  considered.  But  tbe 
fact  still  remains  tbat,  not  only  from  tbe  standpoint  of  inter- 
national support,  but  from  tbat  of  ber  own  internal  economy, 
France  nuist  soon  bend  every  effort  to  free  berself  from  tbe 
vicious  policy  of  loans  wliicb  at  tbe  present  time  merely  accen- 
tuates, if  it  does  postpone,  financial  difficulties. 


INDEX 


Action  Franqaise  (see  also  Or- 
leanist  party,  Press,  Journal- 
ism, Charles  Maurras,  Phi- 
lippe VTTI,  Leon  Daudet),  14, 
15,  110,  183,  274,  275,  276- 
278,  280,  289,  406,  461,  469, 
479,  480,  491 

Action  Francaisc,  Liguc  d',  8, 
11,   132,   187,   196 

Action  Liberale  PopuJaire. 
See  Liberal  Action  party, 
IxaUies   Catholicism,    278 

Action  Eepublicaine  ct  Sociale, 
group   of    (1920),  204 

Adjoints,   379,   387 

Administration.  See  Centraliza- 
tion, Decentralization,  De- 
partment, Prefect,  Region- 
alism 

Agricultural  classes.  See  Peas- 
ants 

Alcoholism,    144,   242 

Allemane,  33,  91 

Alliances  (see  also  "Old  Di- 
plomacy," Balance  of  Power, 
League  of  Nations),  424,  447, 
469,  494 ;  policy  of,  207,  426- 
428  ;  inconsistency  of  proposed 
American  -  British  -  French, 
173,  448,  462,  463 

Almereyda,  death  of,  273 

Alsace-Lorraine,  17,  152,  194, 
198,  203,  265,  311,  374,  403, 
404,  410,  411,  416,  421,  457, 
459,  463,  497;  League  of  Pa- 
triots and,  16;  attitude  of  So- 
cialists toward,  100;  appoint- 
ment of  bishops  in,  13,3 ;  re- 
sults of  1919  elections  in, 
192;      demands     regionalism. 


392-394;  needs  Gorman  coal, 
418 

Americans,  French  opinion  of, 
XV,  473;  attitude  of,  toward 
France,  472 

Amette,   Mgr.,   188 

"Amical"  associations,  352, 
353,  356,  364 

Amiens,  Socialist  Congress  of 
(1914),  91 

Amnesty  demanded,  251,  253, 
261,  263,  266,  352 

Amsterdam,    Socialist    pact    of 

(1904),  35,  81,  91,  94,  102,  107, 
123,  178 

Andrieux,  Louis,   148 

Anticlericalism.  See  Catholic- 
ism, Radical  and  Radical  So- 
cialist party 

Anti-Semitism,  13,  234,  278- 
280,   282 

Arago,  Francois,  199,  205 

Arrondissement,  (see  also  Scru- 
tin,  Electoral  reform)  ;  152, 
375,  386,  387,  390,  396,  397; 
government  of,  378 

Articles  Separes,  429 

Artois,  Count  of,  403 

Assembly'.  See  Chamber  of  De- 
puties,  National   Assembly 

Assistance,  social,  377,  397, 
399 

Associations,  law  of,   1901,  350 

Aubriot,    Paul,    177,    178 

Aulard,   Professor,   189 

Authority,  French  respect  for, 
viii 

Bainville,  Jacques,  13,  278,  452, 

453,   483,    485 
Bakunin,   125 


507 


INDEX 


Balance  of  Power,  426-428,  434, 
435,   418,   463,   465 

Ballot.  See  Elections,  Electoral 
reforms,  SuflFrage 

Barbusse,  Henri,  287 

Barres,  Maurice,  280,  408,  468; 
President  of  League  of  Pat- 
riots, 16-18;  advocates:  fam- 
ily vote,  151,  annexation  of 
Rhine,  173,  410-411,  415,  465; 
regionalism,  395,  399 

Barthe,   382 

Barthelemy,  Joseph,  199;  cited, 
73,  222,  369 

Barthou,  Louis,  63,  90,  160,  172, 
173,   174,  205 

Bataille,  482 

Bebel,  35 

Benoist,  Charles,  24,  158,  173, 
362,  410,  465 

Birth  rate  {see  also  Depopula- 
tion), French  and  German 
compared,   150,  409 

Bismarck,  201,  407,  470 

Blanc,  Alexandre,   100 

Blanquism,  33,  35 

Bloc  National  Repnhlicain 
(1919),  formation  of,  179; 
composition  of,  180;  program 
of,  180;  bourgeois  opposition 
to,  187-190 

Bloc,  of  Left  (1900-1906),  22; 
origin  of,  80;  relation  of 
members  to  each  other,  84- 
87;  dissolution  of,  82-84 

Blum,  Leon,   120 

Bolshevism,  {see  also  Kienthal, 
Zimmerwald,  Loriot  faction, 
Internationale),  105,  106, 
120,  123,  127,  128,  129,  139, 
165,  177,  178,  179,  186,  190, 
206,  209,  210,  262,  275,  286, 
295,  339,  457,  476,  487;  de- 
feated in   1919  elections,  195 

Bon,  Jean,  133,  148 

Bonapartism  {see  also  Napo- 
leon T,  Napoleon  III,  Prince 
Napoleon,  Victor  Napoleon), 
9-11;  in  Assembly  of  1871,  5; 
fear  of,  232 


Bonds,  international  {see  also 
Cost  of  War,  Indemnity), 
advocated  as  a  means  of 
equalizing  War  Debt,  440, 
441 

Bonnet  Bouge,  273,  277 

Bonsoir,   296,   297 

Bordeaux,  Henri,  13 

Bordeaux,  Socialist  Congress  at 
(1917),   103-105 

Borct,  Victor,  67,  205,  266,  326, 
344,  367 

Boucheron,  Louis,  cited,  376, 
377 

Bouffandeau,  M,  163 

Bouillon,  Franklin,  32,  136,  173, 

175,  197,  457 
Bouilloux-Lafont,  441 
Bouisson,  M,  258 
Boulanger,  General,  16,  80,  153, 

233,  234,  498 

Boulangism,  fear  of,  233 

Bouniols,  Gaston,  cited,  155 

Bourbons.  See  Count  of  Cham- 
bord,  Legitimists 

Bourgeois,  Leon,  58,  199,  433, 
96;  relation  of,  to  Radicals, 
32,  136;  Ministry  of  (1895), 
28,  80,  87,  225;  demands 
strong  League  of  Nations, 
449,  451 

Bourget,  Paul,  13 

Bourses  du  Travail,  238,  346, 
351,  355,  366 

Brackc,   M.,   41,   103,   163,   16^ 

176,  178 

Briand,  Aristidc,  34,  42,  56,  57, 
87,  95,  134,  137,  207,  277; 
ministries  of,  58,  63,  74,  88, 
96,  102,  225,  298;  and  Fede- 
ration of  Left,  89;  and  So- 
cialists, 36,  82,  186;  de- 
mands: electoral  reform,  159, 
164;  "woman  suffrage,  148; 
eight-hour  day,  248;  part  in 
1919  elections,  184-186 

Bribery,   154 

Brisson,  Henri,  28,  80 

Brizon,  M.,  100,  105,  195,  287, 
300 


508 


INDEX 


Broglio,  dc,  388 

lirousse,  E.,  202,  322 

Brousse,   I'aul,   33,   34 

Budget  (sec  also  Bouzicmes 
provisoircs) ,  375,  378,  396, 
398;  control  of,  by  I'arlia- 
nient  lost  durinfj  war,  75 ; 
1920  and  1914,  302,  505 

Buffet,  Andre,  234 

Bureau  of   1920  Chamber,  199 

Bureaucracy  {sec  also  Func- 
tionaries, State  Socialism), 
inefficiency  of,  299,  302-313, 
321,  338 

Buyat,  Louis,  158 

Cabinet.     See  Ministry 

Cachin,  Marcel,  98,  107,  255, 
256,  258,  285 

Caillaux,  Joseph,  Ministry  of, 
63,  83,  160,  225;  Minister  of 
Finances,         90 ;  charges 

against,  83,  90,  235;  relation 
to  Radicals,  32,  135,  196; 
part  in  1919  elections,  136 

Calmette,  Gaston,  109,  135,  281 

Cambon,  Victor,  187 

Camelots  du  Roi,    15 

Canton,  375,  386;  government 
of,  378 

Carnot,  Adolphe,  26,  179,  180 

Carnot,  President,   64 

Casimir-Perier,  M.,  64,  220,  388 

Castleneau,  General,  197 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  403 

Catholicism  (see  also  Liberal 
Action  party,  Rallies),  187, 
278,  279,  412,  499;  attitude 
of,  toward :  Republic,  5,  Wo- 
man Suffrage,  147;  Radicals 
oppose,  30,  134,  178,  196; 
policy  of  "pacification"  to- 
ward, 134,  186;  educational 
demands  of,  19,  189,  207; 
part  of  clergy  in  elections, 
188 

Cavaignac,  General,  233 

Cavour,   10 

Censorship  of  press,  251;  based 
on    State    of    Siege    law    of 


1849,    292;    method    of    oper- 
ation    of,     293 ;      complaints 
against,    294-298 ;    repeal    of, 
299 
' '  Center ' '  of  Chamber,  9 
Centralization     in     government 
(see    also    Department,    Pre- 
fect,    Administration),     220, 
361,    373-383;    of   public    ser- 
vices,   302,    313;    history    of, 
384-389;   defense  of,  400 
Centrists.     Sec   Socialist    party 
Chamber    of    Agriculture,    346 
Chamber  of  Arts  and  Manufac- 
tures, 346 
Chamber  of  Commerce  (see  also 
Regionalism),     396;      official 
nature  of,  344;   grouping  of, 
345,   367 
Chamber  of  Deputies  (see  also 
Parliament,      Political      par- 
ties),      362;       how      elected 
165-169;      control     of,     over 
government,     64-69;      during 
war,    69-76;     1914    Chamber, 
193;       1920      Chamber:      by 
parties,   193,  by  groups,  204, 
by    profession,     193 ;     future 
policy  of,  206-208;  bureau  of, 
199 
Chardon,   Jules,   cited,   158 
Charpentier,   A.,   cited,   30,   84, 

85,  235 
Chastenet,  M.,  101,  131 
Chaumet,  Charles,  12,  132,  173, 

179,    197 
Chavenon,  Leon,  295,   296 
Cheradame,    Andre,     187,    282, 

476,  487,  491 
Chicago   Tribune,  297 
Church.     Sec   Catholicism 
Clarte,  366 

Class  struggle  (see  also  Social- 
ism), doctrine  of,  37,  99,  113, 
123,  186,  237;  attitude  of 
French  toward,  .39,  130,  366; 
given  up  in  Sacred  Union,  94 
Claveille,  M.,  63,  264,  344 
Clemenceau,  Georges,  7,  67,  68, 
77,    80,    137,    172,    173,    174, 


509 


INDEX 


179,  182,  186,  188,  189,  196, 
215,  346,  256,  257,  258,  274, 
277,  280,  283,  287,  296,  299, 
352,  446,  457,  469,  505;  life 
of.  Appendix  A;  Ministries 
of,  63,  82,  185,  203,  206,  225, 
266,  344;  attitude  of,  toward: 
Socialists,  68,  104,  League  of 
Nations,  433,  electoral  re- 
form, 61,  89,  158,  162;  and 
Eadical  party,  28,  32,  83, 
136;  assassination  attempt- 
ed, 109;  <?efeated  for  the 
Presidency  (1920),  199-201; 
weakness  of  201,  500 

Clementel,  M.,  (see  also  "Con- 
sortiums"), 63,  196,  197,  199, 
323,  327,  345,   367 

Clericalism.     See  Catholicism 

Coal  resources  of  European 
nations,  417;  needs  of 
France,  249,  418;  amount  in 
Saar  basin,  419 ;  German  coal 
needed  by  Alsace-Lorraine, 
418;  Treaty  provisions  con- 
cerning, 456,  458 

Cochin,  Denys,  58,  96, 

Collectivism  (see  also  State  So- 
cialism, Nationalization), 
242,  243 ;  and  individualism, 
xiii ;  advocated  by :  Radicals 
30,  Socialists,  llS" 

CoUiard,  M.,   196,  248 

Combes,  Emile,  23,  32,  58,  81, 
96,   134,  136 

Commissions,  parliamentary,  71- 
73;  of  inquiry,  71;  control  of 
government  by,  during  war, 
71,  73 ;  how  chosen,  53 

Committee,   Secret,   73 

Commune,  212,  385,  386,  389; 
government  of,  379-381 ;  in- 
creased powers  of,  advocated, 
382,  390;  of  1871,  126,  390, 
497 

Compere-Morel,  M.,  41,  52,  98, 
107,  258,   286 

Comto,  Auguste,  388 

"Concentration,"  policy  of,  79, 
80 


Concordat,    133 

Confederation  GeneraJc  du  Tra- 
vail (see  also  Labor,  Strikes, 
Syndicalism),  20,  61,  82,  245, 
335,  351,  355,  356,  371,  470; 
organization  of,  237;  attitude 
of,  toward  war,  16,  239;  Mi- 
nimum Demands  of,  240-243 ; 
adherence  of  bourgeoisie  to, 
366 ;  diffidence  of  peasants  to- 
ward, 366 

Congress  of  Vienna,  403,  416 

Conseil  de  Prud'hommes,  141 

Conservatism  (see  also  Progress- 
ism),  7,  81;  wins  in  1919 
elections,  208 

"Consortiums,"  policy  of  (see 
also  Importations,  State  So- 
cialism), 196,  316;  resulted 
in :  state  monopoly  of  indus- 
try. 322,  increased  prices, 
324-326;  attempts  to  con- 
tinue policy  after  war,  327; 
protests  against,  320-328, 
332 

Constant,  Benjamin,  372 

Constitution  of  1875  (see  also 
Parliamentary  government, 
Separation  of  Powers),  214; 
a  modus  viveiidi,  216;  em- 
bodies two  theories  of  gov- 
ernment, 215,  217,  222; 
amendment  of,  227;  uncon- 
stitutional laws,  227;  demand 
for  changes  in,  vii 

Corbiere,  386 

Cost  of  Living  (sec  also  Food 
control,  "Consortiums," 
Boret),  67,  243,  263,  266; 
rise  of  prices,  245;  effect  of, 
on  Labor,  244,  246;  partly 
caused  by  government  policy, 
324-326 

^ost  of  War  (see  also  Bonds, 
Tndpuniity),  division  among 
"  r'es  advocated,  437;  now 
:;;lls  on  France,  437;  Stern 
and  I^afont  plans  of  division, 
440-442;  eflfect  of  division  on 
U.  S.,  442 


510 


INDEX 


Cottin,  Emile,  attempts  to  assas- 
sinate Clenienceau,  101;  trial 
of,  109 

Council,  of  War,  127,  177,  264, 
273;  general,  198,  375-378, 
379,  389,  396,  398 ;  of  the  ar- 
rondissement,  198,  378,  379, 
387,  396,  398;  of  the  com- 
mune, 379-380,  387,  388,  389, 
396,  398;  of  Ministers,  57, 
396;  Regional,  397,  398,  399 

Count  of  Chambord,  5,  6,  9, 
215 

Count  of  Paris,  5,  9,  11 

Croix,  281,  469 

Custine,  412,  413 

Danzig,   173,  410 

Daudet,  Leon  (editor  deputy), 
15,  132,  187,  212,  277,  278, 
287,  289 

Debates,  parliamentary.  See 
Interpellations 

Debidour,  A.,  cited,  6,  403,  408 

Debt,  national,  203,  437 

Debt,   war.      See   Cost   of   War 

Decentralization  (see  also  Ke- 
gionalism),  339,  340,  390; 
characteristics  of,  357;  de- 
mand for,   13,   24,   302,   348 

Decrees,  regulating  drinking 
places,  144;  in  regard  to 
State  of  Siege,  69 

Defeatism,   99,   273 

Delahaye,  Jules,  151,  258 

Delahaye,  M.,   165 

Delcasse,  M.,  57,  499 

Democracy,  lack  of  training  for, 
381,  401 

Democratic  Republican  Alli- 
ance, 25,  49,  84,  132,  178, 
186,  202,  204,  205,  206; 
founding  of,  8,  9;  moderate 
and  anti-socialistic  program 
of,  26,  138;  organization  of, 
26 ;  strength  of,  26 ;  relation 
of,  to  Bine  of  Left,  83,  86; 
to  Bloc  Natinnal  HepuhJieain, 
179,  ISO,  189;  leaders  of,  27; 
future  of,  133,  197 


Democratie  Nouvelle  (newspa- 
per), 43,  183,  213,  223,  256, 
275,  282,  297,  476 

Democratic  Nouvelle,  party  of, 
43,  178,  187,  227,  282,  361, 
367 

Department,  153,  383,  385,  386, 
388,  391,  .392,  397,  398;  gov- 
ernment of,  374-378;  increase 
in  powers  of,  advocated,  390, 
401 

Departmental   Commission,   378 

Depopulation  (see  also  Father's 
Vote),  150-151;  efforts  to 
overcome,  150;  effect  of,  on 
peace  demands,  409-410 

Deputies.  See  Chamber  of  De- 
puties 

Deroulcde,  Paul,  18 ;  founds 
League  of  Patriots,  16;  at- 
tempts co^l2J  d'etat,  234 

Dcsehanel,  Paul,  27;  President 
of  Chamber  of  Deputies,  93, 
96,  199,  227,  423;  advocates 
decentralization,  394,  395 ; 
President  of  the  Republic, 
200,   201-202 

Desclaux,  135 

Desmartres,  P.  F.,  cited,  34 

Dessoye,  M.,  162,  164 

Dictatorship  (see  also  Bonapar- 
tism,  Boulangism),  232-235; 
of  the  proletariat,  114,  118, 
120,  123,  243,  261,  300 

Diplomacy,  the  "Old."  See 
"Old  Diplomacy" 

Diplomatic  service,  instability 
of,  310-311 

Direct  Action.  See  Strikes, 
Syndicalism 

Directory,  the,  386,  414,  415 

Disarmament  (sec  also  Three- 
year  military  law),  of  Ger- 
many, 422-424,  425,  449,  454; 
Raynaud  resolution  asking 
for  total  disarmament  of,  227, 
423 ;  as  attempted  by  Napo- 
leon in  1808,  429-430;  in 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  448-449, 
459-461;  America's  inconsist- 


511 


INDEX 


ency  in  regard  to,  485-486; 
in  France,  advocated,  32,  120, 
124,   184,  241,   251,  462 

Dissident  Socialists,  177,  178, 
196 

Dissolution,  right  of,  {see  also 
Parliament),  70,  219-220,  222, 
235 

Doumergue,  M.,  89,  96,  134,  135, 

Douziemes  provisoires  {see  also 
Budget),  75-76 

Dreyfus  affair,  80,  82,  234 

Broit  du  Peuple,  101,  131 

Drunkenness.     JSee  Alcoholism 

Dubost,   Antonin,   199,  439 

Dufaure,  Jules,  59 

Dugage,  R.,  49,  151 

Duguit,  Leon,  230,  343,  369; 
denies  existence  of  sovereign- 
ty, 358 ;  advocates :  syndical 
organization  of  State,  359, 
professional  representation, 
362;  cited,  69,  75,  159,  161, 
182,  216,  218,  341,  362 

Duke  of  Orleans.  See  Orlean- 
ist  party,  Philippe  VIII 

Dumay,  Henri,  348 

Dumont,  Charles,  88 

Dupuy  Cabinet,  225 

Echo  de  Paris,  280,  294,  311, 
410,  453,  464,  475,  481,  491 

Economic  Council,  241;  organi- 
zation of  (1919),  347-348 

Education  {see  also  Schools), 
343,  344,  357,  366,  370,  375, 
397,  398 

Eight-hour  day  law,  183 ;  advo- 
cated by  C.  G.  T.,  241,  246- 
247;  passage  of,  248;  effect 
of,  249 

Election  laws  {see  also  Elec- 
toral Law  of  July  12,  1919), 
v;  concerning  bill  pasting, 
181-182 

Elections:  1898.  80;  1902,  81; 
1906,  81-82;  1910,  83;  1914, 
92;  1919,  72-198;  issues  of, 
175;  results  of,  192-198; 
1920,     of     Senate,     198-199; 


Presidential,  200-202;  sup- 
plementary, 85,  162,  165, 
170;  influence  of  govern- 
ment on,  154-155;  part  of 
clergy  in,  188;  charges  of 
corruption  in,  154;  of  local 
oflScials,  375;  fewness  of, 
381-382;  minority  control  of, 
157 

Electoral  law  of  July,  1919, 
provisions  of,  165-169 ;  effect 
of,  on  parties,  169-171;  as- 
sisted in  formation  of  the 
Bloc,  190-192;  reduced  Social- 
ist seats,  194-195 

Electoral  reform.  See  Elec- 
toral law  of  July,  1919, 
'  *  Father 's  vote, ' '  Family 
vote.  Proportional  represen- 
tation, Scrutin  d'arrondisse- 
ment,  Scrutin  de  liste 

Electoral  system  {see  also  Scru- 
ti7i  d'arrondissement  and 
Scrutin  de  liste),  84-85,  165- 
169,  198,  361 

Emergency  legislation,  74-75 

Encyclical,  Papal,  of  1892.  See 
Bailies 

Engerand,  Fernand,  11 

Enqucte  sur  la  Monarchic,  Or- 
leanist  "Bible,"  13 

Entente  Democratique  et  Soci- 
ale,  parliamentary  group,   88 

Esmein,  Adhemar,  146,  157,  216 

Eugenie,  5,  10 

Europe  Nouvclle,  164,  319,  445, 
476;  and  censorship,  293-294; 
praise  of  President  Wilson, 
470-471 

Excelsior,  149 

Executive  power.  See  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic 

Experts  in  government,  43,  343, 
349,  368-369;  existence  of,  in 
France,  343-348;  extension 
of,  demanded,  348 

Extreme    Left.      See   Socialists 


Family  vote,  as  a  memorial  to 
sons  killed  in  war,  18,  151 


512 


INDEX 


"Father's  Vote,"  as  reward 
for  large  families,  149,  151 

Faure,  F61ix,  64 

Faure,  Paul,  120,  124,  286 

Federation  of-  the  Left  (1914), 
90 

Feminism,  See  Woman  suffrage 

Ferry,  Jules,  1,  22,  80 

Figaro,  135,  281,  481 

Finances,  state  of,  in  1919,  203, 
504;   control  of,  75 

First  of  May,  243;  history  of, 
250;  demands  made  on,  251; 
celebration  of  (1919),  252- 
257 ;  sequel  of,  257-260 

Fiume,  207,  273,  480,  485 

Flandin  Bill.  See  Woman  suf- 
frage 

Floquet,  Charles,  28,  250 

Foch,  General,  197,  297,  410 

Food   control,   314-316 

Ford  Automobile  "affair,"  330 

Forge,  Anatole  de  la,  16 

"Four  Direct  Contributions" 
{see  also   Taxration)    31,   501 

France,  political  forces  in,  i, 
ii,  iii,  iv,  vi,  viii,  ix;  move- 
ments for  reform  in,  v,  vii, 
xi,  xii,  337;  opinion  of,  as  to 
the  Treaty,  xiii,  xiv;  as  to 
America,  xv 

France,  Anatole,  270,  276,  366, 
469 

France  Libre,  106,  286,  453 

Franchise.     See  Suffrage 

Freedom  of  opinion,  in  France 
and  America,  compared,  372, 
299-301 

Freedom  of  the  press  {see  also 
Censorship),  290 

French  Federation  of  Socialist 
Workingmen,  33 

Freycinet,  Charles,  58,  96 

Fullerton,  Wm.  Worton,  cited, 
254 

Functionaries  {see  also  Bureau- 
cracy), 264,  341;  number  of, 
in  France,  311;  organization 
of,  349,  352;  right  to  form 
syndicates    denied,    82,    351, 


353;  salaries  of,  244,  353, 
355;  "Revolt"  of,  355;  join 
C.  G.  T.,  355;  and  decentral- 
ization of  puV)lie  services,  442, 
357;  "status"  of,  22,  351 


Gabriac,  Marquis  de,  467 

Gambetta,  Leon,  7,  27,  80,  153, 
215 

Gaulois,  280,  281 

Gauvain,  Auguste,  281,  469 

General  Councils.  See  Councils, 
general 

General  Strike  {see  also  Strikes, 
Syndicalism),  advocated: 

1906,  85;  1914,  93;  1919, 
262;   principle  of,  236,  268 

Germany,  207,  215,  233,  273, 
284,  297,  329,  400,  404,  435, 
467;  attitude  of  Socialists  to- 
wards, 122;  fear  of,  by 
France,  402,  405,  446,  461, 
472 ;  dismemberment  of,  de- 
manded 281,  406-410,  425; 
exclusion  of,  from  League, 
447 

Gide,  Charles,  366,  442 

Goblet,  28 

Gohier,  Urbain,  279,  295,  478, 
479 

Gorce,  de  la,  cited,  155,  388 

Government,  forms  of,  in 
French  history,  63 ;  instabil- 
ity of,  56 ;  parliamentary,  in 
France,  48 ;  criticisms  of,  56- 
69  ;  contrasted  with  American 
form,  214;  centralization  of, 
373,  383;  lack  of  local,  381- 
382,  401;  history  of  local, 
384-389;    inefficiency   of,   302 

Grevy,  Jules,  64,  217,  498 

Groups,  parliamentary  {see  also 
Action  Bepitblicaine  et  So- 
cialc,  9 ;  Independents,  Re- 
publican Democratic  Entente, 
Republican  Democratic  Left), 
professional,  368;  nominate 
Commissions  of  Cliamber,  53- 
54;   lack  of  relationship  with 


513 


INDEX 


political  parties,  45,  48-53 ; 
weaknesses  of  system  of,  55, 
56;  makes  parliamentary  re- 
gime unstable,  56-64;  permits 
Parliament  to  tyrannize  over 
ministry,  64-69;  in  the  1920 
Chamber,  204,  205 

Guarantees,  French  insistence 
on,  in  Peace  Treaty,  173,  175, 
402,  405,  406,  446,  454,  471, 
491 

Guerin,  Jules,  234 

Guerre  Sociale,  95 

Guesde,  Jules,  239 ;  pioneer  of 
French  Socialism,  33,  34,  35; 
and  Sacred  Union,  57,  58,  94, 
95,  96,  103 

Guilbeaux,  M.    (Socialist),   127 

Guyot,  Yves,  advocates  dismem- 
berment of  Germany,  408 


Habeas  corpus,  absence  of,  108 

Habert,  Marcel,  234 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  cited,  5,  33, 
41,  216,  373,  388,  390,  404 

Harbors,  State   control  of,   308 

Hauriou,  Maurice,  defends  cen- 
tralization, 400;  cited,  341, 
373,  375 

Haussonville,  d',  388 

Haute-Vienne  motion  (see  also 
Socialist  party),  97 

Hennessy,  Jean,  363,  371,  375, 
392,  395,  396 

Herriot,  Edouard,  32,  136,  137, 
138,  145,  198;  cited,  302,  381, 
383,  391 

Herve,  Gustave,  283,  284,  482; 
antimilitarism  of,  85 ;  deser- 
tion of  Marxism,  95,  101,  137, 
272 

Heure,  288,  311,  469 

High  Court  of  Justice  (see 
also  Senate),  136,  225,  234 

TTomme  Libre,  283 

Hugo,  Victor,  advocates  annex- 
ation of  Rhine,  410 

TTumanite,  98,  107,  112,  274, 
75,   285,   294,  457,   469,   489 


Humbert,  Charles,  273 
Hyndman,    H.    M.,    cit«d,    390, 
433 

"Idealism,"  American  {see 
also  United  States),  charges 
against,  xv 

Ignace,  M.,  179,  205 

Importations,  prohibition  of, 
317,  328;  complaints  against, 
329;  repeal  of,  335-336 

Income  tax,  31,  83,  89,  115, 
134;  passage  of  (1914),  60; 
rates  of,  502;  evasions  of, 
503 

Indemnitv  (see  also  Cost  of 
War,  Bonds),  203,  436;  why 
the  Treaty  provisions  were 
unsatisfactory,  443-446 

Independents,  group  of  (1920), 
204 

Individualism,  2-3;  effect  of, 
on  politics,  76-78;  as  an  ob- 
stacle to  Socialism,  xiii,  37- 
40,  366 

Industry,  control  of  by  state. 
See  also  ' '  Consortiums, ' ' 
State  Socialism 

Information,  295-296 

Institutmirs,  (see  also  "Ami- 
cal ' '  associations) ,  organiza- 
tion of,  351-352,  357;  adhere 
to  C.  G.  T.,  356 

Interests,  representation  of,  in 
government.  See  Professional 
Representation 

International  military  force, 
advocated  by  France  (see  also 
League  of  Nations),  449-453 

International  Workingmen's 
Association.  See  Interna- 
tionale 

Internationale,  First,  125;  Sec- 
ond, 126;  attempted  Session 
of,  during  War,  103;  confer- 
ence of  Berne  (1919),  126; 
French  Socialists  adhere  to 
(1919),  128;  withdraw  from 
(1920),  210-211  ;  Third,  125; 
origin  of,  at  Moscow  (1919), 


514 


INDEX 


127;      debates     in     Socialist 

party   as   to    adherence,    120- 

128 ;  Straasburg  decision,  209- 

211 
"Internationale,"         Socialist 

hymn,  253-254,  255 
Interpellations,  rules  governing, 

65-67;  abuses  of,  67-68 
"  Intransigeants, "  27,  79 
Invasions,    of    1815,    402;    of 

1870,   403 
IsSre,  97,  101,  106,  189 

Jacobins,  27 

Jacques,  Leon,  cited,  3,  5,  18, 
19,  22,  50,   228,  362   • 

Jaur^s,  Jean,  34,  81,  82,  112, 
248,  285,  286;  as  a  reformist 
34-35,  138;  founds  French 
Socialist  party,  36;  attempts 
to  resurrect  Bloc  of  Left,  90 ; 
assassination  of,  in  1914,  93, 
108 

Jerome,  Prince,  5,  9,  10 

Jerrold,  Laurence,  cited,  80 

Jeune  Bepuhlique,  7,  22 

Jews.    See  Anti-Semitism 

Jeze,  Gaston  (professor),  cited, 
342,  373,  375,  385 

Joan  of  Arc,  17,  277 

Joinville,  Prince  of,  11 

Jonnart,  M.,  185 

Jouhaux,  Leon,  secretary  of  the 
C.  G.  T.,  239,  240,  255,  264, 
266,  482 ;  resigns  from  French 
peace  delegation,  257 

Journal,  276 

Journal  des  Debats,  207,  281, 
469 

Journal  du  Peuple,  110,  287 

Journal  Officiel,  65,  204,  309, 
310,  336,  345 

Journalism  (see  also  Press,  Cen- 
sorship), political  nature  of, 
270;  instances  of  corruption 
in,  272-274;  personal  element 
in,  271;  suppression  of  news, 
275 

Judiciary.  See  Habeas  Corpus, 
Justice,  Supreme  Court 


Justice,  French,  defects  in,  108- 
110 


Kienthal,    Socialist    Conference 

at  (191G),  100,  195,  287 
Kienthalians.       Sec      Socialist 

party 
Klotz,     Louis,     ex-Minister     of 

Finance,  63,  90,  154,  158,  203, 

280,  504 

La  Bruycre,  130 

Labor  (see  also  Confederation 
Generate  du  Travail,  Strikes, 
Eight-hour  day),  368;  wages 
of,  244,  246,  353;  organiza- 
tion of,  20,  237-239,  365 

Labor  Legislation  (see  also 
Eight-hour  day) ,  advocated 
by:  Radicals,  31,  Liberal  Ac- 
tion party,  34,  91,  Socialists, 
116,  C.  G.  T.,  242 

Labor  parly,  34,  91 

Labor  Union  (see  also  Confede- 
ration Generate  du  Travail), 
237,  238,  241,  250,  350 

Lafferre,  M.,  63,  197,  199 

Lamennais,  383 

Land.     See  Peasants 

Landru  case,  275-276 

Lanterne,  282 

Laval,  M.,  195 

Le  Gleo,  M.,  91 

Le  Play,  388 

League,  Civic,  61,  162,  180 

League  of  Nations  (see  also 
International  military  force, 
Indemnity,  Disarmament)  ; 
32,  173,  241,  243,  277,  410, 
477,  488,  490,  494;  principle 
of,  432;  French  conception 
of,  xiv,  448;  ob.iections  to  the 
form  created,  452,  463;  So- 
cialists and,  117,  122;  finan- 
cial section  demanded,  26, 
438-443,  445 

League  of  Professional  Eepre- 
sentation  and  Regional  Ac- 
tion, 44,  61,  362,  393,  395 


515 


INDEX 


League  of  Proportional  Eepre- 
sentation,  44,  61,  158 

League  of  the  Eights  of  Man, 
44,  61,  295 

Ledru-Kollin,  27,  154 

Lefevre,  Andre,  34,  174,  199, 
202,  205,  423 

Left  Bank  of  the  Rhine,  annex- 
ation demanded,  18,  173,  207, 
279,  410-414,  425,  429,  431; 
occupation  of,  454,  456,  462, 
464,  493 

"Left"  of  Chamber,  9,  203 

Legitimists  (see  also  Count  of 
Chambord),  5,  9 

Lemaitre,  Jules,  13 

Lenoir,  M.,  273 

Leo  XIII,  Pope,  6,  7 

Leopold  I,  10 

Leroy,  Maxime,  369 ;  theory  of 
the  State,  359-361 ;  founder 
of  the  Ligue  des  Gouver7ies, 
348;  cited,  316 

Leygues,  M.,  63 

Leyret,  Henry,  cited,  212,  225 

Liberal  Action  party  (see  also 
Catholicism,  Bailies,  7,  9, 
132,  134,  179,  180,  189,  204, 
206,  228,  280,  371;  history  of, 
8,  18;  religious  and  social 
program  of,  18-20,  207;  or- 
ganization of,  20 ;  strength 
of,  21;  future  of,  133;  gains 
in  1919  elections,  193,  196 

Liberals,  7,  453,  472 

Lichtenberger,  Andre,  284 

Ligue  d' Action  Franqaise,  See 
Orleanist  party.  Action  Fran- 
qaise 

Ligue  des  Gouvernes,  44;  advo- 
cates decentralization  of  pub- 
lic services,  348 

Ligue  des  Hommes  Litres,  44 

Ligue  des  Patriotes,  16,  399 

Ligue  Nationale  cantre  I'Alco- 
olisme,  144 

Longuet,  Joan,  41,  54,  121,  173, 
177,  194,  195,  210;  grandson 
of  Karl  Marx,  97,  107;  editor 
Populaire,     106,     274,     275; 


leader  of  ex-majoritaires,  98, 
100,  107,  113,  286 

Loriot  faction  (Socialist),  41, 
106,  114,  119,  124,  125,  195, 
209 

Loubet,  Emile,  27,  64,  234 

Loucheur,  M.,  63,  205,  331,  335, 
344 

Louis  Philippe,  5,  9,  387 

Louis   XIV,   64,   384,   385,   416 

Luxemburg,  Eosa,  35 

Lyautey,  General,  74 

Lyons,  trade  fair  at,  331;  con- 
trol of,  by  central  govern- 
ment, 380 

Lysis,  187,  282;  founds  New 
Democracy  party,  43;  advo- 
cates professional  representa- 
tion, 361;  cited,  2,  244,  312, 
313,  361 

MacMahon,    Marshal,    64,    70, 

216,  217,  220,  389 
Maginot,  M.,  88 
Maine,  Sir  Henry,  220 
Maistre,  Joseph  de,  172,  212 
Majoritaires     (Socialists),     97- 

106,  177,  285,  286 
Malvy,    Louis,    135,    234,    240, 

351 
Mandel,  Georges,  182,  280,  296, 

297 
Mangin,  General,  27 
Marin,  Louis,  173,  175,  311,  395 
Marsal,  Francois,  202,  504-505 
Martignac,  M.,  387 
Martin,  Henri,  16 
Martin,  Senator,  148 
Marx,    Karl,    33,    34,    97,    107, 

237,  274,  365 
Mascuraud,  Senator,  334 
Matin,  276,  298,  473,  476,  488, 

491 
Maupassant,  Guy  de,  4 
Maurras,   Charles,   13,   15,   132, 

277,  289,  406,  479 
May  Day.     See  First  of  May 
Ma'yeras,  M.,  54,  98,  195,  255 
Mayor,    French,   380,   383,   385, 

386,  387,  388,  389 


516 


INDEX 


M61ine,   Jules,    22,    23,   24,    68, 

80,  9G 
Merchant  marine,  309;   govern- 
ment    operation     of,     during 
war,  315-316 
Merrheim,   M.,  99 
Mounicr,  I'aul,  298,  299 
Militarism.      See    "Old    Diplo- 
macy, ' '  Iniporialism 
Millerand,  Alexandre,  28,  34,  35, 

41,  52,  57,  90,  95,  137,  202, 
343,  493,  504;  member  of 
Republican     Socialist     party, 

42,  203;  policy  of,  as  Prime 
Minister  of  1920  Cabinet, 
202,  203 

Millerand  "Case"  {see  also 
Socialist  x>arty),  34-35 

Minister  of  State,  58 

Minister  without  portfolio,  57 

Ministerial  instability,  56 ;  num- 
ber of  changes  under  Third 
Republic,  59 ;  compared  with 
England,  59 ;  causes  lack  of 
Cabinet  leadership,  60;  leads 
to  dominance  of  Parliament 
over  Ministers,  64;  group  sys- 
tem, a  cause  for,  54-56;  ex- 
aggeration of  the  defects  aris- 
ing from,  61-64 ;  overcome  by 
permanent  functionaries,  62; 
and  by  public  opinion, 
76-78 

Ministerial  ' '  participation, ' ' 
Socialist  opposition  to,  37, 
123,  258;  changed  attitude 
during  war,  94-96,  104 

Ministerial  responsibility,  60, 
220-222,  223,  224,  226,  230, 
342,  358,  374 

Ministry,  dependence  of,  on 
Parliament,  60 ;  reconstruc- 
tion of,  62 ;  members  not  ne- 
cessarily members  of  Parlia- 
ment, 202,  222 ;  composition 
of,  during  the  war,  57,  94,  96, 
104 ;  power  of,  over  adminis- 
tration, 340-342;  over  local 
government,  374;  Millerand 
(1920),  202 


Ministry  of  the  Interior,  59, 
272,  374,  379,  393,  398 

Minorilaires  (see  also  Socialist 
party)  ;  98-106,  285,  299 

Mirabeau,  cited,  158 

Mistral,  Prederic,  394,  395 

Mistral,  M.,  41,  98 

Monarchists.  See  Orleanist 
party.  Legitimists,  and  Bona- 
partists 

Monattc,  Pierre,  240 

Monis  Government,   86,   160 

Monoj)olies,  State.  See  State 
Socialism,  Nationalization 

Monroe  Doctrine,  Prench  inter- 
pretation of,  483-485 

Montesquieu,  214,  227,  372 

Morality.  See  Alcoholism,  Pros- 
titution, Bribery 

Muel,  Leon,  cited,  59 

Multiple  voting.  Sec  Family 
vote,  ' '  Father  's  vote ' ' 

Mun,  M.,  6,  18 

Murat,  Prince,  197 


Nancy      program,      regionalist 

(1865),     388,     394;     Radical 

(1907),  29 
Napoleon  I,  9,  19,  232,  373,  385, 

388,  407,  415,  416,  417,  430, 

458 
Napoleon   III.   5,   10,   155,   216, 

233,  387 
Napoleon,  Prince,  10 
Napoleon,  Victor   (sec  also  Bo- 

napartists),  9 
National  Assembly  (1871-1875), 

3S8,   497;    parties  in,   5,   55; 

monarchical  majority  in,  215; 

effect  of,  on  constitution,  216 
National  Assembly,  to  elect  the 

President    of    the    Republic, 

200,  219;   to  amend  the  Con- 

titution,  227 
National    Association    for    the 

Organization    of    Democracy, 

44,  223,  228,  371 
National   Association   of   Econ- 
omic Expansion,  333 


517 


INDEX 


National  Federation  of  Func- 
tionaries, 61,  352 

National  Socialists.  See  Ee- 
publican  Socialists 

Nationalists,  9 

Nationalization  (see  al^o  Rail- 
roads, Socialism,  Syndical- 
ism), 115,  120,  138,  183,  225, 
242,  338,  370,  499 

New  Democracy,  party  of.  See 
Beinocratie  Nouvelle 

New  York  Herald,  297 

Newspapers.  See  Press  and 
Journalism 

Notre  Voix,  288-289 

Nusellard,  Major,  296,  297 

Octroi,   243,   349 

(Euvre,  188,  283,  310,  335, 
482 

Ogg,  F.  A.,  cited,  226 

' '  Old  Diplomacy, ' '  principles 
of,  405,  406,  425,  431,  435, 
446,  450,  454,  465 

"Opportunists,"  27,  79 

Ordre  Public,  11,  28 

Organization,  law  of  (1884), 
350,  352,  353 ;  industrial,  nec- 
essary to  professional  repre- 
sentation, 360,  364,  368;  ex- 
tent of,  364-368 

Orleanist  party  (see  also  Phi- 
lippe VIII,  Action  Fran- 
^aisc),  9,  11,  234;  in  Assem- 
bly, 1871-1875,  5;  demands  an 
absolute  monarchy,  12-13;  so- 
cial and  religious  program  of, 
6,  14,  361-362,  399;  organiza- 
tion of,  15;  strength  of,  15- 
16,  future  of,  132 

Ostrogorski,  M.,  139 

"Pacification,"    policy  of,    79, 

80 
Painlcve,  Paul,  42,  63,  104,  189, 

197,  203 
Pams,    Jules,    63,    87,    88,    162, 

164,  258,  259 
Paris,  Count  of.     See  Count  of 

Paris 


Parliament  (see  also  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  Senate  groups. 
Political  parties)  ;  dominance 
of,  over  Ministry,  64-69 ;  per- 
manent commissions  of,  53, 
71-73;  sessions  of,  69,  161, 
181,  199;  during  the  war, 
69-76;  never  dissolved  since 
1877,  70,  222;  political 
groups  in,  48,  204 

Parliamentary  form  of  govern- 
ment (see  also  Ministerial  in- 
stability), as  distinct  from 
the  congressional  form,  46, 
214,  224,  230;  parties  neces- 
sary to,  47,  139;  difference 
between  French  and  English 
system,  53,  57,  60,  70;  de- 
fects in  French  system,  56, 
213,  228;  unfair  criticisms 
of,  61-64;  changes  in,  during 
the  war,  69-76 

Parti  Socialiste  de  France,  35 

Parti  Socialiste  Frangais,  35 

Parties.     See  Political  parties 

Pau,  Eadical  Congress  (1913), 
50,  89,  134,  206 

Pays,  283,  482 

Peace  Conference  (see  Treaty 
of  Versailles,  Indemnity,  In- 
ternational military  force), 
122,  276,  286,  299,  404,  415, 
423,  434,  468 

Peace  Treaty.  See  Bonds,  In- 
demnity, International  mili- 
tary force,  Saar,  League  of 
Nations,  Treaty  of  Versailles 

Peasants,  growth  in  number  of, 
38;  attitude  of,  toward  So- 
cialism, 37-40;  attempted  or- 
ganization of,  366,  367 

Perot,  Eaoul,  199 

Personality  in  politics,   76-78 

Pertinax.      Sec    Echo    de   Paris 

Petit  Journal,  276 

Petit  Parisien,  276,  316,  438- 
439,  476 

Phedon.    See  Populaire 

Philippe  VIII  (see  also  Orlean- 
ist party),  11-12,  14,  132,  278 


518 


INDEX 


Pichon,  Stephen,  63,  133,  207 

Piou,  M.,  IS,  132 

Plebiscitdircs,  9 

Poincure,  Raymond,  27 ;  Minis- 
try of,  63,  84,  87,  160;  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  (1913- 
1920),  58,  88,  93,  221;  elected 
to  Senate  (1920),  198;  quot- 
ed, 404-405;  cited,  222 

Political  parties  {see  also  Bona- 
partists,  Liberal  Action  party. 
New  Democracy  party,  Or- 
leanist  party,  Progressists, 
Democratic  Republican  Alli- 
ance, Republican  Socialists, 
Socialist  party)  ;  multiplicity 
of,  1-8,  370;  philosophies  of, 
i;  organization  of,  15ff;  their 
relation  to  Parliament,  48-56; 
their  combinations:  Bloc,  80- 
87,  Sacred  Union,  93,  future 
realignments,  131-140;  effect 
of  electorial  reform  on,  169- 
173 

Pope  (see  also  Leo  XIII),  19, 
22,  189,  203,  207 

Populaire,  105,  274,  275,  286- 
287 

Possibilists,  33 

Post-Office,  French,  305 

Prefect  (sec  also  Department), 
259,  293,  298,  383,  384,  386, 
388,  390,  396,  403;  powers  of, 
374,  379 

Prefectoral  Council,  375 

President  of  the  Republic,  227, 
374,  375,  380;  election  of, 
200,  219;  term  of,  219;  a 
"parliamentary  clerk,"  218, 
220-222;  movement  to  in- 
crease powers  of,  19,  201,  223- 
224 ;  obstacles  to  such  an  in- 
crease, 232-235;  election  of 
M.  Deschanel  1920,  200-202 

Press  (see  also  Journalism,  Cen- 
sorship), ix;  individualism 
of,  271;  charges  against,  272- 
275 ;  does  not  reflect  opinion 
accurately,  271,  289 ;  Royalist 
press,    276-278;    Conservative 


press,  278-281 ;  Liberal  press, 
282-284;  Socialist  press,  284- 
289;  legal  restrictions  on, 
290-299 

Prcssc  do  Paris,  183 

Pressemanne,  M.  (Socialist), 
98,  100 

Prime  Minister,  difficulty  of  se- 
lecting, 57 

Prince  Imperial,  5 

Private  enterprises,  obstacles  to 
(see  also  State  Socialism), 
312-313,  321,  337 

Professional  representation,  24, 
43,  358;  advocated  by:  Lysis, 

361,  Benoist,     362,     Duguit, 

362,  Liberal  Action  party, 
19,  362,  Orleanists,  13,  361- 
362;  principle  of,  362;  syndi- 
cal  organization  necessary, 
for,  360,  364,  368;  defects  in, 
368-372 

Programs,  political.  See  Poli- 
tical Parties 

Prog  res  Civique,  335 

Progressism,  81 

Progressist  party  (see  also  Re- 
publican Federation),  22,  179, 
204 ;  formation  of,  23 ;  con- 
servative program  of,  23, 
228 ;  opposed  by  Bloc  of  Left, 
81,  178,  180;  organization  of, 
24;  strength  of,  23;  future 
of,  133;  gains  in  1919  elec- 
tion, 193,  196 

Proportional  division  of  school 
funds.    See  Schools 

Proportional  representation 

(see  also  Electoral  law  of 
July,  1919),  134;  agitation 
for,  19,  22,  24,  83,  11.5,  156; 
parliamentary  attempts  to  en- 
act, 158-161;  principle  of, 
166-168,  194;  effect  of,  on 
political  parties,  169-171 

Prostitution,  145,  473 

Proudhon,  cited,  267 

Public  opinion,  231;  control  of, 
over  deputies,  78 ;  supreme 
under  parliamentary  form  of 


519 


INDEX 


government,  47,  231;  hin- 
drances to  exercise  of,  in 
France,  70;  in  United  States, 
231,  492 

Question,  the  parliamentary,  65 
Questor,  199 

Radical    and    Radical    Socialist 
party,  9,  50,  60,  119,  162,  175, 

179,  184,  187,  200,  203,  204, 
205,  235,  333,  339,  443;  his- 
tory of,  8,  27,  28;  Anticler- 
ical and  collectivist  program 
of,  29-32,  138;  organization 
of,  32;  Congresses  of:  Tours, 
87,  88,  Dijon,  30,  85,  Nancy, 

85,  Pau,  50,  89,   134,  Nimes, 

86,  Toulouse,  87,  September, 
1919,  178;  relation  to  Bloo 
of  Left,  84-87;  opposes  Pro- 
gressists, 89 ;  relation  to  Bloc 
National  Eeimblicain  (1919), 

180,  188;  demands  abolition 
of  three-year  military  law,  32, 
58,  89,  134;  lack  of  leaders 
in,  136 ;  divisions  of,  136 ;  fu- 
ture of,  134-137,  206;  defeat 
of,  in  1919  elections,  193,  195; 
newspapers  of,  282 

Raffin-Dugens,  100,  195,  300 
Railroads,    376;    State    v.    pri- 
vate, 303-305 
Bailies,  6,  133 
Referendum,  19,  22 
Reform,  organizations  of,  44 
Reformism,   doctrine  of,   7,  81, 

119 
Regional   Councils.     See  Coun- 
cils, regional 
Regionalism,   xii,   13,  383,  388; 
economic,  345 ;   principles  of, 
391-394;     proposed    bill    for, 
396-399;  obstacles  to,  399 
Reign  of  Terror,  386 
Reinach,  Joseph,  145,  280 
Rcnaudel,   Pierre,   97,   98,    106, 
107,   121,   177,   210,   274,   285 
Renoult,  Rene,  32,  197 
Reparations.    See  Indemnity 


Representation.  See  Profes- 
sional representation ;  Pro- 
portional  representation, 
Elections 

Republic.  See  Third  Republic, 
Parliamentary  form  of  gov- 
ernment 

Republican  Democratic  Alliance. 
See  Democratic  Republican 
Alliance 

Republican  Democratic  Entente, 
group  of   (1920),  204 

Republican  Democratic  Left, 
group  of  (1920),  204,  205 

Republican  Federation,  8,  9,  49, 
133,  138,  178,  179,  180 

Republican  Socialist  party,  9, 
51,  138,  178,  186,  189,  196, 
203,  204,  205;  history  of,  8, 
41-42 ;  difference  between, 
and  Radicals  and  Radical-So- 
cialists, 42-43 ;  prominent 
members  of,  42;  strength  of, 
43;  future  of,  137;  relation 
of,  to  the  Bloc  of  the  Left, 
87 

Republicans  of  the  Left  (see 
also  Democratic  Republican 
Alliance),  193,  196,  200,  204, 
205 

Bepublique  Susse,  295 

Revanche,  16,  233,  411,  472 

Revisionism.    See  Reformism 

Revolution,  French,  12,  27,  113, 
360,  377,  412,  413,  498;  effect 
of,  on  administrative  system, 
385;  of  1848,  27,  141,  154, 
387 

Revolution,  Social  {see  also 
Socialism,  Syndicalism,  Lo- 
riot  faction),  demanded,  113, 
118,  127,  128,  182,  241,  287, 
288;  attitude  of  France  to- 
ward, 130,  183,  290,  366 

Rhenish  Republic,  history  of 
former,  412-415;  creation  of, 
advocated,  412,  415,  425 

Rhine.  See  Left  Bank  of  the 
Rhine 

Ribot,    Alexandre,   22,    24,   57, 


520 


INDEX 


58,   59,   63,   92,   95,   96,    104, 

395;     advocates    division    of 

war  debts,  439 
Ricard,  27,  153 
"Right"  of  Chamber,  9,  178 
Eire  de  Paris,  474 
Roanne  Arsenal  Scandal,  307 
Rochctte  Case,  71,  90,  135 
Rolland,  Remain,  366,  469 
Rouher,  5 

Rouvicr  Cabinet,  80,  81,  83,  225 
Royalists.       See     Bonapartists, 

Orleanist    party,    Legitimists 
Russia.     See  Bolshevism 

Saar,  annexation  demanded, 
416,  425,  429,  454,  488;  his- 
tory of,  416;  population  of, 
421;  coal  in,  294,  417,  419; 
Treaty  terms  concerning,  456- 
459 

Saarbruck,   412,   416,   417 

Sabatier,  Paul,  cited,  7 

Sacred  Union,  94,  169,  185,  190 

Sadoul,  Jacques,  177,  195 

Saigon  bamboo  case,  309 

Sailliens,  E.,  cit«d,  142 

Sarrail,  General,  189,  197 

Sarrien,  M.,  28,  63,  81 

Saumonneau,  Mme.,  120 

SccHp,  Georges,  484 

Schools,  24,  division  of  funds 
for,  advocated,  20,  189;  lay, 
advocated  by  Radicals,  89 

Scrutin  d'arrondifisement  (see 
aho  Electoral  law  of  July, 
1919) ;  as  an  election  district, 
152;  "gerrymandering" 

features  of,  155 ;  defects  in, 
153 ;  abolition  of,  165 

Scrutin  de  listr,  24,  29 ;  trial  of, 
in  1885,  153;  advantages  of, 
156;  legislative  efforts  to 
enact,  158-161;  adoption  of, 
1919,  162-169 

Secret  Committee.  Sec  Commit- 
tee, Secret 

Secret  press  funds,  272 

Sembat,  Marcel,  34,  41,  94,  98, 
173,  469 


Senate  (sec  also  United  States 
Senate),  362;  method  of  elec- 
tion, 198,  218;  as  a  High 
Court  of  Justice,  136,  225, 
234;  control  of,  over  Minis- 
try, 225;  attitude  of,  toward 
electoral  reform,  160,  164- 
165;  conservatism  of,  224; 
movement  to  strengthen  in- 
fluence, 224 ;  existence  of,  in- 
consistent with  parliamentary 
government,  225;  election  of, 
1920,  198 

Separation  of  Powers,  govern- 
ment based  on,  180;  differ- 
ence between,  and  parliamen- 
tary government,  214-215, 
218,  219;  advocated  in 
France,  223-229;  defects  of, 
231-232,  235 

Siegfried,  M.,  145 

Sillon,  7,  8,  21-22,  108 

Socialism  (see  also  Socialist 
party,  Class  Struggle,  State 
Socialism,  Republic  Socialist 
party),  7,  208;  history  of,  in 
France,  33ff. ;  doctrines  of, 
37,  112-119,  121-125,  236 

Socialist  party  (Unified),  (see 
Pact  of  Amsterdam,  Jean 
.Taures,  Dissident  Socialists, 
Ministerial  "participa- 
tion"),  9,  51-52,  138,  176, 
177,  178,  184,  186,  191,  192, 
204,  205,  300,  333,  335, 
339,  357,  371,  433,  470; 
formation  of,  8,  33-36; 
growth  of,  40;  seeks  peasant 
support,  37-40 ;  relation  of,  to 
Bloc  of  Left,  36;  organiza- 
tion of,  40;  strength  of,  36; 
antimilitarism  of,  92-93 ;  fu- 
ture of,  137,  206;  adheres  to 
the  Sacred  Union,  94-95;  the 
first  break  in  the  Sacred  Un- 
ion, 97,  98  ;  origin  of  the  Kien- 
thalians,  99-100;  of  the  mino- 
ritaires,  98 ;  of  the  majori- 
taires,  98;  of  the  Centrists, 
98 ;    struggles   between   these 


521 


INDEX 


factions,  98-107;  victory  of 
the  mmoritaires,  106-107;  at- 
titude toward  Villain  trial, 
110;  1919  program,  a  com- 
promise between  imnoritaires 
and  mnjoritaires,  112-119, 
243;  distinction  between  rev- 
olution and  violence,  113; 
political  and  economic  re- 
forms demanded,  115-118; 
Easter  Congress,  1919,  120- 
129,  176,  209,  211,  274,  275, 
285,  487;  motions  on  general 
policy,  121-125;  on  electoral 
discipline,  124;  victory  for 
radicals,  125;  adherence  to 
Second  Internationale,  128 ; 
Socialists  withdrawal  from 
the  Chamber,  257-258;  oppo- 
sition of,  to  Peace  Treaty, 
172-173,  175;  formation  of 
Bloc  against,  131-132,  137, 
179-181;  defeat  in  1919  elec- 
tions, 193,  196;  causes  of, 
194-195;  Strassburg  congress, 
February,  1920,  208-211; 
qualified  adherence  to  the 
Third  Internationale,  209 ; 
character  of  leaders  of,  41, 
184;  newspapers  of,  284-289 

Sorel,  Albert,  cited,  413 

Sorel,  Georges,  236,  365;  theory 
of  strikes,  237,  267 

Sous-prefet,  154,   278,  386,  390 

State  of  Siege,  law  of,  69,  75, 
94,   251,   259,   292,   298,   299 

State  Socialism  {see  also  ' '  Con- 
sortiums,"  Bureaucracy),  23, 
43,  115,  138,  186,  187,  196, 
281,  359,  372;  extent  of,  in 
France,  306,  338;  agitation 
against,  206,  333-338 

Steeg,  M.,  87 

Stern,  Jacques,  440 

Stockhold  question,  103,  126 

Strassburg,  Socialist  congress  at 
(1920),  208-211 

Strikes  (see  also  General 
strike),  354,  355;  causes  of, 
246,  260;  postal  (1909),  82; 


railway  (1910),  82;  news- 
paper (1919)  182;  political, 
260-263;    failure   of,   263-269 

Suffrage.  See  Woman  suffrage. 
Multiple  voting,  Electoral  re- 
form 

Supreme  Court,  with  power  to 
declare  laws  unconstitutional, 
advocated,  19,  24,  226-228; 
inconsistency  of,  with  parlia- 
mentary form  of  government, 
229    . 

Syndicalism,  (see  also  Confede- 
ration Generale  du  Travail, 
Sorel,  Georges),  theory  of, 
236,  261,  267;  difference  be- 
tween, and  Socialism,  236- 
237 

Syndicates,  238;  Christian,  20, 
365 

Tannery,  M.,  305,  306 

Tardieu,  Andrg,  173,  179,  205, 
281 

Taxation,  Appendix  B. ;  former 
system  of,  31,  501;  change  of 
basis  during  war,  502;  failure 
of,  to  provide  revenue,  503- 
504 

Taxes  (see  also  Income  tax), 
375,  378;  excess  profit,  115, 
502-503 ;  international  advo- 
cated to  pay  for  war  debt, 
442 

Telegraph  and  telephone  ser- 
vice, 305-306 

Temps,  162,  185,  186,  272,  280, 
294,  296,  331,  406,  469,  489, 
494 

Tery,  Gustave,  188,  283,  296 

Thierry,  88 

Thiers,  Adolphe,  10,  27,  64,  201, 
216,  404 

Third  Republic,  criticisms  of, 
212ff. ;  compromised  basis  of, 
217ff. ;  attempts  to  over- 
throw, 233-234 

Thomas,  Albert,  41,  96,  98,  102, 
104,  107,  137,  172,  175,  240, 
248,  307,  308,  339 


522 


INDEX 


Three-year  military  service  law, 
32,  58,  83,  89,  134 

Tirard  Cabinet,  225 

Tocquovillo,  do,  3 

Treason  trials,  273-274 

Treaty  of  Frankfort,  403-404 

Treaty  of  Versailles  (sec  also 
Left  Bank  of  Rhine,  Bonds, 
International  military  force), 
176,  177,  1<)7,  263,  295,  296, 
432,  436,  444,  494,  495;  com- 
promises in,  454-463 ;  ratifica- 
tion of,  by  Parliament,  54, 
172-175;  rejection  of,  by 
United  States,  231-232,  491- 
494 

Treitschke,  cited,  430 

Unified  Radicals  (sec  also 
Eadical  and  Radical-Socialist 
party),  51 

Unified  Socialists.  See  Socialist 
party 

Union  of  Commerce  and  Indus- 
try, 44 

Union  of  Economic  Interests, 
44,  334,  367-368,  371;  mem- 
bership of,  337;  anti-statist 
program  of,  337-338 

United  States,  294,  435,  445; 
part  of,  in  war,  474-475; 
ideals  of,  charged  with  im- 
practicability, 480-482,  with 
insincerity,  482-489 ;  responsi- 
bility of,  for  a  weak  League 
of  "Nations,  454,  465-466; 
failure  of,  to  assume  interna- 
tional obligations,  207,  491- 
494 

United  States  Senate,  rejection 
of  Treaty  by,  231 ;  attitude  of 
France  toward,  484,  491-492, 
494;  reasons  for  rejection, 
492 

Uzfes,  Duchesso  d ',  234 

Vague,  252,  287-288,  289,  290, 

486 
Valois,  Georges,  12 
Vandervelde,  Emile,  cited,  339 


Varenne,  Alexandre,  98,  107, 
158,  175 

Vaugcois,  Henri,  13,  277 

Verfeuil,  M.,  120,  121 

Veritc,  110 

Victoire,  95,  272,  273,  283,  482 

I'ictoire  Integrale,  425 

Victor  Emmanuel  II,  10 

Vie  Ouvrirre,  240 

VieiUe-France,  278-280,  475, 
476,  478,  479 

Vilgrain,  M.,  245,  315,  344 

Villain,  Raoul,  assassinates  Jau- 
res,  108;  acquittal  of,  109, 
285;  aids  Socialist  cause.  111 

Villele,  386 

Villey,  Edouard,  cited,  59,  302, 
362 

Viviani,  Rcn6,  12,  34,  36,  63, 
95,  96,  104,  108,  137,  148, 
172;  Republican  Socialist, 
42;  Ministry  of  (1914),  57, 
58,  59,  94 

Vizetelly,  E.  A.,  cited,  10 

Voix  du  Peuple,  239,  251,  252 

Vote  of  confidence,  66 

Waldeck-Rousseau,  23,  27,  34, 
81,  225 

War,  declaration  of  (1914),  69, 
93,  161;  Socialist  attitude  to- 
ward, 94,  122;  women  and, 
143 

War  debt.    See  Cost  of  War 

War  of  1870,  403,  411 

Weill,  Georges,  cited,  44 

Weiller,  Lazarc,  305 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  403 

Worth,  Leon,  17 

Wilson,  President,  240,  295,  447, 
453,  483,  485,  488,  489,  490; 
reception  of,  in  Paris,  468- 
471;  changed  attitude  to- 
ward, 472,  481 ;  personal  at- 
tacks against,  475-479 ;  suc- 
cess and  failure  at  Paris,  466 

Woman  suffrage,  y;  demanded 
as  reward  for  women 's  war 
work,  143;  also  to  aid  solu- 
tion of  moral  problems,  144; 


523 


INDEX 


arguments  against,  146;  leg- 
islative   activities    for,    147- 
149;   riandin  bill,  148 
Women,     French     attitude     to- 
ward. 142;  war  work  of,  143 


Zimmerwald,  Socialist  confer- 
ence at,  99 

Zevaes,  Alexandre,  cited,  35, 
85 

Zevort,  E.,  cited,  7,  16 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    001  139  414    5 

CENTRAL  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
University  of  California.  Saji  Diego 

DATE  DUE 


J  UN  1  6  1979 


JUN  1  9  1979 


CI  39 


UCSD  Libr. 


''^m 


